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Part One 
TRENDS IN THE LATIN AMERICAN ECONOMY IN 1983 
I. MAIN TRENDS 
Three salient facts basically characterized the economic evolution of Latin America in 1983. The first 
was the worsening of the crisis which had begun in 1981 and which by 1982 had attained dimensions 
unrecorded since the Great Depression of the 1930s. The second was the remarkable adjustment 
effort made by many economies of the region in order to reduce the radical imbalances generated in 
the external sector in preceding years. Lastly, the third was the exceptional contraction undergone for 
the second year in succession by the net inflow of capital and the similarly exceptional scale on which, 
in consequence, Latin America had to transfer resources abroad. 
1. The decline in internal economic activity and 
the increase in inflation 
In 1983, just as in 1982, the crisis affected almost all the countries of the region and was reflected in 
the deterioration of the main internal economic indicators. Thus, during the year the gross domestic 
product decreased, the employment situation went from bad to worse, and there was a marked 
speeding-up of the rate of inflation. 
It is estimated that Latin America's total gross domestic product was reduced by 2.9% in 1983, 
after having fallen by 1% in 1982 and increased by barely 1.5% in 1981. As a result of this further 
decline in economic activity and of population growth, the per capita product dropped by somewhat 
more than 5% in the region as a whole, decreasing in 16 of the 20 Latin American countries. 
This downturn, together with those registered in the two preceding years, meant that in 1983 
the per capita product was 9% lower than in 1980 and was equivalent to that recorded in 1977 
(see table 1). In effect, the retrogression in the real level of living was even greater, since per capita 
national income plummeted during the last three years by almost 13%, in consequence of the 
continuous and marked deterioration undergone in that period by the terms of trade and the 
considerable increase in net remittances of interest and profits. 
The decline in economic activity was accompanied, moreover, by rising trends in rates of urban 
unemployment and decreases in real wages in the majority of the countries for which relatively 
reliable data are available. 
Nevertheless, inflation spiralled rapidly, as had already happened in the three preceding years, 
and reached unprecedented levels. Thus, in the region as a whole the simple average rate of increase 
of consumer prices rose from 48% in 1982 to 76% in 1983, and the rate weighted by the population 
shot up still more steeply, from 86% in 1982 to 131% in 1983. Although these upward movements 
reflected a more or less widespread trend, they were preponderantly influenced by the particularly 
high rates of inflation recorded in some countries. Thus, in the course of 1983, price levels increased 
above fivefold in Argentina, were easily quadrupled in Bolivia, trebled in Brazil, more than doubled in 
Peru, jumped by 80% in Mexico and went up by over 50% both in Ecuador and in Uruguay. 
2. Reduction of the external imbalance 
The falling-off in most of the indicators for the domestic economy coincided, however, with a 
significant although very costly reduction of the external imbalance. Indeed, partly on account of the 
marked contraction in domestic levels of production and expenditure —which curtailed demand for 
imports and released goods for export— and partly owing to the adjustment policies applied in many 
countries during 1983, Latin America achieved an unprecedented surplus in its external merchandise 
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trade. In 1983 this trade, which up to 1981 had regularly shown deficits, but by 1982 had closed with a 
positive balance of qver US$ 8.4 billion, generated a surplus of nearly US$ 30 billion. 
This surplus was exclusively attributable, however, to a further spectacular drop in imports, 
whose value sank by 30%, after having decreased by 20% in 1982. This extraordinary reduction in the 
total value of external purchases of.goods was accompanied, as in 1982, by an almost equally marked 
diminution of their volume, which was at once an effect and a cause of the decline in domestic 
economic activity. In turn, despite the fact that the volume of exports of goods expanded by about 8%, 
their values fell by nearly 2 % in 1983, mainly1 as a result of the considerable increases in real exchange 
rates in a number of countries and, in many of them, the significant contraction undergone by 
domestic demand. 
Table 1 
LATIN AMERICA: MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS" 
1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 
Basic economic indicators 
Gross domestic product at market 
prices (billions of dollars 
at 1970 prices) 
Population (millions of 
inhabitants) 
Per capita gross domestic 
product (dollars at 1970 prices) 
Per capita gross national 
income (dollars at 1970 prices) 
Short- term economic indicator 
Gross domestic product 
Per capita gross domestic product 
Per capita gross national income 
Urban unemployment ratec 
Consumer prices 
Terms of trade (goods and services) 
Current value of exports of goods 
and services 
Current value of imports of goods 
and services 
External sector 
Exports of goods and services 
Imports of goods and services 
Trade balance (goods and services) 
Net payments of profits 
and interest 
Balance on current account 
Net inflow of capital 
Balance-of-payments position 
Official international reserves8 
Balance of disbursed external debt 
Total gross external debt 





























































































36.2 40.1 57.8 62.2 40.0 39.0 
1.7 24.1 -11.9 3.1 3.0 -7.7 
40.8 50.6 -5.7 15.1 18.1 9.9 
30.0 63.7 7.8 4.5 15.3 16.7 
Billions of dollars 
54.1 52.8 60.8 85.8 131.4 
5.1 4.2 -6.4 v -9.1 -8.6 
33.7 29.0 7.9 -10.1 -2.5 











































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
"All figures relate to the 20 countries appearing in table 13, except Cuba. Provisional figures. 'Percentages. 
'Weighted average rate for Buenos Aires, Cordoba, Mendoza, Rosario; Bogotá, Barranquüla, Medellín, Cali; México City, Guadalajara, 
Monterrey; Sanjosé, Costa Rica; Santiago, Chile; Lima, Perú; Montevideo, Uruguay. e Weighted average rate for the cities mentioned in 
footnote plus Rio de Janeiro, Sao Paulo, Belo Horizonte, Porto Alegre, Salvador and Recife. Variation from December ro 
December. *Plus monetary gold valued at London fine ounce prices, minus use of International Monetary FundCredir. Total 
gross external debt minus official international reserves. 
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On the other hand, the aforesaid decline in internal economic activity and the reduction of 
nominal interest rates in the leading international financial markets helped to bring down net 
payments of profits and interest in 1983, thus modifying the dizzy pace at which they had risen during 
the preceding years. In fact, the amount of remittances under these heads, which between 1977 and 
1982 had more than quadrupled, soaring from US$ 8.2 to US$ 36.9 billion, fell to a little under 35 
billion in 1983. 
As a result of the sizeable surplus obtained in merchandise trade, the decrease in remittances of 
profits and interest and the considerable reduction also undergone by net service payments, the deficit 
on current account abruptly sank from rather more than US$ 40 billion in 1982 to under 9-3 billion in 
1983. This was the lowest figure recorded since 1974 (see figure 1). 
The steep drop in the deficit on current account coincided with and was largely caused by a no 
less drastic contraction of the net inflow of capital. This inflow, which had already shrunk by 46% in 
1982, after having swelled to an all-time maximum of almost US$ 38 billion in 1981, diminished once 
again, but even more sharply, in 1983, when it barely amounted to US$ 8 billion. 
In these circumstances, and notwithstanding that the deficit on current account was so much 
smaller, the balance of payments closed with a deficit of US$ 1.25 billion. Although this was much 
lower than that of 20 billion recorded in 1982, it signified a further decrease in Latin America's 
international reserves. 
Likewise as a result of the decline in the net inflow of capital, the growth rate of the external 
debt slowed down for the second year in succession. Latin America's total external debt increased by 
8% in 1983, a rate a good deal lower than that of 12% corresponding to 1982 and far below the 
average of 24% recorded between 1978 and 1981. Even so, owing to the fall in the value of exports of 
goods and services and the real decrease in the gross domestic product, both the debt/exports 
coefficient and the debt/product ratio reached unprecedented figures in 1983. Although in 1983 the 
proportion of the value of exports of goods and services absorbed by interest payments slightly 
decreased, it remained very high (34.5%) in comparison with its levels in the past (see figure 1.) 
3. The contraction in the capital inflow and the 
real transfer of resources ' 
As mentioned above, in 1983 the net inflow of capital contracted sharply for the second year running. 
Its reduction was in fact so marked that in the end the amount it represented fell short of that of net 
payments of interest and profits. Accordingly, as in 1982, Latin America, instead of receiving a net 
transfer of resources from, abroad, transferred resources to the rest of the world. 
Moreover, this transfer amounted to very considerable sums: US$ 17 billion in 1982 and almost 
27 billion in 1983, i.e., figures equivalent to 16% and 24%, respectively, of the value of exports of 
goods and services. Looked at from yet another angle, the reversal of the direction of net financial 
payments which took place between 1981 and 1983 was equivalent to a deterioration of 
approximately 36% in the terms of trade. In the first of those years the positive difference between 
the net inflow of capital and payments of profits and interest added to the region's capacity to import 
by the equivalent of almost 9% of the value of exports of goods and services. In 1983, on the contrary, 
the negative difference between these two financial flows subtracted from the capacity to import the 
equivalent of 27% of external sales of goods and services. 
For an adequate assessment of what this figure means, suffice it to recall that the effective 
deterioration of the terms of trade during that period was about 16 %. Consequently, in relation to the 
capacity to import, the negative impact of the decline in the net inflow of capital and the increase in 
payments of interest and profits more than doubled the effects of the deterioration in the terms of 
trade. 
Thus the spectacular change in the direction of net financial flows was a decisive cause of the 
almost universal contraction in economic activity in Latin America and the difficulties encountered by 
some countries in the servicing of their external debt. Up to 1981 the region had received capital of 
'This topic is more fully analysed in Part Two of the present Survey. 
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Figure 1 
LATIN AMERICA: MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS 
Gross domestic 
"product3 
i I L 
Gross national income3 
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Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official data. 
aAnnual growth rate. ^Weighted annual average for cities mentioned in table 8. cWeighted 
average annual rate for cities referred to in t>, excluding cities in Brazil. "^Weighted percentage 
variation from December to December. 
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Figure 1 (Concluded) 
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which the gross amount substantially exceeded the sum total of amortization payments, investment 
abroad and remittances of interest and profits. During the period 1973-1981 this transfer of resources 
was equivalent on an average to 16% of the value of exports, which, in its turn, increased during the 
same space of time at an annual rate of about 20%. In these circumstances, Latin America was able to 
pay amortization and interest payments on its external debt and the profits accruing on foreign 
capital by means of the new loans and investment received year by year. 
As from 1979, however, the size of this net transfer of resources began to diminish, since the 
increases in the net inflow of capital were more than offset by the still greater increases in payments 
of interest and profits. This trend sharpened in the period 1982-1983, during which the slump in the 
net inflow of capital aggravated the negative effects of the international recession and forced a 
number of countries of the region to apply much more drastic adjustment policies than would have 
been necessary to cope with the effects of the recession alone. Thus, in 1983, owing to the procyclical 
behaviour pattern of the capital flows, Latin America had to settle most of its payments of interest 
and profits with resources deriving from the trade surplus or from the international reserves 
previously built up. Nevertheless, as has already been explained, because of the unfavourable external 
context, the trade surplus was not achieved by an increase in the value of exports —which would have 
had an expansionist effect on the economy— but had its origin in an extremely severe contraction of 
the volume of imports, which was the main cause of the decline in economic activity. 
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II. PRODUCTION 
1. The rate and structure of economic growth 
As already pointed out, in 1983 there was a sharp accentuation of the loss of dynamism that the Latin 
American economy had been showing during the two preceding years. After increasing by barely 
1.5% in 1981 —the lowest growth rate on record since 1940— and decreasing by 1% in 1982, the 
region's gross domestic product went down by nearly 3% in 1983 (see table 2 and figure 2). 
In consequence of this unprecedented decline in economic activity, the per capita product was 
reduced for the third consecutive year, but by a proportion (-5.2%) much higher than those recorded 
in 1981 (-0.9%) and 1982 (-3.3%). It was therefore 9% lower in 1983 than in 1980. 
The exceptional intensity of the retrogression in economic activity in the last three years was 
also reflected in the enormous decreases in the per capita product of many Latin American countries. 
During the period in question, it fell by 23% in Bolivia and 21% in El Salvador; 17% in Costa Rica; 
over 14% in Chile, Peru and Uruguay; between 12% and 13% in Argentina and Guatemala; and 
almost 11% in Brazil, Haiti, Honduras and Venezuela (see table 3). 
As in 1982, the falling-off in economic activity was, moreover, quite widespread. The gross 
domestic product dropped in 11 of the 19 countries for which comparable data are available, 
remained virtually static in El Salvador and Panama and increased very slightly in Colombia, 
Costa Rica and Haiti. Thus, only in Argentina, Nicaragua and the Dominican Republic did the 
growth rate of global economic activity exceed that of the population. In addition, in Cuba the global 
social product rose by about 5%2 (see table 2). 
Table 2 
LATIN AMERICA: EVOLUTION OF TOTAL GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT 




















































































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
"Provisional figures. Cumulative variations in the period. cAverage, excluding Cuba. Refers to total social 
product, eRefers to period 1971-1974. These data are not comparable with those for 1976-1983, for methodological 
reasons. 'Refers to 1976-1978. 
2 The concept of global social product used in Cuban statistics represents the sum total of gross production in the agricultural, industrial, 
mining, energy, transport, communication and business sectors. 
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Figure 2 
LATIN AMERICA: ANNUAL GROWTH RATES OF GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT 
1 9 8 1 - 8 3 
I I I 1 I I I I I I I I I I I I l I l I I I l I I I I I l i I I I I I I 
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Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official data. 
In contrast with what happened in 1982, however, the fall of the product in the region as a 
whole during 1983 was especially due to the very unfavourable evolution of productive activity in 
Brazil and Mexico, by far the two largest Latin American economies. 
In Mexico, the global gross domestic product, which had already slightly decreased in 1982, fell 
by 4.7%, while industrial production declined by more than 7% and construction was reduced by 
nearly 14.5 %. The chief causes of this sharp drop in economic activity were the drastic contractions in 
domestic demand and in the volume of imports, resulting from the restrictive policy applied by the 
government with a view to strengthening the balance of payments and bridling the galloping 
inflation which had begun to escape control in the preceding year. Although this policy succeeded in 
halving the swollen public-sector deficit recorded in 1982 and helped to generate an impressive trade 
surplus, it also brought about considerable reductions in fiscal expenditure, private investment and 
wages, with the consequent negative effects on domestic spending and on the level of activity. 
In Brazil, in its turn —a country which by itself generates about one-third of the region's total 
domestic product— global economic activity declined by over 3%, after having marginally increased 
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in 1982. As in Mexico, the decreases were very marked in manufacturing industry (-6%) and, above 
all, in construction (-19%), both of which sectors had remained at a standstill in 1982 and had 
undergone a contraction in 1981 (see table 4). This slump in economic activity, unprecedented in the 
country's evolution during the last half century, was decisively influenced by a further drastic 
reduction in the volume of imports and the severe cuts introduced in the public sector's investment 
programmes, as also by the growing uncertainty consequent upon the acceleration of the rate of 
inflation and the prolonged and toilsome negotiations conducted by the economic authorities with a 
view to rescheduling the external debt and signing a stand-by agreement with the International 
Monetary Fund. 
The decreases in the product were even bigger in Bolivia (-7.6%) and especially in Peru 
(-11.8%), two countries which in 1983 had suffered an unwonted combination of natural disasters, 
characterized by torrential rains and floods in certain regions and severe and long-drawn-out 
droughts in others. These catastrophes inflicted particularly severe damage on agricultural 
production, which was reduced by over 11 % in Peru and 22% in Bolivia. To these were added, in the 
case of Peru, a change in the ocean currents, by reason of which the results obtained in the fishing 
sector plummeted. In addition, economic activity was affected in both countries by exceptionally 
severe inflation and, in Peru, by the drastic contraction in the volume of imports. 
The situation was similar, although less serious, in Ecuador and Paraguay. In the former 
country, the domestic product declined by 3.3%, inasmuch as fishing, agriculture and industry in the 
coastal belt suffered the destructive effects of torrential rains, floods and tidal waves, and also because 
of the abrupt curtailment of the quantum of imports (-35%). 
Table 3 
LATIN AMERICA. EVOLUTION OF PER CAPITA 
GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT 












































Source: ECLAC, on rhe basis of offu 
"Provisional figures. 
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Table 4 
LATIN AMERICA: EVOLUTION OF GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT BY BRANCH OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITY 
(Growth rates) 
Agriculture . Manufacturing Construction Subtotal goods Basic services Other services 
quarrying 




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
°Provisional figures. Including mining and quarrying. c Referring to the social product concept. Including mining and metal working. 
'Excluding metalworking. Referring to business and other productive activities in the non-material sphere of the social product. 
In Paraguay, in its turn, economic activity decreased by 3.7 %, so that the downward trend which 
had made its appearance in the preceding year was sharpened. This further falling-off was decisively 
influenced by the contraction of almost 5% in agricultural production —which still carries a very 
great deal of weight in the economy as a whole— due to the heaviest rainfall and worst floods 
recorded in the country's recent history. The negative effects deriving from the evolution of 
agriculture were accentuated, in addition, by a 20% drop in the volume of exports and an even greater 
reduction in the quantum of imports. 
Trends in economic activity continued to be very unfavourable in Uruguay. After raising its 
level by 2% in 1981 and falling by almost 10% in 1982, the gross domestic product diminished by 
4.7% in 1983" As in the preceding year, particularly powerful determinants of this new decline were 
the adverse evolution of industrial production and construction —which decreased by 7% and 27%, 
respectively, after having undergone reductions of 17% and 14% in 1982— and the violent 
contraction once again occurring in the quantum of imports, which shrank by 26%, after having done 
so by 30% in 1982 and 14% in 1981. 
During 1983 the level of economic activity also fell in Venezuela, whose gross domestic product 
decreased by 3% —an all-time low for the period since the war. As the GDP had remained almost 
entirely at a standstill since 1978, the per capita product declined for the fifth year in succession, while 
the rate or urban unemployment rose, likewise for the fifth year running, and attained an 
unprecedented level of nearly 10%. As in other countries, two important causes of the decline in 
economic activity were the drastic contraction of imports —the volume of which was reduced by 
about 56%— and the increased uncertainty generated by the devaluation of the bolivar and the radical 
changes introduced in the exchange system, after a long spell during which a fixed exchange rate had 
been in force and complete freedom in exchange operations had prevailed. 
In Chile, in contrast, the headlong downward trend in economic activity which had started in 
mid-1981 and in 1982 had led to a drastic reduction of the gross domestic product by over 14% and to 
an equally spectacular rise in unemployment was to some extent attenuated in the course of 1983. 
Although activity continued to decrease during the first half of 1983, it subsequently showed signs of 
recovering slowly, through the operation of three factors: the expansion of public expenditure, the 
fall in real interest rates, and the greater degree of protection for activities competing with imports 
which was signified by the maintenance of a higher real exchange rate, the raising of the general tariff 
from 10% to 20%, and the establishment of higher special tariffs on imports of certain agricultural 
and industrial goods. Nevertheless, this recovery was not sufficient to offset the effects of the decline 
in economic activity during the first half of the year, and, consequently, the gross domestic product 
diminished by nearly 1% in the year as a whole. 
The recovery of economic activity was much more marked in Argentina. In this country, the 
product increased by 2.8%, thanks in particular toariseof about 10% in industrial production. Butas 
in the two preceding years global economic activity had declined by 11%, while the output of the 
manufacturing sector had fallen by almost 23% between 1979 and 1982, both the former and the 
latter were far from regaining their 1977 levels in 1983. 
In Colombia, on the other hand, the gross domestic product increased only very slightly (by 
0.8%) so that its growth rate slackened for the fifth year in succession. The main cause of the 
economy's loss of dynamism was the stagnation of industrial production. This was affected by the 
meagre expansion of domestic demand and by the decrease in exports to Venezuela and Ecuador, 
countries in which Colombian manufactures lost competitive capacity after the devaluations of the 
bolivar and the sucre. As a result of the decline in industrial production, and nothwithstanding the 
moderate increase in construction, the unemployment rate went up for the second year running in the 
main cities of Colombia, reaching an annual average of almost 12%, the peak figure for the last nine 
years. 
Trends in economic activity were likewise unsatisfactory in most of the countries of Central 
America, although as a general rule they were less unfavourable than in preceding years. Thus, the 
gross domestic product increased slightly in Costa Rica, after declining considerably for two years. 
The downward movement of economic activity was also interrupted in El Salvador, where the 
domestic product, which since 1979 had continuously and sharply decreased, was stabilized in 1983. In 
Panama, too, economic activity stagnated, after having expanded persistently and fairly rapidly since 
1978. In Guatemala, as in Honduras, the product fell for the second year in succession, although in 
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Table 5 
LATIN AMERICA: EVOLUTION OF TOTAL SUPPLY, DOMESTIC DEMAND A N D GROSS NATIONAL INCOME" 
Millions of dollars at 1970 prices Annual growth rates 
1. Total supply (2 + 3) 
2. Gross domestic product at market prices 
3. Imports of goods and services 
4. Exports of goods and services 
5. Available domestic supplies of goods and 
services (2 + 3 - 4) = domestic demand (6 + 7) 
6. Total final consumer expenditure 
7. Gross fixed capital formation 
8. Terms-of-trade effect 
9. Factor payments to rest of world 














































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official statistics. 
"Nineteen countries. Of the Caribbean countries, only Haiti and the Dominican Republic are included. 
Includes variation in stocks. 
Provisional figures. c Refers to the cumulative variation in the period. 
those countries the contractions in economic activity were slighter than in 1982. In contrast, the 
activity in question rose by over 5 % in Nicaragua, thus more than offsetting its modest decline in the 
preceding year. This growth was particularly influenced by the marked increment in agricultural 
production shown for the third year in a row, and by the recovery of construction and of 
manufacturing industry. 
Lastly, in 1983 economic activity increased by nearly 4% in the Dominican Republic and by 
somewhat more than 5 % in Cuba. In the former country, the growth of the product was based on the 
30% boom in mining —which thus almost offset its steep decline in the preceding year—, on an 
upswing of almost 15 % in construction —mainly due to the expansion of housing plans— and on the 
steady increase in agricultural production, which rose by about 4% for the third year in succession (see 
table 4). 
The 5% growth rate of the social product in Cuba, in its turn, stemmed mainly from a rise of 
almost 11 % in construction, a 7 % increase in business activity and communications and an increment 
of approximately 5 % in industrial production. The expansion of productive activity was facilitated by 
a relatively satisfactory supply of imports —of which the quantum rapidly mounted for the fourth 
year running— and by the progress made in global economic management and the greater autonomy 
granted to the units of production. 
2. Total supply and demand and domestic suplies of goods 
As in the preceding year, but to an even more pronounced extent, the economic crisis was reflected in 
1983 in highly unfavourable trends in the total supply of goods and services, which, after decreasing 
by about 3% in 1982, was reduced by over 5% in 1983, as the result of a 2.9% decline in the gross 
domestic product and a spectacular contraction —of nearly 30%— in the volume of imports of goods 
and services (see table 5). Owing to this exceptional curtailment of external purchases (ontopof that 
recorded in 1982) the import coefficient dropped from 12% in 1981 to barely 7.4% in 1983 —the 
Table 6 
LATIN AMERICA: RELATIVE SHARES OF COMPONENTS OF GROSS 














































































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
"Nineteen countries. Of the Catibbean countries, only Haiti and the Dominican Republic are included. 
Includes variation in stocks. ^Provisional figures. 
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Figure 3 
LATIN AMERICA: INDEXES OF GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT, 
INTERNAL SUPPLIES OF GOODS AND SERVICES, 
INVESTMENT, IMPORTS AND EXPORTS 
(1970 •-100) 
250 
Gross domestic product 
Imports of goods and services 
. — Exports of goods and services 
Internal supplies 










Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official data. 
1980 1983 
lowest proportion on record in the region since the war— while their volume fell below the level 
attained in 1974 (see table 6 and figure 3). 
Since in 1983 the slump in the volume of imports was accompanied by an almost 7% expansion 
of the quantum of exports, the decline in domestic supplies of goods was much greater than the 
decrease in the product. These supplies were reduced by 6.5% in 1983, after having contracted by 
about 3% in 1982. Thus, in the course of the last two years alone, the per capita internal supply of 
goods and services —which is, in the last resort, the determinant of the current and future level of 
living of the population— fell by over 13%. 
As was to be expected, and as can be clearly seen in figure 3, this decline had a particularly 
intensive impact on capital formation, which had enjoyed a period of thriving growth between 1970 
15 
and 1980, but, after increasing very little in 1981 and falling by 11 % in 1982, dropped by over 19% in 
1983. In consequence of these considerable decreases, the investment coefficient, which had been a 
little over 22% in 1981, was barely 16.5% in 1983. As in the case of imports, this coefficient too was 
the lowest in the last 40 years. 
Furthermore, during 1983 there was a break in the sharply rising trend which net external 
factor payments had been showing. After increasing rapidly in the second half of the 1970s and 
almost doubling between 1980 and 1982 alone, these payments decreased by nearly 4% in 1983. 
Nevertheless, since at the same time the gross domestic product also declined, they went on absorbing 
the same very high proportion of the product (3.4%) as in the preceding year. The heavy burden 
imposed on the economy by the exceptional increase in payments on foreign capital during the 
preceding years was likewise reflected in the fact that the proportion of the product which they 
represented in the two-year period 1982-1983 was almost three times as big as had been customary in 
the mid-1970s (see table 6). 
Lastly, just as in the two preceding years, the negative effects on national income produced by 
the massive net external factor payments were aggravated by the deterioration in the terms of trade. 
In these circumstances (as can be seen in table 6), the existing gap between the domestic product and 
national income continued to widen. 
III. EMPLOYMENT AND UNEMPLOYMENT 
Trends in the employment situation in 1983 evidenced the exacerbation of the crisis which the 
economies of the region had been suffering since 1981, and to which was superadded the impact of the 
adjustment policies applied to cope with it. Thus almost all the countries witnessed a decline in their 
levels of employment. In some of them it resulted in further increases in open unemployment rates, 
while in others the already high levels of unemployment recorded in 1982 persisted. 
1. Employment in industry 
As was to be expected, trends in employment in manufacturing industry largely reflected the 
variation in that sector's level of activity in 1983. In most of the countries there were simultaneous 
decreases in the levels of production and employment; employment in industry showed a rising trend 
solely in Argentina and Chile, the only countries in the group under consideration that experienced a 
recovery in the manufacturing sector in 1983.3 
Even in these two countries, however, the recrudescense of employment in industry was very 
slight, and did not suffice to offset the notable reductions recorded in the preceding years. Thus, the 
number of persons employed in the manufacturing sector in Argentina, which had fallen by about 
22% in 1981 and over 5% in 1982, rose by barely 3% in 1983. This meant that employment in the 
sector was still 30% below its 1977 level (see table7). 
Although the average level of employment in industry declined by 2.6% in Chile, the number of 
workers employed in this sector began to increase as from the second half of 1983 and by the end of 
the year reached a level almost 14% higher than that attained twelve months before. Nevertheless, 
owing mainly to the drastic reduction of almost 21% which occurred in 1982, employment in the 
manufacturing sector in 1983 was more than 20% lower than it had been at the beginning of the 
decade. 
According to the partial data available, employment in industry decreased moderately in Costa 
Rica (-2%) and Ecuador (-3.5 %)-4 But since these downward movements were the first to take place 
in the last eight years, in both countries employment in industry exceeded the levels reached in 1980. 
In the other countries the decreases in employment in industry were much more marked. The 
biggest occurred in Mexico, where employment in manufacturing contracted by over 8%, after 
having declined by almost 2.5 % in 1982. However, thanks to substantial increases between 1976 and 
*Of the nine countries for which long and homogeneous statistical series on employment in manufacturing industry are available — 
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela— only Argentina and Chile showed increases in the 
industrial product ( 10% and 3%, respectively). In contrast, manufacturing activity slightly declined in Colombia, fell by 2% in Costa Rica and 
Venezuela, and dropped sharply in the other countries (-17% in Peru, -9% in Ecuador, -7% in Mexico and -6% in Brazil). 
4 Data for March in the case of Costa Rica, and for the first two quarters in that of Ecuador. 
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Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
"Provisional figures. Personnel employed in manufacturing, according to periodic sample surveys of enterprises. 
employed in manufacturing, according to household surveys. In relation to the same period in the preceding year. 
c Personnel 
1981 —in which period the average annual growth rate of employment in industry was over 6%— 
the number of workers employed in the manufacturing sector was still a little higher than it had been 
in 1979. 
Employment in industry followed a similar trend during the last two years in Venezuela, where 
it fell by 1% in 1982 and by 6% in the first half of 1983. But since its expansion during the three 
preceding years had been very slight, its level was 5% lower in 1983 than in 1978. 
The decline in industrial employment was also considerable (-5.5%) in Peru. For this reason, 
and because of its unfavourable evolution in the preceding years, its level in 1983 was barely higher 
than in 1975. 
Employment in the manufacturing sector dropped even more sharply in Brazil and Colombia, 
in which two countries it decreased by over 1% in 1982. As this downward movement succeeded 
others of considerable significance that had occurred in the two preceding years, employment in 
industry both in Brazil and in Colombia sank to its lowest levels in the last ten years (see table 7). 
2. Unemployment 
Largely as a result of these unfavourable trends in employment in the manufacturing sector, and also 
in consequence of the sharp drop in employment in construction, a further rise took place in the level 
of open urban unemployment, which had been soaring since 1981. In some countries, unemployment 
rates reached record levels, while the slight downturns of about one percentage point which occurred 
in Argentina, Costa Rica and Nicaragua were not sufficient to offset the increases in the rate of 
unemployment in previous years. Consequently, in all the countries there was a good deal more urban 
unemployment in 1983 than before the start of the current recession (see table 8). 
In five countries —Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Uruguay and Venezuela— open unemployment 
reached its highest levels in the last nine years (see figure 4). As in the preceding year, the peak rates 
were recorded in Chile, Nicaragua and Uruguay (22, 17.5 and 16.5%, respectively). 
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What happened in Chile was mainly that the already very high level of urban unemployment 
noted during the preceding year was' maintained.5 The rate remained especially high in 
manufacturing industry (26%) and, above all, in construction (49%). Even so, in the course of 1980 
the rate of unemployment decreased slightly but steadily, reflecting the above-mentioned recovery in 
industrial employment (see figure 5). This decline was also influenced by the enormous expansion of 
government employment programmes, which managed to provide temporary jobs for 13% of the 
active population of the metropolitan region of Santiago in 1983. Despite these factors, the rate of 
unemployment at the end of the year remained above 20%, i.e., at double the figure recorded three 
years before (see table 9). 
The employment situation deteriorated to a more marked extent in Uruguay, where 
unemployment had been shooting up since the third quarter of 1981 and continued to increase until 
mid-1983. Despite its slight decline in the following months, the average unemployment rate of 
almost 16% in Montevideo was the highest recorded since the relevant statistical series had been 
started in 1968. As in Chile, manufacturing and construction were the activities with the highest 
unemployment levels (17%). The rate of unemployment in the business sector, although lower in 
absolute terms (13%), almost doubled within the space of barely a year (see table 10). 
In Bolivia, too, there was a pronounced increase in unemployment. The rate of open 
unemployment in the city of La Paz, which in 1982 had already exceeded 9%, continued to rise in 
1983, until by the end of the year it reached an unprecedented level of nearly 14%. Although no 
Table 8 














































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
"National urban rate. Average for April-October. La Paz. 1978, second semester; 1979, annual average; 1980, May-October; 1981, 
national urban average; 1982 and 1983, average for June-December. c Metropolitan areas of Rio de Janeiro, Sao Paulo, Belo Horizonte, 
Porto Alegre, Salvador and Recife. Average for 12 months; 1980, average for June-December. Bogotá, Barranquilla, Cali and Medellin. 
Average for March, June, September and December. ^National urban rate. Average for March, July and November. Greater 
Santiago. Average for March, June, September and December. gMetropolitan areas of México City, Guadalajara and Monterrey. 
Average for four quarters. National rate for non-agricultural activities. 'National urban rate. August of each year, except the 
years 1974 to 1976, where the reference is to non-agricultural unemployment; 1980, according to data from the National Census taken in 
February; 1981, official estimates. •'Asunción, Fernando de la Mora, Lambaré and urban areas of Luque and San Lorenzo. 1981, first 
semester; 1982, first quarter; 1983, four quarters. Metropolitan Lima. 1978, average for July-August; 1979, August-September; 1980, 
April; 1981, June; 1982 and 1983, official estimates. Montevideo, average for two semesters. ""National urban rate. Average 
for two semesters. 
5 According to data from the Department of Economics of the Universidad de Chile. The figures presented by the Instituto Nacional de 
Estadísticas, for their part, show a decline in the average annual rate from 20% to 19% between 1982 and 1983. But this decrease can be partly 
attributed to the change in the geographical base of the survey, which, as from the second half of 1983, was extended from Greater Santiago to the 
whole of the metropolitan region, thus including some rural areas where open unemployment is usually on a smaller scale. It may also have been 
influenced by the raising of the lower age limit for the labour force from 12 to 15 years. 
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Figure 4 
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precise figures are available for underemployment, it may be assumed to have increased substantially 
at the same time, having shown a sharply rising trend during the past five years (see table l l ) . 6 
The increase in urban unemployment was equally striking in Colombia. The average rate of 
unemployment in the principal Colombian cities rose for the second year in succession, reaching 
almost 12%, the highest figure recorded in the last nine years. As in previous years, Medellín was the 
urban centre worst affected, with a rate that ranged from 16 to 18% in the course of the year. As for 
Bogotá —where almost half the country's urban labour force is concentrated—, during the last 
quarter of the year it showed an unprecedented unemployment rate of 11%. In contrast, average 
underemployment in the four principal cities slightly decreased, and in March 1983 was not even as 
much as 11% (see tables 9 and 11). 
The contraction in economic activity also caused an increase in urban unemployment in 
Panama. Mainly as a result of the 2% fall in the manufacturing product and the 28% drop in that of 
construction, the unemployment rate went up from 10% to 11 % between 1982 and 1983. In the same 
Table 9 
LATIN AMERICA: EVOLUTION OF UNEMPLOYMENT RATE 
IN LARGEST CITIES 
Argentina" 




























Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official data. 
"Figures for April and October. Quarterly averages. 'Figures for March, June, September and December. Including 
Fernando de la Mora, Lambaré and the urban areas of Luque and San Lorenzo. ' 1978, second semester; 1979, average for two semesters; 
1980, May-October; 1982 and 1983, June and December. ^Figures for March, July and November. 'Figures for March, June, 
September and December. 1978, average for July-August; 1979, September; 1980, April; 1981, June; 1982 and 1983, official 
estimates, 'Six-monthly averages for 1978, 1979 and 1980. Quarterly averages for 1981, 1982 and 1983. 
'According to official estimates, barely 80% of industrial production capacity was in use in 1983, while the percentage of urban 
employment in low-productivity informal activities significantly increased. Reflecting the growth of employment in these latter, the proportion 
of the total number of employed persons represented by wage-earners dropped from 60% at the beginning of 1983 to barely 57% at the end of 
the year. 
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Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official data. 
"Provisional figures. Valle Central. Data for March in each year. 'Greater Santiago. Average for March.June, September and 
December. Data supplied by the Department of Economics of the Universidad de Chile. Metropolitan Lima. 1980, April; 1981 and 
1983, June. eMontevideo. Average for four quarters. National rotal. Average for two semesters. 
Table 11 
LATIN AMERICA (SELECTED COUNTRIES): NON-VOLUNTARY 
URBAN UNDEREMPLOYMENT" 
[Average annual rates) 











































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
" Percenrage of the labour force whose working day is shorter than they would be w illing for. Provisional figures. ' Greater Buenos 
Aires. Average for April-October. ^National total. ""Bogotá, Barranquiila, Cali and Medellin. Average for March,June, September 
and December. 1983, March. Urban national total. Average for March,July and November. 1983, March. eNational total. Non-
agricultural activities. 
period, rural unemployment although on a smaller scale in absolute values, showed a proportionally 
bigger increase, rising from 6% to 7%, largely in consequence of smaller sugar-cane harvests and of 
the drought which affected production of basic grains. 
The rate attained by unemployment in Venezuela —almost 10% — also represented an all-time 
high. Although the deterioration in the employment situation was apparent in all branches of 
economic activity, it made itself especially felt in construction, a sector in which the proportion of 
unemployed went up from 1 3 % in 1982 to 2 1 % in 1983. 
In Peru, too, the employment situation grew worse. As a result of the almost 12% slump in 
global economic activity, open unemployment in Lima climbed from 7% in 1982 to nearly 9% in 
1983, while urban underemployment reached the unprecedented level of over 46%. 
Although lower in absolute values, unemployment rates also rose significantly in Mexico and 
Paraguay. In the latter country, urban unemployment rose from 5.6% in March 1982 to more than 
8% in December 1983. 
In the principal cities of Mexico, in their turn, open unemployment went up from 4 % in 1982 to 
almost 7% in 1983. The city hardest hit was Monterrey, where the rate of unemployment more than 
doubled, attaining a record average level of about 1 1 % . The deterioration in the urban employment 
situation was also reflected in the above-mentioned drop in industrial employment, in the decline of 
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the rate of participation (see table 12), and in the transfer of a considerable number of workers from 
the modern sector to the so-called informal activities. However, open unemployment in the three 
principal cities decreased slightly in the last quarter of the year, partly thanks to emergency 
employment programmes.7 
In the case of Brazil, the methodological changes introduced in 1982 preclude comparisons with 
preceding years. However, the quarterly evolution since that date shows a relative increase in urban 
unemployment, especially in the city of Recife. In Sao Paulo and Rio de Janeiro unemployment 
continued to hover between 6% and 7% throughout the year, which is surprising, since these are 
cities in which employment in industry carries a great deal of weight, and, given the marked 
contraction in this sector, a rise in unemployment rates might have been expected (see tables 7 
and 9). 
Argentina, Costa Rica and Nicaragua, for their part, showed slight downward movements in 
1983 in their respective rates of open unemployment, mainly in consequence of the recovery of 
economic activity in all these countries. Nevertheless, unemployment rates remained very high in 
Costa Rica and, particularly, in Nicaragua, where although the rate of urban unemployment fell by 
one percentage point between 1982 and 1983 it was the second highest in Latin America (see table 8). 
This modest decrease was essentially due to the increase of more than 5% in the gross domestic 
product, and was also a consequence of the substantial rise in public employment and the expansion of 
urban informal activities. 
Urban unemployment also declined in Costa Rica, from an annual average of 10% in 1982 to 
one of 8% in 1983. In San José unemployment remained high during the first half of the year, 
fluctuating around 9%, but fell to 6% in November. The most marked decrease occurred in 
manufacturing industry, where the unemployment rate dropped between 1982 and 1983 from 10% 
to 7%. In contrast, the proportion of unemployed workers was barely reduced at all in construction, 
and went down only a very little in the business sector. Another sign of improvement in the 
employment situation was a considerable decrease in urban underemployment, from 24% in March 
1982 to 18% in March 1983 (see tables 10 and 11). These changes in the employment situation 
reflected a slight recrudescence of economic activity, after two years of sharp reduction. 
Table 12 
LATIN AMERICA (SELECTED COUNTRIES): TOTAL 
PARTICIPATION RATES" 




















































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of PREALC data and official figures. 
"Economically active population as a percentage of population of working age, according to household survey data. The lower age limit varies 
slightly from one country to another (see the corresponding footnotes). Provisional figures. ^National total. Lower age limit 
10 years, upper 64 years, Average annual estimate. ' According to data from the corresponding national census. eBarranquilla, 
Bogotá, Cali, and Medellín. Lower age limit 12 years. Average for March, June, September and December. National total. Lower age 
limit 12 years. March of each year. ^Greater Santiago. Lower age limit 14 years. Average for March, June, September and 
December. 'Metropolitan areas of México City, Guadalajara and Monterrey. Lower age limit 12 years. Average for four 
quarters. 'National total. Lower age limit 14 years. Average for four quarters. ; National total. Lower age limit 15 years. First 
semester of each year. 
7 The Mexican Government pur into practice several programmes of this type, both in urban and in rural areas. The aim was to provide 
training (in particular for persons looking for work for the first time) or temporary employment in various public or social utility projects 
(drinking-water, sewerage, housing, highways, etc.). 
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Lastly, during the second half of 1983 the reactivation of the economy also caused a decline in 
urban unemployment in Argentina. The most notable decrease took place in Greater Buenos Aires, 
where not only unemployment but also underemployment dropped steeply. According to provisional 
data,8 both the 3% unemployment rate recorded in October 1983 in the capital and the rate of 
underemployment were the lowest observable since 1980. In contrast, in the other principal cities, the 
reduction in unemployment by the end of the year barely succeeded in offsetting the increases that 
had occurred in the first semester. The situation was particularly unfavourable in Córdoba, where 
unemployment continued to rise throughout the year and reached its highest level since 1977 (see 
figure 5). As a result of these changes, the average rate of urban unemployment fell from 5.3% in 
1982 to 4.6% in 1983. This figure, while considerably higher than those prevailing during 1977-1980, 
was by far the lowest in Latin America in 1983. 
IV. PRICES AND WAGES 
1. Prices 
Although economic activity declined and unemployment increased, and notwithstanding the 
weakening of external inflationary pressures, the rate of increase of prices continued to rise in most of 
the Latin American economies, and in the region as a whole reached a new all-time high in 1983. The 
simple average rate of increase of consumer prices went up from 48% in 1982 to 66% in 1983, and 
the rate weighted by the population soared from a little less than 86% in 1982 to 131% in 1983. 
Inflation speeded up particularly fast in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Peru, Ecuador and Uruguay; 
in Mexico, prices continued to increase at a very rapid rate. Inflation also worsened in most of the 
Central American economies, but particularly in Nicaragua and Guatemala. In contrast, it was 
spectacularly reduced in Costa Rica, underwent a moderate but steady decline in Colombia, and was 
very low in Panama (see table 13). 
Consumer prices continued to shoot up in Argentina, attaining a rate of over 430%, which 
more than doubled that of the preceding year and easily exceeded the very high rates recorded in 1975 
and 1976. This phenomena was linked, as in previous years, to the existence of a very considerable 
fiscal deficit and to the spread of more and more unfavourable expectations as to the future course of 
price levels. To the incidence of these factors was superadded the effect of the frequent wage and 
salary adjustments, which reached very considerable magnitudes, especially in the second half of the 
year, and helped to push up real wages. 
Inflation figures were likewise unprecedented in Bolivia, where consumer prices soared by 
almost 330%, on top of having already trebled in 1982. As can be seen in figure 6, the acceleration of 
inflation was particularly marked as from November, in which month the exchange rate was adjusted 
by 150% —after a year in which it had been pegged by the authorities—and when a rise of more than 
70% in minimum wages was decreed. 
There was also a very marked intensification of inflation in Brazil. As a result of the massive 
public-sector deficit, of the maxidevaluation of the cruzeiro decreed in February and the continuous 
subsequent increases in the exchange rate, of the deterioration of the outlook and of the complex and 
generalized indexing system in force, consumer prices, which in 1981 and 1982 had risen at a rate of 
about 100%, went up by over 180% in 1983, while the overall price index was more than trebled. 
Galloping inflation was also the order of the day in Peru, where the annual rate of increase of 
consumer prices, after fluctuating around 70% in 1981 and 1982, jumped to 125% in 1983- Special 
determinants of this notable increase were the policy of more rapid devaluation of the sol applied by 
the economic authorities until August, and also the sharp increases in food prices due to the poorer 
harvests caused by drought and floods. 
Although a great deal lower in absolute terms than in the four preceding countries, in relative 
terms the increase in inflation in Ecuador was greater; from 24% in 1982 it rose to 52% in 1983. As in 
other countries, this acceleration of inflation was influenced by the devaluations of the sucre decreed 
as from 1982, after a long period of exchange stability; but another decisive factor was the reduction in 
supplies of agricultural products which was caused by floods, and which brought in its train 
Representing only 50% of the sample customarily used 
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Figure 5 
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Table 13 
LATIN AMERICA. EVOLUTION OF CONSUMER PRICES 
(Variations from December to December) 
Latin America" 
Countries with tradition-





































































































































































































































Source: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics, and ECLAC, on the basis of official data. 
"The totals for Latin America and the partial figures for groups of countries correspond to the countries'price variations weighted by each 
year's population. *Upto 1980, represents the variation in the workers'consumer price index; from 1981 onwards, the variât ion in the 
national total, which includes workers and employees. c Up to 1982, represents the variation in the consumer price index in the city 
of Quito; in 1983, the variation in the national total. Represents the variation between October 1983 and October 
1982. ''Represents the variation between September 1982 and September 1981. Represents the variation between September 
1983 and September 1982. ^Represents the variation between November 1983 and November 1982. 
unaccustomed increases in food prices. Towards the end of the year, however, the supply of these 
products became more normal, with the result that the consumer price index showed small decreases 
in November and December and the rising trend of the rate of inflation was abruptly reversed (see 
figure 7). 
The course followed by inflation was very similar in Uruguay, where the rate of price increases, 
after following a systematic downward trend between the beginning of I960 and November 1982, 
shot up again after the devaluation of the peso at the end of that month. Thus, the rate of inflation 
rose steadily and steeply during most of 1983, but was greatly reduced in December. Even so, the 51 % 
increase in consumer prices in 1983 more than doubled the corresponding figure for 1982. 
In Mexico, too, inflation remained very high during 1983, although its rates slowed down as 
from the middle of the year. As shown in figure 6, the annual rate of increase of consumer prices 
reached an all-time peak of almost 120% in July, but subsequently declined almost continually, falling 
to 81% in December. This break in the inflationary trend was mainly attributable to the notable 
reduction of the fiscal deficit and the very restrictive wage policy applied by the economic authorities. 
The reversal of the inflationary trend was much more definite and spectacular in Costa Rica, a 
country where, as in Mexico, the rate of price increases had soared rapidly in 1982. As can be seen in 
figure 7, the rate of increase of consumer prices, after reaching an unprecedented level of close to 
110% in September 1982, declined exceptionally fast and persistently in the subsequent months, and 
by the end of 1983 has dropped below 11 %. In fact, mainly as a result of the fixing of the exchange 
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Figure 6 
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Figure 7 
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rate, of the restrictive wage policy applied and of a considerable expansion of the volume of imports, 
as from the middle of the year consumer prices were almost completely stabilized. 
The course followed by inflation during 1983 was more complex in Chile. Between June 1982 — 
the month in which the authorities decided to devaluate the peso after almost three years of exchange 
stability— and June 1983, the annual rate of increase of consumer prices climbed steadily from 4 % to 
somewhat more than 32%. But the effects on the costs of tradeable goods produced by the abrupt 
upward movements of the exchange rate in the second half of 1982 gradually petered out and real 
wages and salaries went on decreasing; consequently, the pace of inflation began little by little to 
slacken as from August 1983, and fell below 2 3 % by the end of the year. 
During 1983 inflation went on declining gradually but continuously in Colombia, the Latin 
American country in which the rate of increase of prices has beeri most stable in the last ten years. 
This slowdown of inflation took place despite the fact that, with a view to strengthening the balance 
of payments, the authorities speeded up the mini-devaluations of the peso. But the greater 
inflationary pressure that this might have caused was neutralized by the sluggishness of domestic 
demand. 
In Venezuela, likewise, the rate of increase of consumer prices was slightly reduced in 1983. 
They rose, in fact, by only 7%, notwithstanding the sharp devaluation of the bolivar at the end of 
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February. The effects of this latter on consumer prices were mitigated by the maintenance of a 
preferential exchange rate for imports of essential goods, strict price controls in respect of these, 
reduction of previous years' stockpiles, a slump in domestic demand and a downward trend in wages. 
The impact of the raising of the exchange rate on costs was reflected, however, in the evolution of the 
wholesale price index, in which internationally tradeable products carried greater weight. Indeed, 
wholesale prices, which in 1982 had gone up only 6%, rose by over 10% in 1983 and showed an 
upward trend which became particularly marked at the end of the second quarter of that year. 
In Paraguay, on the other hand, inflation notably accelerated its pace. After increasing by barely 
4% in 1982, consumer prices rose by 14% in 1983. As in other countries, the increase in the rate of 
inflation was influenced by the raising of the exchange rate. The effects of the devaluation were 
combined with those of the abrupt reduction of the supply of agricultural products caused by adverse 
weather conditions —which stepped up food prices to a marked extent— and with the impact of the 
over-25% expansion of the means of payment generated by the significant increase in the credit 
granted to the central government. 
Lastly, price trends differed widely among the countries of Central America and the Caribbean, 
which have traditionally had moderate inflationary processes tending as a general rule to follow the 
variations in international inflation. Thus the rate of inflation increased to a marked extent in 
Nicaragua —from an average of 23% in 1980-1982 to 37% in 1983— and in Guatemala, where 
consumer prices rose by 8% after having decreased by 2% in 1982. In contrast, the rate of inflation 
did not vary very much in El Salvador and Honduras; it was spectacularly reduced, as has already been 
shown, in Costa Rica; it was very low in Panama; and it declined slightly for the third year running 
both in Haiti and in the Dominican Republic (see table 13). 
2. Wages and salaries 
As in previous years, the evolution of real wages and salaries was very unequal in Latin America, in 
accordance with the likewise widely differing paths followed by the countries of the region in respect 
of growth, employment, inflation and wage policy. Of the countries for which relatively reliable 
statistical data are available, a majority (Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, Peru and Uruguay) recorded 
substantial decreases both in average wages and salaries and in the minimum wages, mainly as a result 
of the contraction in internal economic activity and the acceleration of inflation. Similarly, in Ecuador 
and Mexico, countries for which statistical data are available only with respect to minimum wages, 
these suffered a marked reduction. In contrast, real salaries and wages continued to follow a moderate 
upward trend in Colombia, while they showed notable increases in Costa Rica and, above all, in 
Argentina (see tables 14 and 15 and figure 8). 
The most spectacular decreases —of about 20% for average wages and salaries and over 10% 
for minimum wages— occurred in Brazil and Uruguay. The deterioration in real wages and salaries 
began to make itself apparent on an unusually large scale in Uruguay as from the second half of 1982 
and continued throughout the following year. This unfavourable trend was due in the first place to the 
abrupt drop in the gross domestic product, the negative effects of which were strengthened in 1983 by 
the impact of the marked acceleration of inflation. It was also influenced by the wage policy which 
formed part of the overall adjustment programme, and by virtue of which the salaries of public 
employees were frozen, compulsory adjustments in the private sector were suppressed and increases 
in the national minimum wage were made more moderate. This last, despite the intensive rate of 
inflation, was adjusted only twice in 1983 (by 15% in January and 33.5% in September). Moreover, 
these increases failed to match the rate of inflation, which meant that the real minimum wage fell by 
10% in 1983. The nominal rise in average wages and salaries was considerably lower, so that their 
purchasing power was lessened by 21%. Since for several years both real minimum wages and real 
average wages and salaries had been showing a persistent downward trend, the levels recorded in 
1983 were the lowest in the last 15 years. 
In contrast, the slump in real wages and salaries in Brazil occurred in a very different context, as 
they had been increasing uninterruptedly up to 1982 (see figure 8). The decreases recorded in 1983 
were equally spectacular, however, since average wages and salaries contracted by over 19%, while 
the minimum wage in Rio de Janeiro fell by 11%. 
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Table 14 
LATIN AMERICA: EVOLUTION OF REAL AVERAGE 
WAGES AND SALARIES 

















































































































































































































































figures. ''Wages in manufacturing industry in the metropolitan area. 'Average wages in indusrry in 
JWages in manufacturing industry. 'Wages or salaries declared by affiliates of the social security 
'Wages and salaries of workers and employees in the non-agricultural sectors, excluding large-scale copper mining and pulp 
industries. * Wages in general for Asunción. Wages in the private sector in the metropolitan area of 
'Wages and salaries in the private and public sectors in Montevideo and the interior. 
As in the case of Uruguay, these reductions were particularly influenced by the speeding-up of 
inflation, which in 1983 reached rates never recorded in the country before. Other determinants were 
the changes in wage legislation, which was modified for the first time in January 1983 and again, after 
a long period of uncertainty and difficult internal negotiations, in November 1983.9 These reforms 
were aimed at bringing down the percentage levels of the six-monthly adjustment applicable to the 
different wage and salary steps. Thus, for wages and salaries amounting to less than three minimum 
wages, the percentage was reduced from 110 to 100% of the variation in the national consumer price 
index in January 1983.10 In turn, the adjustment percentages applied to wages and salaries exceeding 
three minimum wages were fixed at the beginning of the year at a level lower than the rate of 
inflation and were further reduced in November. The second reform in wage legislation consisted in 
the establishment of a ceiling for the increase under the head of productivity, in accordance with the 
variation in national per capita income in the preceding year. Since the ceiling was fixed at zero for 
1982, in 1983 there was no increase on this account. 
As a result of these modifications, the rising trend that average real wages and salaries had been 
showing since the beginning of the 1970s was abruptly reversed, and as fromjune 1983 they began to 
fall steeply. Thus, by the end of the year their level was barely equivalent to that recorded in 1980. As 
for the salaries of public employees, which are not regulated by wage legislation, they were accorded 
nominal increases considerably lower than the rate of inflation, whereby they dropped 20% in real 
terms. 
'The wage legislation in force since 1979 establishes a system of compulsory six-monthly adjustments, scaled in accordance with the 
ratio between the pay received and the minimum wage. It also provides for an additional increase if productivity rises. The latter, however, is 
largely determined by direct negotiations. 
10This index alsoserves as a basis for the entire indexing system applied in Brazil. It should be noted that during 1985 the government, in 
calculating the variation in this index, excluded price increases attributable to the incidenceof faaors considered as exceptional or accidental (for 
example, those caused by the shortageof agricultural supplies due to floods in the south of the country). Naturally, this procedure reduced the size 
of automatic wage adjustments. 
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Furthermore, with a view to gradually establishing a single minimum wage for the whole 
country, in May the number of different areas considered was further reduced, so that thenceforward 
only two levels were differentiated.u The policy of granting two six-monthly adjustments (in May 
and November) equivalent to the variation in the national consumer price index was maintained. But 
since the increase in prices in the principal Brazilian cities was proportionally higher, in all those 
urban centres the real minimum wage decreased. The sharpest drops occurred in the Federal District 
(-16%) and Recife (-17%), the two urban areas where the rates of inflation were highest. 
The notable acceleration of inflation in 1983 also contributed to the 16% decrease in average 
wages and salaries in Peru, which brought these down to their lowest level in the last 10 years. The 
worst deteriorations (-29% and -28%, respectively) corresponded to the construction and business 
sectors, which were especially affected by the slump in economic activity. In manufacturing industry, 
too, real wages declined to a marked extent (-21%). The reductions were smaller, although 
substantial, in the other sectors, ranging from 13% in the banking sector to 8% in non-government 
services. 
Average wages and salaries, however, did not follow the same behaviour pattern throughout 
the year. They were reduced by 21 % during the first half of the year, but in the last quarter rose by 3 %. 
This was due partly to the slowing-down of the rate of inflation in the last months of the year, and 
partly to the granting of a blanket wage increase of 15 %, which had not been originally programmed. 
In contrast, the purchasing power of the average minimum wage scarcely varied at all in 1983. 
Thanks to the special 60% bonus granted in March, it considerably increased in real terms during the 
Table 15 
LATIN AMERICA: EVOLUTION OF VALUE URBAN REAL MINIMUM WAGE 























































































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
"Provisional figures. National minimum wage. 
CPI. Minimum wage for upper urban sectors. 
c Minimum wage for the city of Rio de Janeiro, deflated by the corresponding 
eMinimum income. 4 Min li imum overall wage, calculated on the basis of 
annual minimum wages and legal supplementary benefits. ^National average minimum wage. 'Minimum wage in Asunción 
and Puerto Stroessner, 'Minimum wage in Lima for non-agricultural activities. JNational minimum wage for workers over 18 
years of age. 
" U p to May 1983, for the purpose of fixing minimum wages, three areas had been differentiated: firstly, the south and south-east region 
plus the Federal Dis tria; secondly, the states of Bahía, Pernambuco, and the rest of the central zone; and lastly, the remainder of the north-east. 
The legal minimum wage for these last two areas was unified as from May 1983. 
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Figure 8 






Source: Table 14. 








second quarter of the year (see figure 9). The three subsequent adjustments,12 however, did not 
suffice to offset the effect of inflation, so that during the following months the purchasing power of 
the minimum wage gradually declined. 
In Chile, too, the decrease in real salaries and wages was very marked, inasmuch as average 
wages were reduced by 10%, and minimum income by almost 20% (see tables 14 and 15). This 
unfavourable trend was due, in the first place, to the sharp contraction in the gross domestic product 
which took place in 1982, and which, together with the restrictive wage policy, meant that as from the 
second half of 1982 real salaries and wages dropped steeply. This deterioration, however, was to some 
12Nineteen per cent in July, 10% in September and 8% in November. 
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Figure 9 
LATIN AMERICA (SELECTED COUNTRIES): TWELVE-MONTH 
VARIATION IN REAL WAGE AND SALARIES 
Average wage in manufacturing sector 
— Minimum urban wage 
1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of table IS and official data. 
1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 
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extent slowed down by the subsequent moderation of the rate of inflation, by the modest 
recrudescence of domestic economic activity during the second half of 1983 and by a slight relaxation 
of wage policy during the same period. From April onwards, public employees received several 
special bonuses.13 Then, in July, a nornjnal adjustment of 5% in their salaries was decreed, as well as 
in those of other workers not subject to collective renegotiation. Lastly, in December a Christmas box 
equivalent to 15 % of the corresponding salary was paid. Thus the index of average wages and salaries 
declined more gently, and even rose a little in the last months of the year. Thus, at the end of 1983 its 
level was almost the same as that recorded twelve months before (see figure 9.) 
The biggest drop in average wages and salaries occurred in the manufacturing sector, where 
they fell by over 17%. Employees in the service sector, for their part, suffered an 8% reduction of 
their salaries, and at the same time real wages in mining declined by 6%. 
The minimum wage, in its turn, decreased by nearly 20%, since its nominal amount was frozen 
for two whole years (from July 1981 to July 1983) and subsequently benefited only by an increase of 
5% in nominal terms. 
In Paraguay both average wages and salaries and minimum wages fell by over 7%. In the case of 
the former, this downward movement was mainly attributable to the acceleration of inflation, since, 
in general, higher nominal increases were granted than in the preceding year. Thanks in part to these 
increments, the real wages of agricultural day-labourers actually rose slightly (by 1%) and the 
reduction in real wages in the basic services sector was only 1%. In other activities, however, wages 
and salaries deteriorated a good deal. This happened particularly in the manufacturing and 
construction sectors, which were those hardest hit by the recession, and in which average real wages 
and salaries fell by 8% and 12%, respectively. Although no precise data are available on average 
salaries and wages of public employees, it may be assumed that they declined still more sharply, since 
no adjustments were granted in 1983. 
The same restrictive wage policy that had frozen the minimum wage from May 1981 was 
maintained until August 1983. At that time a nominal increase of 10% was granted, which was 
equivalent to barely half the cumulative rate of inflation during that period. Consequently, this 
adjustment did not suffice to offset the loss of purchasing power completely, and the average 
minimum wage dropped by 7% in 1983 in relation to the preceding year. 
Where Ecuador and Mexico are concerned, the statistical data available only make it possible to 
show the very considerable deterioration undergone in both countries by real minimum wages. But 
because of the impact of the recession in the two economies, and considering the usual backwash of 
the evolution of the legal minimum wage on the other wages, it may be assumed that average wages 
and salaries also dropped sharply in those countries in 1983. 
In Mexico the decline in the real minimum wage was of unwonted magnitude (-23%), bringing 
it down to the equivalent of barely three-quarters of its level ten years before. This decrease reflected 
at one and the same time the application of a restrictive wage policy and the persistence of a high rate 
of inflation. In practice, the 25% and 16% increases granted in January and June failed to 
counterbalance the deterioration undergone by the real minimum wage and were quickly absorbed by 
higher price increases than had initially been foreseen. 
In Ecuador, in turn, the rate of inflation more than doubled in 1983 and rapidly eroded the effect 
of the minimum wage adjustment which had been granted in November 1982. Neither did the 
further increase accorded in July 1983 suffice to compensate the loss of purchasing power. 
Consequently, in 1983 a reduction of the average minimum wage by nearly 11% in real terms was 
superadded to the decreases of similar proportions recorded in the two preceding years. Thus the 
minimum wage dropped by more than one-third in the space of barely three years, so that most of the 
substantial increase (65%) it had enjoyed in 1980 was cancelled out (see table 15). 
In contrast, real wages and salaries rose in 1983 in Argentina, Colombia and Costa Rica. 
Although in Colombia the increases were moderate in comparison with those shown by the 
other two countries, the 5% rise in the real wages of workers in the manufacturing sector appreciably 
speeded up their growth rate. As in the preceding year, the increase in the salaries of industrial 
employees was somewhat smaller, although not insignificant (4%). The daily wage of agricultural 
workers was raised on an average by about 1%, the biggest increments appearing in temperate-zone 
lsIn April they were granted a special bonus of 30%, to be paid in the months of April, September and November. In practice, half the 
bonus corresponding to the month of November was paid in advance in October. 
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agricultural activities. In contrast, the purchasing power of wages and salaries paid in the business 
sector remained completely static. Lastly, real minimum wages increased by 4%, thanks to the 
nominal adjustment of 25% —equivalent to the rise in consumer prices during 1982— granted in 
January, and to the slowing-down of the rate of inflation in 1983. 
The upward trend of wages and salaries was more marked in Costa Rica, where average wages 
increased by almost 10% and the minimum wage by 16%. A contributing factor, in addition to the 
modest growth of the gross domestic product by 1 %, was the notable decrease in the average rate of 
inflation, which dropped from 90% to 33%. By virtue of this slackening of the pace of inflation, 
average wages and salaries, which rose by 50% in nominal values, increased in real terms by 10%, the 
highest rate since 1971. However, owing to the substantial reductions they had undergone in the two 
preceding years (-12% and -19%, respectively) their purchasing power was barely as much as 78% of 
what it had been in 1980. In contrast, the urban minimum wage, which went up by nearly 16% in real 
terms, regained its 1980 level. 
Nevertheless, the most spectacular increases in real wages and salaries were recorded in 
Argentina. Average wages in the manufacturing sector shot up by over 29%, so that the downward 
movements that had occurred in the two precending years were easily counterbalanced and the level 
reached was the highest since 1976 (see table 14). Consequently the participation of wage-earners in 
the gross domestic product at factor cost rose from 32.5% in 1982 to 40% in 1983. 
Furthermore, the recovery in real wages and salaries was widespread throughout all the 
economic sectors. Workers in public enterprises, whose wages had been frozen since the beginning of 
1982, enjoyed the biggest increase (42%). Wages and salaries in the rest of the public sector went up 
by 11%, while salaries in the business sector rose by 23%. 
This evolution of real wages reflected, in the first place, the effect of an expansionary wage 
policy, to which were added the repercussions of the recrudescence of economic activity. The policy in 
question was expressed, on the one hand, in regular increases in negotiated basic wages. Up to 
September the adjustments were granted quarterly and fluctuated around 11%. During the fourth 
quarter, the acceleration of inflation, together with stronger trade-union pressure, led to the granting 
of at once more frequent and more considerable increases (18% in October, 16% in November and a 
fixed sum of 1 200 pesos in December). 
Moreover, an attempt was made to appreciably improve the lowest level of income, to which 
end a much more expansionary policy was pursued with regard to family allowances and minimum 
wages. The latter were favoured with nominal increases of a much larger proportion than was 
accorded to other incomes,14 with the result that they rose on an average by 58% in real terms and 
attained the highest level they had reached in the previous decade (see table 15). 
V. THE EXTERNAL SECTOR 
In 1983 Latin America made an enormous effort to reduce the imbalances which had been piling up in 
the external sector since the end of the 1970s. Thus, in 1983 the rises in exchange rates to which many 
countries resorted in 1982 were reinforced by further devaluations, various other measures to restrict 
imports and encourage exports, and stringent fiscal, monetary and wage policies, directed towards 
reducing domestic expenditure. 
As a result of these adjustment policies, and not withstanding the unfavourable evolution of 
world trade, in 1983 the region obtained an enormous surplus on trade in goods, very significantly 
lessened the negative balance on current account, and reduced, likewise considerably, the size of the 
balance-of-payments deficit. 
1. Foreign trade 
However, as already noted, the surplus of almost US$ 30 billion obtained in 1983 on trade in goods 
was due exclusively to a new and drastic curtailment of imports, of which the total value fell by 30%, 
after having decreased by 19% in 1982. On the other hand, the value of exports, which in that year 
had dropped by 8.5%, declined by about 2% in 1983. 
14 Respectively, 25% in January, 40% in April, 57% in July, 45% in September, 12.5% in October and 55% in December. 
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a) Exports of goods 
As in 1982, the reduction in the value of external sales occurred in spite of an increase in the 
volume exported. The latter, which had expanded at an exceptionally high and sustained annual rate 
of approximately 9% between 1976 and 1981, and which, notwithstanding the international 
recession, had increased by just under 2% in 1982, rose by nearly 8% in 1983 (see table 16). This 
increment, like those in preceding years, easily exceeded the increase ¡a the volume of world trade and 
reflected, in essence, the considerable adjustment effort that had been made in 1983 by many Latin 
American economies through measures designed to reduce domestic expenditure and modify the 
relative prices of tradeable and non-tradeable goods. 
However, the significant increment in the quantum of exports did not derive from a region-
wide trend. In fact, in 1983 the number of countries in which the volume of exports contracted was the 
same as that in which it expanded. Outstanding among the latter instances were the considerable 
increases in the export quantum achieved by the three biggest Latin American economies —Brazil 
(15%), Mexico (12.5%) and Argentina (9.5%)— as well as those recorded by Haiti, Nicaragua, 
El Salvador and Ecuador. In contrast, the volume of exports showed considerable decreases, of about 
11%, in Colombia, Peru, Guatemala and Bolivia (see table 17). 
In the region as a whole, however, the effect of the expansion of the export quantum was more 
than counteracted by the impact of the decline in their unit value. As can be seen in table 16, this latter 
dropped sharply for the third year in succession, so that the cumulative reduction in the last three-
year period amounted to 20%. Although the further decrease in the unit value of exports in 1983 was 
decisively influenced by the fall in petroleum international prices, allowance must also be made for 
the effect of lower international quotations for products of great importance among the region's 
exports, such as coffee, wheat, wool, iron, bauxite and other minerales. Moreover, the substantial 
increases in the international prices of bananas, cocoa, maize, fish meal, soya, cotton and copper in 
1983 were far from offsetting, except in the case of the first of these products, the enormous 
reductions they had suffered in preceding years (see table 18). 
In these circumstances, the total value of exports of goods fell by almost 2 % in Latin America as 
a whole and 6% in the oil-exporting countries. On the contrary, in the group formed by the other 
economies of the region the value of external sales went up by nearly 3 %. But this increase —entirely 
attributable to the vigorous expansion of the volume of exports— only partly compensated for the 
decline of more than 11 % undergone by the value of exports in 1982. Furthermore, the increase in 
question derived mainly from the considerable upswing (8.5%) in Brazil's external sales in 1983. In 
the remaining economies of the region, with the sole exception of Haiti, the value of exports rose only 
moderately or very sharply decreased (see table 17). 
b) Imports 
As in 1982, the fall in the value of imports was much more marked than the decline in that of 
exports. As already noted, the value of external purchases, which in 1982 had been radically reduced 
by more than 19%, was lowered in 1983 in the even higher proportion of almost 30%. Thus, the total 
value of imports of goods, which had climbed vigorously and uninterruptedly between 1970 and 1981, 
dropped by over 43 % in the course of the last two years. Furthermore, since both in 1982 and 1983 the 
unit value of imports declined only slightly, the decreases in the quantum of imports were almost as 
drastic as those in their total value. Such, in fact, was the scale of this contraction that in 1983 the 
volume of imports was not only much lower than in any of the eight preceding years, but scarcely 
exceeded that recorded in 1974. 
Besides being precipitous, the drop in the quantum of imports was very widespread, which 
meant that there was a recurrence of the situation that had occurred in 1982. The volume of external 
purchases shrank in 1983 by over 25% in five countries, and between 12% and 20% in another six, it 
expanded only in Bolivia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua and 
Paraguay. Even in this last group of countries, however, the increase in the volume of imports was not 
enough to make up for the big reductions it had undergone in 1982 (see table 19). 
But the contraction in imports was particularly severe in the oil-exporting countries. Thus their 
quantum diminished by almost 50% in Venezuela, more than 40% for the second year running in 
Mexico and about 33% in Ecuador and Peru. The decrease was also very substantial in Uruguay 
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Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
a Provisional figures. 
—where the volume of imports, which had already declined by over 40% in the two preceding years, 
dropped by 26% in 1983— and in Brazil, Chile and Guatemala, countries where imports fell between 
15% and 19% in real terms, after having dwindled considerably in the two preceding years. 
c) The terms of trade and the purchasing power of exports 
Albeit in 1983 the unit value of imports decreased for the second year in succession, their 
downward movement (-2%) was much less than the fall in average export prices (-9%). Latin 
America's terms of trade therefore declined by 7%, after reductions of about 9% both in 1981 and in 
1982 (see table 20). As in 1982, the deterioration in the terms of trade was more pronounced in the 
oil-exporting countries than in the group formed by the remaining economies of the region. But as in 
the latter the terms of trade had seriously worsened in the five preceding years, the index was not only 
29% lower in 1983 than in 1978, but was also the lowest in the last half century. In 1980-1983 it 
averaged considerably less than in 1931-1933, years which represented the most critical phase of the 
Great Depression. 
On the contrary, among the oil-exporting countries the deterioration of the terms of trade 
during the last three years did not completely counteract the notable progress they had made in the 
two-year period 1979-1980 as a result of the second series of increases in international oil prices. 
Thus, in all these economies except that of Peru, the terms-of-trade index was still much higher than 
in any of the non-oil-exporting countries, and the average level of the terms of trade in the group as a 
whole almost trebled the average index for the non-oil-exporters in 1983 (see table 21). 
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On the other hand, the further deterioration in the terms of trade nullified most of the positive 
effect that could have been expected from the considerable efforts made by Latin America in 1983 to 
expand the volume of its exports. Although, as already mentioned, this volume grew by about 8 %,'the 
purchasing power of exports rose only insignificantly in 1983 (see table 22 and figure 10). This 
increment, besides being insufficient to offset the decline undergone by the purchasing power of 
external sales in the two preceding years, benefited only half the Latin American countries. As can be 
seen in table 23, the purchasing power of exports increased meaningfully only in Brazil (owing 
exclusively to the large-scale expansion of the volume exported), Chile (in consequence both of the 
improvement in its terms of trade and of the real growth of exports) and Mexico (despite the 
deterioration in its terms of trade). 
2. The balance of payments 
a) The current account 
Since the reduction in the value of imports was much bigger than the decrease in the value of 
exports, the balance of trade in goods underwent a new and significant change in 1983. On top of the 
volte face which occurred in 1982 (when a surplus of US$ 8.45 billion replaced the preceding year's 
US$ 2 billion deficit), the year 1983 witnessed an exceptional increase of the trade surplus, which 
amounted to almost US$ 30 billion, and far more than trebled that of the preceding year. 
Table 18 


























































































































































































Source: UNCTAD, Monthly Bulletin of Commodity Prices, Supplement I960-1980 and June 1984. International Monetary Fund, international 
Financial Statistics, Yearbook 1981 and June 1984. 
Note: Unrefined sugar FOB Caribbean ports, for export to the free market. Coffee, Colombian mild arabica, ex-dock New York. Cocoa beans, 
average daily price (futures), New York/London. Central American bananas, CIF Hamburg. Cotton, Mexican M 1-3/32", CIF, 
Northern Europe. Wool, clean, combed, 50's quality, United Kingdom. Beef, frozen, boneless, all sources, United States ports. Fish 
meal, all sources, 64-65 % protein, CIF Hamburg. Wheat, United States, N° 2, Hard Red Winter, FOB. Maize, Argentina, CIF, North Sea 
ports. Soya beans, United States, N° 2, yellow, in bulk, CIF Rotterdam. Copper, Tin, lead and zinc, cash quotations on the London Metal 
Exchange. Iron ore, Canada, c.64% Fe, CIF, North Sea ports. Bauxite, Guyana. (Baltimore). Oil, Venezuela (Tía Juana). 
"U.S. cents per pound. Dollars per ton. 'Dollars per pound. Dollars per barrel. 
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Table 19 
LATIN AMERICA: IMPORTS OF GOODS 

















































































































































































































































































































Source: ECLAC, on rhe basis of official • 
"Provisional figures. 
Table 20 
LATIN AMERICA: TERMS OF TRADE (GOODS) 















































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official data. 
"From 1970 to 1975, includes Bolivia, Ecuador and Venezuela; as from 1976, Mexico and Petu are added. 
and Peru are excluded. ^Provisional figures. 
From 1976onwards, Mexico 
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To this result the principal contributions were made by the very substantial increments in the 
trade surpluses obtained by Mexico, Brazil and Venezuela, and the considerable changes that took 
place in the merchandise trade of Argentina, Chile, Peru, Ecuador and Uruguay (see table 24). 
In Venezuela'the 1983 trade surplus of about US$ 7.2 billion almost trebled that shown in 1982, 
even though, as in that year, the value of exports appreciably decreased. 
On the other hand, in Brazil —where the merchandise trade surplus increased by a factor of 
eight between 1982 and 1983, rising from US$ 780 million to US$ 6.5 billion— the improvement 
was due both to an increase in exports and to a contraction of imports. In its turn, Mexico, which in 
1982 had already succeeded in converting its 1981 deficit of US$ 4.1 billion into a surplus of nearly 
US$ 6.8 billion, boosted its positive trade balance to US$ 13.7 billion, thanks to a new and massive 
curtailment of the total value of its imports —which in 1983 was equivalent to barely one-third of the 
figure for 1981— and to a slight increase in the value of its external sales. 
The trade balance evolved similarly to Mexico's in Chile and Uruguay, although, of course, in 
absolute terms the changes were much smaller. Thus, Chile, after showing a deficit of close on 
US$ 2.7 billion in 1981 and achieving a small surplus in 1982, in 1983 obtained a surplus of US$ 1 
billion, deriving essentially from a new and significant decline in the total value of imports and a 
moderate increase in the value of exports. Uruguay, in the same lapse of time, converted a deficit of 
US$ 360 million into a surplus of US$ 430 million. In this country, however, the exclusive cause of 
the reversal of the trade balance was the radical reduction in the value of imports, which between 
1981 and 1983 decreased by 56%. 
Table 21 
LATIN AMERICA: TERMS OF TRADE (GOODS) 



































































































































































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
"Provisional figures. Cumulative percentage variations in the period. 
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Table 22 
LATIN AMERICA: PURCHASING POWER OF EXPORTS OF GOODS 
















































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official data. 
0 Ftom 1970 to 1975, Bolivia, Ecuador and Venezuela are included; as from 1976, Mexico, and Per u are added. 
Peru are excluded. 'Provisional figures. 
As from 1976, Mexico and 
A drastic contraction in imports was also the main cause of the new increase in the trade surplus 
obtained by Argentina; of the multiplication of Ecuador's trade surplus by a factor of six; and, in Peru, 
of the substitution of a surplus of US$ 300 million in 1983 for the deficit of US $ 560 million recorded 
in the preceding year. 
In contrast with what happened in 1982, when the effect on the current account of the reversal 
of the trade balance was almost entirely neutralized by the sharp rise in payments of interest and 
profits, in 1983 the contribution of the bigger trade surplus to the reduction of the imbalance on 
current account was reinforced by a decline in financial remittances. 
The total value of these latter, which in the past five years had more-than quadrupled, rising 
from US$ 8.2 billion in 1977 to almost US$ 37 billion in 1982, fell to a little under US$ 35 billion in 
1983- This result was influenced both by the decrease in remittances of profits resulting from the 
sharp contraction in domestic economic activity and by the reduction of interest payments on account 
of the drop in nominal interest rates in the international financial markets. 
In these circumstances, the deficit on current account —which had slightly exceeded US$ 40 
billion in the two preceding years— was drastically reduced to less than US$ 9.3 billion in 1983 (see 
table 25). Almost all the countries of the region contributed to this result, either through a substantial 
decrease in their deficits on current account, or, as in Mexico and Venezuela, through their 
replacement by very large surpluses. The sole exceptions to this overall trend were to be found in 
Argentina, Bolivia, Costa Rica, Nicaragua and Paraguay, which showed bigger deficits than in the 
preceding year. 
The magnitude of the adjustment effort made by the economies of the region in order to reduce 
their external imbalance was also clearly reflected in the notable decline in the relation between the 
deficit on current account and the value of exports of goods and services. This coefficient, which in 
1982 had reached the unheard-of proportion of nearly 40%, dwindled in 1983, to scarcely more than 
9%, the lowest figure on record in the last 12 years (see table 26). 
However, the exceptionally low level of this regional average was largely due to the massive 
surpluses on current account obtained in 1983 by Mexico and Venezuela. It therefore reflects the 
situation of many of the Latin American economies to a lesser degree than in the past. Thus, apart 
from Ecuador and Uruguay —where the deficit/export ratio was below 5 %— in the great majority of 
41 
the countries of the region the ratio in question ranged from 25% to 40%. Moreover, the deficit on 
current account was equivalent to over half the exports of goods and services in Colombia and Haiti, 
to almost 100% of these in Paraguay and to close on 120% of them in Nicaragua. 
b) The capital account 
As was mentioned earlier, in 1983 the net inflow of capital decreased for the second year in 
succession. After amounting to the unprecedented sum of about US$ 38 billion in 1981 and falling in 
1982 to a little over US$ 20 billion, in 1983 it dropped to barely 8 billion. 
Just as in the preceding year, this new contraction of the net flow of loans and investment 
chiefly affected Mexico and most of the larger economies of South America. On the contrary, the net 
capital inflow was kept going and even increased in most of the Central American countries, among 
which Nicaragua and El Salvador had considerable external financing at their disposal. 
In contrast, the decline in procurement of external resource was very marked in Brazil —which, 
after receiving over US$ 11 billion in net loans and investment in 1982, obtained less than 5.5 billion 
in 1983— and in Colombia, where the net capital inflow of US$ 340 million recorded in 1983 was 
equivalent to barely 15% of the previous year's supply (see table 25). 
Figure 10 
LATIN AMERICA: EVOLUTION OF SELECTED FOREIGN TRADE INDICATORS 
(Indexes: 1970 --100) 
OIL-EXPORTING 
COUNTRIES^ 
Terms of trade 
— Purchasing power of exports of goods 
Quantum of exports of goods 
NON-OIL-EXPORTING 




1971 1975 1980 83 1971 1975 1980 83 1971 1975 1980 83 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official data. 
aNineteen countries. t>From 1970 to 1975 includes 16 countries. As from 1976 Mexico and Peru 
are excluded. cFrom 1970 to 1975 includes Bolivia, Ecuador and Venezuela; as from 1976 Mexico and 
Peru are added. 
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Table 23 
LATIN AMERICA: PURCHASING POWER OF EXPORTS OF GOODS 
















































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of officia] figures. 























































































































































































































During 1983 the external financing received by Peru was also sharply reduced, the amount 
procured by Chile —which had drastically diminished in 1982— continued to decline, and that 
obtained by Argentina decreased to a moderate extent. 
In Mexico, in turn, there was a new and spectacular change in the external financing situation. 
After dropping from US$ 14.8 billion in 1981 to barely 2.4 billion in 1982, in 1983 the movement of 
loans and investment showed a net outflow of a little more than US$ 2 billion, mainly as a result of 
the deficit of over US$ 5 billion on the short-term capital account. 
Contrary to what had happened in the preceding year, in 1983 the reduction in the net inflow of 
capital received by Latin America was much smaller than that of the deficit on current account. 
Consequently, the balance-of-payments deficit, which in 1982 had reached the record figure of 
US$ 20 billion, was reduced in 1983 to a little over 1.25 billion. 
This considerable drop in Latin America's balance-of-payments deficit reflected both the 
smaller negative balances recorded in 1983 in many countries of the region and the volte face which 
took place in others, where the global deficits shown in 1982 were replaced by positive balances in 
1983. 
Outstandingly significant in this connection were the changes that occurred in Mexico and 
Venezuela. Mexico's balance of payments, which had closed in 1982 with a deficit of nearly US$ 2.9 
billion, showed a surplus of close on US$ 3-3 billion in 1983- For its part, Venezuela, whose deficit of 
US$ 8.15 billion in 1982 had been the highest in the whole of Latin America, obtained a surplus of 





LATIN AMERICA: TRADE BALANCE 





























































































































































































































































































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official data. 
"Excluding net payments of profits and interest. 
Table 25 
LATIN AMERICA: BALANCE OF PAYMENTS 
(Millions of dollars) 
Latin America 
(19 countries) 
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Source: ECLAC, on the ba$is of official data. 
"Including labour and ownership. Including net private unilateral transfers. 
Variation in international reserves, including counterpart entries. 
including long and short-term capital, official unilateral Transfers and errors and omissions. 
Significant balance-of-payments surpluses were also achieved in 1983 by Ecuador and Uruguay 
—which had recorded very large deficits in 1982— and also by El Salvador, Guatemala and Panama, 
whose external operations had shown small negative balances in the preceding year. 
Among the countries that succeeded in reducing their balance-of-payments deficits, special 
mention should be made of Brazil —which brought down its negative balance from US$ 5-2 billion in 
1982 to 2.1 billion in 1983—and Chile, where between those years the deficit dropped from US$ 1.34 
billion to US$ 530 million. 
On the contrary, during 1983 the balance-of-payments deficit slightly increased in the 
Dominican Republic, rose significantly in Argentina and almost doubled in Colombia, where it thus 
became the second largest in the whole of Latin America (see table 25). 
c) International reserves 
In 1983, Latin America's international reserves decreased for the third year in a row, although 
the reduction was not as big as in the two preceding years. As a result of these successive contractions, 
the total value of reserves was 44% lower at the end of 1983 than at the close of 1980 (see table 27). 
However, as in 1983 imports contracted even more sharply, the ratio between reserves and the 
value of imports of goods and services rose to a moderate degree, after having steadily and rapidly 
decreased in the three preceding years (see table 28). 
Table 26 
LATIN AMERICA: RELATION BETWEEN THE BALANCE-OF-PAYMENTS 
DEFICIT ON CURRENT ACCOUNT AND THE VALUE OF 
























































































































































































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official 
"Negative figures indicate a surplus on 
figures. 
the balance-of-payments current account. Provisional figures. 
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Table 27 
LATIN AMERICA: EVOLUTION OF OFFICIAL INTERNATIONAL RESERVES" 

























Source: Internationa] Monetary 




































































Fund, International Financial Statistics. 









































































































































In contrast to what happened in 1982, when reserves declined in much the same proportions in 
the oil-exporting countries as in the other economies of the region, in 1983 the reduction was 
concentrated almost exclusively in the latter. On the contrary, in the oil-exporting countries there was 
a marked increase in reserves, except in Bolivia. 
The growth of reserves was especially intensive (132%) in Mexico, where they had fallen 
precipitously (-70%) in 1982. Consequently, despite their recovery, at the end of 1983 they were still 
considerably lower than in 1980-1981. But as in the last two years the total value of imports dropped 
by over 60%, reserves were equivalent to a much higher proportion of the value of external sales in 
1983 than in any of the six preceding years. 
Reserves also increased significantly —although much less than in Mexico— in Peru (39%) 
and Ecuador (21%). However, owing to the severe reductions they had undergone in both these 
countries during the two preceding years, they totalled much less, especially in Ecuador, than at the 
end of 1980. 
On the other hand, the relative increment in reserves was very small (3.5 %) in Venezuela. But 
as they had declined only moderately in the two preceding years, their total value in 1983 fell only 
10% short of the unprecedented level they had reached in 1980. Furthermore, Venezuela's reserves 
were far the highest in the region —in fact, they represented 40% of the total for Latin America— 
and were also equivalent to an exceptionally large proportion ( 133 %) of the annual value of imports. 
However, the unwonted magnitude of this figure primarily reflected the effects of the spectacular 
(54%) reduction of the value of external purchases of goods and services which took place in 1983. 
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Thus, among the oil-exporting countries, the only one in which reserves decreased was Bolivia, 
where they fell by 13.5%. Despite this decline, they still represented the equivalent of almost seven 
months' imports, i.e., one of the highest coefficients in the region. But as a very substantial 
proportion of reserves consisted of gold —whose immediate use presents more difficulty than that of 
foreign currencies—, the economic authorities' room for manoeuvre in respect of financing 
temporary deficits on the trade balance was in practice decidedly limited. 
In contrast, in the non-oil-exporting countries the drop in reserves was sharper in 1983 than in 
the two preceding years. In these circumstances, the end-of-year value of reserves was equivalent to 
only just over one-third of that recorded at the end of 1979. Moreover, since the relative decrease in 
reserves was once again greater than the contraction of imports, the ratio between the total amount of 
the former and the value of the latter also declined for the fourth consecutive year (see tables 27 and 
28). 
The biggest reduction of reserves occurred in Argentina, where they went down by 62%, thus 
falling to a level equivalent to barely 15 % of that reached at the end of 1979. This new and enormous 
decrease in reserves signified a severe constraint on the management of the balance of payments, 
which was further accentuated by the fact that a high proportion of them consisted in holdings of 
monetary gold. 
In Brazil, too, reserves dropped very abruptly for the third time in the last four years. Thus, at 
the end of 1983 they amounted to only 20% of their value in 1979 and were equivalent to scarcely 
more than one month's imports —an exceptionally low ratio which was above only those recorded in 
Haiti and Honduras. 
Table 28 
LATIN AMERICA: RELATION BETWEEN OFFICIAL INTERNATIONAL RESERVES 














































































































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of table 27 and official data. 
"Provisional figures. 
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The decline in reserves was also considerable (-36%) in Colombia. However, as they had 
amounted to very large sums in 1980 and reductions in the two following years had been relatively 
small, they were still equivalent to over seven months' imports, a proportion exceeded in the region 
only by Venezuela. 
Lastly, in 1983 decreases of more than 20% occurred in the international reserves of Chile and 
Uruguay, both of them countries in which reserves had already steeply declined in the two preceding 
years. Even so, since imports had also fallen abruptly, reserves were still equivalent to very high 
proportions of external purchases. In the case of Uruguay, however, the exceptional magnitude of the 
reserves/imports coefficient (87%) makes for an overestimate of the economic authorities' room for 
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Part Two 
FINANCIAL CONSTRAINTS, TRANSFER OF RESOURCES AND 
RENEGOTIATION OF THE EXTERNAL DEBT 
The evolution of Latin America's external financing and indebtedness during 1983 was characterized 
by two main features. The first was the accentuation of the constraints under which the region had 
been labouring since mid-1982 in respect of its access to international financial markets; the second 
was the initiation of a second round of renegotiations of the external debt, in which the debtor 
countries obtained, in general, somewhat more favourable terms and conditions than in the first. 
I. FINANCIAL CONSTRAINT 
Table 29 shows, through the figures for the movement of financial resources between the region and 
the rest of the world, the magnitude of the financial constraint with which Latin America had to cope. 
As already noted, during the 1970s there was a net transfer of resources to Latin America from 
abroad, i.e., what happened was what normally should in the case of a developing region. A transfer of 
this kind, besides contributing external saving and thus giving an additional impulse to internal 
development or adjustment efforts, facilitates debt servicing, inasmuch as the inflow of new resources 
under the head of net loans and investment exceeds net remittances of interest and profits. 
Furthermore, during the 1970s the transfer of resources to Latin America took place on a very 
large scale: by the middle of the decade it totalled more than 20% of the value of exports of goods and 
services, which, in their turn, were expanding at a very high average rate. In these circumstances, the 
region's capacity to import increased at high speed, as can be seen in figure 11. 
By the end of the decade, however, a marked and progressive decline had begun both in the 
absolute value of resources transferred and in their ratio to the value of exports. In consequence of this 
trend, the direction of the financial flow was reversed in 1982, and a massive negative balance 
resulted. In that year the net transfer of resources abroad amounted to about US$ 17 billion, and the 
process was intensified in 1983, in which year it is estimated that the resources transferred abroad 
represented a sum of approximately US$ 87 billion.15 
Thus, just as during the preceding year, in 1983 Latin America had to face a combination of 
highly unfavourable events: precisely when the net inflow of resources was converted into an 
enormous net outflow, the international recession and the increase in protectionism limited the 
possibilities of stepping up export earnings. In consequence of these two phenomena, the region's 
capacity to import suffered a new and drastic contraction (see figure 11). 
The financial constraint occurred, moreover, at a time when the region's real capacity to import 
had been decreasing on account of the continuous and rapid deterioration of the terms of trade. Thus, 
in addition to the US$ 20 billion reduction of the capacity to import brought about in 1982-1983 by 
this deterioration, a drop of about US$ 43 billion resulted from the draining-off of financial resources. 
In these circumstances, the countries of the region had to adapt their economies by means of a 
radical contraction of their imports, which, as already mentioned, was the main cause of the decline in 
domestic levels of production and employment. 
Thus, the emergence of these substantial net transfers of financial resources from Latin 
America to the creditor banks and countries had highly unfavourable consequences. Economic 
development is a long-term process in which a stable net inflow of external resources usually fills an 
15 As can be seen in table 29, the absolute va\ue oí the trans fer of resources abroad is smaller if account is taken of the errors andomissions 
item in the balance of payments, which probably was constituted in the main, especially in 1982, by unregistered capital outflows. But if this 




LATIN AMERICA: NET INFLOW OF CAPITAL AND TRANSFER OF RESOURCES 
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Source: ECLAC, on the basis of data from the International Monetary Fund and official information. 
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Table 29 
LATIN AMERICA: NET INFLOW OF CAPITAL AND TRANSFER OF RESOURCES 






















































































































































































































Source: 1970-1982: International Monetary Fund, Balance of Payments Yearbook, 1983: ECLAC, on the basis of official data. 
"Equivalent to net inflow of capital minus unregistered transactions. 'Corresponds to balance-of-payments item "errors and 
omissions". ^Provisional estimates. 
essential role in the financing of investment. Accordingly, a diminution of this inflow and, above all, 
its replacement by a net outflow directly affects both the rate and the social cost of the development 
process. Furthermore, such a reversal of the direction of resource transfers proves particularly serious 
when it occurs during the downturn of the economic cycle, since in that event it reinforces the 
negative effects of the conjunctural fall in the volume and prices of exports. Lastly, the net transfer of 
resources abroad may promote a major crisis, both for the developing countries and for the 
international financial system, in so far as the payments problems which it helps to generate may 
affect large-scale debtors in such a way as to call in question, or even imperil, the solvency of the 
creditor financial institutions. 
The immediate causes of this adverse trend in financial movements were two in number: the 
rise in the cost of external credit, and the abrupt decrease in the net capital inflow. 
1. The increase in the cost of external credit 
A very important factor behind the net outflow of financial resources from Latin America was the 
heavy and sustained increase in the servicing of foreign capital, in the form of remittances of interest 
and profits. Between 1977 and 1982 net payments under this head grew at an average annual rate of 
34%, a figure whose significance in real terms can be more clearly assessed if it is borne in mind that 
during that period domestic prices in the industrialized countries rose at an average rate of 9%, and, 
above all, if it is recalled that Latin America's terms of trade deteriorated at an average annual rate of 
about 3%. Although in 1983 payments of interest and psofits slightly declined in consequence of the 
fall in international interest rates and the contraction of economic activity in Latin America, they still 
amounted to nearly US$ 35 billion, i.e., more than three times as much as in 1978 (see table 29). 
The most important component of this phenomenal expansion of payments on foreign capital 
was constituted by net interest payments. These represented 83% of the outflows recorded under this 
head between 1978 and 1983, a period in which, moreover, they continued to soar, and were 
ultimately quadrupled. In turn, this evolution of interest payments had its origin in the rapid growth 
of the external debt and the considerable increases in international interest rates. 
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During the past decade many countries of the region took advantage of the then easy access to 
the Eurocurrency market to pursue a development strategy based on liberal use of external credit.16 
Thus, the region's external debt shot up at a very high rate, which between 1978 ar i981 averaged 
about 22% per annum (see table 30). Although this growth rate fell to 12% in 1982 and to less than 
8% in 1983, it still far exceeded that of other main macroeconomic variables. For this reason, by the 
end of 1983 the external debt was equivalent to proportions of the gross domestic product and of 
exports which not only were very high —42% and 333%, respectively— but topped all those 
recorded in earlier years (see tables 31 and 32). In these circumstances, a steadily increasing 
proportion of Latin America's national income had to be diverted from domestic consumption and 
investment to debt servicing.17 
Of course, as always happens, these regional averages conceal widely differing situations in the 
various countries. Thus, in 1983 the debt/export coefficient was especially high in Nicaragua 
(759%), Argentina (485%) and Brazil (408%), and, on the other hand, fluctuated around 150% in 
Table 30 













































































































































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official data. Brazil and Venezuela: ECLAC.on the basis of data from the Bank for International Settlements. 
"Total public and private external debt. Provisional figures. Corresponds to public debt. Including public debt, plus 
unguaranteed long and short-term debt with financial institutions supplying data to the Bank for Internat ional Settlements. 'Including 
toral medium and long-term debt plui short-term debt with financial institutions supplying data to the Bank for International Settlements. 
l6For more background information on this subject, see CEPAL, Adjustment policies and renegotiation of the external debt 
(E/CEPAL/SES.20/G.17), Santiago, Chile, February 1984. 
17 The burden of indebredness is obviously heavier in relation to exports than to the product. Whereas the debt/product coefficient is not 
much higher in Latin America than in some Asian countries whose creditworthiness is still well-seen in the credit markets, the ratio of more than 
three to one existing between debt i>nd exports trebles that of the large debtor countries in Asia. 
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Table 31 
LATIN AMERICA: RELATION BETWEEN TOTAL GROSS DISBURSED EXTERNAL 




































































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official data. 
"Provisional figures. 
Guatemala, Haiti and the Dominican Republic. The debt/produt ratio, in its turn, reached more than 
80% in Costa Rica and over 135% in Nicaragua, but was only 20% in Colombia and Guatemala. 
Apart from the intensive growth of the total debt during the 1970s, there was a striking change 
in the sources of external credit, which caused a considerable increase in the average rate of interest. 
In the course of that decade private banks took the place of official credit institutions (bilateral and 
multilateral) as the region's main creditors. Thus, the share of the commercial banks in Latin 
America's total external debt has climbed from very modest levels at the beginning of the 1970s to 
approximately 80% at the present time. This structural change has implied a rise in the average cost 
of credit, since, as a general rule, commercial banks charge an interest rate about 50% higher than 
that charged by public international financing institutions, such as IDB and the World Bank. 
In practice, however, the chief cause of the rapid increase in interest payments lay in the 
variability of the interest rates at which private bank loans were contracted. Since in recent years the 
economic policies applied in some of the main industrial centres led toan unprecedented rise in 
bank interest rates, the effective rate of interest that had to be paid by the Latin American 
countries also went up unusually fast. In 1978 the nominal level of LIBOR and the United States 
PRIME rate was already over 9%, and they reached maximum average values of 16.5% and 
18.9%, respectively, in 1981. Although in the two following years they showed a downward 
trend,' their levels in 1983 —10% for LIBOR and 11% for PRIME— were still very high in 
comparison with past periods (seetable 33). 
Moreover, to the cost represented by the basic rates must be added the spread, which since 1982 
has risen steeply, with the result that some countries have had to pay an average spread fluctuating 
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between 1.5 % and 2.0%. Lastly, the increase in the rate of interest was also spectacular in real terms: 
as can be seen in figure 12, after registering negative values in 1974-1977, LIBOR and PRIME swung 
over to the positive side, attaining values of 6% and 8%, respectively, in 1981. Although in the next 
two years they declined, their level in 1983 was still more than twice that of about 2 % recorded in the 
past.IS The heavy financial burden represented for the Latin American countries by the rise in 
interest rates is highlighted in tables 34 and 35. 
The first of these shows that in 1983 net interest payments absorbed 31% of the value of 
exports of goods and services. This figure, although slightly lower than in 1982, was equivalent to two 
and a half times the coefficient of 12% noted in 1978 and 1979.19 
In several countries, of course, the problem was of even greater dimensions than are indicated 
by the regional average. For example, in 1983 the proportion of exports represented by interest was 
53% in Argentina, 47% in Bolivia, 40% in Brazil and 39% in Costa Rica. Since 1978 the growth of 
this coefficient had been exceptionally intensive in Argentina, where it increased by a factor of ten, 
and in Costa Rica, where it was quintupled (see table 34). 
Although the main causes of the spectacular rise in the net interest/export ratio between 1981 
and 1983 were the high interest rates and the increase in the external debt, another influencing factor 
was the serious depletion of the region's international reserves. Through its deposits in the 
Table 32 
LATIN AMERICA: RELATION BETWEEN TOTAL GROSS DISBURSED EXTERNAL 




































































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official 
"Provisional figures. 
daca. 
lftln the first half of 1984 this downward trend was reversed, so that the two rates rose to 11% and 12%, respectively. 
19To appreciate the gravity of the situation, it is useful to recall that an interest/export coefficient of 20% is already considered to 
constitute an unduly onerous financial burden. 
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Table 33 



































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of data from the Morgan Guaranty Trusr, World Financial Markets, and from Economic Repon oj the President, 
Washington, February 1984. 
"Corresponding to the interest rate on 180-day Eurodollar deposits in London. 'Preferential rate granted by United States banks to their 
best clients. 'Nominal rate deflated by the consumer price index of the industrialized countries. ' Provisional estimates. 
international financial markets, Latin America traditionally received a substantial amount of 
resources, which helped partly to counterbalance interest payments. Of course, as international 
reserves decreased, interest earnings were reduced as well. Lastly, the rise in the interest/export 
coefficient was also due to a decline in the value of exports during the last three years. 
There was also a rapid increase in the proportion of the region's gross domestic product 
represented by interest payments. The coefficient for the region as a whole rose from only 1.5% in 
1978 to 4.0% in 1982-1983 and was much higher in 1983 in Bolivia (9.5%), Costa Rica (8.7%), Chile 
(6.6%) and Argentina (6.1%). While in the first three countries the net interest/product ratio was 
already a good deal higher than the regional average in 1978, in Argentina its increase was really 
spectacular, inasmuch as in that year the country in question had had one of the lowest coefficients in 
Latin America (0.7%) (see table 35). 
2. The decline in the net inflow of capital 
The other fundamental cause of the negative transfer of resources that Latin America had to make in 
the last two years was the striking reduction of the net inflow of capital. As previously noted, the net 
amount of this inflow notably decreased both in 1982 and 1983- In effect, its values —US$ 20 billion 
in 1982 and US$ 8 billion in 1983— were equivalent, respectively, to only 20% and 8% of the 
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Figure 12 
NOMINAL AND REAL INTERNATIONAL INTEREST RATES 
(Percentages) 
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Source: ECLAC, on the basis of data from Morgan Guaranty Trust, World Financial Markets, and from 
Economie Report of the President, Washington, D.C., February 1984. 
aRate of interest on deposits in Eurodollars (180 days) in London. ^Nominal rate 
deflated by the consumer price index of the industrialized countries. Preferential rate granted 
by the United States banks to their best clients. 
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Table 34 
LATIN AMERICA: RELATION BETWEEN NET INTEREST PAYMENTS AND 





























































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of data from official sources and from the International Monetary Fund. 
"Provisional figures. 
region's total exports, which were figures far below the averages of about 33% recorded during the 
period 1978-1981.20 
This falling-off in net capital inflows had its origin in two factors: the procyclical behaviour of 
the international private banks and the flight of capital from Latin America to the outside world. 
a) The procyclical behaviour of the international private banks 
The slump in credit activity was related, in the first place, with the behaviour of the private 
banks, Latin America's principal creditors. These institutions are guided by a private and commercial 
perception of risk, which is highly sensitive and therefore imparts a high degree of variability to the 
loans they are prepared to grant. 
It is common knowledge that the banks' image of Latin America's creditworthiness began to 
deteriorate as from 1982, a circumstance which was partly due to the overwhelming increase in debt 
servicing. As can be seen in table 36, the sum to which this amounted in absolute terms was 
more than doubled between 1978 and 1982. Up to 1981, however, this upswing did not create major 
difficulties, inasmuch as exports also expanded at a very rapid rate. Thus, despite the ever-increasing 
commitments under the head of amortization and interest payments, the debt service coefficient 
20The exceptional magnitude of the decline in net inflows of capital is clearly evidenced in column 3 of table 29. These figures, however, 
include the effect of inflows and outflows under the head of unregistered transactions, those termed "errors and omissions" in the balance of 
payments. Accordingly, so that a more exact picture of annual credit activity may be formed, column 1 of the same table presents an estimate of 
the effective net capital inflow, correcting the figures in column 3 by those financial operations which are not included in the economic 
authorities'accounts. Alt hough, as was said before, when this operation is performed the absolute amount of the net inflow of capital works out to 
be larger in each of the last four years, the decline in the net inflow of loans and investment between 1981 and 1983 is also greater. 
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—the creditworthiness indicator in commonest use among creditors—remained relatively stable, 
fluctuating between 42 and 49%. 
But in 1982, mainly as a result of the international recession, Latin America's total exports 
contracted by 10%, whereas debt servicing rose by almost 16%. Thus, the ratio between amortization 
and interest payments and the value of exports jumped from 49% in 1981 to 6 1 % in 1982. Moreover, 
if short-term debt maturities —which amounted to approximately US$ 69 billion—21 were taken 
into account, Latin America's debt service coefficient would have been about 120% in 1982, a 
manifestly untenable situation. 
It was in these circumstances that the region's creditors radically changed their view of its 
creditworthiness and decided to restrict their loans severely. The rapid deterioration of Latin 
America's capacity to serve its debt and the considerable magnitude of the loans already granted by 
banks in the region were among the reasons why these latter saw a much higher degree of risk in their 
financial operations in Latin America. 
Their first reaction to this situation was to harden amortization terms, a step which, in turn, 
had the effect of directly reducing the net inflow of capital. In the 1970s the maturities of loans 
granted to the countries of the region had often ranged from seven to ten years; but such amortization 
periods became increasingly less frequent at the beginning of the present decade. What is more, a 
common practice among banks when they feel their risk to be greater is to meet the borrowers' 
demand for refinancing by means of a steadily growing proportion of short-term credits, i.e., those 
extended for less than one year. This attitude was reflected in the increase of the relative importance 
Table 35 
LATIN AMERICA: RELATION BETWEEN NET INTEREST PAYMENTS AND 





























































































































































Source: ECLAC, on che basis of data from official sources and from the International Monetary 
"Interest payments include those corresponding to the short-term debt. Provisional figu 
Fund. 
res. 
2'See Inter-American Development Bank, La deuda externa y el desarrollo económico en América Latina. Antecedentes y perspectivas, 
Washington D.C., 1984. 
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Table 36 
LATIN AMERICA: EXTERNAL DEBT INDICATOR 























































































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official data. 
"Provisional estimates. 
'The following are the symbols used: DS: debt services; DIS: 
I: gross interest payments on the short- and medium-terms 
medium- and long-term loan disbursements; X: exports of goods and services; 
debt; TGD: total gross external debt disbursed; GDP: gross domestic product. 
of short-term credit in Latin America's total debt, the proportion it represented rising from 15% in 
1975 to an average of 23% in 1980-1982.22 
The accumulation of these short-term liabilities reflected the severe pressures existing within 
the financial system. Credits of this type are usually granted for trade purposes, and it is estimated 
that they should represent the equivalent of about three months' imports. In 1982, however, this 
proportion was exceeded three times over. In 1983, the short-term debt was reduced to the equivalent 
of seven months' imports, largely owing to the constraint imposed on these credit lines by the 
creditors during the crisis. 
One effect of these changes was that the rate of amortization —i.e., amortization payments as a 
percentage of the debt— on the bank debt rose steadily throughout the second half of the last decade, 
"See IDB, op.cit., table 7. 
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reaching more than 40% in the two-year period 1981-1982.2i This, of course, also pushed up the rate 
of amortization on the total debt, which climbed from about 23% in 1975 to over 30% in 1982.24 
The increase in the amortization rate threw into relief the countries' growing vulnerability, 
since it compelled them to intensify their "debtor activity", i.e., that directed towards obtaining new 
loans to cover amortization payments and thus avoid a net outflow of capital. Faced with an intensive 
increase in the demand for credit for the sole purpose of refinancing amortization payments, the 
banks had to meet a growing number of applications for credit just when the amount of their 
commitments in the countries of the region forced them to give more weight to considerations of 
prudence. 
The unwillingness of the banks to continue increasing their loans in Latin America became 
more patent still when they began to have doubts as to the capacity of Argentina —the third among 
the largest debtors in the region— to serve its debt, on account of the South Atlantic conflict in March 
1982, and was made yet more acute by the payments crisis in Mexico in the middle of the same year. 
As this country was the second largest debtor in the Third World, its difficulties created a sensation of 
panic in the financial market, which had a negative impact on the volume and terms of the credit 
available for other countries in the region. Thus, from August 1982 onwards the banks' normal credit 
activity was brought to a virtual standstill. 
The magnitude of the constraint imposed by the banks can be appreciated in table 37, where the 
medium-term bank credits reported in the Eurocurrency market are presented. Before 1982 this type 
of credit was increasing at an average annual rate of 34% at the world level and 21% in the case of 
developing countries; those granted to Latin America exceeded this average, rising at an annual rate 
of 32%. For reasons already indicated, as from 1982 there was a sharp contraction of the new credits 
granted, and this trend persisted in 1983. For Latin America, the amount of new credits was reduced 
by 11% in 1982 abd43% in 1983, these decreases being a good deal larger than those corresponding 
to the developing countries as a whole. Furthermore, part of the credits granted to Latin America in 
1982 and practically all those recorded in 1983 were not market operations, but non-voluntary loans 
which formed part of the debt refinancing programme organized under the sponsorhsip of the 
International Monetary Fund.25 
This drastic reduction in new credits to Latin America, which would have led to a net outflow of 
capital had it not been for the large-scale rescheduling of maturities carried out by the creditor banks, 
accounts for most of the spectacular decline in inflows of capital during 1982 and 1983. 
Table 37 
MEDIUM-TERM BANK CREDITS DECLARED ON THE EUROCURRENCY MARKET 
Billions of dollars Growth rates 
Total 
Industrialized countries 




































































































23See R. Ffrench-Davis, 'El problema de la deuda externa en América Latina', CIEPLAN, Sanriago, Chile, December 1983, p. 14. 
"Estimated on the basis of data ¡n 1DB, op.cit,, tables 1 and 3. 
"For more detailed analysis of the role of the Fund and of non-voluntary loans granted by private banks, see CEPAL, Economic Survey of 
latin America, 1982, Part Two (E/CEPAL/L.286); znd Adjustment Policies and Renegotiation of the External Debt (E/CEPAL/SES.20/G. 17), 
Santiago, Chile, February 1984, chapter III. 
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Table 38 
MEDIUM-TERM BANK CREDITS: SPREADS OVER BASIC INTEREST RATE" 
1981 1982 1983 
First Second j n m J y j n July-
semester semester October 
OECD 0.49 0.46 0.57 0.47 0.50 0.55 0.66 0.57 0.63 
OPEC i 0 97 0 92 °'85 °'80 ° '87 ° 9 5 ° 8 7 ° 8 5 L 3 9 Other developing J 
countries 1 0.83 1.05 1.08 1.47 2.02 1.77 1.80 
Overall average l 0.74 0.69 0.75 0.78 0.69 0.93 1.53 0.96 1.17 
Source: OECD, Financial Market Trends, Paris, November 1982 and November 1983. 
"Weighted average of spreads for credits of over US$ 50 million and with maturities of more than three years. 
Such scanty loans as Latin America was able to secure in the last two years were obtained, 
moreover, on very burdensome terms. Over and above the extremely high rates of interest, the non-
voluntary credits granted by the banks included very large spreads; some idea of the magnitude of the 
change can be formed from the figures in table 38, which show that the average surcharge on loans to 
developing countries increased from 0.95% in 1981 to 1.47% at the end of 1982 and 1.80% by mid-
1983. Thus, the difference between the spreads on basic rates paid by the industrialized countries and 
by the developing countries rose from 0.48% in 1981 to 1.17% inJuly-October 1983- And, as will be 
seen later, the deterioration was a good deal worse for Latin America than for the developing 
countries as a whole. 
b) The flight of capital 
The second determinant of the massive transfer of resources abroad was the abundant outflow 
of private capital from the region. Thus, from the standpoint of their effects on the balance of 
payments, a considerable part of the new loans contracted by some Latin American governments was 
counteracted by the outflow of resources from the private sector. In these conditions, the increase in 
public indebtedness partly originated —especially at the beginning of 1982— in the need to cover the 
flight of private capital to the exterior. 
It is of course difficult to estimate the magnitude of the phenomenon. In the first place, there 
are no records of this type of capital movement, either because of the existence of a free foreign 
exchange market in the countries concerned, or owing to evasion of exchange controls by means of 
such procedures as under-invoicing of exports and over-invoicing of imports. Secondly, the coverage 
of indirect methods of estimating the flight of capital may be insufficient —which would lead to 
underestimating the flow— or their scope may be excessively broad, incorporating other factors 
conducive to an overestimate. 
A traditional indirect indicator of the flight of capital is the balance-of-payments item "errors 
and omissions", which appears in the second column of table 29- According to these figures, between 
1980 and 1983 Latin America could have experienced a cumulative net outflow of capital of about 
US$ 28 billion —a sum equivalent to almost 7% of the value of exports of goods and services during 
that period and to approximately 8.5% of the cumulative external debt at the end of 1983- As is 
likewise evident from the figures in the same table, this outflow absorbed a significant proportion 
(25%) of the net inflow" of capital between 1980 and 1983. 
There are signs, however, that the "errors and omissions" item underestimates the effective 
capital outflow. Another indirect method of estimating the flight of capital is to compare the growth 
of the external debt and the net annual inflow of capital recorded in the balance of payments. The 
difference between the two figures will represent the unregistered outflow of financial resources. 
Since the coverage of the data on external indebtedness for the years preceding 1980 is less wide, it 
seems prudent to confine the analysis to the three-year period 1981-1983. The corresponding 
calculation suggests that there could have been an unregistered financial outflow of about US$ 45 
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billion in that triennium, i.e., a much larger sum than the US$ 28 billion estimated on the basis of the 
"errors and omissions" item in the balance of payments. These US$ 45 billion are equivalent to nearly 
14% of the external debt existing at the end of 1983.2<s 
Nevertheless, these figures must be handled with a good deal of caution, since it is highly 
probable that they overestimate the unregistered capital outflow. In the first place, estimates of 
indebtedness relating to more recent years have a broader coverage than those of earlier date and 
therefore tend to overestimate the growth of the debt. Secondly, the figures on net movements of 
capital, which also enter into the calculation made, are affected by outflows which do not, strictly 
speaking, constitute a flight of capital, such as contraband and traffic in drugs. 
The flight of capital tends, of course, to occur or to be accentuated during periods of economic 
crisis and when the private sector loses confidence in the economic policies applied. In these 
circumstances, some of the holders of assets look for a haven abroad where the value of their capital 
may be conserved. Another factor that influences the process, and was probably important in Mexico, 
Venezuela and Argentina, is the non-existence of exchange controls. Even when such controls are 
susceptible of evasion, their existence increases the cost of transactions of this type and therefore to 
some extent discourages the transfer of capital to the exterior. 
Lastly, it should be noted that although the flight of capital aggravated the crisis, it also signifies 
a potential, since, in principle, the resources concerned could be repatriated and thus give an impulse 
to investment and to the reactivation of the economy. For this to happen, however, economic policies 
would have to offer the holders of such assets prospects of security and an attractive rate of return. 
II. RENEGOTIATION OF THE DEBT 
The abrupt drop in Latin America's net external financing in the two-year period 1982-1983 
interrupted the process of "credit renewal" —i.e., the contracting of new loans to cover debt 
servicing— which had made the servicing of external commitments relatively easy during the 1970s. 
For most Latin American countries the change made the debt burden impossible to carry, and this in 
its turn caused many countries of the region to embark upon negotiations for the rescheduling of the 
external debt. 
1. The first round of reschedulings 
The first round of reschedulings, which was initiated in August 1982, was analysed in depth in the 
Economic Survey of Latin America, 1982. The data on this process published there are updated in 
tables 39, 40 and 41. 
In 1982 fourteen of the twenty countries of the region opened debt rescheduling negotiations; 
Colombia was the only country with a relatively large debt to the international private banks which 
did not do so. Generally speaking, debt restructuration operations combined two essential 
components: the rescheduling of one or two years' amortizations and the procurement of new "non-
voluntary" credits from the private banks in order to refinance that part of interest payments which 
the countries were not in a position to cover with resources of their own.27 Another characteristic 
element in the negotiations was the insistence of the banks that before a rescheduling agreement was 
concluded the country concerned should have agreed with IMF upon an adjustment programme.28 
Lastly, also as part of the rescheduling processes, the Bank for International Settlements and the 
United States Treasury granted very short-term bridge credits to some countries to finance them 
temporarily during their negotiations with IMF. 
Tables 40 and 41 summarize the terms of the first rescheduling. It may be noted that they were 
exceptionally burdensome and represented a grave deterioration of debt conditions, both as regards 
the elements of indebtedness subject to negotiation (the spread in excess of LIBOR, amortization 
periods and commissions), and with respect to the financial cost. The data in column 7 of table 41 
26During the period analysed, the flight of capital was appparently concentrated in three countries: Venezuela, Mexico and Argentina. 
Uruguay also seems to have witnessed an outflow of appreciable magnitude in relation to the size of its economy. 
" I n 1983 this proportion was about 50%. 
28The only exceptions to this rule occurred in the reschedulings of the external debt of Cuba and Nicaragua. 
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Table 39 
LATIN AMERICA (SELECTED COUNTRIES): RENEGOTIATION OF 
EXTERNAL DEBT WITH PRIVATE BANKS 
(FIRST ROUND OF RENEGOTIATIONS 1982/1983)" 

























































































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official data from the countries and from various national and international sources. 
"Including counrries which during 1982 and 1983 signed definitive or provisional exrernal debt renegotiation agreements with rhe private 
banks: excluding the English-speaking Caribbean countties. 
''Refers exclusively ro each counrry's shorr, medium- and long-term public and privare debt with the ptivate commercial banks that supply 
information to the Bank for International Settlements. The debt to government and official agencies is not therefore included, nor the debt 
with suppliers, nor the debt with those commercial banks which do not transmit information to BIS. In some countries, this last item is 
significanr. In rhe case of the Dominican Republic, the data correspond to official information. 
cBank for Inrernarional Settlements. Shorr-rerm bridge credits. 
'Credirs granred by the international banks as part of the process of renegotiation of the external debr. 
^Corresponds to public extetnal debt maturiries falling within the petiod September 1982 to December 1983 (US$ 6 billion ); ro rhose 
matutities of the private external debr, protected by Central Bank exchange insurance, which fell due as from November 1982 
(US$ 5.5 billion); and to maturiries of swaps (US$ 1.5 billion). Ir should be noted that Atgentina did not sign any final agteement on 
renegoriation of its public extetnal debt during the year 1983. In December 1983 rhe new government notified its intention to tenegotiate a new 
agreement. 
"The inrernational banks are wairing ro disburse US$ 1 billion until an agreemenr with IMF is reached. 
*Ar rhe end of 1982 an aplication was submitted to the foreing banks requesting rhem ro grant 1) new loans to the amount of US$ 4.4 billion; 
2) refinancing of public and private debt amortizations to the amount of US$ 4.8 billion; 3) maintenance of the shott-term loans of 
US$ 9.6 billion fot the financing of foteign trade operations; and 4) re-esrablishmenr of the inrer-bankcredit lines at rhe levels reached on 30 
June 1982 (US$ 10 billion). Poinrs 1 and 2 were accepred in February 1983 and poinr 3 larer; point 4 was never sertled. 
'In September 1983 an agreement was signed providing for the renegoriation of US$ 370 million of arrears and of amortization payments 
amounting to US$ 250 million which would fall due during 1983 and 1984. A trade credit equivalent to 50% of the interesr paymenrs disbursed 
in 1983 was also granred. The banks also agreed ro maintain shorr-term revolving credirs ro an amount of US$ 215 million, with a spread of 
,1 3/4% over LIBOR. 
•'In August 1982 a request was submitted for deferment of the external debt service paymenrs which were due robe made between Septembet 
1982 and Decembet 1983. the Banks also agreed ro mainrain the shott-term credit lines with a sptead of 1 1/4 % over LIBOR. 
'includes amortization of credits due to be disbursed during 1983 and 1984 (US$ 2 158 million) and the restructuring of shorr-term financial 
ctedits (US$ 1.3 billion). In February 1983 the inrernational banks authorized a moratorium up to April 1983 and then, by successive tollovets, 
up to January 1984. In thelattet month and in February 1984 the definitive debt tenegotiationagreements were signed. The maintenance of the 
short-term loans for rhe financing of foreign trade operations (US$ 1.7 billion) was also obrained, with a spread of 1 1/2 % over LIBOR. 
'in September 1983 decrees were signed authorizing the signarure of contracts fot the refinancing of public and privare debt amorrizations to 
the amount of USS 2.2 billion in the period November 1982 to December 1983. The agteement includes the maintenance of shott-term ctedit 
lines totalling US$ 700 million with a spread of 1 5/8 % over LIBOR. Between October 1982 and January 1983, by common accord wirh the 
cteditors, no paymenrs were made against the public debt. 
™ A note of understanding between the government and rhe crediror banks commirree was signed in February 1983, bur rhis agreemenr did nor 
come inro force because the banks refused to conrribute new financing equivalent to double the half-yearly ¡nreresr paymenrs falling due. Until 
the end of 1983 the govetnmenr kept up to date with intetest payments; the same was not the case with amortization payments on capital. 
" In August 1982 the international banks authorized a moratorium on public exrernal debr amortization payments for three monrhs, which was 
subsequently extended until March 1983 and later to August 1983. In the latter monrh and inSeprembet 1983 conrracts were signed for the 
refinancing of public exrernal debt amortization payments totalling US$ 19.83 billion. Latet on the amount restructured u nder rhe agreement 
reached US$ 23 billion. 
"During 1982 a renegoriation agreement for this amount was concluded. The tetms of the renegoriarion are similar to those originally 
conrracted in a debt rescheduling agreement the govetnmenr obrained in 1980. 
' I n addition shott-term credit lines totalling US$ 2 billion were renewed, with a spread of 1.5% over LIBOR. 
' In Septembet 1983 an agteement was concludedon the tefinancingof US$465 millionofshorr-rerm debr and US$ 100 millionof medium- and 
long-term debt. 
'Cottesponds to 90% of amorrizarion paymenrs on short- and medium-term credirs due to be made duting 1983 and 1984. In addition, shorr-
rerm credir lines amounting to US$81 million were maintained. At the beginning of March 1983 payments had been deferred for 90 days by 
agreemenr wirh the cteditor banks. In July 1983 an agreement was signed with 80 crediror banks. 
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reveal that in some cases the terms of the debt deteriorated spectacularly—between 175% and 
240%— because of its rescheduling. Column 10 in the same table shows that very substantial 
increases —of 20% or over— also occurred in the real financial cost of indebtedness in an appreciable 
number of cases. 
2. The second round of reschedulings 
Almost immediately after the first round of rescheduling a second began, originating in the operation 
of several factors (see table 42). In the first place, some countries had renegotiated only the payment 
of maturities falling due in 1983, with the addition, in some instances, of the arrears accumulated in 
1982. As the external sector remained sluggish, these countries opted for requesting the rescheduling 
of amortization payments that were due to be made in 1984. Secondly, there were some countries 
which, despite having initiated negotiations to reschedule their debt during the first round, for one 
reason or another did not reach the point of signing a final agreement. Lastly, as already mentioned, 
the private banks agreed to grant new credits, with which a part of the interest payments on the bank 
debt was refinanced under an arrangement which covered only one year's payment. Thus, both the 
countries that rescheduled their 1983-1984 maturities and those that requested a year's 
restructuration had to return to the negotiating table to fix the amounts and terms of the new credits 
that they needed to cover their financing requirements in 1984. 
Table 40 
LATIN AMERICA (SELECTED COUNTRIES): TERMS OF RESCHEDULING 
OF EXTERNAL DEBT TO PRIVATE BANKS 









































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures and data from various national and intetnationai sources. 
"Column R refers to rescheduled maturiries and column AC ro terms for additional credits. 
Calculared as a percentage of the rotal amount of rhe Transaction and paid once only at the time of signing the loan conrracts. It should be nored 
thar evidence has been found that some commissions were not declared, and consequently the figures could underestimare payments under this 
head. 
'At the end of 1983 the new Government of Argentina norified its intenrion to negotiare anorher debr rescheduling agreement, rhe terms of 
which would be better than those included in the present rabie. 
d During 1983 rhe renewal of short-term rrade credits was granted with a spread of 1.75% over LIBOR and for a term of three years. 
•"Nicaragua is continuing rhe rescheduling of its bank debt on the terms esrablished in an agreement signed in 1980. 
-^Nicaragua pays a maximum rate of 7%; the difference berween the interest rate in force and the 7% ceiling will be capitalized. 
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Table 41 
LATIN AMERICA (SELECTED COUNTRIES): DETERIORATION OF TERMS OF 
INDEBTEDNESS WITH PRIVATE BANKS 








































































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official data and information from various national and international sources. 
"The symbol R*AC represents a weighted average of the rescheduled credits and additional credits. 







in which: C= Commissions; P—Period; S= Spread over LIBOR, and in which subindex 1 
refers to the conditions existing in 1983 and subindex 0 to average terms in 1980-1981. All 
components of the formula are weighted by the amount of the loan. It should be noted that 
the deterioration is not in itself an indicator of the quality of a country's negotiation, since 
it is strongly influenced by the borrower's initial position. 
rA real annual LIBOR of 5% is assumed and C/P + S are added. 
dAt the end of 1983 the new Government of Argentina notified its intention to negotiate a new external debt rescheduling agreement. 
a) Tbe reduction of tbe banks' new commitments 
In 1984 the banks continued to pursue their policy of granting new loans to refinance a part of 
interest payments. However, there was a marked decline in this contribution. For example, in 1984 
Mexico has received new credits amounting to US$ 3.8 billion (a sum which represents a 6% 
expansion of the banks' commitments) in comparison with the US$ 5 billion obtained in 1983 
(equivalent to an increase of approximately 8% in the said commitments). In 1984 the new credits 
obtained by Chile were reduced to US$ 780 million as compared with US$ 1.3 billion in the preceding 
year, which implied that the growth rate of the banks' commitments fell from 11 % to 7 %. Similarly, 
there was a reduction of the credits granted to Ecuador and, up to mid-1984, Peru had received no new 
credits, after having been granted US$ 450 million in 1983 (see table 42). The only countries that 
obtained more credits in 1984 than in 1983 were Brazil —which received US$ 6.5 billion in 1984, as 
against US$ 4.4 billion in 1983— and Nicaragua, which apparently had the opportunity of organizing 
a new loan for US$ 200 million, after several years in which it had no access to new credit from the 
commercial banks. It must be stressed, however, that the increase in the financing obtained by Brazil 
was due to the fact that during the first round it was impossible to maintain the inter-bank credit lines 
to that country at the established levels. Accordingly, in the second round it was decided to substitute 
new medium-term credits for the short-term lines. 
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Table 42 
LATIN AMERICA (SELECTED COUNTRIES): RENEGOTIATION OF THE 
EXTERNAL DEBT WITH PRIVATE BANKS 
(SECOND ROUND OF RENEGOTIATIONS: 1983/1984)° 
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Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official data from countries and information from various national and international sources. 
"These data are provisional and subject to revision. The countries included are those that during 1983 did not conclude any formal external debt 
rescheduling agreement with private banks; others that during 1983 signed definitive or provisional agreements relating only to that year's 
maturities, and for those of 1984 began a second round of renegotiations; and countries that applied for new credits to refinance interest 
payments in 1984. 
Refers exclusively to each country's short-, medium- and long-term public and private debt with the private commercial banks that transmit 
information to the Bank for International Settlements. Accordingly, neither the debt with governments of official institutions is included, nor 
the debt with suppliers, nor the debt with commercial banks that do not transmit information to BIS. In some countries this last item is 
significant, and the figures could therefore underestimate the share of the banks in total external debt. 
'Refers to credits granted by the international banks as part of the renegotiation process. 
Refers to USS 14 billion corresponding to amortization payments on the public debt due in 1982-1984; interest payments to the amount of 
US$ 6 billion; and bridge credits for a sum of US$ 2 billion (estimate prepared in May 1984). The total amount includes the renegotiated 
public external debt mentioned in table 39, since the authorities never concluded a definitive agreement with the private banks. In mid-
December 1983 the new Government of Argentina asked the international banks for a moratorium on all amortization and interest payments 
up to 30 June 1984. 
e At the end of March 1984 the Governments of Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, Venezuela and the United States announced a package financing of 
US$ 500 million for the payment of interest on Argentina's external debt, of which US$ 300 million were provided by the above-mentioned 
countries, US$ 100 million by the commercial banks and US$ 100 million by the beneficiary government. The loans from the latin American 
countries are short-term bridge credits and will be replaced by a loan from the United States Treasury once Argentina reaches an agreement 
with IMF, 
includes maturities amounting to US$ 416 million and corresponding to the debt rescheduled by the banks in 1981, and US$ 225 million in 
amortization payments due within the period 1983-1985. In principle, the government reached an agreement with the foreign banks in mid-
1983, but it was conditional upon the approval of an agreement with IMF which up to May 1984 had not been signed. At the end of 1983 it was 
agreed that 50% of interest would be paid. In June 1984 the government notified its intention of temporarily deferring its amortization and 
interest payments. 
BIn November 1983 a final agreement was reached on financing which includes US$ 6.5 billion provided by the commercial banks, 
US$ 3.5 billion in the shape of refinancing by the Paris Club and US$ 2.5 billion in financing from State entities in the industrialized countries. 
Still in force, moreover, are short-term commercial credit lines to an amount of US$ 10.3 billion and short-term inter-bank credit lines 
amounting to US$ 6 billion. 
As from June 1983 Nicaragua for the first time stopped interest payments on the bank debt. In December an agreement was reached to 
refinance interest payments in arrears, which provides for capitalization of 100% of interest payments, amortization to begin as from the 
second semester of 1984. 
'Including the refinancing of US$ 610 million corresponding to the medium- and long-term debt and US$ 950 million corresponding to the 
short-term debt. 
3 Estimate on the basis of official data. 
At the end of March 1983 the international banks authorized a three months' moratorium on payments which was subsequently extended on 
four occasions. In April 1984 a sixth moratorium up to July 1984 was requested. Injune 1984 theGovernment pledged itself to settle part of the 
cumulative interest payments corresponding to the public and private sectors. 
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Table 43 
LATIN AMERICA (SELECTED COUNTRIES): TERMS OF RESCHEDULING 
OF THE EXTERNAL DEBT WITH THE PRIVATE BANKS 

























































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official data and information from various national and international sources, 
"These data are provisional and subject to revision. Column R felates to rescheduled maturities and column AC to terms for additional credits. 
Calculated as a percentage of the total amount of the transaction and paid once only on signing the loan contracts. It should be noted that 
evidence has been found that some commissions were not declared and the figures could therefore underestimate payments under this head. 
Table 44 
LATIN AMERICA (SELECTED COUNTRIES): DETERIORATION OF 
TERMS OF INDEBTEDNESS WITH THE PRIVATE BANKS 






































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official data and information from various national and international sources. 
"The symbol R*AC represents a weighted average of rescheduled credits and additional credits. 




in which: C= Commissions; P= Period; S= Spread over LIBOR an din which-subindex I 
refers to terms existing in 1983-1984 and subindex 0 to average terms in 1980-1981. All 
components of the formula are weighted by the amount of the loan. It should be noted that 
the deterioration in itself is not an indicator of the quality of a country's negotiation, since 
it is strongly influenced by the borrower's initial position. 
CA real annual LIBOR of 5% is assumed and C/P + S are added. 
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Several factors account for the decrease in the banks' new commitments. On the one hand, the 
private banks want to restrict the extent of their commitments in the Latin American countries, and 
are therefore seeking gradually to reduce the amount of new credits linked to each successive round of 
debt renegotiation. On the other hand, the countries of the region, faced both with the unwillingness 
of the banks to grant new resources and with the strict IMF targets designed to reduce financing 
requirements, have spectacularly compressed their imports, whereby they have succeeded in radically 
reducing the deficit on current account and, consequently, the need for new loans. Another factor of 
some importance is that certain countries are hoping to replace part of the bank financing with new 
disbursements by the official international credit institutions, such as IDB and the World Bank. 
b) Reduction of the negotiated price of credits 
As mentioned above, the first round of reschedulings was characterized by the abrupt 
deterioration of borrowing conditions. In the second round, on the other hand, the countries 
succeeded in obtaining somewhat more favourable terms. In table 43 it can be seen that for all 
countries both the spreads over LIBOR and the commissions were smaller, and that maturities were 
longer in the second round of renegotiation than in the first. Although the new debt terms were still 
burdensome in comparison with those prevailing in the credit market in 1980-1981, the relative 
deterioration in the conditions negotiated, as well as the financial cost, was much more moderate than 
in the first phase of the renegotiations (see columns 7 and 10 in table 44). 
But the relief provided to the Latin American countries by the decrease in the negotiated price 
of credit was largely neutralized by the appreciable rise which occurred after December 1983 in LIBOR, 
the basic interest rate over which debtors and creditors have no control. In fact, while the countries 
obtained a reduction of approximately half a percentage point in the spread over LIBOR during the 
second round of renegotiations, LIBOR itself increased two points between December 1983 and May 
1984, more than counteracting the benefits of the improvement in the negotiated price of credit.29 
It is interesting to note that it was the countries which decided to reprogramme only one year's 
maturity (1983) that were able to take most advantage of the new situation, since the softer 
conditions were applied not only to new credits obtained in 1984 but also to the rescheduled 1984 
maturities. On the contrary, the debtor countries that rescheduled the latter in advance during the 
first round of renegotiations had to comply with the more burdensome conditions negotiated on that 
occasion. 
29 It is estimated that if this increase in LIBOR persists for one year, it will signify additional payments on Latin America's external debt 
of at least US$ 5 billion, a sum equivalent to 6% of the value of the region's exports of goods in 1983. 
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PART THREE 




1. Recent economic trends: Introduction and summary 
Economic activity recovered slightly in 1983, though the increase of 2.8% in the gross domestic 
product only partially compensated for the severe falls in the two preceding years (see table 1). This 
incipient recovery had some special features. In the first place, the growth of the product was 
markedly slower than in previous periods of recovery. In the second place, real wages increased much 
more rapidly than production. Moreover, the improvement in industrial activity took place at the 
same time as a continuous fall in purchases from abroad, including those of intermediate goods. This 
untypical behaviour, which reflects the resubstitution of imports following the breakdown of the 
opening-up experiment, once again enabled a significant trade surplus to be achieved. This did not 
alleviate the difficult external payments situation, however, owing to the extremely high cost of the 
servicing of the debt. Moreover, the inflation rate went up again: the growth of consumer prices in 
1983 (430%) exceeded all previous records (see figure 1). Thus, despite the improvement in the rate 
of production and in real wages, and the drop in unemployment, the economy was still far from 
overcoming its already prolonged crisis. 
Economic policy was clearly transitory in character during 1983, since the announcement of 
elections for the month of October put a well-defined limit on government measures. Hence the 
economic authorities confined their objectives to an attempt to avoid brusque changes in the economy 
at a time when the critical situation of the external sector, the deterioration in activity and the 
sharpening of social tensions were simultaneously creating conditions of instability. 
At the beginning of the year the government negotiated an agreement with the IMF, as part of 
its programme for refinancing the external debt. This agreement involved a gradual reduction in the 
growth rate of prices, together with a slight recovery in the product and in real wages. No abrupt 
changes in relative prices were envisaged: there was to be a moderate increase in public service 
charges, and interest rates and the exchange rate were to keep in line with the evolution of prices. A 
reduction of the fiscal deficit and a gradual slackening of monetary expansion were also contemplated. 
Although initially the monetary and fiscal goals were more or less attained, already from the 
beginning of 1983 certain deviations from the agreed programme were observable. In particular, 
wages went up faster than had been foreseen, and the interest rates in the regulated market were 
markedly lower than inflation, while those of the free market attained very high levels. Moreover, 
since the policies were obviously so fragile, there were no clear guidelines to bring about a slowdown 
in price expectations. 
In fact, in the second half of the year, the original programme was overtaken by events. On the 
one hand, the rise in expenditure and the fall in revenue substantially increased the fiscal deficit, while 
the growth rate of wages quickened. At the same time, the renegotiation of the external debt ran into 
increasing difficulties, which culminated in September when a judicial decision ordered the cessation 
of the negotiations that some public enterprises had been conducting with the creditor banks. This led 
to a virtual suspension of payments abroad and to a brusque rise in the parallel exchange rate. The 
sum of the existing pressures, on the other hand, led to a sharp upswing in prices, which grew at an 
average rate of over 17% per month in the second half of the year. 
The authorities who took over the government in December were faced, therefore, with 
conditions of extreme instability. Furthermore, the poor performance of the economy in recent years 
led the majority currents of opinion to favour major changes in the policy approach, with a view to 
increasing domestic income and redistributing it to benefit the lower-income groups. The 
government announced that these would be their main objectives and that they would base their 
strategy for renegotiating the external debt and their programme of price stabilization on them. 
Thus, discussions were initiated with the IMF with a view to reaching an agreement which 
would facilitate the rescheduling of the payments abroad without causing a further contraction of the 
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economy. Changes in fiscal policy were also announced: the deficit in the public sector would be 
diminished by reducing certain expenditures (especially on defence and security), exercising greater 
control over tax evasion, and imposing higher taxation on income and wealth, while expenditure of a 
social nature would be increased. Control of the government financial imbalance, with a view to 
moderating monetary expansion, would be one of the components of the anti-inflationary 
programme; its other element would be the incomes policy. A large part of the initial decisions on 
economic policy were concerned with the establishment of guidelines for prices. In December a 
substantial wage increase was granted (a growth rate in real wages of around 7% was programmed 
for 1984), and measures to control industrial prices were adopted. It was also decided that the 
exchange rate, wages, interest rates, public service charges and controlled prices should be readjusted 
initially on the basis of schedules announced month by month. Thus a policy of gradual deceleration 
was adopted, in the hope that the expectations of the private sector would gradually adjust themselves 
so as to reconcile a fall in the inflation rate with a rise in the activity rate. 
Table 1 
ARGENTINA: MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS 
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983" 
Basic economic indicators 
Gross domestic product at market prices 
(millions of 1970 dollars) 
Population (millions of inhabitants) 
Per capita gross domestic product 
(1970 dollars) 
35 047 37 397 37 675 35 326 33 453 34 388 
27.4 27.8 28.2 28.7 29.2 29.6 
1 282 1 346 1 334 1 231 1 147 1 161 
B. Short-run economic indicators 
Gross domestic product 
Per capita gross domestic product 
Gross national income 
Terms of trade (goods and services) 
Current value of exports of goods 
and services 




Variation between annual averages 
Moneyc 
Industrial workers' wages 
Unemployment rate 
Current income of government 
Total expenditure of government 
Fiscal deficit/total expenditure of 
government' 
C. External sector 
Trade balance (goods and services) 
Balance on current account 
Balance on capital account 






















































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
"Preliminary figures. Gross domestic product plus terms-of-trade effect. 'Balances at end of year. Variation between 
annual averages. 'Simple average of the results of surveys for each year in the Federal Capital and Greater Buenos 
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Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official data. 
aAnnual growth rate. bAverage annual rate in the Federal Capital and in Greater Buenos 
Aires. OMimons 0f dollars. Percentages. 
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2. Trends in economic activity 
a) Total supply and demand 
Total supply went up by 2.5 % in 1983, since the growth of 2.8% in the product more than offset 
the drop of somewhat more than 2% in the volume of imports of goods and services. The recovery in 
the gross domestic product contrasted with the marked decreases it had suffered during the two 
preceding years (see table 2). Nonetheless, the aggregate volume of production was only similar to 
that of ten years earlier, which demonstrates the intensity of the recent crisis. The decline in imports, 
unusual in a period of increased activity, confirms the reversal of the trend towards economic 
openness already noted in 1982. The import coefficient, in fact, was over 40% less in 1983 than in the 
period 1980-1981 and was similar to that recorded, on average, in the period preceding the tariff and 
exchange-rate reforms of the late 1970s. 
The most dynamic component of total demand was exports of goods and services, which went 
up in volume by almost 10%. This was influenced by the notable increase ingrain sales. There was 
also an increase in consumption (4.7%), probably in response to the larger income of wage-earners 
and the negative real interest rates on bank deposits. 
In contrast, investment once more declined: the drop in private construction (-12.5%) more 
than offset the slight recovery in public construction and in expenditure on equipment. With these 
results, investment in construction was at its lowest since 1970. This meant still further depression in 
housing construction, which was affected by financial restrictions, by the reduced public activity in 
this field, and possibly by uncertainty as to future rent regulations. The slight increase in public 
construction, for its part, should be viewed in the light of the extremely low level recorded in 1982. In 
fact, the increased rate of execution of some works was sufficient to produce the slight growth 
referred to, even though no new projects of importance were initiated. Investment in equipment 
Table 2 
ARGENTINA: TOTAL SUPPLY AND DEMAND 
Total supply 
Gross domestic product 
at market prices 




























































Domestic demand 35 576 32 019 32 561 99.6 103.8 94.7 5.1 -9.0 -10.0 1.7 
Gross domestic investment 6 632 5 615 4 912 21.2 22.9 14.3 7.2 -23.1 -15.3 -12.5 




Machinery and equipment 






















































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures supplied by the Central Bank of Argentina. 
"Preliminary figures. The figures for exports and imports of goods and services were taken from balance-of-payments data expressed 




ARGENTINA: GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT, BY TYPE OF 
ECONOMIC ACTIVITY, AT FACTOR COST 
Gross domestic product 
Goods 
Agriculture, hunting, 
forestry and fishing 








Wholesale and retail trade 
restaurants and hotels 
Financial institutions, 
insurance, real estate 
and business services 
Ownership of dwellings 
Community, social and 
personal services 
Government services 




















































































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures supplied by the Central Bank of Argentina. 
"Preliminary figures. As the individual activities and the total were calculated independently, the sum of the former does not 
correspond exactly with the latter. 
likewise grew from very depressed values. Recovery was particularly noticeable in expenditure on 
transport equipment (15%), probably because of the increasing obsolescence of the existing stock. 
Purchases of machinery, on the other hand, rose by only slightly more than 3%, mainly thanks to the 
greater investments of the agricultural sector and scattered increases in capacity in some industrial 
branches. In addition —and as a reflection of the process of import resubstitution already indicated— 
there was a significant change in the origin of the capital goods incorporated: there was a pronounced 
fall in imported goods (-19%) while purchases of nationally produced goods rose by 22%. 
b) Evolution of the main sectors 
i) The agricultural sector. The agricultural product grew by almost 1% in 1983. This rise was 
due exclusively to the increase in livestock production, since, despite the excellent grain harvest of the 
1982/1983 season, the value added by crop farming actually declined slightly (see tables 3 and 4). 
The components of crop farming production displayed an uneven trend: the growth registered 
in fruits and cereals contrasted with the stagnation in the production of green vegetables and pulses 
and the decline in the production of oilseeds and industrial crops. 
The agricultural product assigned to 1983 in the calculation of the national accounts reflects, on 
the one hand, the harvesting activities of the 1982/1983 season and, on the other, the estimates of the 
activity on sowing, care of the crops and part of the harvesting of the 1983/1984 season. Hence, the 
variation in the value added does not necessarily coincide with the changes in the volume of goods 
marketed during the year. The discrepancy was especially marked in 1983: whereas the product 
generated by crop-farming activities typical of the pampa (cereals and oilseeds) declined slightly, the 
supply of goods of that origin reached an all-time record of 40 million tons (see table 5). 
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The exceptional volume of the 1982/1983 harvest was mainly due to the increased production 
of wheat, which came to 15 million tons. Throughout 1983 the relative prices of wheat tended to go 
down, as a result of the fall in the real exchange rate and international price levels (the prices in the 
world market declined by 20% between the sowing months of 1982 and those of 1983). As a result of 
this the area sown was reduced for the 1983/1984 season, and this, coupled with the smaller yields for 
climatic reasons, probably means a smaller supply of this cereal in 1984. In contrast, the improvement 
in the international prices of maize (64%), sorghum (33%), soya (15%) and sunflowerseed (20%) 
stimulated an increase in the areas devoted to these crops. 
The fall in the product of industrial crops was due to the decline in cotton-growing, since there 
was increased production of sugar cane, tobacco and tea. This lower production of cotton was due to 
the low prices recorded in 1982 —which discouraged sowing— and to the poor yields obtained. With 
the fall in the supply, domestic prices rose markedly in 1983, which resulted in a considerable 
expansion of the area cultivated for the 1983/1984 season. As there was a general rise in domestic and 
international prices for industrial crops, a major increase in production is forecast for the agricultural 
year 1983/1984. 
Table 4 
ARGENTINA: INDICATORS OF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION 
Gross product of agricul-










































Source: Central Bank of Argentina. 
"Preliminary figures. The growth rates were calculated on the basis of non-rounded data. 
cIncludes also agricultural construction, hunting, forestry and timber extraction. 
Table 5 
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Prices of steers in 
comparison with: 
Industrial Weat 



















Source: Ministry of Agriculture, National Meat Board and ECLAC, on the basis of Official data. 
"At 1st July. Total slaughtering for the period. 'Slaughtering for the period as a percentage of the stocks at 1st July. 
Average for the period. 'Slaughtering controlled by the National Mead Board, which represents between 77Çf and 80'/t of the total 
(registered) commercial slaughtering. 1970 pesos. ^Kilogrammes of wheat per kilogramme of live 
steer. Preliminary figures and projections. 
Livestock production increased as a result of the build-up in stocks of cattle, but activity declined 
in the milk and wool sectors, while the production of poultry and eggs remained more or less stable. 
Between mid-1982 and mid-1983 the stocks of cattle increased by around a million head (see 
table 6). This was due to a notable reduction in slaughtering (which fell from 14.1 million head in the 
stock-raising year 1981/1982 to 11.4 million in 1982/1983), with repercussions both on domestic 
consumption (which sank to 64 kg per inhabitant per year in 1982/1983 compared with 79 kg in 
1981/1982) and on exports (460 000 tons compared with 565 000 tons in the preceding stock-raising 
year). The process of reduction of slaughtering reached its peak at the end of 1982; from then 
onwards slaughtering began to increase, though it did not exceed the gross additions to the stock. In 
the course of 1983, however, a change occurred in the composition of demand. Exports, which had 
become increasingly difficult to place, declined to a level representing at the end of the year an annual 
equivalent volume of around 300 000 tons; in contrast, domestic demand tended to strengthen, so 
that consumption in the fourth quarter easily exceeded 70 kg per inhabitant per year. 
The relative prices of cattle had notably increased in 1982. In 1983, however, they declined, 
owing partly to the fall in the real exchange rate and partly to the low international prices. The 
recovery in sales to the domestic market in the second half of the year coincided with a fall in export 
demand and with a seasonal increase in supply, so that it did not affect prices. At all events, cattle 
prices seem to have remained at levels which encouraged the retention of stocks, particularly when 
compared with the prices of goods competing for the use of land, such as wheat. 
In recent years there have been important changes in the pampa sector of agriculture. Between 
1977 and 1982 there was an appreciable fall in the cattle stocks of this region, while the long-standing 
decline in stocks of sheep continued and there was only a slight growth in the area devoted to crops. 
All this suggests a fall in the capital assigned to production, probably associated with the rise in 
interest rates and the relatively unattractive rate of return obtainable in the agricultural sector. This 
rise had a further effect in the reduction of purchases of investment goods by the sector. The 
incentives for crop farming persisted in spite of the unfavourable prices, owing to the improvements 
recorded in productivity, which markedly increased the profitability of crop farming as compared 
with livestock. 
This change in the relative productivity of the two subsectors seems to have continued in 1983. 
Nonetheless, the retention of cattle, although less marked than in former periods of recovery of 
stocks, seems to indicate a definite trend: the very reduction of stocks that has occurred in recent years 
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generates expectations of higher prices and stimulates investment in livestock areas. Additionally, 
the growth of cattle stocks from 1982 has not diminished the area cultivated, as happened in earlier 
cycles. This indicates an increase in the receptivity of farmland, in contrast with what happened in 
1977-1982, a period in which, in particular, there was no renewal of pastures. Hence investment in 
the sector appears to be increasing: an impression which is confirmed by the appreciable rise in 
purchases of pesticides, fertilizers and tractors in 1983. 
ii) Mining. The product of the mining and quarrying sector rose by 2.2% compared with the 
depressed values of 1982 (see table 7). Petroleum production did not change significantly, since the 
greater activity of Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales only offset the smaller contribution of the 
contracting enterprises. In contrast, the amount of natural gas of local origin fed in at the head of the 
gas pipelines increased appreciably ( 15 % ), while the production of marketable coal declined owing to 
the lower yield of the coal extracted and an accident at the Rio Turbio mines. 
In recent years there has been an increase in the identified reserves of natural gas, which has 
come to be the non-renewable energy resource in relatively greatest supply. It is planned to stimulate 
the replacement of oil with gas, and this has been reflected in the greater use of gas as a fuel in electric 
power stations and in industry and in the project for the production of synthetic naphtha; there are 
also plans for greater industrial use of this resource. 
iii) Manufacturing. The recovery of almost 10% in industrial activity accounted for four-fifths 
of the growth registered in the total gross product. Thus in 1983, in contrast with what had been 
happening since 1980, industry increased its share in the aggregate product (see table 3). 
Nonetheless, the increase in industrial production, although it marked a definite break with the 
previous downward trend, only very partially offset the loss suffered during the period of contraction. 
As a result, the industrial gross domestic product in 1983 was still lower than that of any year between 
1971 and 1980. 
There were two main causes for the increase in production: on the one hand, the renewal of 
domestic demand, particularly for durable consumer goods; on the other, the resubstitution of 
imports, which had already begun to take place in the previous year. Thus, purchases abroad of final 
goods went down appreciably, in response to the higher relative price of foreign exchange (compared 
with that of the period of "exchange lag") and to the ever-increasing administrative restrictions. This 
enabled local industry to increase its share in the market. Moreover, both the rising prices of imports 
and the expectation of a continued scarcity of foreign exchange seem to have induced many 
enterprises to turn to local producers of inputs, in order to ensure a stable supply. 
Thus there has been a partial reversal of the effects of the tariff liberalization and the 
overvaluation of the exchange rate subsequent to 1978. Even so, the consequences of those policies 
have continued to condition industrial growth. 
On the one hand, the resubstitution of the last two years has reduced competing imports to a 
minimum; the remaining purchases abroad consist of intermediate and capital goods not produced 
Table 7 
ARGENTINA: INDICATORS OF MINING PRODUCTION 
Gross mining product at factor 
cost (millions of 1970 dollars) 









































Source: Central Bank of Argentina and Department of Fuels. 
"Preliminary figures. The growth rates were calculated on the basis of non-rounded figures. 'Millions of 
m3. Thousands of tons. 'After deduction of imports. 
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ARGENTINA 
locally, which are complementary to the activity of the national industries. Thus it is probable that in 
the future the traditional positive association between local production and imports will be restored: 
in that case the supply of foreign exchange, limited by the payments of the external debt, would be one 
of the main constraints on expansion. 
On the other hand, the intense contractive forces operating in recent years led to a certain 
disarticulation of the industrial system: a portion of its capital assets was scrapped —although some 
sectors increased their capacity and there was a certain advance in the application of more modern 
technologies— while numerous firms suffered setbacks and either closed down or drastically reduced 
their quota of specialized personnel. These losses affect the capacity of recovery of industry. 
Moreover, the prolonged crisis of the sector led to the overindebtedness of many firms, even 
though this was to some extent corrected by the decline in the real value of debts in the regulated 
segment of the credit market, which took place in the latter part of 1982 and in 1983-
Notwithstanding, the extremely high interest rates outside the banking system indicate that 
difficulties in the financing of current production and investment still remain. 
It is probable that the instability that has characterized the Argentine economy also constitutes 
a brake on sustained recovery. In the course of 1983 industrial production did not grow continously, 
but fluctuated month by month and tended to slow down towards the end of the year. The variability 
in demand deriving from erratic price movements, and the changes in the incentives to maintain 
stocks caused by the trends of interest rates and the inflationary expectations of the entrepreneurs 
themselves, might partly explain this behaviour. 
The relative prices of the different sectors of industry also registered fluctuations. At all events, 
the ratio between prices and variable costs seems to have tended to narrow during the first nine 
months of the year, since the rapid increase in wages more than offset the lower real values of 
agricultural and imported inputs. The price-fixing policy of the enterprises was also influenced by the 
existence of controls which, although not rigorously applied, appear to have had a moderating effect 
during the first part of the year. However, the prospect of a stricter policy on the part of the new 
authorities gave rise to "pre-emptive" price increases over and above the rise in costs during the last 
quarter. 
The most dynamic industrial branches in 1983 were machinery and equipment and textiles, 
which had already given signs of recovery in the second half of the preceding year. There was a 
general growth of activity, however: all the subsectors increased their production except the wood 
industry (see table 8). 
The food sector registered a slight increase, although continuing to operate at very low levels. 
The slaughtering of beef cattle went down by 5.3%, as a result of the reconstitution of cattle stocks 
already mentioned and the fall in exports. The drop in sales abroad particularly affected the frozen 
meat industry, to the extent of causing the closure of some cold-storage plants. In contrast, the other 
food industries experienced a marked improvement of close on 5%, which was probably induced by 
the greater demand of wage-earners and the ample supply of various agricultural raw materials. This 
last explains in particular the excellent results registered in the production of vegetable oils. 
The textile industry grew by 14%, although its product was still 20% lower than in 1970. There 
was a greater demand for articles of clothing, which also affected the production of intermediate 
goods, thanks to the substitution of imports. 
As mentioned above, the wood industry was the only one which recorded a decline. This was due 
both to the shrinkage of demand (associated with the sluggishness of construction) and to difficulties 
in the supply of raw materials: there were serious floods in the forestry areas and problems in the 
acquisition of imported woods. 
The production of the paper and printing branch, which had already increased in 1982, 
increased again by 5.5%. In this branch there was rapid substitution of imports; in particular, the 
starting up of a new plant at the end of 1982 contributed to the notable increase in the production of 
pulp and paper recorded during the year. 
The resubstitution of imports also explains in part the growth of the chemical industry. The 
domestic demand for these goods was increased, in addition, by the demand for inputs by the other 
industrial activities and by the growth of purchases of agricultural chemicals by the rural sector. In the 
petrochemical industry there was considerable use of the installed capacity, owing to the increased 
sales to the domestic market and to the export of basic products; however, more highly processed 
products continued to be imported. 
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The iron and steel sector continued to stagnate in its primary stages —output of pig iron and 
sponge iron declined by almost 1.5% and that of crude steel grew by barely 0.4%— but there was an 
increase in the production of rolled goods. There was only a slight increase in the output of non-flat 
rolled products, in keeping with the reduced demand of the construction sector, but there was a 
marked rise in the output of flat rolled products to supply the other machinery and equipment 
industries. Exports, which had come to be appreciable, declined in 1983 owing to the shrinkage of 
international markets; towards the end of the year the United States applied restrictive measures 
against sales of Argentine products. Production of non-ferrous metals increased in 1983, with 
particularly notable growth in the output of aluminium. 
The metal-products industries showed a generalized increase, both in the branches supplying 
the capital goods market and in those that produce durable consumer goods. In the first case, the 
outstanding feature was the rise of 70% in the manufacture of tractors, attributable to the increased 
agricultural income and to the need to renew existing resources after several years of very low 
investment. The motor-vehicle industry, for its part, increased its production by almost 2 1 % , owing 
to the greater sales of commercial vehicles and of cars, especially those of larger size. Despite this, the 
sales of motor vehicles were the lowest since 1970, with the sole exception of the year 1982. A similar 
trend was observed in the production of domestic electrical appliances, the value of which increased, 
but without recovering the levels recorded before the recession. 
iv) Construction. The product of the construction sector declined for the third year running, 
this time by almost 7% (see table 3). This represented a continuation of the declining trend which 
had begun in 1978 and was only interrupted by a slight recovery in 1980. As a result, the construction 
product in 1983 came to only 60% of its maximum historical value and was 10% lower than that of 
ten years earlier. 
The fall recorded in 1983 was due entirely to the deterioration in the private construction sector 
(-16%) since activity in public works experienced a slight increase (3%). The latter was not the result 
of the execution of important projects, since there were once again severe budgetary restrictions; the 
Table 8 
ARGENTINA: INDICATORS OF MANUFACTURING PRODUCTION 
Gross manufacturing product at 
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Source: Central Bank of A tgentina; Centro de Industriales Metalúrgicos; Asociación de Fabricantes Automotores, and Asociación de Fabricantes 
Tractores. 
"Preliminary figures. The growth rates were calculated on the basis of non-rounded figures. f Thousands of tons, Includes 
sponge iron. 'Total of finished rolled products in terms of hot-rolled products. 'Thousands of units, gNumber of units 




ARGENTINA: INDICATORS OF CONSTRUCTION ACTIVITY 
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539 396 324 310 -26.5 -18.2 -4.3 
Source: National Institute of Statistics and Censuses; Asociación de Fabricantes de Cemento Portland, and Instituto Argentino de Siderurgia. 
"Preliminary figures. Thousands of square metres. c First 11 months. Thousands of tons. 
increase seems rather attributable to progress on construction projects already begun and to increased 
expenditure in some provinces. 
Housing construction continued depressed, despite the tax incentives for the purchase of new 
houses. Official activity in the housing field did not show any significant recovery. The demand of the 
private sector, for its part, was affected by the scarcity of finance and probably also by uncertainty as to 
the future rent regulations. The reduced demand was reflected in the drop in building permits 
granted, which was particularly acute in the Federal Capital (see table 9). Furthermore, the sale prices 
of housing declined in relation to the costs of construction, especially in the latter part of the year. 
v) Electricity. The generation of electric energy grew by more than 7%: there was increased 
production in hydroelectric and nuclear power stations, which offset the fall in generation by thermal 
sources, whose share of total production fell to approximately 42%. In the course of 1983 several 
important additions were made to the generating facilities: the hydroelectric stations of Agua del 
Toro and Los Reyunos and the nuclear power station of Embalse Río III were put into operation, while 
several thermal plants were enlarged. 
3. The external sector 
a) General evolution, and financing of the balance-of-payments deficit 
In 1983 trade in goods registered a surplus of somewhat more than US$ 3 600 million, 
equivalent to close on 4 7 % of the value of exports (see table 10). This was possible owing to a 
reduction of almost 16% in purchases of goods, and was achieved despite the unfavourable evolution 
of the international markets —which caused a new fall in the terms of trade of nearly 3 % — and the 
difficulties in finding a market for exports, especially those of meat and industrial products. The 
merchandise trade result therefore reflects an appreciable savings effort. Nevertheless, it only 
managed to offset two-thirds of the deficit generated by the servicing of debts. This deficit rose to 
close on US$ 5 400 million and its main component —net interest payments— amounted in 1983 to 
more than half the value of exports of goods and services (see table 11). 
This heavy burden and rapid growth of interest payments had two causes: the large amount and 
rapid increase of the external debt (which in 1982 equalled more than five years of export income and 
around 50% of the annual product), and the very high international interest rates. The combined 
85 
Table 10 
ARGENTINA: BALANCE OF PAYMENTS 
(Millions of dollars) 
Balance on current account 
Trade balance 
Exports of goods and services 
Goods FOB 
Real services 
Transport and insurance 
Travel 
Imports of goods and services 
Goods FOB 
Real services 







Unrequited private transfer payments 
Balance on capital account 
Unrequited official transfer payments 
Long-term capital 
Direct investment (net) 
Portfolio investment (net) 














Errors and omissions (net) 
Global balance 
Total variation in reserves 
(- sign indicates an increase) 
Monetary gold 
Special Drawing Rights 
IMF reserve position 
Foreign exchange assets 
Other assets 


























































































































































































































































































































Source: 1977-1982: International Monetary Fund, Balance of Payments Yearbook, (magnetic tape, May 1984); 1983: ECLAC, on the basis of 
official data. 
"Preliminary figures. Real services also include other official and private transactions, but not factor services. cInaddition to 
loans received and amortization payments made, this entry includes net loans granted and other assets and liabilities. The global 
balance is the sum of the current account balance plus the balance on capital account. The difference between total variation in reserves (of 
opposite sign) and the global balance represents counterpart items: monetizationofgold, allocation of Special Drawing Rights, and variations 




ARGENTINA: REGISTERED EXTERNAL DEBT (AT END OF YEAR) 
1978 1979 1980 
Millions of dollars 
12 496 19 034 27 162 
8 357 9 960 14 459 















External debt/exports of 
goods and services 167 207 275 329 484 485 
Net interest/exports of 
goods and services 5 5 10 27 49 53 
Debt falling due within 
the next two years 53 56 60 58 59 
Source: Central Bank of Argentina. 
"Includes the registered external debt plus arrears for other items. Preliminary estimates. 
effect of these two circumstances was to increase the vulnerability of the economy in the face of 
changes in the international credit markets. On the one hand, the level of real interest rates —un-
usually high in relation to historical values, and also aggravated by the appreciable spreads applied to 
the debts of countries like Argentina— hampers the repayment of the capital; on the other hand, the 
magnitude of debt servicing causes the availability of the foreign exchange required to sustain 
domestic growth to be very sensitive to variations in the cost of credit. Hence it is doubtful whether 
the present conditions of external financing are compatible with development. 
As a result of the heavy burden of payments of interest and profits, the balance-of-payments 
current account had a deficit of almost US$ 2 600 million. Capital movements produced a net income 
of around US$ 1 600 million, which may be attributed to the procurement of new compensatory loans 
on the part of the Central Bank and to the issue of external bonds, but on the other hand the inflow of 
capital to public enterprises was only small and the operations of the private sector produced a net 
outflow of capital. Despite the fact that capital transactions did not offset the deficit on current 
account, there was an increase in the international reserves owing to a variation in counterpart items 
arising from the revaluation of the gold reserves of the Central Bank (see table 10). 
The economic policy aimed at balancing the external accounts had three main aspects: the 
negotiations for refinancing the debt, the management of the exchange rate and the administration of 
external trade. 
At the end of 1982 the external debt situation was causing urgent problems: there would be a 
large number of maturities in the near future; it was foreseeable that the interest to be paid would 
exceed the surplus obtainable from the trade in goods, and arrears of payment had built up. The 
authorities sought to arrange refinancing through agreements with the IMF and with the private 
international banks. In this way a crisis in the payments situation was avoided. Nevertheless, the 
negotiations were difficult and their results were only provisional. Thus, at the end of the year, the 
new government faced another round of hard bargaining with the creditors. 
In the last days of 1982 a credit of US$ 1 100 million was agreed with a group of banks with a 
view to regularizing the arrears of payment. The interest rate on this loan was fixed with a spread of 
1.75% over LIBOR, • and disbursement was made conditional on the signing of a stand-by agreement 
with the IMF. This agreement, which was concluded in January 1983, included a line of credit for 
US$ 1 620 million, along with a loan of US$ 580 million in compensation for the fall in exports. 
'When the agreed commission and other expenses are included, the spread amounted to close to three percentage points. 
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Fulfilment of the economic policy goals established with the IMF was one of the conditions for a 
further loan of US$ 1 500 million negotiated the previous year with the creditor banks. The 
disbursement of these credits was not fully realized, not only because the government did not succeed 
in carrying out the programme agreed with the IMF, but also because the negotiations with private 
creditors ran into legal and political difficulties. In particular, delicate situations arose in connection 
with the bankruptcy law, which accorded priority to domestic creditors, and also in respect of the 
tribunals to which possible litigation would be submitted. This last point paralysed the refinancing of 
the debt of the public enterprises, since a ruling of a local court prohibited the signing of contracts that 
would involve the submission of disputes to non-Argentine courts. 
The rescheduling of the loans obtained by the private sector with exchange insurance also ran 
into difficulties. Finally, a large part of these debts was taken over by the State, which issued bonds for 
a five-year term for close on US$ 5 500 million. A similar system was used to regularize the US$ 1 500 
million of "swap" transactions. In this case, the debts were refinanced for a three-year period. Thus, 
although an appreciable part of the external debt was originally contracted by the private sector, a 
growing portion of the commitments with the exterior was taken over by the government. 
The programme agreed with the IMF provided that the exchange rate would remain more or 
less stable in real terms and that foreign exchange transactions would be gradually liberalized during 
the year. In the event, the devaluation rate was lower than the rise in domestic prices, especially in the 
first half of 1983, even though the real exchange rate remained substantially higher than during the 
"exchange lag" period of 1979-1981 (see table 12). On the other hand, in the first part of the year 
there was some relaxation of exchange controls: the minimum period for import payments was 
reduced and the remittance of profits, dividends and royalties was permitted through the use of 
external bonds. Nevertheless, restrictions were subsequently reimposed; indeed, the crisis already 
mentioned in the negotiations on the official debt led in October to a virtual suspension of payments 
abroad. 
The variable evolution of the exchange regulations and of the negotiations with foreign 
creditors was reflected in the parallel foreign exchange market. The exchange rate in this market 
grew more slowly than the official exchange rate in the first half of the year, so that the gap between 
the quotations of the dollar in the two markets fell to less than 20% in June, but the differential 
increased sharply in the following months and went up to over 7 5 % towards the end of October. 
After the elections, however, there was a fall in the demand for foreign exchange, as a result of which 
between October and the end of the year the parallel exchange rate declined in nominal figures, 
bringing the exchange gap down to around 15%. Thus, although with differing intensity during the 
year, there continued to be incentives for the evasion of exchange controls, and the possibility that 
there have been over- or underdeclarations of transactions in foreign exchange should be taken into 
account in interpreting the figures on external trade. 
Table 12 
ARGENTINA: EVOLUTION OF THE EXCHANGE RATE AND PRICES"6 
_ . Index of trade 
Exchange . D . . d 
rate 
(pesos per 
prices Relative prices 
(dollars) 
dollars)c _ T Of exported Of imported Exports Imports goods goods 
1980 0.184 135.1 155.7 56.5 64.8 
1981 0.442 134.5 148.1 60.6 67.3 
1982 2 193 113.5 139.7 74.8 91.8 
1983 10 546 106.1e 133.6e 78.5e 98.3C 
Source: ECLAC Office in Buenos Aires, on the basis of official data. 
"All the indexes have as their base 1974= 100. Excluding adjustments for taxes, surcharges, reimbursements or other fiscal or financial 
incentives. 'From B September 1982 this includes the effective exchange rate which resulted from a combination of the trade 
exchange rate (85%) and financial exchange rate (15%). From 1 October 1982 the weightings were 80% and 20% respectively. From 
November 1982 a single exchange rate has been applied once more. The deflator employed is the wholesale price index of non-
agricultural domestic goods. The annual values are simple averages of quarterly relative prices. In the base year, 1974, multiple exchange rates 
were in force. The indexes have been calculated with reference to the "combined" rates for non-promoted exports and for 




ARGENTINA: MAIN FOREIGN TRADE INDICATORS 








Terms of trade (goods) 













































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
"Preliminary figures. 
b) External trade 
i) Exports. After the sharp fall suffered the previous year, the value of exports of goods rose by 
1.5% in 1983. This increase was due entirely to the expansion of almost 10% in the volume of sales, 
which more than offset the considerable fall which occurred once again in their unit value (see 
table 13). 
The growth in exports was due to the bigger sales of products of agricultural origin, which 
increased remarkably to over 60% of total sales. In particular, there was a notable increase in exports 
of cereals (see table 14). Wheat sales were especially high as a result of the record harvest obtained in 
the 1982/1983 agricultural year. There was also an increase in sales of maize, but the volume of 
sorghum exported declined slightly. On average, cereal prices showed only a very slight variation in 
relation to the 1982 values, for the drop in the price of wheat offset the rise in those of maize and 
sorghum. Towards the end of the year, however, there was a rapid improvement in prices, probably 
caused by the reduction in the supply from North America. There was also some recovery in oilseed 
prices towards the end of 1983 and this, coupled with the abundant domestic supply of raw materials, 
contributed to the 12% increase in the value of exports of this item. 
In contrast, there was a pronounced fall in the sales of products of stock-raising origin. Exports 
of meat in particular suffered a sharp decline for the third year running, and their value did not reach 
US$ 600 million, compared with a total of almost US$ 1 000 million registered three years 
previously. This was mainly due to the contraction in external demand and to the policy of the EEC, 
which not only appreciably reduced its imports of Argentine meat, but has also begun to compete in 
third-country markets with highly subsidized products. 
During 1983 there was also a sharp fall (-28%) in the value of industrial exports, as a result of 
decreases in both their volume and average prices. Moreover, the contraction in the Value of sales 
extended to all the main groups of products. The main causes of this decline were the reduced demand 
from other Latin American countries and the recovery of the domestic market. There was a 
pronounced decline in exports of iron and steel products, which, as already stated, suffered from 
depressed international demand and also, towards the end of the year, the imposition of restrictive 
measures by the United States. There was likewise a decline in sales of processed foods, owing to the 
drastic fall in their prices. On the other hand, the prices of chemical products went up, though not 
enough to offset the contraction in the volumes exported. 
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ii) Imports. The value of imports of goods went down for the third year running, this time by 
16% (see table 15). This fall was not due to a lower level of activity, but rather to the substitution of 
imported products prompted by the successive devaluations, the administrative controls, and 
apparently also the increasing difficulty in obtaining commercial credit from abroad. 
As happened in the two preceding years, the most marked decreases occurred in purchases of 
final goods. Thus, imports of consumer goods came to only US$ 240 million, whereas in 1980 they 
had amounted to close on US$ 1 900 million. Thus, external purchases of durable consumer goods 
which compete with local products, and which had previously been stimulated by a policy of tariff 
reduction, were reduced to a minimum. There was also a further sharp fall (-15%) in imports of 
capital goods, so that their volume barely exceeded a third of the value they had achieved in 1980 (see 
table 15). 
For their part, imports of intermediate goods suffered a decline (-8% with respect to 1982 and -
40% with respect to 1980) which was generalized but less abrupt than that of the other groups of 
products. This was partly due to the recovery of local supply and also to some reduction in stocks 
which apparently took place towards the end of the year. 
The import régime aimed to reconcile an adequate supply of inputs for local industry with 
discouragement of purchases abroad. Requirements for prior authorization and minimum payment 
periods were applied (although importers could make purchases by using external bonds or their own 
funds already placed abroad). The restrictions were increased in October, as a result of the failure of 
the negotiations on the external debt. This meant that the difficulties in obtaining letters of credit 
also increased. At the end of the year the new government established a temporary system for 
imports. Three lists of products were defined: the first comprised products regarded as essential, 
imports of which would be authorized almost automatically; the second list would require prior 
permission; while imports of the products on the third list were provisionally suspended. 
Table 14 





Wool, animal hair 
and horsehair 
Hides and skins 









Other industrial products 
Source: ECLAC Office in Buenos Aires, on the basis of official figures. 
"Preliminary figures. 
Millions of dollars 
at current prices 
1981 1982 1983° 


































2 345 2 328 1 670 
618 551 363 
1 727 1 777 1 307 
Percentage 
breakdown 
1970 1980 1983" 


































13.6 26.6 21.6 
0.4 3.5 4.7 
13.2 23.1 16.9 
Growth rates 
1981 1982 1983° 


































10.1 -0.7 -28.3 
120.7 -10.8 -34.1 




ARGENTINA: VALUE AND COMPOSITION OF IMPORTS OF GOODS 
Total 
Capital goods 
Fuels and lubricants 
Intermediate goods 
Chemical products, 
plastics and rubber 
Paper and pulp 
Metals and metal prod-
ucts, electrical equipment 
and components, spare 
parts machinery and 
transport equipment 
Other intermediate goods 
Consumer goods 
Millions of dollars 








































































































Source: Central Bank of Argentina and ECLAC Office in Buenos Aires. 
a Preliminary figures. 
4. Prices, wages and employment 
a) Prices 
The rate of inflation accelerated again in 1983, until it reached the highest annual values ever 
recorded: the consumer price index rose by 434%, while wholesale prices increased by 411% (see 
table 16). Throughout the year, moreover, there was a clear upward trend in the variation of prices. 
Thus, in the first six months, theCPI increased at an average rate of around 12.5% per month, but the 
figure rose to over 17% in the second half of 1983. 
Argentina has known periods in which the inflation rates have been extremely high; in some 
cases the growth in prices even exceeded 50% per month. These brusque increases were generally 
associated with sudden changes in economic policy, which signified drastic adjustments in the 
exchange rate. This was not the case in 1983; in fact, it is difficult to identify a single "shock" as the 
sole cause of the sharp rise in prices. The inflation in 1983 was rather the result of a confused process 
in which the political weakness of the government was combined with social pressures and the 
absence of clear guidelines for the expectations of the individual agents. 
In the first part of the year the economic policy aimed at a gradual slowdown of inflation. The 
agreement signed with the IMF put limits on monetary and fiscal expansion, and these were initially 
observed. At the same time, wages, the exchange rate and public service charges went up month by 
month, according to a system which took into account the inflation rate registered and official 
estimates of the future growth of prices. Likewise a system of control was established on the prices of 
the larger enterprises, which were compensated by being given credit facilities at the regulated 
interest rate. 
Although it continued to display sharp fluctuations, the inflation rate declined for some 
months: thus, in May the monthly variation of the CPI fell below 10% for the first time since mid-
1982. Even so, this did not suffice to produce expectations of greater stability, since both the evolution 
of prices and the economic policy itself seemed subject to changes which were difficult to foresee. The 
rise in the price of meat in June, owing in part to seasonal factors, contributed to a further rise in the 
rate of variation of the CPI and produced expectations of new increases. In addition, as the moment of 
the elections approached, the fragility of the anti-inflationary policy became manifest: the fiscal 
deficit increased appreciably (exceeding the terms of the agreement with the IMF), wage increases 
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accelerated, and the sharp rise in the parallel exchange rate further strenghtened, the spiralling 
upward trend. Moreover, the prospect of the application of stricter controls by the new authorities 
created incentives to make pre-emptive price increases. Thus, as of September there was a general 
upsurge of inflation. The growth rate of the CPI exceeded 20% in that month and came close to that 
figure two months later. 
The variability of the inflation was linked with probably erratic changes in relative prices. 
Nonetheless, some pattern can be identified in the movements during 1983. Prices of industrial 
goods, in particular, rose more rapidly than those of imported products and goods of agricultural 
origin (see table 16). This was partly due to the lag in the devaluation rate in relation to price 
increases, to the adjustments of industrial prices in anticipation of more rigid controls, and also to an 
increased supply of beef. The relative prices of public services, for their part, which had originally 
been increased as a policy objective, were indeed higher than the average for 1982, but they declined in 
the latter part of the year owing to the decision of the outgoing authorities to avoid social tensions in 
the period prior to the elections and the transfer of government. 
b) Wages and employment 
Real wages rose substantially in 1983, after a prolonged period in which they had suffered 
serious losses. The recovery was general, being observable both in industrial wages and in the service 
and public administration sectors: thus, while the real average wage of workers in manufacturing 
increased by around 23%, that of public employees rose by over 17% (see table 17). 
This behaviour was probably due to two main factors. In the first place, the increase in activity, 
especially in the manufacturing sector, increased the demand for labour. In the second place, the trade 
unions were able to act with fewer constraints, so that they succeeded in exerting sufficient pressure 
to obtain rises in remunerations. Hence, the income policy that the government had proposed to 
adopt to Regulate wages was forced to yield in the face of these heavy pressures. 
Table 16 
ARGENTINA: EVOLUTION OF DOMESTIC PRICES 
Consumer prices 
Food and beverages 
Clothing 







Food and beverages 
Clothing 
























































































ARGENTINA: EVOLUTION OF WAGES AND SALARIES 
1979 1980 1981 
Average real wage of manufacturing workers 
Variation between annual averages 14.8 12.0 -10.2 






Average real salary of public employees 












Source: ECLAC Office in Buenos Aires, on the basis of official data. 
"Preliminary figures. 
Table 18 
ARGENTINA: EVOLUTION OF EMPLOYMENT AND UNEMPLOYMENT 












































































Source: National institute of Statistics and Censuses and Ministry of the Economy. 
"Preliminary figures. 
The new authorities, for their part, increased all wages in December by a fixed sum which 
substantially raised the wages of the lower-income strata. At the same time a change was made in the 
method of calculating the complementary annual salary, which also meant an appreciable rise in the 
remunerations received at the end of the year. The authorities also announced a policy of monthly 
adjustments with a view to raising real wages by around 7% in 1984. 
In keeping with the improvement in the level of activity, during 1983 there was a rise in 
employment of labour. The average unemployment rate in Greater Buenos Aires fell to 4 % in 
comparison with the 4 .7% rate recorded in 1982, and in October it even dropped to 3 .1% (see 
table 18). There was also a fall in underemployment. Employment in manufacturing, however, 
increased only slightly (3.3%), although the growth in the number of hours worked was somewhat 
greater. This suggests that business was cautious in taking on new personnel. Furthermore, the 
drastic fall in manufacturing employment throughout several years seems to have reduced the supply 
of labour for that sector. 
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5. Monetary and fiscal policy 
a) Monetary policy 
The money supply (measured as M2) increased appreciably faster in 1983 than in the previous 
years; even so, its growth of 405% was slightly lower than the rise in prices. The amount of currency 
outside banks, for its part, grew by 370% (see table 19). 
Transactions with the external sector were once again a factor of absorption; hence the 
monetary expansion was due entirely to the growth of domestic credit. The public sector in particular 
greatly increased its indebtedness with the monetary system, both through the increase in actual loans 
and through the deficit on the Monetary Regulation Account ( that is to say, on the payments made by 
the Central Bank to financial institutions in compensation for the compulsory reserves), which is 
computed as a credit to the government. 
The financial system operated during 1983 under the régime established in the July reform of 
the previous year. This reform provided, on the one hand, for the consolidation of bank credits to 
enterprises (whose indebtedness had reached critical figures) and, on the other, for the segmentation 
of the market for deposits. As a result, the interest on short-term deposits came under the control of 
the Central Bank, time-deposits of more than 90 days were permitted at freely negotiated rates, and a 
system of indexed deposits was created. Except for those at a free rate, these deposits were subject to 
high reserve requirements (initially 100%) but in compensation the Central Bank granted a 
rediscount to the banks so that they could refinance their loans. At the same time, it was decided to 
redeem the main government securities (treasury bonds, adjustable debentures) in order to reduce the 
supply of money substitutes. The regulated interest rate was initially fixed at values much lower than 
the inflation rate, so as to bring about a rapid reduction in the real volume of the debts of enterprises. 
This policy caused an appreciable fall in the liquidity ratios in the second half of 1982, since the public 
reduced its demand for deposits and, to a lesser extent, for means of payment. 
Once the initial effect of the reform had been assessed, it was announced that the interest rate 
would be fixed in accordance with the inflation rate, the aim being to avoid excessive credit costs, 
while at the same time preventing pressures on the demand for goods and foreign exchange. In the 
event the real interest rates in the regulated segment were markedly negative throughout 1983, as a 
result of which the real value of debts continued to decline. All in all, the demand for deposits did not 
Table 19 











































































Source: Central Bank of Argentina. 
° Preliminary figures. 
Money 
Currency outside banks 
Current account deposits 
Factors of expansion 
Net international reserves 
Domestic credit 
Government and public 
institutions (net) 
Private sector 
Factors of absorption 
Quasi-money (savings and 
time deposits) 
Other items (net) 
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fall (although there was a shift towards indexed investments) probably because a good part of the 
process of adjustment to the low returns had already taken place in the early months of the reform. 
The segmentation of the credit market was manifest in the large differentials in interest rates. 
In the first half of the year, the free-rate bank credits had a cost appreciably higher than the inflation. 
In August, the Central Bank eliminated this market, in order to tighten its control over credit. 
Nonetheless, there was a great expansion of loans outside the institutionalized system, also at high 
rates of interest. Thus in the course of 1983, while the real rate for deposits in the regulated sector was 
negative at 30% annually, the interest charged on loans at the free rate exceeded 30%. 
In recent years the organization of the financial system has become a matter of heated debate. 
The régime adopted in 1977 sought to improve the efficacy of the channelling of savings by reducing 
controls and freeing the interest rate. In practice this system was far from achieving the expectations 
of its authors, however, and the financial crisis of 1980 (whose effects still persist) revealed the 
fragility of the system and the costly errors of those who sought and offered credit. Hence, the Central 
Bank had to take over the running of numerous institutions whose portfolios were not viable, while at 
the same time many firms were showing signs of imminent insolvency. The reform of 1982 sought to 
correct this situation, but although it alleviated the financial burden of the enterprises (through an 
implicit heavy tax on deposit holders), it did not succeed in regularizing the market, since the 
problems as regards the repayment of debts did not completely disappear, the cost of intermediation 
continued very high, and the development of parallel markets revealed the presence of imbalances. 
The authorities who took over at the end of 1983 announced their intention to introduce radical 
changes in the system, beginning with the consolidation of institutions so as to put their portfolios on 
a sounder basis and reduce the costs and margins of intermediation. At the same time, the Central 
Bank would assume the declared role of credit orientation. The controls on interest rates would be 
maintained, although with the express intention of keeping these in line with the growth of prices. It 
was hoped to increase the real size of the institutionalized system and to channel a greater proportion 
of credit towards the private sector, once the fiscal deficit had been reduced. These measures, it was 
hoped, would tend to discourage credit transactions in the marginal markets. 
b) Fiscal policy 
The considerable increase in the National Treasury deficit during 1983 was due to the increase 
in expenditure and the fall in income, measured at constant prices (see table 20). 
The reduction in income was caused by the fall in tax revenues, which in its turn was due to a 
drop in gross tax collection and an increase in the assignment of resources to the Social Security 
System and to the National Housing Fund (in order to compensate for the suppression of the 
employers' contributions to retirement pensions and of the contribution to FONAVI decreed at the end 
of 1980). 
The increase in Treasury expenditure (over 80% in constant values) was due to the behaviour 
of transfers and loans, which was in turn the result of three concurrent factors. In the first place, at the 
end of the first quarter the government decided to deny the public sector access to the credit of the 
domestic financial system, so that the Treasury had to make big transfers to some public enterprises 
and decentralized agencies in order to provide them with funds for the payment of commitments as 
they fell due and for the financing of operational deficits. Secondly, the Treasury had to come to the 
aid of the provincial authorities, whose finances had seriously deteriorated. Finally, there was also a 
marked increase in expenditure owing to the non-settlement of private debts which had been 
guaranteed by the National Treasury. 
The remaining expenditure remained constant or declined in real terms. Remunerations paid 
through the National Treasury grew at a rate similar to the variation in prices, despite the substantial 
improvement in the real salaries of government officials. Expenditure on non-personal goods and 
services declined slightly. There was a notable fall in interest payments owing to the redemption of 
domestic securities decided on in 1982.2 
As regards the financing of the deficit, the advances made by the Central Bank were much 
higher than the financing needs recorded in the Treasury statements; this was due to the low level of 
2 In view of the criterion used in imputing interest, the servicing of the external debt is included for the most part as negative financing 
under the heading "amortization of the adjustment" (see table 20). 
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foreign investment in Argentine bonds, the redemption of domestic debentures, the posting as 
amortization payments of a large part of the interest payments, and also the classification as a 
financing operation (with negative sign) of the account designated "amortization of other debts", 
which appears to have included the payment'of debts incurred abroad mainly in relation to purchases 
of armaments. 
Taking the public sector as a whole, the burden seems to have been maintained at a similar level 
to that of 1982, when it was far below historical levels. The low tax revenue might be attributed to a 
relaxation of fiscal discipline and to the high rates of inflation, which reduce the real value of income 
during the period between the time when the tax is incurred and that when the payment is made. 
Additionally, the behaviour of taxation in 1983 was not homogeneous, since there was an increase in 
revenues derived from taxes on foreign trade (especially export duties) and on fuels, while there was a 
fall in the remaining taxes (such as those on value added, profits, wealth and domestic taxation), 
which are included in the system of federal co-participation. The fall in the co-participation tax 
revenues, as mentioned earlier, was intensified by the increase in the real value of the funds diverted 
to the Social Security System. As a result of this phenomenon, the revenue accruing to the Treasury 
and the provinces from this group of taxes declined (after deduction of inflation) by almost 30%. This 
was one of the main causes of the deterioration of the provincial finances. 
The fiscal situation of the local authorities was likewise aggravated by the fall in provincial tax 
revenues proper and by the simultaneous increase in expenditure. This last was due to the levelling up 
of the wages of local government personnel with those of the national civil service (which meant 
Table 20 







































































































































Source: National Treasury of Argentina. 
1. Current income 
Tax revenue 
Non-tax revenue 
2. Current expenditure 






3. Current saving (1 - 2) 
4. Capital expenditure 
Real investment 
Loans (net of repayments) 
5. Total expenditure (2 + 4) 
6. Deficit ( 1 - 5 ) 




Issue of securities 
Bond amortization payments 
Amortization of adjustment 
Amortization of other debts 
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bigger improvements in salaries than those granted in the nation as a whole), to the maturing of 
private debts guaranteed by the provincial States and to the expenditure occasioned by the serious 
floods that occurred in the northeast. 
As regards public enterprises, the process of gradual increases in charges begun in mid-1982 
continued during a good part of the year, giving rise to an appreciable increase in the average for the 
year. This enabled the level of the operational deficit to be kept steady despite the marked 
improvements in wages granted to the personnel. Owing to the outgoing government's decision to 
try to reduce tensions during the electoral period, however, the trend towards recovery in the levels of 
charges was halted in the last quarter. 
Thus, by the end of 1983 the increase in expenditure and contraction of income of the public 
sector as a whole had become serious in the extreme. The new authorities declared their intention of 
putting the public finances in order, and proposed to bring about a drastic reduction in the fiscal 
deficit to this end, while at the same time reorganizing expenditure, reducing that earmarked for 
defence and security, and increasing the share of expenses of a social nature. They also propose to 
increase tax revenue through control of evasion and the imposition of higher taxes on the upper-




1. Recent economic trends: Introduction and summary 
During the past four years Bolivia has been immersed in a severe economic crisis, and the evolution 
displayed by the economy in 1983 was very similar to that of the preceding year. Thus, almost every 
indicator again showed a considerable downturn, marking the second consecutive year of deteriora-
tion of economic activity and welfare, following the economic difficulties that started to become 
apparent in 1980 and 1981. 
Furthermore, in 1983 the country suffered a series of natural disasters (droughts and floods) 
that affected almost half of the national area and approximately two million people, causing damages 
of incalculable consequences which depressed even more the low levels of development that had been 
attained. 
The forecasts made for 1983 by the new government which took office at the end of the 
preceding year had envisaged an economic upturn that would be achieved through a rise of 4% in the 
product, a slowdown in the rate of inflation to one-third of that of the preceding year, an increase in 
real wages and a decline in unemployment, besides an improvement in the performance of State 
enterprises and a reduction of the fiscal deficit. However, reality was quite different from those 
expectations. 
In 1983 total production, the per capita output and investment dropped again sharply. In the 
external sector imports increased, but exports, as has been the case in recent years, continued to 
shrink. Internally, prices increased even more than the preceding year, although minimum wages 
retained their purchasing capacity. Finally, although the fiscal deficit in real terms diminished by half, 
it continued to be exceedingly large. 
In 1983, the gross domestic product fell in absolute terms for the third year in a row. The 
contraction was slightly over 7.5 %, after a reduction of almost 9% in 1982. Declines such as those of 
the past two years had not occurred since 1961, and this marked the continuation of a period, which 
had begun in 1976, of regular and consistent decreases in the growth rate of the production of goods 
and services (see table 1 and figure 1). 
The decline in production caused the per capita gross domestic product to drop by 10%, after 
having declined by more than 11 % in 1982. Such drops, added to other lesser ones which had occurred 
in the three previous years, resulted in an overall reduction of 25% in the period 1979-1983. 
In 1983 gross national income also decreased (-7.6%), for the third consecutive year, although 
the reduction had been even larger (-11%) the year before. The decline in national income in 1983 
was not larger because the terms of trade rose almost 3%, after a slightly larger drop in the two 
preceding years. 
There were widespread losses in the production of goods and services. Thus, the production of 
goods declined over 13%: this was the sharpest drop ever, at least since 1970, and followed another 
fall of slightly over 10% in 1982. In 1983, the most affected subsector, was agriculture, whose output 
fell by 22%. That drop was followed —though on a lesser scale— by manufacturing (-7.5%) and 
commerce and hotel activities (-11.6%). 
Together with this widespread decrease in production, inflationary pressures flared up to 
unprecedented limits. Consumer prices (December-December) rose by over 328%, while their 
variation between annual averages (which in 1982 had been over 123%) was close to 276% in 1983. 
The external sector, for its part, continued to face serious problems. The current value of 
exports of goods and services, after having exhibited in 1982 a decline of almost 10%, declined again 
the following year (-6.5%). As imports —after having recorded a fall of over 36% in 1982—rose by 
slightly over 13%, the trade balance dropped to US$ 137 million, or almost half the amount of the 
preceding year. 
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Net remittances of interest on the external debt continued to be a heavy burden for the balance 
of payments. In 1983, they accounted for US$ 399 million, an amount more than six times higher than 
that in 1977. Furthermore, payments would have been still larger if the country had been in a position 
to fulfill all of its external commitments. 
Thus, the small surplus on the trade of goods and the substantial interest payments increased 
the current account deficit to US$ 252 million: more than double the amount registered in 1982. 
Capital inflows —unlike what happened in 1982 when they only amounted to slightly over 
US$ 150 million, or half the value recorded the year before— resumed their expansion in 1983 and 
reached the considerable amount of US$ 237 million. 
Long-term capital inflows experienced a substantial increase, rising by nearly US$ 350 million, 
in contrast with a similar decline in 1982. In contrast, short-term capital outflows speeded up sharply. 
In 1982 they had only represented US$ 7 million, but in 1983 they amounted to US$ 400 million, thus 
Table 1 
BOLIVIA: MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS 
A. Basic economic indicators 
Gross domestic product at market 
prices (millions of 1970 dollars) 
Population (millions of inhabitants) 
Per capita gross domestic product 
(dollars at 1970 prices) 
B. Short-run economic indicators 
Gross domestic product at 
market prices 
Per capita gross domestic product 
Gross national income 
Terms of trade (goods and services) 
Current value of exports of goods 
and services 




Variation between annual averages 
Money (Mj) 
Current income of government' 
Total expenditure of government' 
Fiscal deficit/total expenditure 
of government 
C. External sector 
Trade balance (goods and services) 
Balance on current account 
Balance on capital account 
Variation in international reserves 
External debt' 
External debt service/exports of 
1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983° 
1 930 2 010 2 078 2 116 2 128 2 107 1 923 1 777 




















































































































































goods and services 17.8 23.2 50.5 30.6 26.9 26.8 26.9 30.8 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official data. 
"Preliminary figures. Gross domestic product at 
Percentages. fMedium-and long-term external 
market prices plus terms-of-trade effect. 
public debt at end of each year. 
4 Real growth rates. 
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offsetting the effect of long-term capital inflows. The overall result of the external transactions 
during the year was that the country lost reserves in the amount of US$ 14 million: an amount that 
constitutes nearly one-third of the reserves accumulated the year before. 
Another serious problem that the economy and the authorities had to face was connected with 
the operation of the exchange market. Thus, one of the main limitations on the normal development 
of economic activity was the acute shortage of foreign exchange in the Central Bank to meet both the 
service of the external debt and the necessary imports. Early in the year the amount of foreign 
exchange available for the procurement of the most essential goods barely came to US$ 100 million, 
sufficient to cover less than two months of imports. 
As a result of the foregoing, most transactions in foreign currency were conducted on the 
so-called parallel market. Given the shortage of foreign exchange its quotations attained very high 
levels, a fact that contributed, on the one hand, to the intensification of the process of dollarization of 
the economy and, on the other hand, to a further acceleration of the already high inflationary trends, 
while at the same time promoting unregistered trade. Thus, the dollar not only constituted an 
internationally accepted means of payment but was also an asset in itself, through which members of 
the public could accumulate wealth and protect themselves against the deterioration of the national 
currency. 
In order to reduce the difference between the value of the dollar in the official market and in the 
parallel market and to give a more realistic value to the national currency, the nominal exchange rate 
was devalued in November 1983 so that the number of Bolivian pesos per dollar went up from 196 to 
500, i.e., the exchange rate increased by 155%. 
In 1983 there was a substantial slowdown in the rate of expansion of the money supply (Mt), 
which increased 160% compared with 230% the year before. That important reduction in the growth 
rate of the means of payment was possible because both the net credit delivered to the public sector as 
well as financing available to the banks were considerably tightened. While the former increased only 
69%, the latter rose by 116% compared with rates of 421% and 341%, respectively, the year before. 
As the rate of price increases was higher than that of the monetary variables, the latter had a negative 
evolution in real terms. 
The behaviour of the public sector during 1983 also followed the trend of some monetary 
aggregates and prices. In real terms, the current income of the central government —which in 1982 
had already shrunk by nearly 39%— decreased in 1983 by more than 47%. The severe fiscal crisis was 
apparent from the behaviour of the ratio current income/gross domestic product. In 1983, this came 
to only 4% whereas only two years before it had been 10%. 
Due to the highly restrictive policy begun at the end of the preceding year, in 1983 total 
government expenditure at constant values fell 50%, compared to an increase of 140% in the 
preceding year. The deficit —though substantial— was half of that in 1982, when it reached 386%. 
With respect to economic policy, two broad economic packages were approved during the year. 
In March new price increases were approved for goods included in the family shopping basket. 
There were also wage increases, while all components of the public sector were called upon to adjust 
their wage policies to that established by the government. In addition to the foregoing, a major part of 
the supplementary bonuses were included in the basic salary, and the concepts of "production bonus" 
and "professional category" were defined more strictly. Furthermore, rates of interest and compul-
sory cash reserves were increased and new lines of credit for agriculture and mining were opened. 
Between May and September, a new scale of assumed costs for the mining sector was 
established; the income tax on natural persons was lowered; the wage ceiling for social security was 
raised and, once again, the rates of interest and compulsory cash reserves were increased. 
Finally, in November other provisions were approved whereby, while attempting to influence 
economic activity directly, it was sought to preserve the continuity of the process of legal and 
administrative rearrangement begun by the authorities. Thus, a rise in the exchange rate was decided, 
and new increases in domestic prices and other wage increases were established. In addition, the 
regularization of public sector debts with the Central Bank and a rebate of income tax retentions for 
natural persons were determined. With regard to the process of administrative rearrangement 
mentioned above, the following measures were adopted: formulation of a new banking law and 
establishment of the Stabilization and Development Board (Junta de Estabilización y Desarrollo), 
which became the main body for the control and follow-up of economic activity. 
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Figure 1 
BOLIVIA: MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS 
/V Gross national income
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Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official data. 







BOLIVIA: TOTAL SUPPLY AND DEMAND 
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Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures supplied by the Central Bank of Bolivia. 
aPreliminary figures. Figures on exports and imports of goods and services were taken from balance-of-payments data, deflacted\ 
price indexes calculated by ECLAC. 
2. Trends in economic activity 
a) Total supply and demand 
In 1983 the total supply of goods and services diminished over 5 %, following a decrease of more 
than 12% in 1982, representing a contraction for the fourth consecutive year (see table 2). 
A drop of nearly 8% in the gross domestic product, which already had fallen approximately 
10% in the period 1981-1982, contributed to this downturn. The negative impact on the supply was 
buffered in part by an increase of 15% in the volume of imports in 1983, in contrast with the sharp 
drop of 35% recorded the year before. 
Domestic demand, for its part, declined 5% in 1983, registering declines in both of its 
components once again. Fixed capital investment went down by nearly 19%; as it had dropped by 
nearly 40% in 1982 and between 1979 and 1981 had suffered an overall decline of approximately 
50%, its 1983 level was scarcely more than a quarter of that recorded in 1978. The sluggishness in the 
process of capital formation was reflected in the behaviour of the investment coefficient, which in 
1983 was equivalent to only 6% of the gross domestic product, i.e., half the level attained in 1980. 
On the other hand, global consumption also dropped, although the 4% decrease was only half 
that recorded in 1982. Both public and private consumption contributed to this fall. 
Although the drop in public consumption in 1983 was substantially less severe than the year 
before (-14%), this brought its real value down to a similar amount to that of 1974. Private 
consumption, for its part, decreased 4% in 1983, after having declined 7.5 % in 1982, so that its value 
was similar to that of 1977. 
Due to a series of complex internal and external factors, the volume of exports kept on 
dropping in 1983. With a decrease of nearly 8% this was the fourth year running of persistent drops 
in the volume of external sales (see table 2). 
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b) Evolution of the main sectors of production 
In 1983, one of the most visible symptoms of the country s economic problems was the fall of 
nearly 8% in the product. Practically all economic activities contributed to this decline (see table 3). 
The production of goods dropped over 1 3 % during the year; since it had also decreased in 1981 
and 1982, this caused the value of the production of goods to sink to its lowest level since 1970. The 
great deterioration in production —equivalent to 39% of the product— was due to two main reasons. 
Firstly, agricultural activity had to face an unusual and devastating combination of droughts and 
floods. Secondly, in 1983 all economic activities continued to suffer the consequences of the foreign 
exchange shortage, which first began to show itself the preceding year, affecting especially sectors 
which are highly dependent on imports such as mining, manufacturing and, to a lesser extent, 
construction. 
With respect to agriculture —one of the most important sectors, accounting for 17% of the 
product— it shrank by 22% in 1983. Due to this loss, agricultural activity dropped back to the levels 
reached in 1973. 
Table 3 
BOLIVIA: GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT, BY KIND OF ECONOMIC 
ACTIVITY, AT FACTOR COST 
Millions of dollars 
at 1970 prices 
Percentage 
breakdown Growth rates 
1980 1981 1982 1983° 1980 1983° 1980 1981 1982 1983" 
Total gross domestic 
product 1 966 1 947 1 777 1 642 100.0 100.0 0.6 -0.9 -8.7 -7.6 
Goods 
Agriculture, hunting, 
forestry and fishing 




Electricity, gas and water 
Transport, storage 
and communications 
862 850 764 661 42.6 39.1 
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246 227 216 12.2 12.8 2.1 -0.5 -7.6 -4.8 
Other services 




insurance, real estate 
and business services 
Ownership of dwellings 
Community, social and 
personal services 
Government services 
Less: imputed bank 
service charges 
914 902 826 795 45.1 47.1 -0.4 -1.3 -8.4 -3.8 
318 310 259 229 15.7 13.6 
213 207 197 193 10.5 
161 160 159 159 8.0 
383 385 370 373 18.9 22.1 
204 207 208 211 10.1 
34 30 25 22 1.7 





















1.3 -12.9 -10.4 -19.1 -9.0 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures supplied by the Central Bank of Bolivia. 
"Preliminary figures. ''As the individual activities and the totals were calculated independently, the sum of the former does not 
correspond exactly with the latter. 
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Industrial production also suffered a sharp fall (-7.5 %), although this value was only half of that 
recorded the year before. Since another drop of nearly 4% had occurred in 1981, the total drop in 
manufacturing in the period 1981-1983 came to 25%. 
The other goods-producing sectors showed a less unfavourable performance. Mining stagnated, 
after declining over 9% in 1982, and the real value of construction also remained unchanged. Since in 
1980 it had dropped by 12%, while in the two subsequent years it had decreased by 35% and 40% 
respectively, however, its 1982 level was only one-third that recorded in 1979. As this sector absorbs a 
large volume of manpower, this decline helped to intensify the unemployment problem. 
The production of basic services declined over 4%, though this rate was less than the 6.5% 
drop recorded in 1982. It was due largely to a fall of 5% in transport and communications, since the 
other component of basic services —electricity, gas an water— decreased by only around 1.5%. 
Finally, production under the heading designated "other services", which contributed slightly 
over 47% of the gross domestic product, decreased nearly 4%, thus declining for the fourth year 
running. The largest decrease was in commerce and hotel activities (-11.5 %), though the decline had 
been even greater in 1982 (-16%). The magnitude of the deterioration seen in this sector was 
followed in 1983 by that in financial institutions. The other activities either stagnated (ownership of 
dwellings), or increased only slightly (community and government services). 
i) Agriculture. As pointed out earlier, one of the biggest problems that the economy as a whole 
had to face during 1983 was due to the natural disasters which devastated a large part of the country. 
In the highlands, the departments of Potosí, Oruro, La Paz, Cochabamba, Chuquisaca, Tarija 
and Santa Cruz were affected by a protracted drought which drastically reduced normal crop yields. It 
is estimated that the damaged area covered approximately 380 000 km2 —equivalent to 35% of the 
country's areas—, and the number of people who suffered the consequences was approximately 
1 600 000. 
Furthermore, in the eastern and northern regions of the country, the departments of Santa Cruz 
and Beni were affected by unusually heavy rainfall which caused large floods and affected both urban 
and rural areas. In this case, the damaged area exceeded 150 000km2 and, directly or indirectly, 
approximately 700 000 people were victims of this disaster. 
The problems caused by these climatic changes in agriculture, among the peasants and in the 
country as a whole were serious. With regard to agriculture, the main problems were the decrease of 
15% in the cultivated area during the crop year 1982/1983 with respect to the average for the period 
1978-1982; the damage to pastures and the loss of land due to floods and sedimentation; the scarcity 
of essential inputs and the damage to agricultural production; the drop in food availability, with the 
ensuing rise in the price of agricultural products, and, finally, the intensification of the problem of 
rural-urban migration. 
These natural disasters even affected future agricultural activities, since to satisfy food needs the 
seeds from previous harvests were often assigned for consumption, ' or cattle were slaughtered to 
prevent them perishing from water shortage or floods. The increase in beef supply pushed down its 
real price and the income of small farmers and cattle raisers deteriorated. 
In these circumstances, agricultural activities suffered an unprecedented decline in 1983. 
Moreover, the enormous drop was widespread. 
Grains in general, which in previous years had accounted for about 45% of the area under 
cultivation, exhibited a downward trend. Thus, the output of wheat, which occupies approximately 
20% of the total area under cultivation, fell by 44%. Other extensive crops such as rice and maize also 
performed in a highly unfavourable manner. In the case of rice, which generally occupies 13% of the 
area sown, the volume harvested dropped by 29%, following another drop of nearly 15% in 1982. 
The production of maize experienced an equally sharp fall, since after having declined approximately 
11% in 1982, it went down again by 25%, thus sinking to a very similar level to that of five years 
before (see table 4). 
During 1983 tubers and roots, which are basic elements in the Bolivian diet, also declined 
considerably. Potato production, for example, dropped by 66%, thus sinking to a similar level to that 
recorded at the beginning of the 1960s. 
1 In these circumstances, some products —particularly tubers— may have disappeared for ever, since they were exclusive varieties from 
the highlands which do not exist in other parts of the world. 
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Table 4 
BOLIVIA: INDICATORS OF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION 
Main crops 
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Finally, vegetable and fruit crops were also severely affected by the climatic phenomena. In 
these products, decreases were approximately 70% for broad beans and 25% for tomatoes.2 
The droughts and floods also affected the cattle-breeding sector. Although no data were 
available on final results for 1983, the performance of the sector was certainly unfavourable since, for 
example, 86% of cattle and sheep and 90% of their producers were affected by the drought that 
devastated the departments of La Paz, Oruro and Potosí. 
The shortage of food obviously contributed to a turnabout in the parity ratio between prices for 
crop farming products and industrial goods, with the former more than recovering the level of the 
most favourable years. Thus, in 1983 there was a sharp increase (50%) in the parity index, following a 
drop of 23% in 1982 with respect to the preceding year which had interrupted the persistent 
improvement exhibited by the terms of trade between agriculture and industry. Nevertheless, these 
data should be viewed with caution. On the one hand, this increase was due to the transient food 
shortage mentioned above; on the other hand, it did not necessarily mean a proportional improve-
ment in the income of peasants, since an important part of the increase in wholesale prices was 
appropriated by middlemen. 
In brief, 1983 was a devastating year for Bolivian agriculture. In the face of such a serious 
situation, and as soon as it became aware of the extent of the problems, the Government approved an 
emergency plan designed to confront them. In its first phase, this plan was oriented to fostering 
winter crops. To that end the Central Bank approved credits amounting to US$ 11 million, with 
nominal interest rates ranging between 38% and 48% annually, which in real terms were markedly 
negative. In addition, an amortization period of one year was granted. In the second phase of the plan, 
designed for summer crops, funds amounting to US$ 61 million, with interest rates similar to the 
previous ones, were made available. Furthermore, thanks to credits granted by the Inter-American 
Development Bank (IDB), US$ 43 million was allocated to the agricultural sector for the procurement 
of inputs, tools and working capital. Finally, studies with a view to the continuation of the agrarian 
reform process were initiated during the year. 
ii) Mining. In addition to the problems that have traditionally affected this sector, others arose 
in 1983 which increased its difficulties. The main problem stemmed from the exchange policy and the 
foreign exchange shortage existing in the country. The scanty foreign currency reserve in the Central 
Bank had to be carefully managed in order to be able to cover both the cost of servicing the external 
debt and the most essential imports (food, medicines, etc.). Therefore, the Central Bank could meet 
only a very small part of the demand for foreign currency for other imports, and so the foreign 
exchange that the mining sector required for the purchase of inputs, machinery, etc., had to be 
procured in the parallel market, at higher prices than the official rates. 
Other factors that also had a considerable influence in increasing the costs of production were 
the price increases of all national and imported goods and inputs, the periodic wage adjustments and 
tax increases. 
These domestic difficulties were compounded by others coming from the exterior, among 
which the most important were the international crisis and the fall in the demand for raw materials. 
In brief, the problem faced by the mining sector was due, on the one hand, to increasing costs 
and, on the other, to the impossibility of passing on such increases to sales prices, since these were 
governed by a depressed international market. 
2The situation, serious though it was at the national level, was even worse at the department level, as shown by the following figures for 

















































In the light of the above, the mining product in 1983 suffered a slight decline (-0.4%), adding to 
the drop of over 9% the year before. Consequently, the sector continued to stagnate, as it has done 
since 1971. 
Production of tin —by far the most important mineral—fell by over 11% in 1983 (see table 5). 
This fall followed that registered in 1982, so thajin the 1982-1983 biennium production decreased by 
20%. With the exception of 1981, output had fallen steadily since 1978 and, with the decline in 1983, 
it sank to its lowest level in the past 19 years. The fall in the volume of tin production occurred in spite 
of a slight upturn in its international price, which went up from US$ 5.74 per pound in 1982 to US$ 
5.88 per pound a year later, but this rise did not compensate for the decrease of over 10% in 1982. 
Furthermore, Brazil was added to Bolivia's traditional Southeast Asian competitors, since it has been 
constantly increasing production from deposits with lower operating costs, and in 1983 it expanded 
its volume of production by 60%. 
In 1983 the production of antimony fell 29%, following on the fall recorded the preceding year, 
and as a result production fell to its lowest level since 1970. The negative effects of this decline were 
further increased by the sharp new reduction of nearly 20% in this metal's international price in 
1983, following a reduction of 18% the preceding year. 
Lead production, which fell approximately 2.5% in 1983, after another.drop of over 25% in 
1982, sank to its lowest level since 1965. There was a substantial decline in its international price, 
which went down by 24% for the second year in a row. 
Copper production decreased approximately 30% during the period 1982-1983, while tungsten 
output fell by 12% in the same period. 
In 1983 silver production increased by 10% and gold production by over 6%. The increase in 
silver production was in line with the trend that had been apparent since 1979 and had only been 
interrupted in 1982. The steep rise in the price of silver from US$ 7.79 to US$ 11.42 per ounce, more 
than offset the fall of 28% it experienced in 1982. 
Finally, although gold production increased by slightly over 6%, this was not enough to offset 
the sharp drop of nearly 40% registered the year before. Because of this, production in 1983 was only 
64% of that recorded in 1981 (see table 5). Furthermore, the 13% rise in the international price of 
gold in 1983 failed to cancel out the sharp drop of 20% recorded in 1982. 
During 1983 prospecting for gold was promoted in order to increase production. To that end, 
from May onwards, a more realistic price policy was implemented —in contrast with that in force for 
other minerals— consisting of the purchase of the extracted metal at a higher exchange rate than that 
prevailing in the official market. The results were very positive: whereas between January and April 
the State had only purchased 76 kilogrammes, in the two following months it purchased 367 kilos. 
Table 5 
BOLIVIA: INDICATORS OF MINING PODUCTION 


























































































Source: National Association of Medium-Scale Miners. 




BOLIVIA: HYDROCARBON INDUSTRY INDICATORS 
1980 1981 1982 1983" 
Growth rates 

















































Thousands of cubic metres 
Petroleum 
Production of crude petroleum 1384 1286 1418 960 -14.4 -7.1 10.3 -9-7 
Exports of crude petroleum 
Refining of petroleum products 1503 1352 1373 899 -5.9 -10.0 1.5 -15.0 









Source: Central Bank of Bolivia. 
"Preliminary figures, for the period January-September. 'Corresponding to January-September in relation to thesame period of 1982. 
Moreover, mining claims increased considerably during the year, investments of up to US$ 200 
million were announced, and a Bureau of Gold Control (Oficina de Control Aurífero) was also 
established. 
Among other mining policy measures adopted during the year by the Government, the 
following may be highlighted: i) granting of credits of US$ 60 million to the sector for the purchase of 
inputs and tools and for working capital; ii) compensation for the general increase in prices, for 
increases in electricity tariffs for private industrial use and for higher railway freight charges, through 
a rise in mining sector "assumed costs" for tax purposes; and iii) centralization, through the Central 
Bank, of the payment of mining and hydrocarbon royalties of public and private institutions (decided 
at the end of 1983). 
Finally, it is necessary to point out the special importance of the statement made in April by the 
trade unions regarding the introduction of self-management of the Bolivian Mining Corporation 
(Corporación Minera Boliviana). After the relevant negotiations, the Government approved in 
November the legal measure providing for co-management in that State enterprise. 
As regards the production of crude petroleum, this fell by nearly 10% in the first nine months 
of 1983 (see table 6). With the exception of 1982, when it expanded by slightly over 10%, production 
has persistently diminished since 1974. 
Domestic gasoline sales dropped by 4 .5%, while those of fuel oil and gas oil fell by 8%, thus 
continuing the depressive trend evidenced by these derivatives. In the first case, a drop such as the one 
mentioned above had not occurred since 1973 and the same was true of gas oil. These drops may be 
ascribed, inter alia, to the acute deterioration of the economic situation, which necessarily had as one 
of its impacts a downturn in the demand for fuels for domestic and industrial consumption. In 
contrast, kerosene sales rose by 1 1 % , although such an increase was still not enough to offset the 
drops in preceding years (see table 6). 
As far as prices are concerned, in 1983 fuels experienced large nominal price increases, on top of 
those that occurred in 1982. The largest price increases were for high octane gasoline (186%) and fuel 
oil (173%); prices of other products also increased in similar proportions. In spite of such increases, 
however, these fuels still remained extremely cheap in international terms. Thus, even at the official 
exchange rate high octane gasoline was sold during most of the year at the equivalent of 12 U.S. cents 
per litre, and at the exchange rate prevailing on the parallel market, the price was merely 5 cents. A 
similar situation was observed for the rest of the fuels. 
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In the context of fuel prices in neighbouring countries, the situation had negative consequences 
for the economy. In Peru, for example, the average price of gasoline during 1983 was approximately 
30 U.S. cents. Such big differences in prices had very marked repercussions. On the one hand, they 
fostered unregistered trade, and on the other hand, the short supply of dollars existing in the economy 
could have been supplemented with dollars deriving from this form of foreign trade. 
Even though fuel prices were reviewed when the November devaluation was effected, the fact 
that they were very low in international terms and the difference between the official exchange rate 
and that in the parallel market meant that this unregistered trade with neighbouring countries 
continued to be attractive. 
Finally, in 1983 a study was begun of a new comprehensive law on hydrocarbons which 
envisaged the termination of the operating contracts signed with foreign firms and the possibility of 
the State enterprise Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales Bolivianos taking charge of every phase of the 
exploitation and processing of natural resources. 
3. The external sector 
a) Overall trends 
During 1983, the three main interrelated problems of the external sector continued to be the 
behaviour of exports, the external debt and the exchange rate. 
Export activities continued to experience great difficulties. In 1983 the volume of exports went 
down steadily for the fourth year running, and the volume of sales was lower than in 1970. At the 
same time, the persistence of the international crisis prevented the unit value of exports from 
compensating for that trend. 
Nor could the small foreign exchange reserves be expanded by increasing the country's 
indebtedness, since Bolivia's commitments stood at untenable levels. Thus, instead of granting new 
credits, most of external creditors, demanded net payments. For that reason, it was not easy 
simultaneously to meet the debt payments and pay for imports of essential goods for the economy. 
The debt service accounted for a relatively modest share of exports of goods and services (31%), but 
even so it was not possible to meet all the commitments expiring during the year, and the country 
accumulated large arrears. 
Other important problems were those related to the exchange market, which suffered from 
great instability due to the shortage of dollars during the year. Dollars were necessary for imports, and 
as the amounts that could be obtained in the official market were limited and controlled by the 
Exchange Policy Commission (Comisión de Política Cambiaría), importers had to purchase them in 
the parallel market, thereby forcing up their price. This in turn caused sharp increases in domestic 
prices. Moreover, bearing in mind the high rate of inflation, the majority of the economic agents 
protected their wealth through the accumulation of dollars, thereby providing yet another stimulus 
for exchange rate increases in the parallel market. 
b) External trade 
i) Exports of goods. In 1983 the value of exports fell slightly more than 8.5%. Thus, the value of 
external sales diminished for the third consecutive year, with an overall drop of 20% in the triennium 
(see table 7). 
The decline in 1983 in the value of exports of goods was due exclusively to the fall of nearly 11% 
in the volume exported, since the unit value increased slightly over 2 %. In contrast, in 1982 there was 
a drop of both the volume exported (-6%) and the unit value (-3.5%). 
The decline in the volume of exports confirmed once more the serious domestic restraints 
which prevent the export sector from expanding its sales. Except for 1976 and 1979, the volume of 
exports have been declining steadily since 1975. 
Furthermore, the drop in exports was very widespread, and except in the cases of silver and 
sugar the value of the main export products shrank considerably (see table 8). 
Thus, metallic tin exports, which accounted for one-fifth of external sales, dropped over 26%. 
Due to that fall and that registered in the preceding year, the overall drop in the period 1982-1983 was 




BOLIVIA: MAIN FOREIGN TRADE INDICATORS 































































































87.6 Terms of trade (goods) 
Purchasing power of 
exports of goods 
Purchasing power of exports 
of goods and services 112.8 
110.2 
Indexes (1970 = 100) 
139.7 111.0 113.4 119.8 121.2 120.6 143.6 134.8 132.1 139.2 
191.4 135.8 164.0 163.6 147.0 149.5 165.1 154.7 143.0 134.8 
190.0 138.0 169.0 170.8 157.4 162.9 179.5 167.7 151.6 143.7 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official data. 
"Preliminary figures. 
Table 8 
BOLIVIA: EXPORTS OF GOODS, CIF 
Total 


















































































































































































Source: Central Bank of Bolivia. 
"Preliminary figures. 
m 
value went up slightly. Indeed, the 27% fall in the quantum brought it to its lowest level since 1970. 
The average price increased slightly (2%), but in spite of this the international price of tin remained 
depressed during 1983 and was far below the exceptionally high value of 1980 (see table 9). 
Foreign sales of natural gas, which in 1983 accounted for nearly 50% of total sales, decreased 
slightly (1%), thereby interrupting the trend of systematic expansion in the value of exports of this 
hydrocarbon which had begun in 1972. The slight decrease in 1983 was due exclusively to a decrease in 
the volume sold, since the unit value increased a little. Thus, the quantum dropped by 3.5% to a level 
similar to that of 1981, and although the average price rose instead by nearly 2%, this was the 
smallest increase since exports began in 1972. 
During 1983, the value of other traditional exports also showed a negative performance. Thus, 
zinc dropped over 13% and tungsten by 41%, although both declines had a lesser impact, because 
their share in the external trade decreased. 
In contrast with what occurred with nearly all mineral exports during 1983, the value of foreign 
sales of silver expanded very considerably. The expansion of nearly 60% reversed the trend of the two 
preceding years, when there had been drops of 39% and 49%, respectively. This increase was made 
possible because both the volume and, especially, the unit value went up with respect to 1982, by 4.5 % 
and 51% respectively. Nevertheless, even with the upturn in the sales of rhis product, its value 
remained well below the levels recorded in 1980-1981. 
Lastly, in 1983 there was also a considerable shrinkage in non-traditional exports, which 
dropped by 35%, thus evolving negatively for the third consecutive year. The only positive aspect in 
the behaviour of these products was the sharp increase in sugar sales, which amounted to US$ 15 
million. However, in spite of their growth in 1982 and 1983, the value of these exports was still well 
below the 1980 level (see table 8). 
ii) Imports of goods. In 1983, the value of imports of goods rose over 12%, which was due 
exclusively to expansion of the quantum, since their unit value decreased (see table 7). 
The increase in the volume of external purchases in 1983 came after four years of decline in a 
row, but even so the quantum only reached á value close to that of 1973. 
Table 9 
BOLIVIA: AVERAGE PRICE OF TIN ON THE LONDON METAL EXCHANGE 









































































































Source: UNCTAD, International Monetary Fund (IMF) and ECLAC estimates. 
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Table 10 














































































































































































Source: Central Bank of Bolivia. 
"Figures estimated for the entire year on the basis of the evolution of the first nine months. 
expected for the whole year. 
Rates calculated on the basis of behaviour 
On the other hand, in 1983 the unit value declined (by approximately 3%) for the second 
consecutive year (see table 7). 
Considering imports by groups, the value of consumer goods dropped substantially. Thus, in 
1983 they fell by over 28%, following another fall of over 65% the preceding year (see table 10). 
These declines affected durable and non-durable goods more or less equally. Their most serious 
feature was the fall in purchases of non-durable consumer goods, since this coincided with a poor crop 
year, thus producing an unprecedented contraction in agricultural supply and an inordinate increase 
in food prices. 
The value of imports of raw materials and capital goods increased 25 % in the former case and 
17% in the latter, but even so these increases could not offset the declines recorded in 1982. 
Considering the components of the first-named category, purchases of raw materials for agriculture 
stagnated during the year, whereas those for industry and, especially, construction materials expan-
ded considerably. The value of imports of capital goods for industry and transport equipment also 
increased during the year, though at very different rates. In contrast, purchases of equipment for 
agriculture suffered a very sharp drop. 
c) The terms of trade 
Due to the increase of slightly over 2% in the prices of exports and the drop of 3 3 % in the unit 
value of imports, the terms of trade improved by over 5% during 1983. This performance reversed 
the trend of the two preceding years, when the terms of trade fell by 6% and 2%, respectively (see 
table 7). 
Lastly, due to the sharp fall in the volume exported (-10.6%), the improvement in the terms of 
trade could not prevent the purchasing power of exports from shrinking by nearly 6%. This decline 
occurred for the third consecutive year, since in 1982 there was a slightly larger drop (7.5%), and in 
the preceding year it had also declined (-6.3%) (see table 7). 
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Table 11 
BOLIVIA: BALANCE OF PAYMENTS 
(Millions of dollars) 
Balance on current account 
Trade balance 
Exports of goods and services 
Goods FOB 
Real services 
Transport and insurance 
Travel 
Imports of goods and services 
Goods FOB 
Real services 






Labour and ownership 
Private unrequited transfers 
Balance on capital account 


















Errors and omissions 
Global balance 
Total change in reserves 
(- sign indicates an increase) 
Monetary gold 
Special Drawing Rights 
IMF reserve position 
Foreign exchange assets 
Other assets 




























































































































































































































































































































Source: 1977-1982: International Monetary Fund, Balance of Payments Yearbook; 1983: ECLAC, on the basis of official data. 
"Preliminary figures. 6Real services also include other official and private transactions, but not factor services. cIn addition to 
loans received and amortization payments made, this entry includes net loans granted and other assets and liabilities. The global 
balance is the sum of the current account balance plus the balance on capital account. The difference between total variation in reserves (of 
opposite sign) and the global balance represents counterpart items: monetizationofgold, allocation of Special Drawing Rights, and variations 
due to revaluation. 
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d) The balance on current account and capital movements 
During 1983 the current account deficit rose to over US$ 250 million, representing an increase 
of more than 100% over 1982 (see table 11). 
The merchandise trade balance yielded a surplus of US$ 275 million in 1983, which was US$ 
124 million less than in 1982. The decline in the positive balance of Bolivia vis-à-vis the rest of the 
world was due to the behaviour of both exports and imports. Thus, exports fell by US$ 70 million, 
while imports expanded slightly more than US$ 50 million. In spite of this latter increase, external 
purchases remained extraordinarily compressed with respect to previous years (see table 11). 
Real services maintained their usual negative behaviour. In 1983 exports corresponding to 
invisible transactions increased 14% to nearly US$ 100 million, but as payments for similar imports 
rose 15% to US$ 234 million, the relevant deficit expanded slightly 
As had occurred in previous years, the bulk of net payments to the exterior was connected with 
factor services. In 1983 nearly US$ 430 million was paid to the exterior under this heading, and 
although the increase over the preceding year was only US$ 10 million, the absolute level of payments 
was six times higher than that recorded in 1977 (see table 11). 
The amount of profits remitted to the exterior was relatively modest and remained within the 
same order of magnitude of previous"years. The major part of payments in respect of factor income 
stemmed from net disbursements for debt interest, which came to US$ 399 million in 1983. This 
amount was only 2% higher than the payments recorded in 1982, but it was much greater than the 
figure of US$ 65 million in 1977. The extent of the sacrifices that the country had to endure to meet its 
external commitments is evidenced in the ratio between net interest payments and exports of goods 
and services. In 1983 that ratio was 47%, and the year before 43%-
Net long-term capital movements —after having shrunk considerably in 1982, when they 
dropped 65%— more than recovered in 1983, when they reached US$ 512 million. However, the 
effect of the larger inflow of long-term resources was offset to a great extent by a large net short-term 
capital outflow, which amounted to US$ 400 million in 1983. 
Among the different capital flows that entered the economy during 1983, the second place in 
order of importance was occupied by unrequited public capital transfers, which rose by 134% to a 
record nominal figure. The origin of a large part of these funds was the assistance provided by other 
governments to the country, mostly connected with the natural disasters that ravaged the economy in 
the first part of the year. 
Taking into account the behaviour of the different capital movements, the capital account 
received a net foreign exchange inflow of US$ 237 million, that is, only US$ 80 million more than in 
1982, and as the capital account surplus was lower than the current account deficit, the country lost 
reserves in the amount of US$ 14 million in 1983 (see table 11). 
e) The external debt 
The high degree of external indebtedness continued to place serious restraints on the economy 
during 1983. The year-end debt balance increased by 17%, and the debt service grew 7% compared 
with 1982, due entirely to interest payments, since payments of principal were practically paralysed. 
The level of indebtedness continued to represent a heavy burden for the economy. The debt 
service/exports of goods and services coefficient was 31 %, that is, slightly higher than that recorded 
in 1982 (27%) (see table 12). Moreover, that coefficient would have been still larger had it not been 
for defaults in the payment of certain commitments. 
In 1983 the Government carried on with the process, uninterrupted since 1980, of renegotia-
ting practically all the loans granted by international private banks to the country. The first steps in 
this direction were taken in March, and consisted of an unofficial moratorium in respect of 100% of 
the capital payments that were due between April and October of that year, resulting from the 
medium- and long-term debt of the public sector. A new rescheduling of payments of interest arrears 
was also carried out, under which the country committed itself to pay them between April and 
September. A second round of negotiations took place in May. In this case, it included credits already 
rescheduled in 1981. Capital maturities for 1983, 1984 and 1985 were also postponed. However, in 
practice these agreements never materialized because the Government could not implement the 
stand-by loan programme of the International Monetary Fund, which the private creditors had 
prescribed as a precondition for negotiation. 
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Among other debt reschedulings carried out during the year, it is worth mentioning that agreed 
with Argentina, whereby Bolivia rescheduled its payments amounting to US$ 660 million for a period 
of 10 years, including three years' grace, at an interest rate of 8%. 
In practice, debt service problems inhibited the granting of new loans by foreign banks. In 
contrast, credits granted by multilateral agencies and those derived from bilateral agreements 
expanded in 1983 at the rates of 17% and 49%, respectively. Particularly significant were the credits 
from the Inter-American Development Bank and the Andean Development Corporation in the 
amount of US$ 82 million, intended for the agricultural and mining sectors. In addition, there were 
others from different governments and several international agencies. 
f) The exchange rate 
One of the major problems that both the economy and the authorities had to face during 1983 
was that of the ups and downs experienced by the exchange market. Its typical high degree of 
instability and the great sensitivity developed by the agents acting within it made its control by the 
economic authorities difficult in practice. In addition, it is difficult to separate the behaviour of this 
market during 1983 from what had occurred in recent years, from the external debt problem and from 
the foreign exchange scarcity existing in the economy. 
Following the devaluation carried out in 1972, the exchange rate remained fixed until the end of 
1979. During that period, exports had a less dynamic performance than imports. Thus, between 1972 
and 1979 the average growth rate of external sales of goods was 19.5%, while FOB imports of goods 
rose over 24% a year.3 
Table 12 
BOLIVIA: MEDIUM AND LONG-TERM EXTERNAL PUBLIC DEBT 
Total contracted, at 
year-end 





Total contracted, at 
yead-end 





Debt service/exports of 
goods and services 
Principal/exports of 
goods and services 
Interest/exports of 



















































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of data published by the Central Bank of Bolivia. 
"Preliminary figures. 
^This process became especially acute between 1974 and 1978, when exports of goods grew 19% annually, while FOB imports of goods 
increased over 30%. 
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As a consequence of the foregoing, there was generally a trade deficit, but there were no 
difficulties in financing this, since the economy was receiving a strong inflow of external credits. 
Until 1979, the credits received by the economy amounted to US$ 1 940 million. 
In 1979, a part of the disbursed credits began to fall due, meaning a rise in the external debt 
service costs. In the face of these looming difficulties, the first process of renegotiaton of the debt 
service was initiated. Furthermore, at the end of the year and with the purpose of reducing the foreign 
exchange outflow for import, the peso was devalued from 20.02 pesos per dollar to 24.53. 
In the period 1980-1981, the trade balance produced a small surplus, but the net foreign 
exchange reserve position was negative, so that it became increasingly difficult to meet external debt 
payments and imports. Besides, in 1982 new debt services fell due which could not be paid for. On the 
other hand, the maintenance of a fixed exchange rate from the end of 1979 through early 1982, 
together with domestic rates of inflation higher than the international rates,4 amounted to 
subsidizing the consumption of foreign products. 
In view of the foregoing, efforts were made to alleviate the foreign exchange shortage that 
began to be openly perceived since early 1982 by devaluing the currency in February of that year, 
raising the exchange rate by 76% to 43.13 pesos per dollar. In spite of this marked depreciation of the 
peso, however, speculation in dollars could not be restrained and the national unit of account 
practically lost its own identity. 
In these circumstances, two exchange areas —the official market and the parallel market— 
were established in March 1982 with the purpose of increasing the stability of the exchange market. 
In addition, the rule whereby it was mandatory to surrender 100% of foreign exchange from public 
and private sector exports to the Central Bank was modified. These latter measures produced still 
greater instability, however. Prices soared,5 and the dollar reached a value in the parallel market that 
was up to six times higher than its official price (September 1982). 
Against this background, a change of government took place in October 1982, and in November 
three measures in the exchange area were implemented in an attempt to solve the above problems. In 
the first place, a new devaluation was approved and at the same time a fixed exchange rate was 
reinstated, so that the area of free dollar quotation legally disappeared. The exchange rate rose by 
354% from43.13 to 196 pesos per dollar. Concurrently, a system of exchange control was introduced, 
whereby all foreign exchange operations were to be conducted through the Central Bank. Finally, the 
so-called dedollarization of the economy was carried out, which consisted in converting into national 
currency all debts contracted in dollars, attempting thereby to make the performance of the economy 
independent of the dollar price in the parallel market. 
The dedollarization performed in November 1982 had, inter alia, the following objectives. On 
the one hand, it tried to restore a higher degree of control over the financial and monetary system; the 
process of dollarization of the economy which had taken place virtually meant the substitution of the 
dollar for the national currency in the majority of domestic transactions, and made control of the main 
monetary variables —and hence of the economy as a whole— increasingly difficult. 
The other objective of dedollarization was to bring some relief to dollar debtors. Debt service 
costs had become very heavy as a result of the large borrowing incurred in the past, and the 
ever-increasing price of the dollar in the parallel market made it increasingly difficult for debtors to 
pay their commitments; this problem affected especially the productive sectors, whose financial costs 
were increasing as time went by, with an obvious impact on prices, which helped to increase the rate 
of inflation. 
Dedollarization was carried out when private banks had accumulated foreign currency 
surpluses, and for that reason different exchange rates were applied to the assets and liabilities of 
banks.6 
This was the broad background against which the performance of the exchange market during 
1983 should be set. In essence, its behaviour throughout the year intensified the tensions noted 
earlier. 
4The consumer price index in Bolivia grew between November 1979 and January 1982 by 514%, whereas in the same period the 
wholesale price index in the United States increased by 21%. 
'Between July and September 1982, the average rate of increase in consumer prices was nearly 20% per month. 
6See R. Morales Anaya, "Evaluación y análisis de las medidas de política cambiaría de noviembre de 1982", in Punios de Vista, No. 3, 
September 1983, 
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During the last two months of 1982 and January 1983, the difference between the price of the 
dollar in the official and the parallel markets diminished considerably, and never exceeded 70%. 
Accordingly, in those months domestic prices remained relatively stable and their rate of expansion 
slowed down considerably; thus, in November they increased nearly 19%, but in December and 
January there were more moderate increases of 7% and 0.6%, respectively. 
Later, between February and May there was some stabilization in the parallel market of the 
dollar, and its price even went down. In the course of the year the gap between the two prices 
expanded, however, so that the economy found itself once more in a situation of great instability. 
As there was not enough foreign exchange, there was an ever-increasing gap between the 
official value of the dollar and its value in the parallel market. The value of the dollar for its part, 
determined the price of other goods, and controls established to prevent price increases were not 
effective. At the same time, the strong inflationary expectations of the economic agents fostered the 
hoarding of goods, causing in the short run a false shortage of certain items which led to new price 
increases. 
Finally, price increases were passed on once again to the exchange market, thereby further 
increasing the price of the parallel dollar. 
Table 13 
















































































































Source: Central Bank of Bolivia; ECLAC, on the basis of official data; and International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics. 
"Exchange rate used by the banking system to convert foreign currency into national currency. These are the indexes of the real official 
exchange rate for the peso [except during March-October 1982, when a real rateobtained from the averageofficial rate (weighted 40%) and the 
open-market exchange rate (weighted 60%) was in use] vis-à-vis the currencies of trading partners, weighted according to the relative size of 
exports or imports to or from those countries. With respect to the methodology and sources used to calculate the effective real exchange rate, 
see the Statistical Appendix of ECLAC, Economic Survey of Latin America, 1981, United Nations publication, Sales No. E.83.II.G.2. 
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As from June, an enormous difference between the dollar price in the two markets occurred 
again. The difference in that month was 120%, and each month it increased progressively, until it 
reached 340% in October. At the same time, the growth rate of the general consumer price index 
between the same months (June-October) was nearly 86%. 
In November, with an exchange rate in the parallel market amounting to nearly four and a half 
times that in the official market, the official peso/dollar rate was modified from 196 pesos to 500 
pesos. Following this devaluation, the gap existing between the two markets in which the dollar was 
traded was somewhat reduced, but it still remained large, and in November and December the dollar 
exchange rate in the parallel market was two and a half times higher than that in the official market. 
Finally, in the highly unstable situation described above, the effective real exchange rate could 
not help reflecting the inflationary tensions nor the highly speculative process which developed in 
the economy. The annual average indexes of the effective real exchange rate for exports and imports 
dropped 40% in both cases (see table 13), and the levels at which the two indexes stood were very 
close to those of 1981, which in turn had been the lowest since 1970. 
In brief, the fundamental problem in 1983 continued to be the shortage of foreign exchange in 
the economy, both to meet the external debt service costs and to pay for essential imports. That 
caused complaints throughout the year by the import sectors, which also complained about the slow 
procedures of the Exchange Policy Commission (Comisión de Política Cambiaría) —established in 
November of the preceding year— in relation to the study and approval of import licenses. 
4. Prices, wages and employment 
a) Price trends 
In 1983 the rate of inflation remained in the triple-digit level for the second consecutive year. 
The December-December variation in the consumer price index was 329%, a slightly higher rate 
than that of 1982 (see table 14). Although all the components of the consumer price index exhibited 
substantial increases, food prices took the lead with a growth rate of 344%. Clothing and the 
"miscellaneous" component showed similar increases, while the housing component rose somewhat 
less (228%). 
The variation between annual averages also grew at an accelerated pace. Thus, the general 
consumer price index expanded 276%, after having grown by 124% in 1982. The same happened 
with all components of the consumer price index, a remarkably fast increase being observed in the 
price of food products, which rose by 304% or nearly two and a half times the rate of 1982. 
Wholesale prices rose even faster than consumer prices. The December-December general 
index rose by 518%: an increase of slightly over 100 points with respect to 1982. The highest price 
increase (693 %) was in the case of imported products, which had risen by 543 % in 1982. The rate of 
increase in the prices of agricultural products also accelerated (601% compared to 275% the 
preceding year). As for the prices of manufactures in 1983, they increased less than the year before, 
although they still rose at a rapid rate (345%) (see table 14). 
The variation between annual averages of the wholesale price index was 416%. In contrast with 
what occurred with the December-December variation, in this case the prices of agricultural products 
increased the most (518%), while import prices rose 489%. Manufactures, in contrast, rose 
somewhat less (312%). 
The overall high rate of inflation for the year showed different fluctuations during the period. 
Thus, during the first six months, in spite of the marked acceleration during February and March in 
the monthly rates of consumer price rises (10.2% and 11.8%, respectively), the general trend was 
towards a slower increase. Month-to-month variations in the general price index in April and May, 
and especially in June, were smaller (see figure 2). 
In the second part of the year, in contrast, the rate of variation of prices accelerated conside-
rably. Between July and December the growth rate was never below 10% per month, and it ranged 
around 25% in August, November and December. 
Price increases stemmed from the food shortage noted earlier, which was especially severe in 
the second half of the year, and from difficulties in importing products due to the lack of foreign 
exchange. Moreover, the depreciation of the peso vis-à-vis the dollar meant that prices of both 
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imported and national products increased because they were in practice indexed according to the 
exchange rate in the parallel market. 
Another important inflationary factor was the fiscal deficit, which expanded in nominal terms 
by 90%, following a considerable higher rise in 1982. The expansion of the means of payment needed 
in order to cover the fiscal deficit also influenced the rate of domestic price increases. 
Unregistered trade in goods also affected the rise in the cost of living. Several attempts were 
made to reduce the extent of this activity, which arose mainly for two reasons. One was the enormous 
disparity between the official exchange rate and that in the parallel market, and the other was the 
considerable differences between the prices of essential goods in the country —subsidized in many 
cases— and the price of the same goods in neighbouring countries. 
Finally, and within the context of the pricing policy implemented throughout the year, it is 
worth mentioning the two price increases for essential goods approved by the Government, one in 
March and the other in November, an the progressive approach of these prices to the equilibrium 
levels of the market. The policy of progressively reducing the subsidies had a dual purpose: to 
promote domestic production, and to prevent the diversion of national products to other markets. 
b) Wages and salaries 
During 1983, wages and salaries were one of the issues that received most attention in the 
package of economic policy measures put into effect. This was basically due to two different reasons. 
On the one hand, in previous years real wages had suffered a significant deterioration, and the 
repercussions of this process were not only economic. On the other hand, the wage structure in force 
up to then had formed a complex system of remunerations which made wage policy management 
more difficult. 
With respect to the first issue, since 1980 there had been a steep fall in the purchasing power of 
wage earners. That year, real average wages decreased by 5.5%, and in the two following years the 
drops were even larger: in 1981 wages fell nearly 9 % and in the following year the decline was 27% 
(see table 15). 
Table 14 
BOLIVIA: EVOLUTION OF DOMESTIC PRICES 
1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 
Variation December-December 
Consumer price index 
Food 















































































































































BOLIVIA: CONSUMER PRICE INDEXES 
Twelve-month variations 
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198~1 1983 1982 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of data supplied by the National Statistical Institute. 
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Wage losses in almost every branch of economic activity were considerable. In 1981, the real 
wage index in mining decreased by 12%, and this downturn was followed by another of 38% one year 
later. In manufacturing, the overall drop in the index between 1981 and 1982 was 45%, and in the 
petroleum industry the same index, after having practically stagnated in 1981, fell 52% the following 
year. 
It may be assumed that in 1983, as a consequence of the sharp nominal wage increases 
implemented during the year, the deterioration exhibited by average real wages may have been 
checked. On the basis of the data available up to March, average real wages are estimated to have 
fallen 2.5% with respect to the 1982 average. 
The new government, which took office at the end of 1982 formulated its wage policy in the 
light of the decline in real wages. For that reason, in analysing the evolution of that policy during 1983 
account should be taken of the measures that were adopted in this respect in November of the 
preceding year. 
In the first days of November 1982, the Government introduced a set of provisions designed to 
rationalize the wage system. To that end, a general wage increase was approved, both for the public 
and private sectors. For wage earners receiving 15 500 pesos or less, the increase was 30%; in the case 
of wages over that amount, an increase of 4 650 pesos per month was established. 
A minimum monthly wage of 8 490 pesos was also established, to be adjusted —on a one-time 
basis— after 100 days. Once that adjustment had been implemented, future adjustments would take 
place at certain intervals and would conform to criteria to be developed later. 
In March 1983, as a consequence of the decision adopted in November of the preceding year, a 
sliding scale for the minimum wage was applied, involving an increase of 46% in the minimum wage 
for the public and private sectors. The figure was set bearing in mind the fact that in the period 
between November 1982 and February 1983, prices had gone up by the same amount; the minimum 
wage therefore went up from 8 490 pesos to 12 400 pesos per month. 
On the other hand, in March 1983 two other important measures were taken. Firstly, from that 
date on, the principle of the sliding scale for the minimum salary was introduced. This meant that in 
the future, for the period of one year, the minimum wage would be adjusted according to the evolution 
of the price index. The sliding scale would be applied every six months, except if the increase in the 
price index in the meantime exceeded 40%, in which case the wage increase would be equal to the 
percentage of price increase, beginning to count from that date on a new period of six months for the 
Table 15 
BOLIVIA: EVOLUTION OF AVERAGE WAGES IN 
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Source: Ministry of Labour, National Wages Commission. 




BOLIVIA: EVOLUTION OF EMPLOYMENT AND UNDEREMPLOYMENT" 
1983 
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 Central axis'" 
July-Sept. 
Unemployment rate 4.5 5.2 7.5 8.6 9.9 12.26 
Underemployment rate 43.9 46.1 48.5 50.9 53.5 
Source: National Statistical Institute, Permanent Household Surveys. 
"Total capitals. Comprises the cities of La Paz, Santa Cruz, Cochabamba and Oruro. 
future application of the sliding scale. Secondly, all workers who received wages higher than the 
minimum —except those who earned more than 50 000 pesos— received an equal increase of 3 910 
pesos. In accordance with the behaviour exhibited by prices in the following months, a new rise in the 
minimum salary of workers in the public and private sectors was agreed in July. In this case, the wage 
increment was 41%, bringing the minimum wage to 17 484 pesos. 
From October until the end of the year, wage policy became much more complex. Between July 
and October some sectors of economic activity had received new wage increases in accordance with 
the existing regulations. Consequently, in October a rise of 23% in the minmum wage from 17 484 
pesos to 21 500 pesos was decided in order to standardize the situation of all wage earners. Also in 
October an additional increase of 40% was applied to that amount, so that the minimum wage rose to 
30 100 pesos. Moreover, the establishment of a compensatory bonus of 22 500 pesos, to be paid in 
three months starting in November, was also agreed. As a result of all these increases, the minimum 
wage in November and December amounted to 37 600 pesos. 
Another fundamental objective established by the economic authorities, which they attempted 
to achieve from the end of 1982 and throughout 1983, was to rationalize and simplify the wage system 
in the country. Until October 1982, the forms of payment exhibited a great variety, with different 
components according to the type of establishment, and there were even cases in which each firm set 
its own remuneration pattern. The system was organized on the basis of a relatively low basic wage or 
salary, increased by the addition of countless compensatory bonuses.7 
In view of this situation, there were attempts, through different measures adopted as from 
November 1982 and during 1983, to modernize the wage structure. To that end a series of steps 
pointing in the following directions were taken. On the one hand, except for those bonuses paid for 
seniority, overtime, dependency allowances, etc., all others were consolidated and incorporated into 
the basic wage. On the other hand, the concepts of production bonus and professional category were 
redefined, since they no longer answered the purpose for which they had been created. 
Finally, other important measures were adopted during the year, among them a ban on the 
granting by public and mixed enterprises, as well as by decentralized public institutions, of wage 
increases departing from the wage policy defined by the Government. An electricity tariff of a social 
nature was also established, providing for a minimum consumption at a preferential price. 
Furthermore, in the second half of the year frequent references began to be made to a 
widespread urge for higher wages not matched by an increase in production and productivity, and it 
was decided that in the future both concepts should be taken into account in the indexes used for wage 
calculations. 
c) Evolution of employment and unemployment 
Because of the generalized crisis, the unemployment already existing in the Bolivian economy 
expanded further during 1983, thereby confirming the trend of previous years. The unemployment 
rate ranged around 12% (see table 16). 
7 As evidence of the degree of anarchy prevailing in the field of wages, it maybe noted that by November 1982 the wage structure had 
become so heterogeneous that, in addition to the basic wage and seven compensatory cost-of-living bonuses, there were a number of other 
supplementary bonuses making up the total wage. Their number changed from one branch of economic activity to another; for example, in 
manufacturing the number of supplementary bonuses amounted to 53; in services to 40; in the banking sector, to 38; in commerce to 31, and to 
smaller numbers in the other economic sectors. 
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The factors leading to this increase in unemployment were related, among others, to the sharp 
fall in production and import difficulties. In addition, as a consequence of the natural disasters that 
affected almost the entire agricultural sector, unemployment increased sharply in rural areas, and this 
contributed to increased migration to the cities. As employment possibilities in urban areas were not 
very favourable, the already extremely high levels of underemployment got worse. 
According to surveys undertaken by the Ministry of Planning and Co-ordination, the repercus-
sions of the droughts and floods were enormous. Forty-six per cent of the rural population suffered 
the loss of between 50 and 100% of their sources of employment, meaning fewer jobs for some 
300 000 persons, representing 19% of the rural economically active population, or 22%, if only the 
highland departments are considered. 
5. Monetary and fiscal policy 
a) Evolution of the means of payment 
Although the monetary base expanded considerably in 1983 (181%), this was a much slower 
rate of expansion than in 1982, when it rose nearly 300%. This slower growth rate was made possible 
because the process of monetization of assets followed by the Central Bank diminished considerably 
(see table 17), the reason being that in 1983 the net credit granted to the public sector and the 
financing made available to banks increased by only 69% and 116%, respectively, compared with 
increases of 422% and 3 4 1 % the preceding year (see table 17). 
In 1983 the approach taken two years earlier was maintained and the financing granted to the 
central government suffered a sharp fall. The growth rate of credits granted to the rest of the public 
sector also diminished very considerably after the large increse that they had experienced in 1982. 
As a consequence of the smaller increase in the monetary base in 1983, the variations 
experienced by the currency outside banks and the cash reserves of banks were also smaller than in 
1982. In that year they had been enormous (258% and 365%, respectively), but in 1983 they grew by 
only 158% and 2 2 1 % (see table 17). 
Table 17 
BOLIVIA: MAIN MONETARY INDICATORS 
1. Monetary base 
Origin 
International reserves (net) 
Credit to public sector (net) 
Central government 
Other public sector 
Financing to banks 
Other items (net) 
Destination 
Currency outside banks 
Cash reserve of banks 
2. Demand deposits 
3. Money supply (M,) 
4. Fixed-term deposits 











































































































Source: Central Bank of Bolivia. 
° Preliminary figures. Data correspond to November. Figures were calculated with respect to the same period of the preceding year. 
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BOLIVIA 
Table 18 . 
BOLIVIA: STRUCTURE OF INTEREST RATES 
(Percentages) 
Loans 
Business and private 
activities 
Maximum effective nomi 
Real rate 
Productive activities 
Maximum effective nomi 
Real rate 
Deposits 
Deposits in savings banks 
Minimum nominal rate 
Real rate 
Fixed-term deposits in 
national currency 





























































































Source: Central Bank of Bolivia. 
"Annual averages, up to and including November. With a clause protecting their value. 
The growth rate of demand deposits also decreased; in 1983 they expanded 165 %, compared to 
slightly over 180% the year before. 
As a result of the increase in currency outside banks and the expansion of demand deposits, the 
money supply (M,) rose by 160%, i.e., less than in 1982. The expanded money supply (M2), for its 
part, grew by 135%, compared with 233% in 1982, but in view of the high domestic inflation, the 
large nominal increases in the monetary supply represented sharp contractions in real terms. 
As regards domestic nominal interest rates, those for both deposits and loans were raised in two 
occasions during 1983. However, the most significant fact was the deterioration they experienced as a 
consequence of the price increases that occurred during the year. In real terms, interest rates on 
credits granted by the banking system for commercial or productive activities were sharply negative 
(-53%). At the same time, the rate of return for private persons making savings or fixed-term 
deposits was also negative (-59%) (see table 18). 
These negative real interest rates explained, in part, why the public preferred to maintain an 
important share of their wealth for transactions in cash, instead of letting it lose its value. Something 
similar may have occurred with respect to the rate of return of credit operations carried out by banks. 
In 1983, legal cash reserve rates were modified on two occasions, the first as part of the package 
of measures approved in March, and the second in July. In both cases, the rates were raised for both 
national and foreign banks by between 5 and 12.5 points, depending on whether they referred to 
demand deposits, deposits in savings banks, etc., in national currency. For demand deposits and 
fixed-term deposits in foreign currency, the cash reserve rate remained 100%. 
One of the main reasons for raising interest and cash reserve rates was to restrict the surplus 
liquidity in the economy and thus reduce the high rate of price increases. 
Lastly, it is worth mentioning that in view of the big price increases experienced during the year 
and the strong speculation with the dollar, there were few incentives to make any productive 
investments. In actual fact, the most profitable economic activity was indebtedness in national 
currency. Those who were in a position to do so applied to the banking system for credits in national 
currency and then converted the resources thus obtained into dollars in the parallel market in order to 
protect their wealth, or to perform later the reverse operation, according to the rate of variation of the 
exchange rate in this market. Taking into account the rapid price increases in the economy, the 
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profitability of the operation stemmed essentially from the fact that interest rates were negative, 
while in the second place there was also a small increase in the value of the dollar in real terms on the 
parallel market.8 Furthermore, the mere conversion of wealth into dollars allowed its owners to 
protect themselves from the deterioration of the Bolivian national currency. 
b) Central government income and expenditure 
In nominal terms, the behaviour of central government current income and total expenditure 
during 1983 was quite different from that recorded in 1982, for while the former nearly doubled, the 
latter markedly slowed down their high rate of expansion. As a consequence of these different forms 
of evolution the fiscal deficit at current values grew in 1983 considerably less than the preceding year. 
Thus, whereas in 1982 the deficit increased at a rate of nearly 1 000%, a year later it expanded by only 
90% (see table 19). 
The above considerations, however, have little significance in the context of the inflationary 
process in which the economy was immersed between 1982 and 1983. For that reason, it is more 
realistic to make the corresponding comparisons in real terms. 
In constant values, current income shrank by 47% during 1983, so that it amounted to only half 
the value of the preceding year and one-third of the 1981 level. This was therefore the fifth 
consecutive year of persistent decline in the real income of the central government (see table 20). 
As may be seen from the figures, the main income of the National Treasury showed a negative 
performance during the year. The main declines in central government revenue were in the field of 
mining and petroleum royalties and customs revenue. Income from foreign trade operations dropped 
nearly 72%, following another decline in 1982 of 46%. However, the steepest falls of 1983 were in 
royalty income: mining royalties decreased nearly 90% and petroleum royalties approximately 74%. 
The smallest downturn was in domestic income tax, which fell by 27% (see table 20). 
On the expenditure side, the total amount suffered a drop of 49% in real terms, in contrast with 
the increase of 140% recorded in 1982. Payments for personal services fell 35% in the first nine 
Table 19 
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Mining royalties 





Materials and supplies 
Fixed and financial assets 
Public debt 































































































































































Source: Central Bank of Bolivia. 
"Data refer to September and rates were calculated with respect to the same period of the preceding year. 
8The following example illustrates the above more clearly. The real interest rate of credits for commercial and private activities was 
53%. The profitability of the process of taking out debts in pesos and converting them into dollars is explained by the fact that, for every 100 
pesos of indebtedness with the banking system, only 47 pesos had to be paid back in real terms, and as in addition the dollar had a slight inciease in 
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Main ratios (percentages) 
44.2 45.2 42.0 85.1 84.6 
9.1 9.0 7.2 38.7 21.1 
11.5 10.9 10.0 6.7 3.8 
20.6 19.9 17.2 45.5 24.9 
Source: Central Bank of Bolivia. 
"Data refer to the period January-September, and rates have been calculated with respect to the same period of the preceding year. 
''Figures calculated on the basis of real values. 
months. The value of purchases of materials and supplies, as well as that of fixed and financial assets, 
decreased 1 1 % and 19%, respectively, whereas the entry "other expenditure" fell 44%. Disburse-
ments for transfers and contributions declined considerably less. The only expenditure that increased 
in real terms was that in respect of non-personal services —partly because of the disbursements that 
had to be made to confront the disasters that affected the economy during the first part of the year— 
and public debt services, which were exceptionally high. 
As a result of all the above, the deficit shrank 49% in real terms, after having expanded in 1982 
by the enormous amount of 386%. 
In spite of the foregoing, the figures for 1983 continued to evidence the crisis in which the 
central government is still entangled. Current income as a percentage of the gross domestic product, 
after having declined from 10% in 1981 to less than 7% in 1982, went down yet again in 1983, when 
it represented less than 4 % of the product. 
With respect to expenditure, there was a substantial improvement in 1983. This item, which in 
the preceding year had been equivalent to 45 % of the product, decreased practically to one-half of this 
(25%) a year later. A drop of this size was made possible because, although in both those years the 
product shrank significantly, in 1982 real expenditure expanded, while in 1983 it decreased. 
In view of all the above, although the deficit had declined from its 1982 level of the equivalent of 
39% of the product, it still stood at an extremely high level in 1983 (21%). 
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The financial difficulties that the central government had suffered in recent years are also 
evidenced by the fact that between 1979 and 1981 the real income of the Treasury only covered 55% 
of its expenditure: a situation that became even more acute in 1982 and 1983, when it only covered 
15%. 
In this context, the measures adopted during the year attempted to rationalize the legal 
provisions in force while raising fiscal revenue, on the one hand, and reducing public expenditure, on 
the other. In March, public enterprises were forbidden to agree to wage policies different from those 
established by the Government for the country as a whole. In June, but with retroactive effect as of 
January, a new income tax scheduled for natural persons and a new scale for the inheritance tax on 
undivided estates were established. Income tax on wages under 14 000 pesos was eliminated, while 
that on remunerations ranging between 14 000 and 20 000 pesos were reduced by 65%. At the same 
time, new exempt minimums and deductions for dependants were established. 
Finally, other important provisions included in the measures adopted in November may be 
mentioned. Given the strong speculation on the dollar in the second part of the year, which in turn 
resulted in high price increases, it was decided that the Finance Ministry should supervise all foreign 
exchange purchase and selling operations.9 Furthermore, the first steps were taken to ensure that all 
institutions and public or joint enterprises regularized their debts with the Central Bank. It should 
also be mentioned that a 40% reduction was granted on income tax retentions of wage earners during 
the last quarter of the year. 
9 Evidence of the seriousness of the speculation problem was the establishment of a reward for informers and pertinent authorities 
amounting to 50% of rhe value of transactions not in keeping with legal requirements. 
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1. Recent economic trends: Introduction and summary 
Application of the economic adjustment programme agreed with the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) was undoubtedly the central element in Brazilian economic policy in 1983. This programme 
was drawn up at the end of 1982 and enjoyed the financial support of the Fund, which thus also gave 
its backing for the refinancing of the debts with foreign commercial banks and the procurement of 
fresh credits. A salient feature of this programme was the policy of austerity in public expenditure, 
which was to be applied more vigorously than in preceding years with a view to reducing the high 
fiscal deficit. 
Another significant feature of the adjustment programme was the adoption of an exchange-
rate policy designed to improve competitiveness in the export field. In view of the unsatisfactory 
balance-of-trade results observed early in the year, an extraordinary devaluation of the cruzeiro was 
decreed by the authorities in February. The polky of periodical mini-devaluations in line with 
domestic inflation which was continued thereafter enabled the real exchange rate thus established to 
be maintained —a situation which contrasted noticeably with events following the previous major 
devaluation of December 1979. 
The authorities also gave particular attention to wages policy, especially with regard to the 
prevailing system of adjustment of personal remunerations. The Government took the view that the 
index-linked wage policy was itself causing further inflation and adversely affecting the efficacy of the 
economic adjustment measures. It was consequently decided to modify the wage-adjustment 
procedures as from the beginning of the year. 
An initial change in the corresponding regulations was accordingly introduced injanuary 1983, 
with the aim of keeping increases at the lowest wage levels (which had previously been subject to six-
monthly adjustments at rates in excess of inflation) strictly in line with the variations recorded in the 
national index of consumer prices. As a result of continuing inflation and the difficulties being 
encountered in applying the economic adjustment programmes, wages legislation was again 
amended in July by limiting wage adjustments to a maximum of 80% of the variation recorded in the 
consumer price index. These modifications met with vigorous opposition in Congress, which even 
rejected the Government-sponsored amendments on two occasions. It was therefore not until 
November that the new wage-readjustment policy involving a partial reduction in the level of 
indexation applicable to wages was finally enacted. 
Considerable difficulties were also encountered in 1983 in the procurement of external 
resources, and the inflow of loans was smaller than it had been before the severe contraction 
experienced as from September 1982. Credit procurement mechanisms were at the same time 
substantially modified, since the international banking system refused to continue granting new loans 
in the manner hitherto applied, whereby Brazilian institutions and foreign banks negotiated the 
loans freely and independently. In view of this adverse circumstance it became necessary to initiate 
negotiations between the Government and the country's foreign creditor banks, the latter being 
'represented for this purpose by committees. Under the new system, both the granting and 
disbursement of loans became subject to the fulfilment of the terms agreed with the International 
Monetary Fund and to such other requirements as might be introduced by the banking committees. 
Negotiations between the Government and the International Monetary Fund began in 
November 1982. Injanuary 1983 the Government submitted a formal request in the form of a letter 
of intent specifying the adjustment programme it intended to apply in order to correct the internal 
and external imbalances affecting the national economy. 
In February 1983 a credit was approved by the IMF in favour of Brazil for the amount of 
US$ 4 900 million under an extended three-year agreement, in addition to a new compensatory 
financing loan of US$ 500 million. In the same month negotiations were concluded by the 
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Government with foreign commercial banks for the refinancing of the existing indebtedness and 
procurement of fresh credits. The total resources thus promised by the commercial banks amounted 
to US$ 4 400 million, while the conversion of amortization commitments into new loans came to 
approximately US$ 4 500 million. 
The adjustment programme agreed upon with the IMF included a set of measures in the 
exchange rate, monetary and fiscal spheres, and established quantitative quarterly limits as regards 
the net international reserves to be held by the national monetary authorities (Central Bank and 
Banco do Brasil), external indebtedness, exchange-rate variations, finance requirements of the non-
financial public sector, and net domestic assets of the monetary authorities.l It was specified in the 
agreement that in the event of non-fulfilment of these specific quarterly targets loan disbursements 
would be withheld and would be resumed only after consultations and the establishment of new 
quantitative goals. The programme also included annual targets with regard to inflation, growth of 
federal government income in real terms, expansion of the monetary base and means of payment, and 
trade and current account balances in the national balance of payments. A number of economic policy 
measures were also agreed, such as the elimination of subsidies, establishment of new taxation and 
adjustment of the rates of existing taxes, containment of public expenditure, elimination of 
government expenditure charged to the monetary authorities, liberalization of the financial system 
and reduction of import and foreign-exchange restrictions. 
Since the economic targets established for the first quarter of the year were not fulfilled, the IMF 
suspended payment of the disbursements due to be made in May and August. The foreign commercial 
banks took a similar attitude, withholding the disbursements scheduled to be made from May 
onwards. These decisions by the IMF and the commercial banks compelled the authorities to 
renegotiate the quantitative limits agreed upon at the beginning of the year. In September 1983 Brazil 
asked to be excused from the commitment to comply with the former targets, and new quantitative 
limits were agreed with the IMF and confirmed in a third letter of intent. The adjustment programme 
was at the same time expanded to include monthly targets with regard to growth of the money supply, 
the monetary base and the financial requirements of the federal and State governments, 
municipalities»and public enterprises. In contrast with what had previously been agreed with regard 
to the quarterly goals, however, non-fulfilment of these monthly targets would not now cause the 
automatic suspension of loan disbursements by the Fund but would only make it necessary to carry out 
mutual consultations. 
Disbursements under the expanded agreement arrived at with the IMF were resumed in 
November 1983, and in December the commercial banks disbursed the suspended installments of the 
group of loans approved early in the year. In the last quarter of 1983 Brazil also set in motion 
negotiations with the foreign commercial banks with a view to obtaining a second group of loans to 
cover the accounts for that year, plus resources to finance the 1984 balance of payments. These 
disbursements were not however received before the year's end, with the result that some of the 
targets undertaken with the Fund remained unfulfilled. 
The performance of the Brazilian economy in 1983 was undoubtedly unsatisfactory, as 
evidenced by the severe contraction (-3%) in economic activity, which caused a considerable 
reduction in per capita income for the third consecutive year (see table 1). In addition, a further 
increase was recorded in the already high rates of inflation and of urban unemployment. The external 
sector difficulties continued, especially in the balance-of-payments capital account. The high rates of 
interest in the international financial markets continued to affect the Brazilian economy adversely, 
and these interest rates, coupled with the high level of the foreign debt, were again the cause of a 
considerable transfer of resources to other markets. It nevertheless proved possible to achieve a 
substantial reduction of the balance-of-payments current account deficit, thanks to the positive 
balance on foreign trade in goods and services. Trade in goods showed a record surplus due to a 
significant recovery in exports and a further considerable reduction in imports. 
The gross domestic product declined by 3.3 % : the worst result recorded in this respect since the 
crisis of the 1930s. The per capita product, for its part, fell by 5.4%, which came on top of the 5% 
contraction experienced in the two preceding years. These results were decisively influenced by the 
1 Net domestic assets were defined in the first letter of intent as the difference between commitments vis-a-vis the private sector and the 
net international assets of the monetary authorities. In the third letter of intent issued in September, these assets were defined as the difference 
between the monetary liabilities and net international reserves of the monetary authorities. 
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Table 1 
BRAZIL: MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS 
BRAZIL 
Basic economic indicators 
Gross domestic product at market 
prices (billions of 1970 dollars) 
Population (millions of inhabitants) 






















B. Short-run economic indicators 
Gross domestic product 
Per capita gross domestic product 
Gross domestic income 
Terms of trade 
(goods and services) 
Current value of exports of goods 
and services 




Variation between annual averages 
General price index 
domestic availability 
December-December 
Variation between annual averages 
Money 
Wages and salaries' 
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Current government income 
Total government expenditure* 




























































































Millions of dollars 
External sector 
Trade balance (goods and services) 
Balance on current account 
Balance on capital account 
Variation in international reserves 































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official data. 
"Preliminary figures. Gross domestic product plus terms-of-trade effect, less net factor payments to the rest of the world and net 
private transfer payments. r Consumer price indexes for Rio de Janeiro. The general price index is a weighted average of the 
wholesale price index (60%), the cost-of-living index for Rio de Janeiro (30%) and building cost in the same city (10%). 'Average 
nominal wage in industry. Weighted average of rates in main metropolitan regions. ^Including financial costs relating to the 
public det, except redemptions of securities. Including long-and short-term capital, unrequited official transfers, and errors and 
omissions. 'Including the total medium-and long-term debt plus short-term indebtedness to financial institutions reporting to the 
Bank for International Settlements, the figures consequently differ in composition from those given in table 25. 
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severe contractions in the levels of activity of the manufacturing and building sectors. Real income 
registered an even more disadvantageous trend than that of the gross domestic product, since the 
terms of trade deteriorated for the sixth consecutive year. 
Employment in the formal sector fell by more than 3%, reflecting the considerable decline 
observed in this connection in manufacturing and construction, while employment in the services 
sector showed an increase of slightly more than 1%. On the other hand, the rise in the average 
unemployment rate in the main metropolitan areas was relatively modest, increasing only from 6.3 % 
to 6.7%, so that it failed to provide a clear indication of the real situation in the labour market. As in 
1982, this development may be explained in part by a contraction of the economically active 
population, since many people out of work, discouraged by the prolonged recession,2 gave up seeking 
employment. 
Inflation rose appreciably in 1983. The general price index recorded a growth rate of 211% and 
showed a marked acceleration in the first nine months of the year. Prices rose in the first quarter at an 
annual rate of 170% —already a much higher figure than in 1982— and the annualized rate reached 
almost 300% in the third quarter. There was a significant decline in the final quarter of the year, but 
even so the final 1983 rate of inflation was more than 200% per year. These results considerably 
exceeded the targets established in the letters of intent submitted to the International Monetary 
Fund. 
In order to reduce the rate of inflation, the Government —in addition to applying the measures 
provided for in the adjustment programme agreed with the Fund— resorted to administrative price 
controls and introduced the already-mentioned amendments in wages policy. 
The decidedly unsatisfactory results of the anti-inflation policy may be explained by various 
factors, prominent among which were some measures deriving from the application by the 
Government of the adjustment plan itself, such as the curtailment of production subsidies in the case 
of farm products, the running-down of price-regulating stockpiles, and the devaluation of the 
cruzeiro vis-à-vis the US dollar. Also influencing the worsening inflationary situation were the 
natural disasters experienced in the course of the year (floods in the central-southern areas of the 
country, continuation of the drought in the northeast for the fifth consecutive year), which 
appreciably reduced domestic supplies, especially of basic food products. Inflationary expectations 
had been rising since the end of the preceding year as a result of the supply problems already referred 
to and fears of a severe devaluation of the cruzeiro due to the critial situation in the external sector. 
The existence of a generalized indexation system also helped to accentuate these expectations, as well 
as creating greater difficulties in the application of anti-inflation measures. 
The area where the most favourable results were achieved was that of foreign trade, a positive 
balance of some US$ 6 500 million being recorded on the merchandise trade balance, surpassing even 
the ambitious goal of US$ 6 billion established by the economic authorities at the beginning of the 
year. The increase of 8.6% in exports represented a partial recovery from the considerable 
contraction of the preceding year and was due to the improved external competitiveness of Brazilian 
products arising from the depreciation of the cruzeiro in real terms. Recovery in the export field 
would have been greater had it not been for the fact that sales to developing countries, especially in 
the Latin American region, which in recent years had become important clients, fell drastically due to 
the severity of the economic crisis also affecting them. Imports 'Continued to decline due to the 
application of more restrictive measures on external purchases and the incidence of the domestic 
recession. 
Non-factor services showed more favourable results than in the past, the deficit on these 
transactions amounting in 1983 to US$ 2 400 million compared with US$ 3 600 million in the 
preceding year. As a consequence of these combined results, trade in goods and services in 1983 
showed a surplus of US$ 4 billion, in contrast with the deficits recorded in previous years. The deficit 
on current account, for its part, was substantially lower and was equivalent to only 45%.of that 
recorded in the preceding year (see figure 1). 
In spite of the noticeable improvement in the balance-of-payments current account, 
considerable difficulties continued to be encountered on the capital account, aggravating the situation 
experienced as from September 1982, when the inflow of medium- and long-term foreign loans was 
drastically reduced. Furthermore, the net outflow of short-term capital and the suspension of 
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aAnnual growth rate. ^Percentage variation from December to December. Up to 1979 this 
corresponds to the consumer price index for Rio de Janeiro, and from 1980 onwards to the consumer 
price index for the entire country. cMillions of dollars. ^percentages. eIncludes the total 
medium- and long-term debt plus short-term debt to financial institutions reporting to the Bank for 
International Settlements. The above series therefore differs from the figures shown in table 25. 
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disbursements by the Fund and international creditor banks gave rise to serious balance-of-payment:s 
problems, with the result that pending foreign payment commitments began to accumulate rapidly. 
This situation induced the authorities to seek to negotiate the qfficial debt with the Paris Club and to 
request new loans from the foreign commercial banks (second phase of renegotiation of the external 
debt). Due to the non-receipt of the first disbursements under the new credit facilities requested from 
the foreign commercial banks, by the end of the year the arrears in settling commitments due to the 
banks amounted to US$ 2 340 million. The problems arising from these arrears made it necessary for 
the economic authorities to institute the centralization of all foreign exchange operations in the 
Central Bank as from August 1983. 
As in former years, the economic adjustment plan included limits on the annual expansion of 
the monetary base and means of payment. In addition to those traditional indicators, quarterly targets 
were specified in respect of the net domestic assets controlled by the monetary authorities and loan 
requirements in the non-financial public sector. The programme also included various measures to 
reduce the financing needs of the public sector, outstanding among them those aiming to eliminate 
expenditure carried out in former years by the federal government and charged to the monetary 
authorities through the medium of "open accounts". In 1983, a significant proportion of this 
expenditure was covered with resources from current government income. As for the rest of the 
public sector, strict limits were fixed in regard to the expansion of credit granted by the financial 
system to public enterprises, State governments and municipalities. 
With the same purpose of curbing monetary expansion, credits to priority activities such as 
agriculture, exports, and the alcohol-fuel programme were made subject to maximum growth limits 
in accordance with monetary budget availabilities. These credits had not formerly been liable to 
limitations of this nature since they, too, had been chargeable to the above-mentioned "open 
accounts". On the other hand, loans to other sectors granted under non-preferential conditions were 
liberalized by eliminating ceilings on their expansion. 
Other important changes were introduced in the sphere of interest rates, all types of which 
were made subject to regulation by the Central Bank. Furthermore, preferential rates for priority 
activities were raised, with the aim of reducing the official subsidies granted in this respect. 
In the sphere of fiscal policy, measures were introduced to improve the collection of tax 
revenues, although the increment targets in real terms set in this connection were not reached, since 
various types of taxes were affected by the decline in the level of economic activity. On the other hand, 
the planned results in the policy of restraining government expenditure were attained, since it proved 
possible to reduce outgoings both in the case of those chargeable to the Treasury and those effected 
through the monetary authority. In the latter instance, considerable reductions were achieved in the 
amount of subsidies granted in connection with credit and the marketing of basic commodities. 
Despite these measures and the results obtained in the fiscal area, considerable difficulties were 
encountered in fulfilling the quarterly goals of the adjustment programme as regards net domestic 
assets held by the monetary authorities. In the first quarters of the year the results were close to the 
goals so defined, but towards the end of the year it became impossible to fulfil them, due mainly to 
delays in receipt of the second group of loans from the foreign commercial banks. Another factor that 
prevented fulfilment of the goals was the big injection of money made necessary in December to 
redeem the considerable volume of public-debt securities due for settlement at that time. 
The monetary base and means of payment grew by approximately 90%, so that the 
corresponding goals for the year were close to being fulfilled. This was mainly due, however, to the 
contraction induced by the considerable decline in international reserves. According to other liquidity 
indicators, the increases were greater than planned, although still considerably less than the variation 
in prices. 
Monetary control came up against serious difficulties as a result of the problems arising in the 
management of the domestic public debt. Thus, in order to alleviate the pressures on interest rates 
and relieve the lack of liquidity which was affecting many economic sectors, the Central Bank had to 
inject almost 2.3 billion cruzeiros into the monetary market: a sum equivalent to more than 100% of 
the monetary base at the beginning of the year. In addition, due to the above-mentioned redemption 
of securities, the balance of the public debt outside the field of action of the monetary authorities 
contracted by more than 30% in real terms. Monetary control was furthermore hampered by the 
inability of several public enterprises to meet their foreign debt servicing commitments, for which 




BRAZIL: TOTAL SUPPLY AND DEMAND 
Total supply 
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at market prices 




Gross domestic investment 
Gross fixed investment 
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Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures supplied by the National Accounts Centre of the Getulio Vargas Foundation. 
"Preliminary figures. '"The figures for exports and imports of goods and services were taken from balance-of-payments data expressed 
in dollars at current prices, which were converted to constant 1970 values using price indexes calculated by ECLAC for the 
purpose. cChanges in stocks are included in private consumption. 
Investment expenditure by public enterprises was significantly lower because of the controls 
exercised by the Department of State Enterprises (SEST) and the impossibility of financing the 
planned investments by means of external resources. As in 1982, this contraction of public 
investment had a negative effect on the capital-goods manufacturing sector and the building industry, 
which were the most depressed activities in the year under review. 
Despite the significant reduction of both current and investment expenditure in real terms, 
difficulties were experienced in meeting the goals established as regards the borrowing needs of the 
public sector, due to the big increases in its financing costs caused by the steep revaluation of the 
domestic debt and the considerable international devaluation of the currency. Public-enterprise debt 
servicing costs amounted in 1983 to 30% of their operating income, compared with 25% in the 
preceding year. However, if the amount corresponding to revaluation of the domestic and foreign 
debt in accordance with monetary correction and exchange rate variations is excluded, the results 
obtained must be regarded as satisfactory, since operational financing needs, defined as the difference 
between nominal financing availabilities and the amount of the above price and exchange rate 
revaluations, dropped from the equivalent of 6.2% of the gross domestic product in 1982 to 2.9% in 
1983. 
2. Trends in economic activity 
a) Total supply and demand 
Total supply dropped by 4% in 1983, thereby aggravating the accumulated contraction of the 
two preceding years, which had shown the most unfavourable results in this respect since the 
economic crisis of the 1930s. The decrease in total supply reflected the contraction of 3 3 % in the 
gross domestic product and the severe drop in imports for the third consecutive year. The latter led to 
a further deterioration in the import coefficient, which in the year under review reached the lowest 
level since 1966 (see table 2). 
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On the other hand, a clear upswing (15%) was observed in the volume of exports of goods and 
services, thereby restoring (after the drop recorded in 1982) the growth trend recorded between 1968 
and 1981, when exports rose at an average annual rate of more than 10%. Exports thus became the 
only main economic variable to show a favourable result in the year under review. 
In contrast, the main components of domestic demand contracted sharply in the year. Private 
consumption fell by approximately 2.5%, while gross fixed investment declined for the third 
consecutive year, this time by the unprecedented amount of 18%. The coefficient of gross capital 
formation consequently dropped appreciably, to the lowest level in the past 30 years. 
Significant changes occurred in the financing of gross domestic investment, with the 
proportion accounted for by external resources falling from 14% in 1982 to 10% in 1983, the latter 
result being less than the average for the period 1975-1981. This reduction in the share of external 
saving was due to the country's need to obtain a high trade surplus by transferring real resources 
abroad in order to counteract the balance-of-payments crisis, caused, among other factors, by the 
lower procurement of new external loans. It may be noted that gross national saving, as a percentage 
of the gross domestic product, has been declining since 1975 due to the increasing transfers of 
resources abroad as a consequence of the deterioration in the terms of trade over the five-year period 
1978-1982 and the extremely sharp rise in interest rates affecting the foreign debt (see table 3). 
b) Evolution of the main sectors 
During 1983 the production of goods fell considerably (-6%), thereby aggravating the 
unfavourable trend of the two preceding years. The production of basic services continued to grow 
moderately while that of other services showed a slight contraction (see table 4). 
Salient aspects in the production of goods were the considerable declines in manufacturing and 
building activities, while agricultural production showed modest growth. Vigorous expansion was 
again observed in the output of the mining industry (14.5%) but its incidence was small due to its 
relatively scant significance in the composition of the overall product (1%). 
Table 3 






















1975- 1980 1981 1982 1983" 
1979 
Percentages of gross domestic investment 
1. Gross domestic investment 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
2. Gross national savings 
a) Domestic savings 
b) Net factor payments0 
c) Terms-of-trade effect 
3. External savings 11.4 13.2 11.4 14.4 10.0 
Percentages of gross domestic product 
1. Gross domestic investment 26.6 22.7 22.2 22.0 18.7 
2. Gross national savings 
a) Domestic savings 
b) Net factor payments' 
c) Terms-of-trade effect 
3. External savings 3.0 3.0 2.5 3.2 1.9 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official data. 
"Preliminary figures. The original information is expresed in constant values at 1970 prices. 
























BRAZIL: GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT, BY KIND OF ECONOMIC 
ACTIVITY, AT FACTOR COST 
Gross domestic product 
Goods 
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Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures supplied by the Getulio Vargas Foundation. 
"Preliminary figures. b As the individual activities and totals were calculated independently, the sum of the former does not coincide with 
the latter. 'Including financial institutions, insurance and real estaré, except ownership of dwellings. Including restaurants, 
hotels and business services. 
In the field of services the most dynamic sector was once again electricity, gas and water, which 
expanded in the year by almost 8%. Although greater than in the preceding year, however, this 
increase was still less than the considerable expansion recorded in this sector between 1970 and 1980 
(an annual average rate of 12%). 
i) The agricultural sector. The agricultural product showed an increase of 2.2%, after having 
gone down by 2.5 % in the preceding year. This favourable trend in the year under review was mainly 
due,to the big increase (80%) in the production of coffee, which partly compensated for the steep 
decline recorded in the preceding year when output of this product was severely affected by frosts (see 
table 5). 
Among other export products, favourable results were obtained in crops of major importance 
such as soya, sugar cane and cocoa, while decreases were recorded in the production of items of less 
significance such as tobacco, cotton, peanuts and castor oil seed. Soybean output increased by close on 
14% despite a loss of one million tons due to adverse climatic conditions almost at the end of the 
harvest period. As in former years sugar cane production showed a favourable rate of expansion, due 
both to an increase in area sown and yields obtained. Since the commencement of alcohol production 
for energy purposes in the mid-1970s, the area devoted to the cultivation of sugar cane has expanded 
by more than 60% (from 2 to 3.3 million hectares), and output has grown by 130%. 
The production of crops destined primarily for the domestic market contracted very 
considerably, mainly because of the natural disasters already mentioned. A further contributing factor 
in this context was that, due to the official foreign-exchange policy and price controls, which had a 
particular effect on food products mostly consumed by the lower-income sectors, farmers gave 
priority to the production of commodities for export. 
With the exception of wheat, output of the crops intended mainly for the domestic market 
showed severe contractions. There was a particularly acute drop in the bean harvest (-45%), due to 
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reductions both in area sown (-30%) and yields obtained (-20%). The smaller area cultivated was 
attributable to relative lack of interest in this crop on the part of producers, due to the very 
unfavourable prices obtained the preceding year. Other crops for local consumption which declined 
considerably were rice (-20%), potatoes (-15%), maize (-14%), tomatoes (-11%) and yuca or manioc 
(-10%). These severe reductions were mainly caused by adverse weather conditions. 
On the other hand, despite the smaller area sown, wheat production rose appreciably (23%) 
thanks to considerably improved yields which were nearly double those previously obtained. This 
product therefore recovered from the poor results of the preceding year and even exceeded the output 
levels obtained in 1981, which were the highest recorded so far in the country's history. The 
considerable contraction in the area sown to wheat was attributable to the difficulties faced by 
producers as a result of harvesting failures in the preceding year in the southern part of the country 
due to unfavourable climatic conditions, and also to delays in fixing the amount of financing for the 
crop and uncertainty in connection with the subsidy applicable to wheat consumption. 
Livestock output rose by 3 % in 1983, assisted by further increases in the production of beef and 
poultry and partial recovery in the case of pork and milk (see table 5). 
Table 5 
BRAZIL: INDICATORS OF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION 
Index of agricultural 
production (1970 = 100) 
1975 1980 1981 1982 1983 
Growth rates 
1980 1981 1982 1983° 
136.7 170.9 182.5 177.9 181.8 6.3 6.8 -2.5 2.2 
Production of main crops 
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Source: Fundación Instituto Brasileiro de Geografía e Estatística (IBGE), Levantamento sistemático de produç3b agrícola, December 1983. 




BRAZIL: INDICATORS OF MINING PRODUCTION 
1970 1975 1980 1981 1982 1983° 
Growth rates 
1980 1981 1982 1983" 
Index of mining production 
(1970 = 100) 100.0 147.6 187.3 187.7 203.3 232.8 12.6 0.2 8.3 14.5 
Production of some 
important minerals 
























































































Source: Fundación Instituto Brasileiro de Geografía e Estatística (1BGE), National Petroleum Council, Department of National Mineral 
Production, and Central Bank of Brazil. 
"Preliminary figures. Thousands of cubic metres. 'Millions of cubic metres. Metal content. 
ii) Mining. The mining product again showed a high rate of growth in 1983 (14%),decisively 
influenced by considerable expansion in the production of mineral fuels and recoveries in the output 
of some metallic minerals (see table 6). 
Petroleum and natural gas exploration and development investments again gave excellent 
results in the year under review. Petroleum production rose in the year by the unprecedented extend 
of 27%, while that of natural gas increased by 3 3 % . Much of the output of petroleum (60%) came 
from offshore deposits, especially from the Campos area located in the Atlantic off the State of Rio de 
Janeiro. Crude oil production thus rose to an average daily volume of approximately 400 000 barrels 
—thereby approaching the target of 500 000 barrels adopted for 1985 when the ambitious 
investment programmes were undertaken with a view to achieving a significant reduction of imports. 
Coal production rose by 10%, continuing the rapid rate of expansion observed since 1975. In 
the case of coal for the metallurgical industry the rate of increase was 16% while that for energy 
generation amounted to 6%. 
Iron ore output rose by 1 1 % , thereby recovering from the drop recorded in 1981 and the static 
situation prevailing in 1982. The increase was due to greater demand from the steel industry and, to a 
lesser extent, higher exports (4%). The infrastructural work being undertaken in connection with 
the Grande Carajás project was again delayed, however, due to insufficient financial resources, with 
the result that iron ore exports from this region will only be able to commence in 1986. 
With the coming into operation of the copper refinery at Caraiba in November 1982 it became 
feasible to start extraction of this mineral. Local supplies will cover 40% of the input of the refinery, 
the remainder being supplied by imports of concentrate. 
iii) Manufacturing. The product of the manufacturing sector declined in 1983 by 6.3% —the 
largest contraction recorded since the crisis of the 1930s, with the exception of the slightly greater 
drop recorded in 1981 (see table 7). This decrease was mainly attributable to the domestic recession, 
since foreign sales showed signs of recovery, stimulated by the devaluation of the cruzeiro in real 
terms. 
The industries most affected by the crisis were those turning out capital goods. Production 
declined in their case by 20%, after having dropped by almost 1 1 % in 1982 and by 19% in 1981. The 
output level of these producers in 1983 was therefore less than 60% of that recorded in 1980 —a 
situation reflecting the severe contraction of gross domestic investment since 1981. The production 
of intermediate goods, which had fallen by more than 10% in 1981 and remained unchanged in 1982, 
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showed a further contraction of 3% in 1983 to a level 13% lower than that recorded three years 
earlier. The output of consumer goods also declined considerably, the drop of 5% in the case of non-
durable consumer goods —the largest contraction since the beginning of the present crisis— being 
especially significant. 
Of the 17 branches of industrial activity, only two —food and pharmaceutical products— 
reported higher production levels than in 1980. Moreover, only the producers of food products, paper 
and paperboard and rubber products recorded increases in output in 1983- The sector most affected by 
the prevailing crisis was that producing non-metallic minerals, which suffered a drop of 15%, due 
mainly to severe reductions in public investment. 
The production of transport equipment fell by almost 9% due to considerable decreases in the 
manufacture of light commercial vehicles, utility vans, trucks and buses which more than offset a 
recovery in the production of passenger cars. The number of buses and trucks manufactured in the 
year was equivalent to only slightly more than one-third that produced in 1980, the severe contraction 
Table 7 
BRAZIL: INDICATORS OF MANUFACTURING PRODUCTION 
Industrial product 
Manufacturing production 











Paper and paperboard 
Petroleum products 
Other chemical products 
Pharmaceutical products 
























































































































































































































































Source: Fundación Instituto Brasileiro de Geografía e Estatistica (IBGE). 
"The indexes for 1983 were calculated on the basis of the increments shown in the new IBGE index, which only provides information for 1982 
and 1983. This new index was drawn up using 1978 prices whereas the indexes shown in this table for the period 1970-1982wereestimatedon 
the basis of 1970 prices. 'Billions of dollars at 1970 prices. 'Includes mining. Includes petroleum 




BRAZIL: MOTOR VEHICLE PRODUCTION 
Motor vehicles 
Passenger cars 




Vehicles fuelled by 
gasoline or alcohol 
Vehicles running on gasoline 
Vehicles running on alcohol 
Conversion of vehicles 


















































































Source: National Association of Motor Vehicles Manufactures (ANFAVEA). 
"Including multi-purpose light commercial vehicles. Only includes passenger cars, light commercial and utility vehicles. 
being due to lower external as well as domestic demand. The drop in domestic sales, for its part, was 
due to the recessive situation being faced throughout the country and the greater restrictions imposed 
by the banks on financing for these types of vehicles. The production of passenger cars, on the other 
hand, continued the recovery begun in the preceding year. The output level nevertheless remained 
lower than that recorded in 1980. The manufacture of alcohol-powered vehicles in 1983 showed an 
increase of 150%, while that of gasoline-powered passenger cars dropped by 54%. The production of 
vehicles running on alcohol thus represented 87% of the passenger cars turned out in the year (see 
table 8). The growth in the production of alcohol-powered passenger cars was due, as in 1982, to the 
existence of a number of incentives for the use of this type of vehicle, such as the lower cost of fuel 
compared with gasoline (40% cheaper per litre and 30% per kilometre run), assurance of alcohol 
supplies throughout the country, credit and tax benefits (granted mainly in the case of vehicles for use 
as taxis, though this incentive was discontinued in mid-1983), and less restrictions on the supply of 
alcohol during weekends (the sale of this fuel continued to be allowed on Saturdays, whereas that of 
gasoline remained banned). 
Although the metallurgical subsector reported a further decline in output in 1983 (-1.5%), 
several types of iron, steel and non-ferrous manufactures showed a marked recovery (see table 9). 
Particularly worthy of note were the improvements recorded in the output of pig iron (19%), steel 
ingots (13%), flat rolled products (17%) and aluminium (28%). These increases were mainly due to 
larger foreign sales, since the domestic market remained relatively slack. As already mentioned, 
copper production rose considerably as a consequence of the coming on stream of the Caraiba Metáis 
refinery in the Bahía area. This plant has an annual refined copper output capacity of 150 000 tons, 
and its operation contributed to a reduction of imports of this commodity. 
The end of 1983 saw the entry into operation of the Tubarâo steel mill, an enterprise in whih 
SIDERBRAS is associated with a Japanese-Italian consortium and whose production of semi-finished 
steel plate will to a large extent be exported. As a consequence of the restrictions imposed by the 
Department of State Enterprises, the resources obtained by SIDERBRAS for its investment budget 
were only sufficient to meet financial commitments, thereby causing a severe curtailment of the 
investment programme. Development of AÇOMINAS and other projects consequently remained 
incomplete. 
The lower output results of the producers of beverages (-8%), textiles (-10%) and clothing (-
11%) were due to the reductions in consumption of these articles caused by the deterioration in real 
wages and employment. The production of foodstuffs, on the other hand, showed a moderate rate of 
growth (4%), attributable to favourable results in activities linked with the processing of important 
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agricultural crops for export and the higher output of alcohol motor fuel. Finally, paper and 
paperboard production rose in 1983 by 3% thanks to a significant increase in exports. 
iv) Construction. The product of the construction sector declined sharply (by 19%) in 1983, 
thereby notably accentuating the crisis which began in 1981 and brought to an end a decade of growth 
at an annual rate of almost 10%. As a result of this fall in activity, employment in construction, which 
had already contracted significantly in the main urban areas in the three preceding years, underwent a 
further marked decrease in 1983 (see table 10). 
This severe reduction was due to the policy of containment of public sector investment and the 
fact that the recession also discouraged investment by private interests. At the same time the 
construction of dwellings came up against serious difficulties due to the lack of financial resources 
both in the context of the National Housing System and in the private sector. 
v) Energy. Notwithstanding the economic recession, final commercial energy consumption 
rose by almost 2% —an increase similar to that recorded in the preceding year. The total 
consumption of petroleum products fell, however, for the fourth consecutive year as a consequence of 
the substitution of petroleum by other sources of energy (see table 11). 
According to preliminary data from ELECTROBRAS, gross electricity production in the year 
amounted to 152 417 GWh, of which 94% represented hydroelectric energy, whose output increased 
by 7% compared with 1982. Industrial consumption rose by 6.5% due to the introduction of 
preferential tariffs which had the effect of encouraging substitution for other energy sources. Home 
and commercial consumption increased still more, reflecting greater use of domestic electrical 
appliances. 
Installed capacity for electricity generation grew by 4% to 40.5 million KW. Almost the entire 
increase was due to the expansion of hydroelectric facilities, since thermal electric generation capacity 
rose by only 1% to 6.1 million KW. Projects under construction, including expansion projects, 
represented a total capacity of 32 million KW, of which hydroelectricity will account for 28.4 million 
KW. 
The policy of replacing petroleum with other energy sources has proved notably successful, as 
evidenced by the fact that the consumption of petroleum products, as a percentage of total 
commercial energy consumption, fell from 60% in 1970 to 41% in 1983", fuel oil demand decreased 
for the fourth consecutive year, due to replacement with coal and electricity, and the consumption of 
gasoline fell for the fifth consecutive year as a result of the contraction in the use of privately-owned 
Table 9 
BRAZIL: METALLURGICAL PRODUCTION 







































































































































Source: Conselho de Nao-Ferrosos e Siderurgia (CONSIDER). 




BRAZIL: CONSTRUCTION INDICATORS 
1975 1980 1981 1982 1983 
Growth rates 
1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 
Index of real 
product (1970 = 100) 
Apparent consumption 
of some building 
materials 










178.5 251.9 241.3 240.3 194.6 3.5 7.8 -4.4 -0.4 -19.0 
1067 1669 1490 1456 1032 3.4 20.4 -10.7 -2.3 -29.1 















91.6 92.1 85.9 69.4 -4.9 -3.1 0.5 -6.7 -19.2 
Source: Fundación Getulío Vargas, Conselho de Nao-Ferrosos e Siderurgia (CONSIDER) National Cement Industry Syndicate (SNIC), and 
Ministry of Labour. 
"Simple average of indexes for Belém, Fortaleza, Recife, Salvador, Belo Horizonte, Curitiba, Porto Alegre and Brasilia. 
Table 11 
BRAZIL: FINAL ELECTRIC ENERGY CONSUMPTION" 
Electricity 








Alcohol motor fuel 
Total 
Petroleum derivatives 
alcohol and gasoline 
Energy/product ratio^ 
































































































































































Source: 1970-1982: Ministry of Mines and Energy, Bataneo Energético Nacional 1983; 1983: Estimates prepared by ECLAC, on the basis of 
figures provided by ELETROBRAS, Ministry of Industry and Trade, and the National Petroleum Council. 
"Excluding firewood and sugar-cane bagasse. Tons of petroleum equivalent. Preliminary figures. Approximately 
92% was produced by water power and 8% by thermalenergy. Electricity consumption in MWh has been converted to TPE by applying the 
coefficient 0.29 TPE/MWh, in line with petroleum consumption at the country's oil-fired thermal power plants. 'Includes kerosene, 
naphthas and other energy products. Commercial electricity consumption divided by gross domestic product. 
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vehicles and the replacement of gasoline with alcohol for private transportation purposes. Diesel oil 
consumption, for its part, fell by 1.4%, more in response to the economic recession than to 
substitution by other forms of energy. 
c) Developments in employment and unemployment 
Formal-sector employment in urban centres dropped in 1983 by almost 5%, thereby making 
still more acute the downward trend observed since 1981.3 The level of employment was thus 10% 
lower in 1983 than three years earlier. Manufacturing and construction were the sectors showing the 
most unfavourable results in 1983, with decreases of 7% and 20%, respectively (see table 12). 
The level of employment in manufacturing —which had already fallen in the two preceding 
years— continued to decline in 1983 (see table 13), so that its annual average for the year was 20% 
lower than in 1980. The fall in employment was in fact greater than the contraction of activity in the 
manufacturing sector during this period. Labour productivity rose in consequence at an annual 
average rate of 2.6%, evidencing the fact that the enterprises involved made considerable 
adjustments in an effort to deal with the recession. The lower employment level in the industrial 
sector was of a generalized character, no increase being recorded in any of its component branches. 
The activities showing the greatest reduction in the number of persons employed were the metal 
products and machinery branch (-15%), non-metallic mineral products (-13%),electrical equipment 
(-12%) and textiles (-11%). 
According to official statistics, unemployment in urban areas rose from an average of 6.3% in 
1982 to 6.7 % in 1983. It began to increase from the first quarter, but diminished in the final quarter of 
the year, though without recovering the low level recorded in the same period of 1982 (see table 14). 
This unemployment trend was not however adequately representative of the situation in the 
labour market, since it failed to reflect the severe drop in formal employment levels in urban sectors. 
This manifest contradiction may well be due to the transfer to the informal sector of many persons 
losing employment in formal activities and to a reduction in rates of participation of the economically 
active population, especially among women and young people. The latter circumstance would in its 
turn be attributable to the magnitude and prolonged duration of the economic depression, which 
must have discouraged many persons from continuing to seek employment in view of the scarcity of 
available opportunities. 
Table 12 
BRAZIL: INDEXES OF URBAN UNEMPLOYMENT 

































































































Source: Ministty of Labour, National Employment System (SINE). 
"Calculated on the basis of employment information from the household survey Pesquisa Nacional de Amostras Domiciliarias (PNAD). 




BRAZIL: PERSONNEL EMPLOYED IN THE MANUFACTURING SECTOR 
(Base: 1976 = 100) 










































































106.5 110.0 101.9 95.1 88.1 
Source: Fundación Instituto Brasileiro de Geografía e Estatistica (1BGE), Indicadores Conjuntarais da Industria, (several issues). 
"Preliminary figures. 
Table 14 
BRAZIL: UNEMPLOYMENT RATES IN MAIN URBAN CENTRES 
Major cities 













































































































































Source: Fundación Instituto Brasileiro de Geografía e Estatistica (IBGE), Monthly Employment Survey. 
"Weighted according to the population of each city. 
3. The external sector 
a) General trends 
A drastic contraction in the procurement of external loans took place in the second half of 1982. 
This circumstance, coupled with the significant growth of the current account deficit, helped to cause 
a large deficit on the overall balance of payments, which could only be financed by means of a 
significant loss of international reserves and special short-term operations involving foreign 
commercial banks, the United States Treasury, the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) and the 
International Monetary Fund. 
Moreover, as a result of a variety of external developments it became evident that the volume of 
new loans that Brazil might be able to obtain in international markets in the coming years would be 
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considerably less than in the past and that traditional mechanisms for the procurement of external 
resources would be insufficient to finance the current account deficit and the amortization of the 
foreign debt. 
Under these circumstances, the financial authorities drew up an economic adjustment 
programme at the end of 1982, to be given the financial support of the IMF, which was designed to 
confront the difficult short-term balance-of-payments situation and to introduce structural changes 
in the medium term with the aim of reducing the relative role of external savings and improving the 
efficiency of the economy through the medium of relative price adjustments. 
In the planning for the future of the external sector carried out in 1982 it was envisaged that the 
current account deficit capable of being financed by the maximum amount of external resources 
available in the form of direct investment and foreign loans (net of amortizations) could not exceed 
US$ 6 900 million. Since the projected deficit on the services account came to US$ 12 900 million, it 
would be essential to attain a surplus on the trade in goods of at least US$ 6 billion in order to reach a 
position of equilibrium in the 1983 balance of payments (see table 23 below). 
With a view to ensuring the necessary external financing for the coming years, negotiations 
were started with the IMF at the end of 1982 with the aim of obtaining a group of loans, and a 
financing plan was submitted to the foreign commercial banks comprising four projects for the 
purpose of: obtaining new additional loans (project 1); converting amortization commitments into 
long-term loans (project 2); and recovering or maintaining short-term lines of credit (projects 3 and 
4). The negotiations between the Government of Brazil and the international commercial banks thus 
in effect took the place of the former direct individual negotiations between those banks and the 
Brazilian recipients of such external loans. These negotiations included in a single package all the 
financial loans that Brazil intended to request over a given period of time (in principle one year) and 
were supported by —and subject to— the terms of the economic adjustment programme agreed with 
the IMF. 
The latter programme established specific balance-of-payments goals for the three-year period 
1983-1985. With regard to the current account, the country's financial authorities adopted as their 
goal the reduction of the deficit (excluding re-invested profits) from 4.5% of the GDP in 1982 to 2.2% 
in 1983, 1.5% in 1984 and 1% in 1985. The global balance of payments should reach a position of 
equilibrium in 1983, and show surpluses of US$ 1 billion in 1984 and US$ 2 billion in 1985. These 
developments would enable the ratio between debt-servicing requirements and exports of goods and 
services to be reduced, slow down the growth rate of the commitments of the international 
commercial banks in Brazil, and transform the net international reserves position of the monetary 
authorities from a significant deficit at end-1982 into a surplus at the end of 1985. 
The financial authorities aimed to improve the external competitiveness of Brazilian exports 
by raising the exchange rate in real terms vis-a-vis the US dollar. To this end, in December 1982 the 
monthly accumulated value of the mini-devaluations to be made during 1983 was calculated in such a 
way that on average it would be 1% higher than domestic inflation. On 21 February 1983, however, 
an extraordinary increase of 30% was instituted in the exchange rate. This measure was deemed 
necessary in view of disappointing results observed in the trade account in January and in order to 
facilitate fulfilment of the balance-of-payments goals. Furthermore, the Government undertook to 
protect thereafter the degree of external competitiveness thus achieved by means of systematic mini-
devaluations which would be at least equal to domestic inflation. 
The annual average exchange rate (in terms of cruzeiros per dollar) rose in 1983 by 222%, 
representing a real devaluation rate of 35% (see table 15). With respect to the currencies of Brazil's 
main trading partners, and taking into account the geographical distribution of exports of 
manufactured products in the period 1978-1982, the devaluation of the cruzeiro in real terms 
amounted to approximately 30% (see table 16 and figure 2). The real devaluation of the cruzeiro vis-
a-vis the US dollar in 1983 thus exceeded that of most of the Latin American currencies. In the case of 
the European countries and Japan, part of the effects of the maxi-devaluation were absorbed by the 
new appreciation of the dollar vis-à-vis the currencies of those countries.4 
4Due to the exchange rate policy applied in 1980, the appreciation of the dollar vis-a-vis other currencies as from 1981, and the 
devaluations carried out throughout Latin America in 1982, the extraordinary devaluation of the cruzeiro in February 1983 failed to recover 
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Source: International Monetary Fund (IMF), International Financial Statistical. 
"Correspond to the wholesale price index for manufacturing industries calculated by the Getulio Vargas Foundation. 
Within the framework of trade policy the maxi-devaluation was accompanied by the 
reintroduction of taxes of between 10% and 20% on exports of a number of basic commodities (these 
taxes were, however, reduced or eliminated in the course of the year) and a reduction in the tax on 
financial operations (IOF) in the case of certain raw materials —mainly non-ferrous metals, iron and 
steel products and agricultural inputs. Although the fiscal credit subsidy in favour of exports and 
other trade-policy mechanisms were maintained in 1983, the intention nevertheless remains to 
adjust exchange-rate policy in the medium term in such a way as to make possible the elimination of 
export subsidies and the reduction of import restrictions.5 
5 In order to compensate for the effects of the maxi-devaluation of February 1983, the percentages of financing of working capital for the 
production of manufactured goods for export to which exporting firms are entitled in accordance with Central Bank Resolution 674, were 
reduced by 25%. Annual interest rates applicable to this type of financing were increased from 40% to 60% in June 1983, and —as from 
1 January 1984— to 3% per annum plus the variation in the nominal value of Index-Linked Treasury bonds (ORTN) during the period of the 
respective loans. 
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The extraordinary devaluation carried out in February had a favourable effect on the subsequent 
evolution of the trade balance. Exports also benefited from the economic recovery in the United 
States. On the other hand, the economic recession and restrictions on external purchases brought 
about a significant contraction in imports.6 As a consequence of these changes, the goal established in 
connection with foreign trade in goods was exceeded, since a surplus of US$ 6 500 million was 
achieved. 
Brazil had considerable difficulty, however, in fulfilling the goals established as regards 
domestic economic policy and the quarterly balance-of-payments targets, measured in terms of the 
variations in the net international reserves held by the monetary authorities. The adverse 
performance of the balance of payments was mainly due to lower-than-expected inflows of external 
resources in the form of direct investment and short-term capital, due primarily to the disappointing 
progress of the corresponding projects (3 and 4). The situation became more acute when the IMF 
decided in April to hold up the new loan disbursements due under the extended agreement: a 
circumstance that caused the commercial banks, in their turn, to postpone the remaining 
disbursements of new pledged loans (project l ) . 7 
Due to these impediments, significant delays were incurred in settling overdue foreign debt 
payments, which, by the end of August 1983, amounted to US$ 2 500 million. These delays compelled 
the financial authorities to institute the centralization of all foreign exchange transactions in the 
Central Bank as from 1 August 1983. The primary purpose of this move was to administer foreign 
payments in such a manner as to keep delays in payment of the public and private foreign debt within 
certain time limits in order to avoid a default situation.8 
In September, after agreeing new economic-policy goals with the IMF, the second phase of 
renegotiation of the foreign debt was put in hand in order to obtain additional resources for financing 
the 1983 balance of payments and to ensure the availability of the necessary external resources for the 
following year. These negotiations covered a total of US$ 11 billion,9 broken down as follows: 
- Renegotiation of the debt-servicing commitments subject to the intervention of the Paris 
Club, amounting to an initially estimated value of US$ 2 billion; 
- New loans from the commercial banks for US$ 6 500 million; 
- Commercial credits from government agencies for the sum of US$ 2 500 million. 
Balance-of-payments estimates indicated that some US$ 3 550 million of the new loans 
granted by the commercial banks should be received by Brazil before 31 December in order to comply 
with the IMF requirements in respect of the level of international reserves and to cover the arrears of 
foreign debt service payments. However, as the corresponding disbursements were not forthcoming 
before the end of the year, these goals remained unfulfilled. The balance of payments for 1983 showed 
a final deficit of US$ 2 100 million. On the other hand, the fact that the group of requested loans was 
not received within the year meant that the goal of limiting the growth of the foreign debt was more 
than fulfilled. 
''The main instruments used in the effort to limit imports were: 
- Discontinuance of the issue of import permits for a large number of products. 
- The application of surcharges in the case of imports of "luxury" goods. 
- extension of the tax on financial operations (IOF) to purchases of foreign exchange for all imports not expressly exempt from this 
levy. Imports of petroleum were also made liable to this tax as from December 1983. 
- The submission to CAŒX (the Banco do Brasil's Foreign Trade Portfolio) of annual import programmes by enterprises intending to 
effect imports. Until August 1983 this requirement only applied to the larger importers, but subsequently it was extended to all. 
- Requirement to obtain external financing, for certain minimum terms varying according to the type of product, as a requisite for the 
granting of import licenses. 
- Application of a maximum annual limit for all public sector imports (with the exception of wheat and petroleum). This limit, which 
was fixed at US$ 3 630 million in 1981, was reduced in 1982 to US$ 3 028 million and still further reduced to US$ 1 989 million in 
1983. 
- Centralization of all foreign currency transactions in the Central Bank, thereby obliging the commercial banks to open foreign 
currency clearing accounts with the Central Bank. 
7 The pending disbursements in the framework of the programme agreed with the IMF and of project 1 with the commercial banks were 
made at the end of the year, thereby enabling the bridging loans received from the Bank for International Settlements to be paid off. 
"This measure continued in force until March 1984, when the first disbursements received from the foreign commercial banks under the 
new loan arrangements made it possible to settle ttiese overdue foreign debt commitments. 
yNot counting the IMF programme, the conversion of debt amortization payments due to the commercial banks into new loans 
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Source: International Monetary Fund, Internationa/ Financial Statistics. 
"These indexes were obtained by adding together the real exchange rates of Brazil's most important trading partners, weighted in accordance 
with the geographical composition of Brazilian exports and imports. The countries included in the calculations are: United States, Canada, 
Japan, the Federal Republic of Germany, Belgium-Luxembourg, France, Italy, Netherlands, United Kingdom, Spain, Switzerland, Argentina, 
Chile, Mexico, Paraguay, Uruguay and Venezuela. All the indexes refer to wholesale prices, primarily of domestic and industrial products. 
In the case of Brazil the wholesale price index for manufacturing industries drawn up by the Getulio Vargas Foundation was used. 
In spite of these difficulties, notable progress was made in 1983 in the sphere of the external 
accounts. As already mentioned, the surplus on merchandise trade exceeded the established goal and 
the current account deficit was spectacularly reduced from US$ 16 300 million in 1982 to less than 
US$ 7 600 million.10 
b) Merchandise trade 
i) Exports. Exports of goods in 1983 amounted to US$ 21 900 million, 8.6% more than in 
1982, but 6% below the 1981 level. This favourable development was mainly due to an improvement 
in the external competitiveness of Brazilian products as a consequence of the exchange rate policy 
adopted, the economic recovery in the United States of America, and the domestic recession inside 
Brazil. The initially forecast value of US$ 23 billion was not achieved because exports continued to be 
affected by the difficult economic and financial situation faced throughout Latin America as well as in 
10 A surplus of US$ 9 100 million on trade in goods was established by the financial authorities as a goal to be fulfilled in 1984, together 
with a reduction of the current account deficit to US$ 5 billion. These developments would make possible an overall balance-of-payments surplus 
of US$ 4 300 million. 
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other developing countries, the high value of the US dollar and the resurgence of protectionism. The 
recovery expected by the financial authorities in the international prices of basic commodities also 
failed to materialize, and the unit values of most of the products in this category exported by Brazil 
remained at the same low levels as in 1982. Furthermore, export prices of industrially-processed 
goods suffered a severe drop. As a result, the average unit value of exports showed a further decline of 
6% which partially counteracted the effects of their extraordinary increase of over 15% in volume 
(see table 17). 
The value of exports to the member countries of the Latin American Integration Association 
(ALADI) dropped by 28% in 1983 after having contracted by 32% in the preceding year. 
Consequently, the value of these exports in 1983 was only half that recorded in 1981. On the other 
hand, exports to member countries of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) and the 
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) (with the exception of Venezuela, and 
Ecuador) rose in value by 21% and 22% respectively, thereby partially recovering from their severe 
contraction in 1982 (see table 18). 
Figure 2 
BRAZIL: EVOLUTION OF INDEXES OF EFFECTIVE REAL 
EXCHANGE RATES FOR EXPORTS AND IMPORTS 
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Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official data. 
"Preliminary figures. 
The main factor in the growth of Brazilian exports in 1983 was however the sales to the United 
States market which grew by 26% to reach a value of US$ 5 billion, representing 23% of all Brazilian 
exports in the year. The increases in exports to the European Common Market (4.5%) and Japan 
(10.5%) were more modest due to the slower economic recovery in these economies and the 
depreciation of their currencies vis-a-vis the US dollar. 
The large increase in exports to the United States was achieved despite a significant resurgence 
in 1982 and 1983 of protectionist pressures against the importation of certain Brazilian products. 
United States industrialists made several requests in those two years for the imposition of 
countervailing customs duties and/or anti-dumping taxes in respect of some imports from Brazil, 
especially steel products. However, the Governments of Brazil and the United States managed on the 
whole to prevent these moves from giving rise to the institution of compensatory import tariffs. To 
this end they agreed to introduce suspension agreements whereby the net subsidies estimated by the 
US Department of Trade were counteracted by the levying of an export tax in Brazil. Approximately 
25% of the value of exports to the United States in 1983 was subject to export-tax payments arising 
from these negotiations, which were primarily intended to obviate the imposition of compensatory 
import duties. In addition, exports of other articles, such as sugar, special steels, textiles and ready-
made clothing, were subjected to quantitative restrictions. 
Exports also showed considerable changes in composition. A renewed tendency was thus 
observed in 1983 towards a greater proportion of industrially-processed products in total exports and 
a decrease in the relative significance of sales of basic commodities. 
The growth of exports of commodities (3.4%) was led by coffee beans (12%), soya (soya meal 
shipments rose by 11% and beans by 151%), unrefined sugar (24%), and cocoa beans (31%).u On 
the other hand the value of exports of iron ore fell by 18% due both to lower volume and a drop in 
prices (see table 19). 
The considerable increase of 25% in the value of exports of semi-manufactured products was 
fairly diversified in origin, higher values recorded in the case of cocoa, pig iron, tin and ferrosilicon 
being particularly noteworthy. 
11 The growth of overall exports of coffee (10%) and sugar (6.9%) was lower than the above-mentioned rates due to decreases in exports 
of these products in semi-processed or manufactured form. The increases in value of overall soya and cocoa exports amounted to 20.8% and 
29.3%, respectively. 
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The increase of 10% in exports of manufactured goods was primarily due to higher sales in the 
United States market, especially of iron and steel products (58%), footwear (37%), textiles, motor-
vehicle parts and chemical products. At the same time a spectacular increase (of 364%) occurred in 
the value of exports of aluminium and manufactures thereof, which reached a total of US$ 264 
million. In contrast, despite the severe contraction of domestic demand, reductions were recorded in 
the value of exports of transport equipment (-16%), and machinery and mechanical products (-8%) 
which depend to a relatively greater extent on markets in the developing countries. 
ii) Imports. The overall value of imports of goods in 1983 came to US$ 15 400 million —20% 
less than in 1982 and a third lower than in 1980. 
An item of considerable influence in this result was the 18% drop in the value of imports of 
crude oil, which alone account for more than half of the country's foreign purchases. In physical 
terms, imports of petroleum reached an average daily volume of 726 000 barrels compared with 
793 000 in 1982. n The average price paid per barrel dropped for the second consecutive year, from 
US$ 33 in 1982 to US$ 29.50 in 1983. 
Table 18 
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countries 1 783 2 125 2 210 2 392 8.9 10.9 39.1 19.2 4.0 8.2 
Supplies to ships and 
aircraft; undeclared 
exports 260 356 251 275 1.3 1.3 82.0 36.8 -29.5 9.5 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of data from Banco do Brasil, Carteira de Comercio Exterior (CACEX). 
"European Economic Community (10 countries) Including Puerto Rico. cSouth Africa, Australia, Austria, Spain, Finland, 
Iceland, Malta, Norway, New Zealand, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey and Yugoslavia. Includes socialist countries of 
Asia. 'Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, excluding Venezuela and Ecuador. 'Latin American Integration 
Association. 
12 Brazilian imports amounted in 1979 to one million barrels per day. Subsequent reductions have been due to the displacement of 
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Source: Banco do Brasil, Carteira de Comercio Exterior (CACEX). 
"Preliminary figures. Includes consumption on board ships and aircraft, re-exports and specia transactions. 
If petroleum and its derivatives are excluded, the total value of imports dropped in the year by 
22%. This contraction was moreover fairly generalized in terms of economic destination (see 
table 20). Among raw materials, there was a further drastic reduction (-61 %) in imports of iron, steel 
and non-ferrous metals, due mainly to the continuation of import substitution processes which 
enabled the value of these imports to be reduced in 1983 to US$ 335 million, or less than a quarter of 
the 1980 figure. 
The drop in imports was also generalized in terms of their geographic origin, for there was a 
drop in purchases from all groups of countries (with the exception of Eastern Europe) in 1983, the 
reduction of 33% in imports from the ALADI countries being particulary noteworthy (see table 21). 
The improvement in the merchandise trade surplus from US$ 780 million in 1982 to 
US$ 6 500 million in 1983 was mainly due to the lower purchases of petroleum already mentioned. 
These contributed decisively to the US$ 2 500 million reduction during the year in the trade deficit 
with the OPEC countries (including Venezuela and Ecuador). Furthermore, trade with the United 
States, which prior to the present decade customarily showed a deficit, recorded a surplus of 
US$ 2 700 million in 1983: more than double the surplus of US$ 1 200 million registered in 1982. 
iii) Terms of trade and purchasing power of exports. Preliminary estimates indicate that the 
terms of trade remained stable in 1983 as a result of similar declines in the unit values of exports and 
imports. This checked the prolonged deterioration that had been taking place since 1978, during 
which period a decline of 46% took place (see table 17). 
The drop in export prices mainly affected industrial products, since on average commodity 
prices maintained the same unit prices as in 1982. It is probable that in order to maintain their 
competitiveness in foreign markets exporters of manufactures may have absorbed part of the 
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Table 20 



















































































Source: Central Bank of Brazil 
Table 21 
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Source: ECLAC, on the basis of data from Banco do Brasil, Carteira de Comercio Exterior (CACEX). 
"European Economic Community (10 countries). Including Puerto Rico. cSouth Africa, Australia, Austria, Spain, Finland, 
Iceland, Malta, Norway, New Zealand, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey and Yugoslavia. Including socialist countries of 




appreciation in the value of the US dollar by lowering their prices in that currency —a practice that 
was facilitated by the exchange rate policy. The drop in import prices, for its part, was attributable 
both to lower oil prices and to the lower dollar prices of imports from countries whose currencies also 
declined in value vis-a-vis the US dollar. Since there was not significant variation in the terms of trade 
during the year, the notable increase in the volume of exports (15.4%) was reflected in an equivalent 
rise in their purchasing power. 
c) Services trade and factor payments 
The traditional deficit on the trade in real services contracted significantly from close to 
US$ 3 600 million in 1982 to slightly more than US$ 2 400 million in 1983. Freight and insurance 
payments were 13% lower than in 1982, in line with the decline in imports of goods. Since, on the 
other hand, freight and insurance earnings increased in a similar proportion, the corresponding 
deficit fell from US$ 1 450 million in 1982 to US$ 980 million in 1983. Outgoings on account of 
foreign travel contracted much more markedly (-40%) due mainly to the measures adopted to 
discourage this form of expenditure.13 
After their spectacular rise in previous years, net interest payments fell from nearly US$ 11 400 
million in 1982 to less than US$ 9 600 million in 1983. This reduction reflected the drop in interest 
rates in international financial markets in the second half of 1982. 
d) Tbe current account position and its financing 
i) Background. In 1983, the deficit on current account contracted spectacularly to US$ 7 560 
million, compared with more than US$ 16 300 million in the preceding year. The ratio between this 
deficit and the value of exports of goods and services thus fell to 32% after having stood at 74% in 
1982 (see table 22). 
Despite this favourable result, it proved impossible to finance the current account deficit as 
originally envisaged, with the result that the balance of payments as a whole showed a final deficit for 
the year of more than US$ 2 100 million. 
Negotiations to ensure the financing of the current account deficit and foreign debt 
amortization payments had been initiated at the end of 1982, when Brazil applied for access to a 
number of IMF facilities and submitted four financing proposals to the international commercial 
banks. The first global balance-of-payments forecasts for 1983 envisaged a surplus of about 
US$ 1 500 million. Those forecasts were, however, subsequently reviewed and the objective was 
adopted of achieving a state of equilibrium in the overall balance. This objective also became one of 
the goals included in the programme agreed with the IMF. 
The IMF agreement was signed on 25 February, together with projects 1 and 2 as proposed to 
the commercial banks concerning new loans and the conversion of debt-amortization commitments 
into long-term loans. 
Several difficulties regarding the capital account arose in the course of the year, however. When 
Brazil failed to fulfil its principal economic policy objectives in the first quarter of the year, the IMF 
decided not to release the disbursements programmed for payment in May and August, each 
amounting to 374 million Special Drawing Rights. This decision in its turn caused the international 
commercial banks to freeze the disbursements corresponding to project 1 due for delivery in June and 
September, amounting in each case to US$ 635 million. As a result, by September the accumulated 
disbursements for the year under the IMF agreement and project 1 were some US$ 2 billion less than 
the inflow originally foreseen. After the establishment of amended economic policy goals, the IMF 
released in November the remaining disbursement installments programmed for 1983, and after the 
signing of the new agreement between Brazil and the IMF the international commercial banks, in 
their turn, disbursed in December the rest of the loans corresponding to project 1. 
These problems were aggravated by other unfavourable developments. Direct investment 
proved to be considerably less than the amounts originally forecast, and there was a significant net 
outflow of short-term capital, due, among other reasons, to an increase in export financing by the 
1 Jln September 1982 it was decided to apply the tax on financial operations (IOF), at the rate of 25 %, to purchases of foreign exchange for 
tourism abroad. In March 1983 the maximum amount of foreign exchange allowed for this purpose was reduced, but the IOF tax was eliminated 
at the same time. The limit was again reduced as from 1 August. 
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Table 22 
BRAZIL: BALANCE OF PAYMENTS 
(Millions of dollars) 
Balance on current account 
Trade balance 
Exports of goods and services 
Goods FOB 
Real services 
Transport and insurance 
Travel 
Imports of goods and services 
Goods FOB 
Real services 







Unrequited private transfer payments 
Balance on capital account 
Unrequited official transfer payments 
Long-term capital 
Direct investment (net) 
Portfolio investment (net) 














Errors and omissions (net) 
Global balance 
Total variation in reserves 
(minus sign indicates an increase) 
Monetary gold 
Special Drawing Rights 
IMF reserve position 
Foreign exchange assets 
Other assets 







































































































































































































































































Source: 1978-1982: International Monetary Fund, Balance of Payments Yearbook; 1983: ECLAC, on the basis of official data. 
"Preliminary figures, ¿Real services also include other official and private transactions, but not factor services. 
cIn addition to loans received and amortization payments made, this entry includes net loans granted and other assets and liabilities. 
''The global balance is the sum of the current account balance plus the balance on capital account. The difference between total variation in 
reserves (of opposite sign) and the global balance represents counterpart items: monetizationof gold, allocation of Special Drawing Rights, 
and variations due to revaluation. 
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BRAZIL 
Banco do Brasil and the disappointing progress in projects 3 and 4, the aim of which was to restore or 
maintain short-term lines of credit (see table 23)- Preliminary estimates also revealed that the 
current account deficit would exceed the forecast goal of US$ 6 900 million (excluding reinvested 
profits and dividends) and would reach a level of approximately US$ 7 700 million. In these 
circumstances, Brazil was unable to comply fully with the service of the foreign debt, with the result 
that arrears of payment in this respect amounted at the end of August to US$ 2 500 million. 
The review of economic policy goals carried out in September in conjunction with the IMF 
cleared the way for the second phase of the external financing programme. In this new stage the 
economic authorities sought additional financing in order to fulfil the balance-of-payments goals by 
eliminating the global deficit before 31 December 1983 and consequently also settle the arrears of 
payments on the foreign debt. Financing was also sought to ensure fulfilment of the 1984 goal of 
increasing the net international reserves by US$ 1 billion. 
The balance-of-payments projections available in September showed a probable deficit of 
US$ 4 500 million. It was estimated that US$ 700 million corresponding to debt servicing payments 
due in 1983 could be refinanced with the assistance of the Paris Club, leaving a shortfall of US$ 3 800 
million to be financed with additional resources (see table 23, second column). The main source of 
this initial financing would be new loans from the foreign commercial banks to a total value of 
US$ 6 500 million for 1983 and 1984. 
The first disbursements of the second set of loans from the foreign commercial banks failed to 
materialize within 1983, however, and this was the main reason for the deficit finally recorded in the 
overall balance of payments for the year. 
ii) The programme agreed with the IMF. Brazil's request to the IMF for a group of loans was 
formally submitted on 6 January 1983 through the first letter of intent and the technical 
memorandum appended to it. Brazil requested access to IMF resources to a value of 4 489 million 
Special Drawing Rights (approximately US$ 4 900 million), which was equivalent to 450% of 
Brazil's quota. Of this total, 249 million SDRs corresponded to the first credit tranche and 4 239 
million SDRs to an agreement under the policy of extended access to the resources of the Fund, for a 
three-year period. The Executive Board of the IMF approved the request on 28 February 1983. Brazil 
also requested maximum access to the resources available for compensatory financing and the 
financing of buffer stocks. 
As is usual, financing under the extended agreement was subject to an economic and financial 
adjustment programme which included the following programme criteria u in the external sector for 
1983: 
- Maintenance of international reserves. It was agreed that one goal would be the attainment of 
equilibrium in the global balance of payments, which meant that the net international reserves held 
by the monetary authority (Central Bank and Banco do Brasil), adjusted in accordance with the 
monetarization of gold and exchange rate fluctuations, should not amount at 31 December 1983 to 
less than the level recorded one year earlier (-US$ 2 884 million). This equilibrium should be reached 
by means of successive reductions of the accumulated deficits at the end of each quarter (see table 24). 
- Growth of the external debt. Maximum limits were established for the net quarterly growth of 
the external long- and short-term public and private debt, in line with the balance-of-payments goals. 
The growth of the debt was defined as the difference between foreign debt disbursements and 
amortization payments, adjusted in accordance with variations in the net position of certain types of 
short-term debt. The quarterly goals for 1983 were, however, modified in the course of the year and 
the goal for the year was amended in September in order to incorporate the new loans from the 
international commercial banks. 
- Exchange policy. In its first letter of intent Brazil undertook to adjust the cruzeiro/US dollar 
exchange rate in such a manner that the accumulated devaluation per month would be, on average, 
one percentage point higher than domestic inflation measured in accordance with the general price 
index (IGP-DI). This commitment was modified in the second letter of intent as a result of the 30% 
devaluation introduced on 21 February 1983. Under the new commitment the periodical increase in 
the exchange rate would, as a minimum, be equal to the general price index variation. As from the 




BRAZIL: NEEDS EXTERNAL RESOURCES AND FINANCING IN 1983 
(Millions of dollars) 
A. Resource requirements 
Deficit on current account" 
Trade balance - goods 
Deficit on services 






Financing provided by international 
organizations, government agencies 
and supplier loans 




Amortization of bridging loans 
Project 2 
Committed in 1982 
Others 
Short-term capital 
Projects 3 and 4 
Others 
Other capital movements 
Monetary authority liabilities BIS 
United States Treasury 
Other short-term liabilities 
Use of IMF credit 
Refinancing via the Paris Ciub 
C. Errors and omissions 
D. Balance-of-payments result (B-A+C) 
E. Variation in reserves, in balance-of-payment 
terms (- indicates an increase) 
F. Financing deficit (-(D+E)) 








































































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of the following information: 
Original forecast: National Monetary Council, External Sector Programming in 1983. 
Galveas, A crise Mundial e a Estrategia Brasileira de Ajustamento do Bal anco de pagamentos. 
Revised forecast: Central Bank, Brazil Economic Program, internal and External Adjustment, October 1983. 
Actual figures and projections for 1984: Central Bank of Brazil, Brazil Economic Program, Volume 2, March 1984. 
"Basic data for the second phase of the external financing programme. Excluding profits and re-invested dividends. 
cOf opposite sign. Less export loans, after deduction of amortization payments received. 'Data shown in Galveas. 




BRAZIL: VARIATIONS I N INTERNATIONAL RESERVES 
(Millions of dollars) 
























































































866 66 91 45 112 208 -21 67 96 142 
II. Net reserves held by 









Use of IMF 
credi/ 
C. Net reserves 
(A-B) 
D. Adjustments for 
counterpart items 
E. Net reserves, 
adjusted (C-D) 
Goal established 
with the IMF 
First letter of 
intent 
Third letter of 
intent 
4 352 3 250 
3 304 6 134 
3 304 5 590 
2 941 3 054 3 757 -309 
7 435 8 353 9 444 1 301 
389 ... 5 979 6 897 6 748 
500 1 050 1 050 1 050 
876 
3 304 4 214 
550 
-876 
715 ... 4 929 5 847 6 748 
544 1 456 1 456 1 456 2 696 912 
1 048 -2 884 ... -4 494 -5 299 -5 687 -1 610 
226 404 527 226 
1048 -2 884 ... -4 720 -5 703 -6 214 -1836 
-2 884 -4 384 -4 384 -3 584 -2 884 -1 500s 700s 




























Source: ECLAC, on the basis of information given in: IMF, International Financial Statistics, April 1984: Central Bank of Brazil, Monthly 
Report, March 1984 and Brazil Economic Program, Internal and External Adjustment. Volume 2, March 1984. Technical 
memorandums attached to the Brazilian letters of intent. 
"On the basis of data published by the Central Bank of Brazil. On the basis of data published by the IMF. 'Obtained through 
differences. Central Bank and Banco do Brasil. Method of calculation employed to determine balance-of-payments performance in 
the framework of the corresponding goal agreed with the IMF. eIncludes arrears of payment of the debt to a value of US$ 2 340 
million. 'Re-purchase commitments. ^Maximum balance-of-payments deficit accumulated in the year. 
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third letter of intent, the minimum devaluation commitment was linked with the evolution of the 
general price index, corrected for fortuitous factors (the so-called "expurgated index"). 
- Trade policy. The agreement with the IMF included some provisions concerning import 
restrictions and payments relating to international transactions, as well as certain practices which in 
effect gave rise to the existence of multiple exchange rates (the most significant practices of this 
nature at the end of 1983 were the tax on financial operations (IOF) and the credit premium for 
exports, both of which are due to disappear in the course of 1985). Certain restrictions affecting 
remittances abroad in respect of royalties, technical assistance, profits and dividends were eliminated 
in 1983, as well as taxes affecting exports of certain basic commodities (mainly orange juice and cattle 
hides). Brazil also made some adjustments —mainly in respect of payment periods— in bilateral 
payments agreements with Hungary and Romania (both of these countries being members of the 
IMF). 
iii) The projects submitted to the private banks. In December 1982 Brazil submitted to the 
foreign commercial banks a plan in connection with its external financing needs for 1983. In October 
1983, within the second phase of external finance programming, a new plan was submitted regarding 
additional external financial requirements in 1983 and 1984. On both occasions four projects were put 
forward with the aim of obtaining new loans, converting amortization commitments into long-term 
loans, and restoring or maintaining short-term lines of credit. 
The projects submitted in December 1982 were as follows: 
Project 1: New loans to the value of US$ 4 400 million, to be disbursed in March (US$ 2 500 
million), June, September and December 1983 (US$ 635 million each). Part of these loans was 
advanced at the end of 1982 in the form of bridging loans to a value of US$ 2 339 million. The 
corresponding agreements were signed on 25 February 1983. 
Project 2: Conversion into new long-term loans of debt amortization payments due to be made 
to the commercial banks in 1983. It was initially estimated that this project would involve some 
US$ 4 billion. This amount was subsequently raised to US$ 4 600 million. 
Project 3: Maintenance of US$ 8.8 billion of short-term lines of credit for commercial 
transactions, through the renewal of expired credits. 
Project 4: Reinstatement of lines of credit in the external inter-bank market (very short-term 
inter-bank deposits lodged with agencies of Brazilian banks abroad) to a total of US$ 10 billion. 
The four projects submitted to the foreign commercial banks concerning additional financial 
requirements in 1983 and the financing of external resources needed in 1984, for their part, were as 
follows: 
Project A: New loans to a value of US$ 6 500 million (of which US$ 3 500 million should 
become available in December 1983), mainly in order to finance debt arrears. 
Project B: Conversion of amortization payments falling due in 1984 into new loans, to a value of 
US$ 5 billion. 
Project C: Maintenance of short-term lines of credit for commercial operations, to the extent of 
US$ 10 billion. 
Project D: Maintenance of inter-bank deposits at agencies of Brazilian banks abroad to a value 
of US$ 6 billion. 
iv) Agreement with the Paris Club. At the end of November 1983, Brazil negotiated in Paris 
the reprogramming of debt service payments in connection with direct government loans and 
commercial loans covered by guarantees or insurance extended by foreign governments or their 
institutions. The renegotiation plan covered interest and amortization payments falling due between 
1 August 1983 and 31 December 1984 as well as accumulated arrears at 31 July 1983. 
The value of the debt subject to this reprogramming exercise was estimated at between 
US$ 2 400 million and US$ 3 800 million, according to initial estimates drawn up by the 
Government of Brazil on the one hand and information received from the corresponding creditor 
governments on the other. The discrepancy was mostly due to the fact that guarantees provided by 
foreign governments are not always referred to in the documentation relating to commercial loans to 
Brazil. 
With regard to interest and amortization payments due between 1 August 1983 and 31 
December 1984, Brazil negotiated a nine-year rescheduling agreement with a five-year grace period 
on the following terms: 
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85% to be paid in eight equal half-yearly installments between 1 January 1989 (end of the 
period of grace) and 1 July 1992. 
15% to be paid as follows: 5% in accordance with the originally-established credit periods, 4% 
on 30 June 1985, 3% on 30 June 1986 and 3% on 30 June 1987. 
It was additionally agreed that the accumulated arrears at 3 1 July 1983 would be settled in three 
equal payments on 31 March 1984, 30 September 1984 and 31 March 1985. 
e) The external debt 
As had been the case in 1982, a corollary of the difficulties that had to be faced in order to finance 
the current account deficit was the fact that Brazil's external debt grew more slowly in 1983 than had 
been originally foreseen. 
As already noted, Brazil entered into a commitment with the IMF to limit the net increase in the 
short- and long-term public and private debt to a level of US$ 6 billion. Subsequently, in the context 
of the second external financing programming phase, this limit was raised to US$ 9 billion, thereby 
incorporating the first disbursements of the second group of loans requested from the foreign 
commercial banks, due to be received before 31 December 1983. However, on account of the 
difficulties mentioned in the preceding section, the actual growth of the foreign debt, measured in 
accordance with the definition agreed with the IMF, amounted in 1983 to only US$ 3 500 million. 
The registered external debt rose by 16%, from US$ 70 200 million at the end of 1982 to 
slightly more than US$ 81 300 million at 31 December 1983.15 For its part, the unregistered (short-
term) debt dropped from US$ 13 billion to US$ 10 300 million (see table 25). This was due both to a 
reduction in the traditional lines of credit associated with foreign trade and the amortization of debts 
contracted at the end of 1982 through the medium of special short-term operations connected with 
the level of international reserves (bridging loans to a value of US$ 3 715 million). This contraction 
was, however, partially compensated by the accumulation as at 31 December 1983 of external debt 
arrears amounting to US$ 2 340 million which acquired the nature of a non-traditional form of short-
term debt. 
In these circumstances the total external debt (short- and long-term, public and private) 
reached a level slightly in excess of US$ 91 600 million at 31 December 1983 —10% more than it had 
been one year earlier. 
Debt servicing costs, for their part, were again equivalent to an extraordinarily high proportion 
(73%) of exports of goods and services. They also exceeded, for the third time in four years, the 
amount of medium and long-ter credits obtained (see table 26). 
4. Prices and wages 
a) Prices and anti-inflationary policy 
The economic adjustment programme agreed upon by the Government of Brazil with the 
International Monetary Fund sought as one of its aims to bring about changes in relative prices and 
reduce subsidies and price controls. It was also announced that policies with regard to prices would be 
pursued in such a manner as to stimulate economic activities. In order to reduce the fiscal deficit and 
improve the efficiency of the economy it was decided to adjust the prices of public services and of 
products subject to price control in accordance with their corresponding costs. Prices of essential 
goods that in 1982 had not risen in line with domestic inflation would for their part be gradually 
readjusted in order to eliminate their relative lag. 
The adjustment programme laid down goals for reduction of the high rates of inflation, in spite 
of the probable effects of the freeing of official price controls. The first letter of intent envisaged a 
reduction in the annual average rate of inflation from 95% in 1982 to 78% in 1983, while the rate of 
increase in prices from December to December was scheduled to decline from 99% in 1982 to 70% in 
1983. However, as a result of the extraordinary devaluation of the cruzeiro in February and problems 
"Of the amortization payments due in 1983 on the medium- and long-term foreign debt, amounting to USS 7 591 million, USS 4 532 
million was converted into new loans within the framework of project 2. (This consisted almost entirely of amortization payments on rhe 
external debt arising from financial credits, 88% of which were converted into new loans.) 
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Table 25 
BRAZIL: EXTERNAL DEBT 
(Millions of dollars at end of each year) 
1983 









Total external debt, registered 
and unregistered 
Total 
... 71 878 83 205 ... 91 638 
I. Medium and long-term debt (registered) 
43 511 49 904 53 848 61 411 70 198 77 006 81319 
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BRAZIL: COEFFICIENTS OF THE EXTERNAL DEBT 
Loans and financing 
Debt service payments 
Principal 
Interest (net) 
D S / X 
D S / LF 






1977 1978 1979 
Millions of dollars 
8 765 13 284 11907 
6 238 8 138 10 645 
4 135 5 439 6 541 










48.0 59.5 63.7 
71.1 61.3 89.4 




























Source: 1976-1981: International Monetary Fund. 1982 and 1983: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
Note: DS = Debt services. 
X = Exports of goods and services. 
D = Total registered public and private debt. 
LF = Loans and financing 
GDP = Gross domestic product. 
"Preliminary figures. Medium- and long-term credits, less export loans, after deduction of of amortization payments received. 
of supply in the case of some essential food products, it became evident even in the early months of 
the year that it would not be possible to fulfil those goals. They consequently had to be modified on 
two occasions. 
Average inflation in 1983, measured in accordance with the general price index16 based on 
domestic availability (IGP-DI), amounted to 155%, while the increase in this index in December 1983 
compared with the same month in the preceding year came to 211% (see table 27). These 
discouraging results were due to a number of factors, prominent among which were the elimination 
or reduction of subsidies for food products and fuels, depreciation of the national currency in real 
terms, import restrictions, the heightening of inflationary expectations, the general system of price 
indexation applied in the country, and problems of supply in the agricultural sector. 
The natural disasters which struck the country in the course of the year caused serious problems 
in the supply of farm products, and especially those mainly consumed by the general population, such 
as beans, rice, yuca and maize. Shortfalls in the supply of essential products, coupled with the 
measures adopted by the Government to reduce subsidies for basic foodstuffs, brought about 
markedly higher price increases (356%) than those recorded in the general price index (238%). 
Other factors contributing in this respect were the limitations on the formation of buffer stocks of 
agricultural products due to the restriction of credit for this purpose with the aim of controlling 
monetary expansion. 
Inflationary expectations, for their part, were considerably accentuated from the beginning of 
the year as a result of the extraordinary devaluation of the cruzeiro in February, the centralization of 
foreign exchange operations in the Central Bank, the already-mentioned problems of supply in the 
case of several essential agricultural products, and the difficulties experienced in the negotiations 
with the IMF and foreign commercial banks. 
As in previous years, the effects of the anti-inflationary policy were seriously restricted by the 
generalized indexation system. In 1983 this mechanism continued to be applied to assets and 
liabilities in the financial system, sales of real estate, judicial liabilities, the exchange rate, and wages 
in both the public and private sectors. The Government, however, attempted to reduce this self-
fuelling source of price increases by modifying some indexation mechanisms. An effort was made to 
avoid the impact of certain extraordinary factors such as severe food price increases deriving from 
natural disasters and increases in the prices of such items as fuels resulting from the elimination of 
subsidies, which tended to accelerate the inflationary process through the application of automatic 
16The general price index is calculated by theGetulio Vargas Foundation and represents a weighted average of wholesale prices (60%), 
the cost-of-living index for Rio de Janeiro (30%), and building costs in Rio de Janeiro (10%). 
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price-readjustment mechanisms under the indexation system. With this in mind, price indexes were 
amended to take into account the effects of such anomalous developments. As a result of these 
amendments, the "corrected" general price index in 1983 showed an increase of 175%, whereas the 
uncorrected index would have amounted to 211 %.17 The Government also modified the law 
governing wages, as a consequence of which wage adjustments became lower than the increments 
corresponding to the recalculated price index, in order to eliminate the incidence of the extraneous 
factors mentioned. 
In view of the acceleration of the inflationary process, administrative price controls were 
maintained, thereby postponing the programmed reduction of government intervention. In practice, 
the prices of products representing a high proportion of popular consumption, the prices charged by 
State-owned enterprises, and public service tariffs continued to be subject to official control, and a 
large number of manufactured products were also added. Thus, in February, by a decision of the Inter-
Ministerial Price Council, approximately 300 industrial products were made subject to price control, 
Table 27 
BRAZIL: EVOLUTION OF DOMESTIC PRICES 
1978 1979 1980 1981 
General price index" 
Total supply 
Domestic availability 







Consumer price index, 
Rio de Janeiro 
Food 
Building costs, 
Rio de Janeiro 
National consumer price index 
General price index 
Total supply 
Domestic availability 
Wholesale price index 
Total supply 
Domestic availability 
Consumer price index, 
Rio de Janeiro 
Building costs, 
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Source: Getulio Vargas Foundation, Conjuntura Económica, and Central Bank oí Brazil, Informativo Mensal, various issues. 
aThe general price index represents a weighted average of the wholesale price index (60%), the cost-of-living index for Rio de Janeiro (30%) 
and building costs in that city (10%). 
17The national consumer-price index (INPC) shows only the information after adjustment, i.e., after eliminating the incidence of the 
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Source: Getulio Vargas Foundation and Fundación Instituto Brasileiro de Geografía e Estatística (IBGE). 
"Based on domestic availability. 
and it was decided that these prices could only be raised by up to 90% of the variation in value of the 
index-linked National Treasury bonds (ORTN). This proportion was subsequently reduced to 80% 
under a new Inter-Ministerial Price Council resolution adopted in July. 
Finally, a contractive trend was introduced in the sphere of fiscal and monetary policy in order 
to reinforce the struggle against inflation. However, the increase in the velocity of circulation of 
money reduced the efficacy of those policies. 
The rate of inflation in 1983 was more than double that recorded in the three preceding years, 
when it had been around 100%. This acceleration in the growth of prices became evident from the 
beginning of the year and reached its maximum severity in the third quarter, when the three-monthly 
rate of increment in the general price index was equivalent to an annual rate of almost 300% —a level 
never before reached in this country. The rate declined in the fourth quarter, but still continued at 
over 200% (see table 28). These results considerably exceeded the ceilings established in the 
adjustment programme, even though these had been raised twice in order to incorporate the 
incidence of factors not initially considered. 
Prices of agricultural products rose noticeably faster than those of other items. In the wholesale 
price index, they showed an increase of 336% in the year, while the prices of manufactured goods rose 
by 200%. The food component in the Rio de Janeiro consumer price index rose by 250%, while the 
rest of the index rose by less than 180% (see table 27). This situation helped to aggravate the 
difficulties faced by the lower-income sectors of the population, because of the greater incidence of 
foodstuffs in their "shopping basket". 
For its part, the National Consumer Price Index (INPC) increased by 173% —a trend similar to 
that observed in the general price index.l8 
L8The INPC is fulfilling an increasingly important role in the generalized system of indexation in the Brazilian economy. This index has 
traditionally served as a basis for the calculation of half-yearly wage readjustments. Since 1981 it has also been taken as the basis for the monthly 
adjustment of support prices for agricultural products.and it has been used since December 1982 «determine the annual adjustments of housing 
rents, which were formerly amended in accordance with the variation in value of the Index-Linked Treasury bonds (ORTN). 
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As a result of the measures taken to curb rising consumer prices, the housing and public service 
sections increased to much less than the general index (118% and 127% respectively). In the caseof 
housing, the relative price lag was attributable to an alteration in the method of readjustment of 
housing rents which, as from December 1982, was fixed at 90% of the variation in the National 
Consumer Price Index (INPC). This percentage was reduced to 80% in July, when wage policy in 
general was amended. The relatively lower increase in public service prices, for its part, was due to the 
fact that in the face of accelerating inflation the authorities decided to postpone readjustment of the 
prices and tariffs applied by government-owned enterprises. 
b) Wages 
In contrast with the two preceding years, indicators relating to the industrial sector revealed a 
drop of nearly 9% in 1983 in the average annual real wages paid to production workers (see table 29). 
This development was attributable to the accelerating inflationary process and to a change in the 
wage-adjustment mechanisms applicable to workers. Thus, the existing wage law was modified at the 
beginning of the year by reducing the percentage of half-yearly readjustments of wages in the bracket 
of up to three minimum-wage rates from 110% to 100% of the variation in the INPC index. This wage 
readjustment system was again altered by the authorities in July, when a uniform readjustment 
percentage was established equivalent to 80% of the increase recorded in the national consumer price 
index, thereby eliminating the differential increments according to amount of remuneration 
established in the 1979 wage law. At the same time, a ceiling was placed on wage increments due to 
higher productivity. This type of wage adjustment became subject to annual determination by the 
Executive in accordance with the previous year's variation in per capita income. However, the 
frequency of wage readjustments was kept at six months. 
In view of vigorous opposition in the Nation Congress —which on two occasions rejected the 
legislative decrees changing the provisions concerning wages— the Executive found itself compelled 
to alter the proposed wage readjustment system once again in order to avoid a further rejection by 
Congress, since this would have meant a return to the 1979 wage law, as modified in 1980. The new 
legislative decree was eventually only endorsed by Congress in November, thereby bringing to an end 
a period of several months of uncertainty in the sphere of wage policy —a fact that to a certain extent 
affected the negotiations with the foreign commercial banks concerning the second group of loans. 
The new wage readjustment system restored the concept of scaled increments, granting 
adjustments equivalent to 100% of the variation in the national consumer price index to workers 
earning up to three minimum wage rates. Those earning higher wages were assigned appreciably 
lower readjustment percentages compared with those in force at the beginning of the year. Thus, 
levels of remuneration equivalent to 10 minimum wages, which in 1982 had been granted 
readjustments to the extent of 103% of the variation in the INPC index, became entitled to only 80% 
of that variation, and in the case of remunerations equivalent to 20 minimum wages, the 
Table 29 
BRAZIL: AVERAGE WAGES IN UNDUSTRY 





























































Source: Gerulio Vargas Foundation and Fundación Instituto Brasüeíro de Geografía e Estatística (IBGE). 
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Source: ECLAC, on the basis of information from the Centra) Bank of Brazil and the Getulio Vargas Foundation. 
readjustment percentage was reduced from 84% to 68% of the INPC variation. Furthermore, no wage 
increases in recognition of higher productivity were awarded in 1983, since under the Executive's new 
provisions this form of additional remuneration was reduced to zero on the grounds that the previous 
year's general per capita income level had fallen. In addition, as already mentioned, the Government 
eliminated from the INPC —and consequently from legal wage adjustments— the incidence of 
extraordinary or fortuitous factors, with the result that in Rio de Janeiro, for example, the consumer 
price increments considered for wage readjustment purposes amounted to 164% compared with the 
rise of 178% recorded in the uncorrected consumer price index. 
Moreover, the readjustments of minimum wage rates granted in May involved differential 
increments depending upon the region concerned. This decision was adopted with the aim of 
gradually establishing a uniform minimum wage rate throughout the country. Thus, as from that 
month the differentiation in question consisted of only two minimum wage ranges: for the southern 
and south-eastern19 regions and the Federal District, the minimum wage was fixed at 34 776 
cruzeiros (an increase of 47%), while in the rest of the country it was set at 30 600 cruzeiros (an 
increment of up to 50.5%). A flat-rate increase of 64.2% was given throughout the country in 
November, equivalent to the half-yearly variation in the national consumer price index (INPC). 
These minimum wage adjustments were, however, clearly lower than the rise in consumer 
prices in the major cities, so that minimum remuneration levels fell in real terms in all those urban 
centres, particularly outstanding in this respect being the decline of more than 15% in the Federal 
District and Recife (see table 30). This reduction of wages in real terms was mainly the result of the 
acceleration of inflation and, to a lesser extent, the fact that the correction already referred to in the 
consumer price index failed to reflect the real rate of inflation. 
19This region includes the States of Espíritu Santo, Minas Gérais, Rio de Janeiro, Sab Paulo, Paraná, Santa Catarina and Rio Grande do Sul. 
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Wages of public servants —the readjustment of which is not regulated by the wage law— were 
raised by 40% in January and 30% in June in the case of civilian personnel, and by 58% and 30%, 
respectively, in the case of the military. These increases were considerably lower than the rate of 
inflation, so that the wages of civilian personnel fell in real terms by more than 20% and those of 
military personnel declined by 1 1 % compared with the preceding year. State administrations and 
municipal corporations followed the wage policy of the federal government, in general. 
5. Monetary and fiscal policy 
a) Monetary policy 
The economic adjustment programme agreed with the International Monetary Fund included 
the establishment of limits on the growth of the monetary base and means of payment. It was also 
agreed that monetary policy would be assessed in the light of the variation in the net domestic assets 
held by the monetary authorities, for which maximum growth rates were fixed. This policy was 
supplemented by the control of public sector financing requirements, increases in the preferential 
interest rates formerly granted to priority sectors, and the elimination of quantitative restrictions on 
unsubsidized credits, together with other economic policy measures. 
In the first letter of intent, net domestic assets were defined as the difference between monetary 
liabilities to the public (including foreign currency deposits in the Central Bank) and the external 
assets of the monetary authorities in the form of net international reserves and other net external 
assets. The goals in connection with the financing needs of the public sector included the federal 
government, State and municipal administrations, government-owned enterprises, social security 
bodies and government funds and programmes administered by the banking system. 
The goals with regard to public sector financing needs and net domestic assets of the monetary 
authorities could not be fulfilled, however, in the first half of the year. This was mainly due to the 
extraordinary devaluation of the cruzeiro in February and its subsequent effects on the rate of 
inflation, monetary correction and domestic and foreign indebtedness. The consequent suspension of 
disbursements under the extended agreement with the Fund in April made it necessary to negotiate 
new limits. 
In the September letter of intent the quarterly limits were revised and methodological changes 
were also introduced. In the calculation of net domestic assets held by the monetary authorities, 
foreign currency deposits with the Central Bank (i.e., foreign loans not yet used by Brazilian debtors 
and external assets consisting of trade balances relating to contracts in non-convertible currencies) 
were no longer considered. In this manner the direct influence of devaluation of the cruzeiro on the 
commitments of the monetary authorities was eliminated.20 
In order to achieve the monetary policy goals the authorities used classical instruments of 
control —such as obligatory bank reserves and liquidity rediscounts— together with methods of 
direct control, such as the establishment of ceilings for interest rates and credits granted by the 
financial system to the public sector. 
In order to restrict the expansion of domestic liquidity the obligatory reserves in respect of 
demand deposits in the medium-sized and large commercial banks were raised from 40% and 4 5 % to 
45 % and 50%, respectively.2I The legal reserve level on time deposits in commercial, investment and 
development banks was also raised, from 5% to 10%.2 2 
20The formula or definition used to calculate the net domestic assets of the monetary authorities in accordance with the first letter of 
intent dated 6 January 1983 was: 
NDA = (ML + FCD) - (NIR + OEA) 
where: 
NDA = Net domestic assets 
ML = Monetary liabilities to the private sector 
FCD = Foreign currency deposits with the Central Bank 
NIR = Net international reserves 
OEA = Other net external assets. 
This definition was modified in the letter of intent dated 15 September 1983, items FCD and OEA being eliminated so that the final 
formula was: 
NDA = ML - NIR 
(See: Marques, Maria S., and Batista, Paulo N , "O terceiro acordó Brasil-FMI", CEMEI/IBRE/FGV, 1983.) 
21 On the other hand, the legal reserve level of 36% applicable to small commercial banks was maintained, as were the lower reserve rates 
in force in less developed regions. 
22 The commercial banks are required to deposit these reserves with the Central Bank and are paid interest on them at a rateequivalent to 
the variation in value of the Index-Linked National Treasury bonds (ORTN), plus 6% per annum. 
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Another feature of monetary policy in 1983 was the change in the interest rates on special lines 
of credit granted by the Central Bank. In this respect the inflation indicator used for the indexation of 
these rates was changed, replacing the National Consumer Price Index (1NPC) with the index of the 
nominal value of Index-Linked National Treasury bonds (ORTN). Moreover, the practice of pre-
fixing the price index variation for use in calculating the actual rates payable by debtors was 
discontinued. In the case of rediscounting operations, the Central Bank stipulated that interest rates 
would be equivalent to the variation in value of the ORTN bonds plus 18% per year, whereas they had 
formerly been determined in accordance with the variation in the INPC index plus 10% per annum. As 
regards lines of credit for the agricultural sector, the applicable interest rates were fixed at 85% of the 
variation in value of the ORTN bonds plus 3% annually in the case of crop financing operations or 5 % 
annually in that of agro-industrial activities (in coming years these rates will be raised until they 
incorporate 100% of the variation in value of the ORTN securities in 1985). For the less developed 
regions, such as the north and north-east, the rates of interest fixed were equivalent to only 70% of 
the ORTN variation. For other agricultural financing operations, interest rates were made equivalent 
to 100% of the ORTN variation plus annual surcharges of up to 12%, depending on the type of 
transaction involved. 
The cost of pre-shipment financing for exports of manufactured goods, for its part, was fixed 
from June 1983 onwards at an annual rate of 60%. (As from 1984 these rates will be equivalent to 
100% of the variation in value of the ORTN bonds plus 3% per year.) For special programmes such as 
POLONORDESTE and PROTERRA the applicable rates of interest will amount to 5 5 % of the variation in 
value of the ORTN. 
Apart from these changes aiming to establish less negative interest rates in real terms, more 
rigid control was established on the expansion of lines of credit for priority activities such as 
agriculture, exports and the alcohol programme. The system of "open accounts" for these activities, 
which had been used in recent years and which had shown itself to be a destabilizing factor in the 
monetary budget, was consequently eliminated. 
In order to mitigate the impact of inflationary expectations on interest rates, the monetary 
authorities eliminated the limits on the expansion of loans granted by the financial system and fixed 
the rates of interest applicable to loans granted by the commercial banks. Interest rates on credit 
operations of up to 180 days using domestic resources were initially restricted to 6% monthly in the 
case of the small and medium-sized banks and 5% in that of the large banks. In other credit 
operations of commercial, investment or development banks (except when employing foreign 
resources) rates were limited to a maximum equivalent to the full variation in value of the ORTN 
bonds plus 20% annually in the case of the large banks and 24% in that of the small and medium-
sized banks. The limit on loans for up to 180 days was subsequently eliminated in view of the rising 
inflation. 
The main factors of expansion of the monetary base in 1983 were the loans granted by the 
Banco do Brasil, the redemption of federal public-debt securities, credits granted by the Central Bank, 
and lines of redit for the marketing of wheat and fuels (see table 31). Although the loans granted by 
the Banco do Brasil were the factor that most contributed to monetary expansion, they continued to 
contract in real terms for the fourth consecutive year. The large-scale redemption of federal public-
debt securities, for its part, was responsible for a bigger increase in the monetary base. On the other 
hand the incidence of lines of credit for the marketing of wheat and fuels declined in the course of the 
year thanks to the gradual elimination of subsidies for the consumption of those products. In practice, 
the higher price of fuels —which rose by nearly 300%— made it unnecessary to increase the 
resources of the petroleum account. The expansion of this account in the first half-year amounted to 
320 billion cruzeiros, whereas in the second half of the year it was nil. 
Outstanding among the factors of contraction of the monetary base were the transfers carried 
out by the National Treasury for 2 700 million cruzeiros, a sum 300% greater than in the preceding 
year. 
The means of payment expanded in 1983 by 92% and the monetary base by 89%, both 
increments being much lower than the 200% rise in the level of prices. The growth rates of M2 and 
M3 were greater —131% and 170%, respectively— but even so considerably lower than the rate of 
inflation (see tables 32 and 33). Likewise, if securities in circulation outside the banking system are 
added to the above concepts, the expansion of liquidity, measured in accordance with this new 
indicator, was still considerably less than inflation. 
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This low growth rate of the monetary aggregates in comparison with price increases brought 
about a noticeable rise in the velocity of circulation of money. Because of the inflationary process and 
the availability of an up-to-date financial system offering a range of investment opportunities, the 
economic agents avoided holding monetary assets which gave no return or only a nominal return at a 
much lower level than that of expected inflation (for example, currency and demand deposits). In 
1980 the last-mentioned had represented 3 3 % of total financial assets held by the public, whereas at 
the end of 1983 they were equivalent to only 16%. The preference for other high-liquidity assets 
brought about a considerable increase in savings deposits (see table 34). This expansion was partly 
due to the fact that the liquidity of these deposits increased in 1983 since, on the one hand, monthly 
payments of both the interest and the adjustment for monetary correction were authorized and, on 
the other, the sum exempt from income tax in such deposits was also increased. 
The goals established for the net domestic assets of the monetary authorities were not fulfilled 
at the end of the year, since the level of net international reserves was lower than planned bacause of 
the non-receipt by that date of disbursements under the second group of loans negotiated with the 
foreign commercial banks. 
Table 31 
BRAZIL: MAIN FACTORS OF EXPANSION AND CONTRACTION 
OF THE MONETARY BASE 
(Variations in billions of cruzeiros) 
1981 1982 1983 
1. Factors of expansion 
Credit to the agricultural sector 
Crops 
Marketing of wheat 
Minimum prices 
Sugar: exports and cost equalization 
Credit to exports 
Credit to the public sector 
Public debt* 
Special operations 
Credit from the Central Bank 
Special funds and programmes 
Transfers to financial institutions 
Others 
Others credits from Banco do Brasil 
Credit to PRO ALCOOL 
Other accounts (net variation) 





Resources of Banco do Brasil 
Resources of funds and programmes 
Time deposits with Banco do Brasil 
Amortization of debt of the social 
security system 
Public debt 
Obligatory deposit in respect of time 
deposits 


















































































Source: Central Bank of Brazil, Informativo Mensal, January 1984, and Gerulio Vargas Foundation, Conjuntura Económica, February 1984. 

















































































Source: Central Bank of Brazil, Informativo mensal, January 1984. 
Table 33 
BRAZIL: PRIVATE SECTOR LIQUIDITY 











































Source: Getulio Vargas Foundation, Conjuntura Económica, February 1984. 
"M1 = Means of payment (currency outside banks and demand deposits). 
*M2 = M1 + demand deposits in public savings banks and National Co-operative Credit Bank, plus time deposits. 
CM* = M1 plus savings deposits. 
The public debt placed outside the sphere of operation of the monetary authorities amounted at 
the beginning of 1983 to 1 1 % of the gross domestic product. However, since the monetary 
authorities had to redeem securities corresponding to that debt in the course of the year —provoking 
monetary expansion to a value of 2 300 million cruzeiros— the amount in circulation fell to a level of 
8% of the gross domestic product. This contraction of securities in circulation was attributable to 
declining interest on the part of the public and of the financial system, which in turn was due to the 
policy followed until September by the monetary authorities, who refrained from issuing new 
securities containing an automatic adjustment clause based on variations in the rate of exchange. 
These had formerly proved very attractive on account of expectations of further devaluation of the 
cruzeiro. 
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Between September and November, however, new issues were made of securities subject to 
readjustment of value in accordance with variations in the rate of exchange. In September the Central 
Bank placed on the market Index-Linked Treasury bonds (ORTN) to a value of 750 billion cruzeiros 
and redeemed one billion cruzeiros' worth of National Treasury Bills. The proportion of such bills in 
the total amount of federal securities outside the field of action of the monetary authorities was thus 
reduced from approximately 30% in 1980 to less than 4 % in 1983. This virtual disappearance of the 
bills was a result of the public's lack of interest in securities not readjustable in line with monetary 
correction or exchange rate variations and the fact that the interest yields of these securities in real 
terms had proved negative in recent years. 
In December the authorities modified the procedures they had followed in previous months and 
embarked on a massive redemption of federal securities, taking advantage of the fact that 
expectations of greater devaluations had been greatly reduced by the agreements being negotiated at 
that time with the IMF and international banks and the favourable results in the merchandise trade 
balance. 
Loans to the private sector showed an increase of nearly 150% in the year (see table 35). This 
fall in the availability of resources in real terms was due mainly to the reduced access to additional 
external resources. Moreover, private economic agents avoided the foreign-currency loans offered by 
the local banks because of the uncertainty concerning the future evolution of the rate of exchange and 
also regarding the current economic recession. As a consequence of the lack of interest on the part of 
borrowers the financial institutions found it necessary to increase their foreign currency deposits with 
the Central Bank, so that the balance of these accounts at the end of 1983 amounted to US$ 11 billion: 
US$ 2 billion more than the balance the year before. 
With regard to loans to the public sector, the economic authorities took vigorous steps to 
comply in the second half of 1983 with the goals agreed with the IMF. Through the medium of 
Resolution 831 the Central Bank established maximum limits on the expansion of credit from the 
financial system to the public sector in general. These limits were determined monthly by the Central 
Bank on the basis of guidelines suggested by the Inter-Ministerial Committee for the Control of 
Budgetary Implementation set up in August 1983-
b) Fiscal policy 
Fiscal policy was one of the central aspects of the economic adjustment programme applied by 
the Government in 1983, since considerable emphasis was placed on a drastic reduction of the total 
public sector deficit. To this end, rigorous quarterly goals were established with regard to the 
procurement of loans by the sector (see table 36). According to these goals, the financing 
Table 34 
BRAZIL: DEPOSITS AND OTHER DOMESTIC LIABILITIES OF THE 
FINANCIAL SYSTEM WITH THE PUBLIC 




Bills of exchange 



































































BRAZIL: LOANS BY THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM TO THE PRIVATE SECTOR 
Banking sector 











National Housing Bank 
(BNH) 
Real estate credit corporations 
Official 
Private 
Savings and loan associations 
Federal Savings Bank (CEF) 
State Savings Banks 
National Economic and Social 
Development Bank (BNDES) 
State development banks 
National Co-operative Credit 
Bank 



































































































































































































































Source: Central Bank of Brazil, Informativo mensal, January 1984. 
"Preliminary figures. 
requirements of the public sector were to decrease from 13.8%2i of the gross domestic product in 
1982 to 7.9% in 1983. In order to attain this goal, an increase of 16% in real terms was planned in 
federal government revenue, for which several measures were adopted in the sphere of taxation, 
especially as regards income tax. An effort was also made to implement a more suitable policy 
concerning the prices and tariffs charged by public enterprises, bearing in mind not only their 
financial situation but also the prevailing conditions of supply and demand.24 
With the aim of reducing public expenditure, an attempt was made to limit staff costs and 
transfers to decentralized units and enterprises. It was also laid down that during the period covered 
by the agreement with the Fund, government expenses defrayed by the monetary authorities would 
be eliminated through a substantial reduction in their total amount and the gradual transfer of the 
remainder to the federal budget. 
The expenses of government-owned enterprises were more severely reduced, especially in 
capital investment. It was decided not to undertake any major new project in 1983 (except for the 
23This percentage was subsequently reviewed and raised to 15.8%. 
24 Hydroelectric power plants, for example, were operating below their full generating capacity. 
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Carajás project, financing of which was fully ensured from abroad), while the implementation of 
projects begun in previous years would also be slowed down. 
Application of the adjustment programme in terms of income —both in the fiscal sector and as 
regards the operating income of public enterprises— was not however carried out as strictly as 
originally intended and the results achieved in this respect consequently fell short of official 
expectations. On the other hand, in the matter of expenditure —other than that of a financial 
character— the planned action was applied with great severity and a substantial reduction in real 
terms was achieved. It was not possible to reduce financial costs due to the incidence of adjustments in 
the value of loans, especially those of external origin, since the increase in the rate of exchange was 
considerably higher than the rise in domestic prices. 
As a result of the appreciable increase in financial costs, the financial requirements of the public 
sector reached a level equivalent to almost 18% of the gross domestic product, compared with less 
than 16% in 1982 (see table 37). The goal agreed with the Fund in this respect was raised on three 
occasions in order to adjust the nominal values in the light of the higher rates of inflation being 
registered. The goal finally established was fulfilled at the end of the year. 
In view of the difficulties inherent in the use of nominal limits it was decided to introduce an 
additional indicator —given the name of operational financing— which was defined as the difference 
between nominal financing and an amount taking account of the effects of monetary correction and 
exchange rate variations on the value of the loans.25 In the light of this new indicator, the results of 
the policy of restraint on the financing needs of the public sector were significant. Operational 
financing actually fell from 6.6% of the gross domestic product in 1982 to 2.5% in 1983 and there was 
a clear decline in the total public sector deficit (see table 37). 
It is estimated that the total central government deficit, which in recent years had reached a 
level equivalent to 5% of the gross domestic product, dropped to 4 % of the GDP in 1983 as the result 
of a reduction of current expenditure equivalent to 12% in real terms (see table 38). Excluding 
financing costs, since the greater part of these were in effect debt amortization,26 the total federal 
government deficit was equivalent to 0.7% of the gross domestic product, whereas in 1980 and 1981 
it had amounted to approximately 4 % and in 1982 to 2.6% of the GDP. 
Federal government tax revenues in 1983 showed a nominal increase of 145%, but this was 
equivalent in real terms to a contraction of 3.5%, thereby failing to fulfil the corresponding goal 
Table 36 
BRAZIL: GOALS AND ACTUAL RESULTS OF SOME INDICATORS AGREED 
WITH THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND FOR 1983 
































Source: Central Bank of Brazil, Brazil Economic Program, Internal and External Adjustment, March 1984. 
"Balance at end of quarter. Accumulated flow in the year. clnthegoals for the first three quarters deposits in foreign corrency in 
the Central Bank and other external assets were included in the definition of net domestic assets of the monetary authorities. The goal 
was not achieved due to delay in reaching agreement on the second group of loans with the foreign commercial banks, the first desbursement of 
which was initially scheduled for December 1983. 
"Discussions concerning this concept are still going on. The results shown are therefore preliminary. 
26 Domestic public debt financing costs may mostly be regarded as amortization payments since the interest rates implicit in the 
corresponding securities were invariably negative or extremely low compared with the prevailing Treasury Bill discount rates or with the 




BRAZIL: FINANCING OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR" 
1981 1982 






Other financial institutions 
Government-owned enterprises 
Monetary authorities 
External debt payments 
Others 
Commercial banks 
Other financial institutions 
Suppliers 




Funds and programmes 
Social security 
External financing 
B. Monetary and exchange-rate correction 
C. Operational financing (A-B) 
Nominal financing/gross domestic 
product 
Operational financing/gross domestic 
product 
Flows in billions of cruzeiros 












































































Source: Central Bank of Brazil, Informativo ntensal, February 1984. 
"Preliminary figures. 'Payments made by Banco do Brasil in respect of the external debt of government-owned enterprises. 
established in the adjustment plan (see table 39). This was due to the unfavourable performance of 
several important taxes such as those on manufactured products, fuels and lubricants, imports, 
financial operations, and the tax on the use of vehicles. The general economic decline, which 
particularly affected the industrial sector, had a negative influence on these taxes, and they were also 
affected by the fact that the authorities refrained from adjusting taxable values in line with the rate of 
inflation in order to avoid the possibility of these tax dues rising more steeply than taxpayers' 
incomes. 
Revenue from the tax on manufactured products (IPI) showed a severe drop of 2 5 % as a result 
of a decline of 20% in gross collection and a decrease of 6% in refunds. The IPI tax on cigarettes and 
tobacco, which represents approximately 40% of total gross revenue under this levy, showed a drop 
in real terms since tax rates rose less than the general price index, and moreover the consumption of 
cigarettes fell. Although refunds were lower in real terms they still came to a significant amount since 
they represent one of the most important incentives for exports of manufactured goods. 
The poor results of the tax on fuels and lubricants were due to a contraction in sales of gasoline, 
which is the petroleum product paying the highest tax. The results were also influenced by the 
changes made in the system of collection of this tax with a view to attenuating the rise in fuel prices, 
which were considerably affected by the devaluation of the cruzeiro and the elimination of the subsidy 
which had favoured several petroleum products. 
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The tax on financial operations also declined severely in real terms due to lower imports and to 
reductions in the tax rates applicable to credit operations, which were scaled down in order to 
alleviate the financing costs of debtors. Import duties, for their part, were affected by the decline in 
imports. 
On the other hand, fiscal revenue from personal and corporate income evolved favourably, for 
in spite of the prevailing economic crisis collections rose by 36% in real terms as the combined result 
of amendments introduced in the capital gains tax, the institution of monetary-correction 
adjustments in tax installments payable by corporate entities, an increase from 10% to 15% in the 
supplementary tax payable by financial institutions, and a reduction of the tax-payment period. 
Revenues from export duties, also rose considerably due to the extraordinary devaluation of the 
cruzeiro in February since, in addition to the direct incidence of these taxes, the authorities raised the 
tax rates in order to avoid reductions in export prices. 
Finally, tax revenues for social programmes rose appreciably as a result of the establishment of 
FINSOCIAL in June 1982. Collection of the corresponding tax began in thesecondhalfof that year, and 
the tax rate was set at 0.5% of the value of sales of goods-producing enterprises, and 5% of the 
amount of sales tax paid in the case of service enterprises. 
Table 38 




Transfers to official banks 
Transfers to autonomous institutions 
Expenses defrayed by the authorities 
Expenses defrayed by the monetary 
authority 
Subsidies to wheat, sugar, petroleum 
and other basic products 
Subsidies for preferential-
interest loans0 
Public debt financing costs 
Interest payments and monetary 
correction ORTN 
Discounting of National 
Treasury Bills 
Total deficit 
Deficit excluding financing costs 
Fiscal deficit/gross domestic product 
Fiscal deficit/gross domestic product 
(excluding financing costs) 
Fiscal deficit/total government 
expenditure 
Fiscal deficit/total government 
expenditure (excluding financing costs)" 




































































































41.5 36.9 25.2 
31.5 22.9 7.5 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official information. 
"Excluding amortization payments. Not including payments made in respect of the service of the external debt of government-owned 
enterprises. f Estimated by the Central Bank on the basis of the difference between rates of inflation and average preferential-credit 
interest rates. The deficit particulars shown exclude financing costs since, due to the fact that implicit interest rates in the case of 




BRAZIL: CURRENT INCOME OF THE NATIONAL TREASURY AND OF STATE 
AND MUNICIPAL ADMINISTRATIONS 




















Taxes earmarked for social programmes 
Others taxes 
Others current income 
Levies 
Motor vehicle lecensi fees 
Other levies 
Sundry income 
Current income of state government 
Tax on circulation of merchandise 
Sao Paulo 




Transfers from the National 
Treasury in respect of tax receipts 
earmarked for the States 
Current income of municipal 
corporations 
Transfers from the National 
Treasury in respect of tax receipts 



































































































































































































































































































Source: Central Bank of Brazil, Bolettm mensal, January 1984. 
"Includes only collections under the two headings specified. Other 
of the tax revenue of the States. Comprises the States 
tax income is received but the two factors shown represent a high proportion 
of Paraná, Santa Catarina and Rio Grande do Sul. 
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The considerable contraction of current federal government expenditure in real terms was 
attributable both to items payable from the resources of the National Treasury and to a reduction in 
the subsidies financed by the monetary authority. Expenditure corresponding to personal 
remunerations and family allowances rose in nominal terms by 115%, equivalent to a contraction in 
real terms of 15%, thereby reflecting the wage policy applied by the federal government. The only 
items of expenditure showing increases in real terms were those relating to debt servicing costs and 
expenditure incurred in assisting the victims of floods in the south of the country and of drought in 
the north-east. 
Subsidies disbursed by the monetary authority showed an even greater contraction in real terms 
than the expenses defrayed by the Treasury, thereby demonstrating the clear intention of the 
financial authorities to reduce this type of expenditure. The raising of interest rates on credit 
operations for priority activities brought about a significant decrease in subsidies under this heading, 
but the effects of this were not felt throughout the whole year, since the new measures were only 
instituted in July. With regard to other subsidies, the Government achieved an appreciable reduction 
but was unable to eliminate them entirely. The only subsidies to continue in future will be those 
covered directly by the National Treasury in accordance with budget items specifically established for 
the purpose. Consolidation of the Brazilian budgetary system will thus be achieved, with consequent 
elimination of a disturbing factor in the management of monetary policy in recent years. 
The operating income of autonomous institutions and government-owned enterprises rose less 
than the level of prices since, with a view to slowing down the rate of inflation, the financial 
authorities did not readjust their tariffs or selling prices in line with related costs as envisaged in the 
adjustment programme agreed with the IMF. Expenses incurred in payment of personal 
remunerations and family allowances went down sharply on account of the Government's wage 
policy and the severe restrictions on the engagement of additional personnel. Real investment 
expenditure rose by 88% in nominal terms, which was equivalent at constant prices to a reduction of 
nearly 20%. This was due to the strict policy of containing expenditure applied by the Ministry of 
State Enterprises and the difficulty experienced in obtaining resources from abroad. On the other 
hand, financing costs rose by 17% in real terms, thus preventing the achievement of better results as 
regards the reduction of the overall public sector deficit. 
In spite of this reduction of imbalances, the financial situation of the public enterprises was 
critical in 1983 due to the inability to obtain external financing. Many of the enterprises concerned 
were unable to meet their external liabilities, and these consequently had to be covered by the Banco 
do Brasil on behalf of the federal government, which had undertaken responsibility as guarantor in 
the corresponding loan contracts. 
Finally, income received by the States and municipal corporations fell in real terms, evolving 
even more unfavourably than the revenue of the federal government. This was due to the fact that the 
tax on the circulation of merchandise (ICM) —the main source of income of the State 
administrations— and transfers from the federal government to the State and municipal 
administrations deriving from taxes prescribed for specific purposes fell sharply in real terms as a 
consequence of the economic crisis. 
In addition to this unfavourable trend in the area of tax revenue, the States and municipal 
corporations were adversely affected by the restrictions placed by the Government on the granting of 




1. Recent economic trends: Introduction and summary 
The growth rate of economic activity has gradually slackened since 1979. Thus, the gross domestic 
product grew 5.4% in 1979,4.1% in 1980 and 2.3% in 1981, while the rates for the past two years 
were the lowest since statistical records began to be kept: 0.9% in 1982 and 0.8% in 1983 (see 
table 1). There have, however, been some indications of a change in this trend since mid-1983. 
This stagnation has been particularly notable in agriculture and industry, which grew much 
more slowly than the average rate for the other sectors from the outset of this process. The situation 
has only changed in the past few years, when such low growth rates have spread to the whole 
economy (see figure 1). 
The production situation has been reflected in employment levels, although with some time 
lag. At the beginning, laws prohibiting the immediate laying-off of workers reduced the direct effects 
of this phenomenon, but the rules governing the dismissal of workers have recently been made more 
flexible, the accumulated effect of several years of slack production thus made itself felt in the space of 
a few months, with the unemployment rate rising from 9.0% to 12.7% during 1983-
There were different reasons for the lack of growth in industry and in agriculture. The flagging 
performance of industry was clearly related to the drop in demand, initially prompted by falling 
exports (as a result of weakening world markets) and by the rise in imports brought about by the 
policy of relaxing controls on the external sector. Thus, the decrease in production was initially felt in 
export activities, such as textiles and clothing, and in production activities which lend themselves 
more easily to import substitution, such as textiles, the products of basic metal industries and 
transport equipment. This was later compounded by the way in which fiscal and monetary policy was 
handled. In 1980 an energetic policy of expanding public investment was implemented which 
generated a large fiscal deficit, and the action subsequently taken by the monetary authority to ward 
off the monetary effects of this fiscal imbalance entailed a severe restriction of credit and a rise in 
interest rates which affected industry as a whole and particularly the production of durable consumer 
goods. The fiscal deficit thus completed the chain reaction of recessionary factors which had begun 
with the stagnation of exports and the increase in imports. 
In contrast, the decline in the agricultural growth rate was due to supply-side factors. 
Throughout the past decade, technological research and investment in this sector had been 
slackening-off, and the effects of this have been felt in the past four years. The level of productivity of 
most crops has evolved only slowly, and there has been no major expansion of the agricultural 
frontier. In addition, some crops which play a very important part in the sector's performance have 
run up against a series of adverse phenomena which have not been controlled satisfactorily. Thus, for 
example, cotton and rice have been affected by productivity and price problems which have given rise 
to inefficient crop shifts and to a significant reduction in the overall growth of production. 
The drop in industrial demand was initially manifested in terms of volume; its impact on prices 
was not felt until 1981, and then only very slightly. Moreover, the decrease in the growth rate of 
industrial prices from 25% to 20% was not accompanied by a parallel change in costs, since real 
interest rates, real wages and the real exchange rate rose steadily. The burden of this adjustment was 
therefore mainly taken up by company earnings. Prices were not significantly affected until mid-
1983, when the drop in aggregate demand caused by the decline in industrial and agricultural 
production, the monetary squeeze and the fall in both legal and illegal exports to Venezuela and 
Ecuador led to a considerable drop in the growth rate of prices. Thus, the rate of increase in food 
prices slipped from 25% in 1982 to 17% in 1983 and that of the general price index declined from 
24% to 17% over the same period. 
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The balance-of-payments situation has progressively deteriorated. Minor exports have been 
decreasing since 1980 and exports of services plummeted in 1983. The marked constriction of 
imports during the latter year could not wholly counteract the trend. Thus, the trade deficit in 1983, 
although much lower than in the preceding year, was still a very substantial one. 
Moreover, in 1982, not enough external resources were secured in 1983 to finance the current 
account deficit. The recent problems which many of the countries of the region have had with their 
external debt has led the international banking system to restrict financing even for those countries 
whose judicious handling of the problem has saved them from having difficulties in servicing their 
debt, and there hasthus been a drastic decline in the country's international reserves. These fell from 
US$ 5.2 billion to US$ 3.19 billion between 1980 and 1983, and in the last year alone, they fell by 
US$ 1.8 billion. 
The overall economic situation in Colombia during the first half of 1983 was a very delicate one. 
Economic activity was faced with the worst recession in the last 30 years and unemployment rose 
rapidly. Reactivation of the economy appeared to be the most urgent priority at that time, but the 
Table 1 
COLOMBIA: MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS 
A. Basic economic indicators 
Gross domestic product at market prices 
(millions of 1970 dollars) 
Population (millions of inhabitants) 
Per capita gross domestic product 
(1970 dollars) 
B. Short-term economic indicators 
Gross domestic product 
Per capita gross domestic product 
Gross national income 
Terms of trade (goods and services) 
Current value of exports 
of goods and services 
Current value of imports 
pf goods and services 
Consumer prices 
December to December 
Variation between annual averages 
Money 
Wages and salaries' 
Unemployment rate 
Current government income 
Total government expenditure 
Fiscal deficit/total expenditure 
of government 
C. External sector 
Trade balance (goods and services) 
Balance on current account 






























































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official data. 
"Preliminary figures. National index for manual workers. 
Average annual rate for Bogotá, Barranquilla, Medellin and Cali. 
cReal wages for manual workers in manufacturing. 
tn f ̂  • i n - i i - • 'Percenrage Surplus. 8 Total disbursed debt. 
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COLOMBIA 
steps taken to accomplish this came into conflict with the need to keep inflation under control and to 
maintain exchange stability. Managing the economy was especially difficult because of the change in 
external sector conditions that took place early in the year when devaluations in neighbouring 
countries caused exports to plummet, thus causing the reduction in reserves to be far greater than had 
been forecast late in the preceding year. 
Against this background, a two-pronged policy was followed which was aimed both at 
reactivating the economy and at halting the deterioration of the external sector. The methods 
employed were to set the rate of devaluation above that of inflation, to expand the fiscal defici t, and to 
restrict imports by various means. The first two mechanisms, however, exacerbated the balance-of-
payments problem. The high rate of return on external transactions caused personal savings and 
internal liquidity to be shifted to deposits abroad and to the payment of the external debt. A process 
was thus begun whereby the expansion in credit for the private sector was cancelled out by the drop in 
international reserves, which, in turn, raised the amount of the fiscal deficit needed to counter the 
constraining effect which that reduction had on aggregate demand. The decrease in reserves and the 
rise in the fiscal deficit were thus both greater than would have been desirable. 
Moreover, the raising of the real exchange rate and the expansion of export subsidies were not 
enough to offset the effects of the shrinkage of external markets caused by the world recession and the 
measures adopted to remedy it. In practice, the policy which was applied was not successful in 
counteracting the quantitative controls placed on imports by Ecuador, Venezuela and other countries 
with a view to adjusting their balance of payments. Under these circumstances, the value of exports of 
goods and services fell 16% below the level of the preceding year, while the drop in external sales of 
manufactures was even greater, since these products are more varied and their markets are more 
highly concentrated in Latin America. 
The policy for regulating imports was, on the other hand, both sound and well-timed. The 
action taken in this area made it possible to reverse the trend towards a rapid growth in imports 
which had been observed in previous years and to reduce the drop in international reserves by 
US$ 1 billion. The recovery of the domestic market for the products of the industrial sector modified 
the latter's make-up. Thus, the production of consumer goods and raw materials, which had been the 
most severely affected by the relaxation of controls on foreign trade, since they were the products 
which lent themselves the most to import substitution, rose substantially during the second half of 
the year, thereby altering the downward trend in industrial activity. Industrial production reacted 
positively to this and, after having dropped by an annualized rate of 6% injune, it closed the year with 
only a very slight decrease. Even so, the manufacturing sector's response to the import restrictions 
policy may be said to have been slow and limited. Although the decrease in industrial imports made 
room for a 10% increase in production, the actual production barely maintained the level of the 
preceding year. 
Another factor favouring the recovery of production activity was the expansion of construction. 
The Government launched a determined policy to increase financing for housing, and the deposits 
made for this purpose rose 43% in 1983, while the surface area constructed climbed 34% in relation 
to the preceding year. This was partially offset by the drop in public investment, however, and the 
value added in construction rose only 3%. 
Government action to boost" agriculture was relatively dispersed. Generally speaking, it was 
aimed at expanding credit and improving external competitivity. The sector's recovery during the 
second half of the year does not, however, appear to reflect a change in the structural factors which 
had curbed its growth in previous years. Thus, the 2% increase in the agricultural product was 
primarily due to rapid growth in coffee production and to the return to normal cotton production in 
the second half of the year: both typically cyclical phenomena. 
With respect to monetary policy, the national budget was responsible for a 44% increase in the 
monetary base, while the rise in credit for the private sector was responsible for a further 27%. The 
external sector, however, counteracted a greater expansion with a 57% decrease. Since the bank 
multiplier, for its part, rose 11 % the net result of these changes was an expansion of nearly 26% in 
the means of payment. This figure, which would be high under normal circumstances, cannot be 
regarded as being so in this case in view of the recession and the under-utilization of the economy's 
installed capacity. In effect, the figure is compatible with an inflation rate of under 20% and a slight 
recovery in industry, so in this sense the monetary policy is a suitable one for reconciling the goals of 
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Figure 1 
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COLOMBIA 
stability and growth, at least in the short run. The most serious consequences of the lack of policy co-
ordination were seen in the path followed by the monetary aggregates: 70% of the total monetary 
expansion took place in the last two months of the year, thereby giving rise to unnecessary difficulties 
in the economy. 
For the time being, aggregate demand does not pose a problem with respect to maintaining the 
downward trend in inflation. Most industrial sectors have a wide margin of under-utilized capacity 
and have had serious difficulties in adjusting their prices. The reduction in industrial prices in real 
terms has not been accompanied by a like decrease in costs, for in 1983 real industrial wages rose 5%, 
real interest rates fluctuated around 15% and the real exchange rate climbed 8%. Because of this, 
many industrial companies' profits have been lower and a number of them have reported losses; 
naturally, a situation such as this cannot continue for long. Unless substantial progress is made with 
respect to an earnings policy which can bring about a rapid adjustment in these variables, the first 
reaction of companies upon observing any upsurge in demand will be to raise the prices of their 
products. 
Fiscal policy has unquestionably been one of the most complex elements of all in managing the 
economy. The Government introduced tax reforms in order to change the trend towards an increase 
in the fiscal deficit. In general terms, wide-ranging amnesties were granted in order to facilitate the 
incorporation into the tax system of individuals who had been operating outside of it, new forms of 
estimating income were introduced and the existing ones were broadened, penalties for tax evasion 
were increased, and tax rates were lowered. The combined effect of these adjustments was an 
estimated increase of 15 billion pesos in tax revenue for 1983. Inasmuch as this was a one-time 
increase, this sum suggests that the scope of the reform was quite modest and only made a small 
contribution to lowering the fiscal deficit. At the end of the year, however, the Government made a 
series of changes in the sales tax in order to change it into a value added tax. Although these 
adjustments represent an increase in the existing tax rates, their real impact will depend upon their 
administrative base, which does not appear to be very solid. In any event, tax receipts could be 
increased significantly by these means. 
However, along with the tax reform, it became necessary to increase the fiscal deficit in order to 
offset the monetary effect of the drop in international reserves, which was compounded early in the 
year by the devaluations in Venezuela and Ecuador. The purposes of these measures are not mutually 
contradictory despite appearances. The tax reform was applied on the basis of a long-term view and 
its object was to raise tax revenue. In contrast, the increase in the fiscal deficit was an attempt to solve 
a short-term problem by means of increased spending. In this latter connection, it should be noted 
that such a large increase in the fiscal deficit, which will inevitably place severe constraints on future 
action, was not necessary; the same result with respect to aggregate demand could have been achieved 
with a smaller deficit, provided that interest rates were not kept at a level which induced people to 
transfer domestic resources abroad, thereby exacerbating the drop in reserves. 
The steps taken by the Government to reactivate the economy were successful in halting the 
process of economic decline by mid-1983. At the same time, it proved possible to reduce the inflation 
rate from 24% in 1982 to 17% in 1983. The economic recovery has been very weak, however, and 
does not appear to be enough to reverse the upward trend in unemployment. Moreover, some of the 
measures which have been taken speed up the drawing down of international reserves, which will 
inevitably act as a brake on the reactivation of the economy. What provides the most food for thought, 
however, is that future action does not seem to have been made any easier. The effectiveness of the 
means used thus far to bring about a reactivation will be sharply reduced later on. Thus, imports have 
been reduced to the point where the supply of essential raw materials and capital goods has been 
affected; the expansion of construction is limited by the enormous amount of financial resources 
required to sustain it; the enlargement of the fiscal debt is held back by the impossibility of continuing 
to lose international reserves. Furthermore, the decreasing level of investment in machinery and 
equipment is an indication that entrepreneurs are adjusting installed capacity to suit the new demand 
conditions, and this could severely limit the recovery of previous levels of activity. The consolidation 
of the first signs of an improvement in economic activity therefore depends on the ability to make 
adjustments in the economic policy programme with a view to strengthening existing mechanisms 
and supplementing them with others which will ensure a longer-lasting and more sustained impulse. 
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2. Recent economic trends 
a) Total supply and demand 
The growth rate of economic activity has declined steadily since 1980. In 1983, the product 
increased scarcely 0.8%, which was the lowest figure in the past 20 years. As a result of this, together 
with a 19% reduction in the volume of imports of goods and services, total supply fell by 1.4%. 
Indeed, in absolute terms the drop in imports far exceeded the small increase in the product (see 
table 2). This is an indication that import restriction policies have not been as successful as hoped. 
The increase in the demand for nationally-produced goods which is implicit in the decrease in 
imports did not bring along with it an equivalent increase in production. 
The main factor which accounted for the behaviour of final demand was a sharp drop (-15%) in 
investment in machinery and equipment. The expansion of public investment and housing 
construction was not enough to offset this fall. As a result, gross capital formation declined by 3.6% in 
comparison to the preceding year. The decrease of almost 13 % in the volume of exports of goods and 
services also contributed to the shrinkage of demand. Household consumption, however, maintained 
its 1982 level and was the steadiest cojnponent of final demand. 
The drop in demand has created a situation in which there is an excess of capacity that 
discourages investment projects. During the past two years, entrepreneurs have been reluctant to 
obtain bank loans and to use the systems of import preferences in order to set up new plants and to 
expand existing ones. This unsatisfactory investment performance has altered the causes and 
characteristics of the stagnation of the economy. In effect, because of its adverse effects on capital 
formation, the initial slackening of effective demand has given rise to expectations which tend to 
cause this stagnation to gradually turn into a problem of supply. 
Table 2 
COLOMBIA: TOTAL SUPPLY AND DEMAND 
Millions of dollars 
at 1970 prices 
Percentage 
breakdown Growth rates 
1981 1982 1983° 1970 1980 1983° 1980 1981 1982 1983° 
Total supply 23 919 24 681 24 329 109.1 109.9 110.0 5.1 2.4 3.2 -1.4 
Gross domestic product 
at market prices 21740 21943 22 118 100.0 100.0 100.0 4.1 2.3 0.9 0.8 




































































































































Source: ECLAC calculations based on figures supplied by the National Bureau of Statistics (DANE). 
"Preliminary figures. The figures for exports and imports of goods and services were taken from balance~of~ payments data expressed 




COLOMBIA: GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT BY KIND OF ECONOMIC 
ACTIVITY, AT FACTOR COST 
Gross domestic product 
Goods 
Agriculture, hunting, 
forestry and fishing 




Electricity, gas y water 
Transport, storage and 
communications 
Other services 
Wholesale and retail trade, 
restaurants and hotels 
Financial institutions, insurance, 
real estate and business services 
Ownership of dwellings 
Community social and personal 
services 
Government services 
Less: Imputed commissions for 
banking services 
Millions of dollars 





























































































































































































Source: 1970-1982: ECLAC calculations on the basis of figures supplied by the National Bureau of statistics (DANE); 1983: ECLAC estimates 
based on official figures. 
"Preliminary figures. As the individual activities and the totals were calculated independently, the sum of the farmer does not 
correspond exactly with the latter. c The discrepancies between these growth rates and those shown in tables 1 and 2 are due to the fact 
that they involve different measurements of the product: in this instance, at factor cost, and in the other cases at market prices. 
b) Evolution of the main sectors 
The decline in economic activity first began in industry and later spread to agriculture. For 
several years, growth in these two sectors was less than the average for the economy. This gap 
narrowed in 1983, when the recession spread evenly to all the main economic sectors (see table 3). 
i) Agriculture. During the past four years, agriculture has grown much more slowly than its 
historical average. Indeed, in 1982 agricultural production actually fell (by 1.9%), while in 1983 it 
only rose by 2.1 % (see table 4). This performance has been due to specific problems with some 
products. There was a decrease in the productivity of the cotton crop, which represents a large 
proportion of crop-farming output, and lower international prices had a substantial effect on its 
profitability. There have been very sharp fluctuations in the rice crop as a result of the support price 
policy. The steps taken to regulate coffee production have not had the expected effect and have given 
rise to phenomena which are difficult to understand. The influence of long-term policy has been even 
more significant. Spending on technological research has fallen during the past ten years and 
investment in machinery and infrastructure has grown only very slowly; the effects of this have been 
felt in all their intensity during the past four years, during which time productivity has not increased 
and the extension of the agricultural frontier has been limited. 
Crop performance varied significantly in 1983. In 1982, the fastest-growing agricultural sector 
was cereals, especially rice, while the output of oilseeds was lower than during the previous year. In 
contrast, in 1983 the output of cereals fell and the production of oilseeds rose (see table 4). The sharp 
changes in relative prices produced marked fluctuations, many of them due to the setting of the rice 
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support price during the second half of 1982. At that time, agriculture was having serious difficulties 
and external prices were depressed. Planting cotton, in particular, was unprofitable because of the 
decrease in productivity and the drop in external prices. Within this frame of reference, the raising of 
the rice support price by 22 %, which was much greater than the increase in the external price, gave 
this crop a clear advantage over most crop-farming products. As a result, production soared, but the 
rice could not be placed on external markets, partly because of the enormous difference between the 
external price and the support price. The Agricultural Marketing Institute (1DEMA) had to use large 
amounts of funds to buy up the surplus, and stocks grew considerably. This situation began to change 
in early 1983. The over-production of rice and the difficulty of marketing it were a clear indication to 
producers that the policy could not be continued for long. Planting consequently dropped and rice 
production fell 12%. At the same time, various aspects of cotton cultivation improved. The price set 
by the Government in 1983 for domestic sales was higher than the international price; the external 
price improved, and there was a recovery of productivity in a number of areas. The external prices of 
most export crops also rose during the second half of the year. As a result of these changes, cotton 
production recovered during the second half of the year and the output of soya and African palm 
increased substantially, thereby setting the stage for a reversal of 1982 trends. It should be noted, 
however, that many of the problems caused by massive crop shifts could have been avoided with a 
more orderly and well-timed pricing policy. 
Table 4 
COLOMBIA: INDICATORS OF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION 
Index of agricultural 
production (1970 = 100) 
Crop farming 
Stock-raising 
Production of main crops' 
















Refined cane sugarc 





Source: ECLAC, on the basis of data supplied by the Ministry of Agriculture, the Banco de la República and the National Coffee-Growers 
Federation. 
"Preliminary figures. Agricultural year. 'Calendar year. Production of oil pulp 





























































































































































































































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of data supplied by the Banco de la República. 
"Dollars per pound. Corresponds to the prevailing price on the New York commodities exchange for the "other milds" variety, plus 
US$ 0.02. 'Dollars per 70 kg bag of raw coffee. 'Pesos per 125 kg load of parchment coffee. ''Per 70 kg bag 
exported. 'Percentages. •'Tax on the value in foreign currency of the coffee export repayment price. 
Nonetheless, the 1983 drop in cereal production did not have any major effect on supply, since 
it was more than offset by the drawing down of the stocks accumulated in 1982. 
Trends in the production of staple foods were uneven. While bean output climbed 12% and 
potato production rose slightly, yuca production fell by over 22%. 
The coffee production situation has also affected overall agricultural performance. The increase 
in external coffee prices which began in 1975 as a result of the frosts at that time in Brazil pushed 
domestic prices up 80% between 1975 and 1978. This rise stimulated production, which increased at 
an average annual rate of 12 % between 1976 and 1981. Some of the increased output could not be sold 
on international markets, and Colombian coffee stocks climbed from 2 million to 10 million bags 
between 1976 and 1983. World coffee stocks rose from 27 million to 46 million bags during the same 
period. In response to this situation, domestic prices began to be lowered in 1978 and various sorts of 
administrative measures were taken to curb planting (see table 5). Nonetheless, the results of this 
policy have been slow in coming (which is only natural, given the long interval which elapses between 
coffee planting and harvesting) as well as erratic. Production dropped 1% in 1982 but rose sharply 
(12.5%) in 1983. That increase, which went against all predictions, accounts for nearly one 
percentage point of the agricultural sector's growth rate. Its main effect, however, was a further 
increase in coffee stocks. 
Thus, it is clear that the increase in crop-farming output over the previous year was not due to 
fundamental changes in structural factors affecting the sector's growth, but primarily to the rapid 
expansion of coffee production (which, for the reason given above, will probably not continue for 
long) and to the resolution of serious temporary difficulties which had affected cotton-growing. 
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In 1983 the Government attempted to boost crop-farming production in various ways. Firstly, 
it promoted a significant expansion of credit: the financing provided by the Agricultural Finance 
Fund, for example, rose 37%. It also extended preferential treatment with respect to exchange 
dealings to crop-farming activities. The export subsidy for these products, which had been under 10% 
before and which had been lower than the percentage received by industrial products, was in most 
cases set at the ceiling of 20%. 
ii) Industry. After having grown at an average rate of 7% during the first part of the 1970s, 
industrial production steadily declined from 1979 on. After increasing by only 1.2% in 1980, it fell by 
around 3% in both 1981 and 1982 and dropped a further 1% in 1983 (see table 6). As already stated, 
however, this downturn seems to have been reversed in mid-1983. 
The decline in industrial production was brought on by a contraction in demand. The initial 
cause of this contraction, which first became evident in 1980 and which deepened in following years, 
was the drop in exports. Another even more important cause was the policy of relaxing restrictions 
on the external sector. The reduction of tariffs, the drop in the real exchange rate and the elimination 
Table 6 









Leather and leather products 
Footwear 
Wooden furniture 
Printings, publishing and related activities 








Other petroleum and coal products 
Rubber products 
Plastic products 
Glass and glass products 
Other non-metallic mineral products 
Basic iron and steel industries 
Basic non-ferrous metals industries 
Capital goods 
Metal products, except machinery 
Machinery, except electrical appliances 
Electrical machinery and appliances 
Transport equipment and material 




































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of data supplied by the National Bureau of Statistics (DANE). 




COLOMBIA: CONSTRUCTION PERMITS APPROVED 
Thousands of square meters Growth rates 
1979 1980 1981 1982 1983" 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983" 
Total area 











46 other cities 
Total area of new housing 











































































































































































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of data supplied by the National Bureau of Statistics (DANE). 
"Preliminary figures, January-October 1983. Growth rate for January-October 1983 with respect to the same period of 1982. 
'includes permits approved in the metropolitan area of Yumbo. 'Includes permits approved in the metropolitan areas of Bello, 
Envigado and Itagüí. 
of quantitative restrictions led to a substantial increase in imports. At the same time, some of these 
measures, together with some errors in the domestic pricing policy, led to a very big increase in 
contraband trade. Thus, a portion of domestic manufacturing production was gradually replaced by 
imports. Subsequently, multiplier phenomena which exacerbated the problem began to appear. The 
drop in industrial production lowered the growth rate of the gross domestic product and this, in turn, 
resulted in a drop in aggregate demand which primarily affected industrial activity. 
The available figures appear to indicate that the decline affecting industry was halted during the 
first half of 1983 and that there was some recovery during the second half of the year. This turnaround 
was clearly associated with the economic policy applied, since the Government made a number of 
drastic changes in external sector policy from mid-1982 onwards. As well as raising the tariffs on 
most industrial products, it made sharp cuts in the number of goods subject to the free importation 
system and applied a policy of strict controls on contraband. Moreover, the exchange rate has been 
rising faster than the difference between domestic and external inflation, and the dollar on the 
parallel market was much higher than the official dollar exchange rate. All of this helped to reduce 
legal and illegal imports and to expand the domestic market for national industry. The increase in the 
demand for nationally produced goods which took place as a result of the drop in imports stimulated 
an expansion of industrial production, especially of consumer goods and raw materials, which are the 
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imports that can be most easily substituted by domestic production. Even so, the response of 
industrial production to the increased demand was not entirely satisfactory: the decrease in imports in 
1983 amounted to over 30% of total industrial production, but the latter showed no increase over the 
preceding year. 
Another factor which had a clear effect on industry was interest rates, which have stayed at 
excessively high levels for several years and which have ended up by undermining the financial 
structure of enterprises. The biggest industrial companies' balance sheets show a general decline in 
profits, and several of them are running at a loss. 
One factor which helped to aggravate this situation was the exchange policy that began to be 
applied in 1982. In the past, some manufacturing companies had been able to sidestep high domestic 
interest rates by borrowing abroad at a much lower financial cost. This possibility ceased in 1983, 
however, when the policy was adopted of raising the nominal exchange rate several points above the 
rate of inflation. This has given rise to an industrial cost structure which product prices are unlikely to 
be able to absorb. 
iii) Construction. The value added in construction rose 3% in 1983. This increase was^ 
substantially less than in previous years, and had a different origin. Between 1980 and 1982, the 
growth in the sector's activity was due to the increase in public investment, which more than made up 
for the decline in housing construction. In 1983, however, expansion was due to a very significant 
increase in housing construction, which grew by 34% (judging from the permits approved in the 
country's ten main cities), thereby cancelling out the effects of lower public investment (see table 7). 
The considerable expansion in housing construction was the result of a deliberate government 
policy aimed at reducing the housing deficit and stimulating recovery in the economy in general. The 
main mechanism used for this purpose was the housing savings system, which received preferential 
tax and interest rate treatment as from the beginning of the year. As a result, deposits in the system 
rose 43% in 1983, thereby even exceeding the demand of those seeking credit. Indeed, financial 
intermediaries had great difficulty at the beginning in mobilizing the resources, and their loans 
increased only 35%. 
The government initiative of offering a no-down-payment housing programme through the 
Institute of Real Estate Credit (ICT) was equally significant. In 1983 the Institute began the 
construction of 100 000 basic housing units, which was much more than in previous years. The 
programme's continuance is threatened, however, but the lack of a suitable financing system; the 
deficit of the ICT has grown considerably and has primarily been financed by delaying payments to 
contractors. Although the Government has made major adjustments in order to provide the ICT with 
more resources, it is unlikely that this will be enough to maintain the dynamism exhibited by the 
housing programme in 1983. 
Table 8 



























































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of data supplied by the Ministry of Mining and energy and the Banco de la República. 
"Preliminary figures. Thousands of dollars at 1970 prices. c Millions of 42-gallon barrels. 




COLOMBIA: PETROLEUM INDUSTRY INDICATORS 
Productions 
Extraction of crude oil 
Output of petroleum 
products 
External trade 
Imports of crude oil 
Imports of petroleum 
products 
Exports of petroleum 
products 
Imports of crude oil 
Imports of petroleum 
products 













1981 1982 1983° 


































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of data supplied by the Banco de la República and the Ministry of Mining and Energy. 
"Preliminary figures. 
The expansion in construction has not had all the reverberations that had been expected. Thus, 
as may be seen from table 6, the industrial sectors which produce building materials showed no 
growth in relation to the preceding year; glass production dropped 3.5%, the output of other non-
metallic mineral products fell nearly 3% and that of the lumber industry decreased almost 4%. 
iv) Mining. In 1983 the mining sector continued to be the fastest growing economic activity. Its 
added value climbed nearly 10%, which was far more than during the two previous years (see table 8). 
This expansion took place even though the mining of iron ore rose less than 1 % and the production 
of gold, silver and platinum continued to decrease, largely because of the decline in the international 
prices for these products in recent years. 
Consequently, the increase in mining activity is primarily accounted for by the growth in the 
output of oil, natural gas and coal. After steadily declining during the 1970s, crude oil production has 
been climbing systematically since 1980. Its mean annual growth between 1980 and 1983 was 
approximately 4% (see table 9). Nonetheless, the decrease in external prices has slowed the rapid 
growth it showed early in the decade. Exploration, especially for new deposits, has diminished in 
recent years, and there has also been a reduction in partnership contracts. On the other hand, the 
Colombian Petroleum Company (ECOPETROL) has invested heavily in increasing existing deposits by 
means of secondary recovery procedures. This effort has been aimed at making full use of the present 
sources rather than creating new ones; this will make it possible to maintain the expansion of 
production for several more years, but not over the long term. 
Fuel consumption rose 2.5% in relation to the preceding year. This figure, which is very low in 
comparison to past statistics, was a clear reflection of the recession. 
Fundamental changes were made in the production structure of petroleum products in 1983. 
Crude oil imports were increased very sharply (93%) so that existing refining capacity might be fully 
used; partially as a result of this, the output of petroleum products rose nearly 10%. In turn, this 
increase allowed gasoline imports to be reduced and exports to be increased, thereby significantly 
improving the oil balance, whose deficit was lowered from nearly US$ 380 million in 1982 to less 
than US$ 250 million in 1983 (see table 9). 
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Natural gas production was 8% greater than in the preceding year. Most of this increase was 
taken up by thermoelectric plants and by the increase in household consumption, which has been 
encouraged by the domestic fuel pricing policy. 
c) Employment 
Predictably, the slowing down of production activity affected employment. The unemployment 
rate had already climbed in 1982, and it shot up much faster in 1983, rising in the country's four major 
cities from 9 % in December 1982 to 12.7% in December 1983 (see table 10). 
The increase in unemployment, which was observed in all cities for which data are available, 
was especially marked in Bogotá, the city with the lowest unemployment levels in recent years. 
Medellin, however, continued to be the urban centre with the highest rate of unemployment. 
The process by which the unemployment rate has reached its highest level since 1974 has 
developed over a long time. The labour force has recently been growing at an annual rate of over 3 %, 
which is far above the average rate of increase in the value added during recent years. This imbalance 
between the labour supply and demand had not been reflected in unemployment figures, however, 
due to institutional restrictions preventing the dismissal of workers. Because dismissal procedures 
have recently been made more flexible, however, everything seems to indicate that the effects of the 
imbalances which had built up over a number of years are now being felt within a short span of time. 
This situation might be alleviated to some degree by taking special steps to stimulate some sectors, 
such as construction, which are in a position to absorb manpower rapidly. Basically, however, a real 
solution can only be found if overall growth rates are high, and this is no easy task for an economy 
exhibiting serious weaknesses in some of its main productive activities as well as in the external 
sector. 
Table 10 




























































































































































































COLOMBIA: MAIN FOREIGN TRADE INDICATORS 
(Growth rates) 
























Terms of trade (goods) 
Terms of trade (goods and services) 
Purchasing power of exports of 



























































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of officiai figures. 
"Preliminary figures. 
3. The external sector 
a) Merchandise trade 
The merchandise trade balance has been negative since 1980, and the deficit has reached high 
levels during the past three years. In 1983, however, the deficit of US$ 1.6 billion was a good deal 
lower than the US$ 2.4 billion deficit in 1982. This decrease was due entirely to the sharp reduction in 
imports, which went down by 22% as a result of the highly restrictive policy applied. 
i) Exports. Exports have tended to flag since 1981, and this process was even more marked in 
1983, when their value fell by 15% (see table 11). 
The performance of the various export products was far from uniform. There was a moderate 
decrease in agricultural exports, while mining exports nearly doubled but industrial exports fell 
sharply (see table 12). 
The downward trend in exports has been no accident: it has coincided with the world recession. 
Colombian exports are concentrated in a number of markets, especially Latin American ones, which 
cannot be easily replaced and which have dropped off considerably in recent years. • 
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In 1983, exchange policy was handled in a way which was intended to reverse the downward 
trend in exports. To this end, a policy was applied of raising the nominal exchange rate faster than 
both past and expected inflation. In addition, export subsidies were increased substantially; after 
having been maintained at around 10% in previous years, they rose to nearly 20%. Nevertheless, this 
policy has had very modest results: as already noted, exports fell sharply in 1983, and there were no 
signs of any appreciable recovery for 1984. 
The exchange policy's relative lack of effectiveness is clearly related to the nature of the world 
economy. The actions taken in many countries to revive and reorient their economies have clearly had 
a protectionist slant and have consisted of expanding production for the domestic market by reducing 
imports. Thus, the only means which many countries of Latin America have found of dealing with the 
obligations stemming from their excessive external borrowing has been to cut back imports, which 
were reduced by around 45% between 1981 and 1983. Colombia has not been able to escape the 
consequences of these policies, and the exchange adjustments have in fact not been enough to offset 
the quantitative measures taken by some countries to limit imports. Thus, the devaluation of the peso 
was by no means able to offset the effects of the devaluation and the establishment of preferential 
exchange rates in Venezuela and Ecuador, which had a very negative effect on Colombian exports. 
The difference between the trends in exports of manufactures and agricultural products tends to 
corroborate this statement. Because agricultural products are homogeneous and are less heavily 
Table 12 
COLOMBIA: EXPORTS OF GOODS, FOB" 
Total 
















Leather and footwear 
Metal products, 
















































































































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of data supplied by the Colombian Foreign Trade Institute (INCOMEX). 






































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of data supplied by the International Monetary Fond 
"This corresponds to the average of the indexes of the real exchange rates for the peso with res pea to the currency of main trading partner 
countries, weighted according to the relative importance of exports to those countries or imports from them. For information regarding the 
methodology and sources used for the calculations, see the technical appendix in the Economic Survey of Latin America, 1981. 
concentrated in Latin America, they can be shifted more easily to other markets, whereas 
manufactures are more limited in this respect. It is not easy, for example, to shift exports of boilers 
and home appliances, which have traditionally been sold in Latin America, to the markets of Europe 
and the United States. The shrinkage of the Latin American market has therefore almost inevitably 
affected the external sales of these products. 
The evolution of the exchange rate over the past eight years is shown in table 13. The real 
exchange rate began to drop as from 1975, with a slight recovery in 1983. These figures do not include 
export subsidies, however, which have played a very important role in the Colombian economy. If 
these subsidies, which decreased in 1975 and then moved back up in the second half of 1982, are taken 
into account then the pattern appears to be less irregular, and the difference between the current 
exchange rate and that of 1975 would be less. In that case, the improvement in the exchange rate 
might be said to have begun in mid-1982, and its recovery would be much greater than what is shown 
in the table. In sum, the real exchange rate would not be more than 20% below that of 1975, and the 
upturn over the past year and a half would be of the order of 15%. 
ii) Imports. Variations in the value of imports have traditionally been very closely linked to 
trends in the gross domestic product; this has not been the case, however, in recent years, when sharp 
fluctuations have been recorded. Thus, during the period 1979-1982 imports grew much more rapidly 
than the gross domestic product, and in 1980 their value rose by nearly 44%. As from mid-1982, 
however, they began to decrease and in 1983 their value fell by 22%. 
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These changes have not been chance events. Indeed, both were brought about by deliberate 
economic policy moves. Thus, in the 1978-1982 period, the real exchange rate was reduced, tariffs 
were lowered and the number of products whose importation was prohibited was decreased. The 
resulting drop in the relative prices of trade goods encouraged the purchase of these products abroad 
and helped to displace the purchase of national products. Imports therefore shot up while the output 
of some nationally-produced goods which had previously enjoyed greater protection decreased 
considerably. As already mentioned, the decline in industrial activity which began in 1980 is primarily 
accounted for by this factor. The harmful effects of this policy led to its modifications as from 1982. 
Since then, tariffs have been raised, the exchange rate has been raised faster than inflation and, even 
more significantly, the list of prohibited imports has been greatly expanded. Between 1982 and 1983, 
the percentage of imports subject to the prior licensing system rose from 38% to 53%. 
At the outset, the import restriction policy was intended to bring about reactivation, and this 
was the means used to attempt to reorient the demand which had previously shifted to the exterior 
towards domestic production. Broadly, these measures were intended to restrict imports of consumer 
goods first, then those of raw materials, and only lastly thoseofcapitalgoods. Their effects began to 
be felt from the second half of 1983 onwards and, as shown in table 14, consumer goods and especially 
durable consumer goods were the imports which fell most. 
The aims of import controls changed as the international reserves progressively sank. Thus, the 
restrictions have gradually been extended to include imports of capital goods and of some raw 
materials for which local substitutes cannot readily be found. The recessionary effects of these 
measures have not yet been felt because of the excess installed capacity which exists and the 
availability of stocks, but it is to be expected that this situation will act as a serious limitation with 
respect to future reactivation efforts. 
b) The balance of payments 
The effects of the reduction in exports were more than offset by the drop in imports. As a result, 
the merchandise trade deficit fell from US$ 2.4 billion in 1982 to US$ 1.6 billion in 1983 (see 
table 15). The negative balance on merchandise trade was compounded by the effect of interest 
payments, which were over US$ 600 million more than income under the same heading. The deficit 
on current account thus reached US$ 2.15 billion; although this is less than the deficit for 1982, it is 
still excessive. 
Table 14 































































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of data supplied by the Colombian Foreign Trade Institute (INCOMEX). 
"The data are based on import records and therefore differ from the balance-of-payments figures. 
Preliminary figures. "Includes small lots of unclassified imports. 
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Table 15 
COLOMBIA: BALANCE OF PAYMENTS 
COLOMBIA 
(Millions of dollars) 
Balance on current account 
Trade balance 
Exports of goods and services 
Goods FOB 
Real services 
Transport and insurance 
Travel 
Imports of goods and services 
Goods FOB 
Real services 






Labour and ownership 
Unrequited private transfer payments 
Balance on capital account 
Unrequited official transfer payments 
Long-term capital 
Direct investment (net) 
Portfolio investment (net) 














Errors and omissions (net) 
Global balance'' 
Total variation in reserves 
(- sign indicates an increase) 
Monetary gold 
Special Drawing Rights 
IMF reserve position 
Foreign exchange assets 
Other assets 






























































































































































































































































































































Source: 1977-1982: International Monetary Fund, Balance of Payments Yearbook, April de 1984; 1983: ECLAC, on the basis of official data. 
"Preliminary figures. *Real services also include other official and private transactions, but not factor services. cIn addition to 
loans received and amortization payments made, this entry includes net loans granted and other assets and liabilities. The global 
balance is the sum of the current account balance plus the balance on capital account. The difference between total variation in reserves (of 
opposite sign) and the global balance represents counterpart items: monetizationofgold, allocatbnof Special Drawing Rights, and variât ions 
due to revaluation 
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Net external financing covered only a minimal part of the deficit on current account. Capital 
income fell sharply and was not even enough to offset the disbursements represented by amortization 
and interest payments. The country was thus exporting resources precisely at the time when it was 
suffering from one of the worst trade imbalances in recent years. Given these circumstances, the 
current account deficit was mainly financed from the international reserves, which went down by 
US$ 1.8 billion. This meant that, in 1983 alone, the country lost one-third of the international assets 
it had accumulated between 1975 and 1981. This brought the reserves down to US$3.1 billion by the 
end of 1983. 
c) The external debt 
Generally speaking, Colombia has followed a moderate policy with respect to external 
borrowing. As shown in table 16, the balance of the disbursed debt rose only very slightly between 
1975 and 1978. This trend began to change in 1979, when the debt started to rise rapidly; as a result, 
the balance of the debt more than doubled between 1978 and 1982. For its part, the ratio between debt 
service and exports of goods and services, which had remained moderate —under 20%—until 1980, 
started to move up quickly as from 1981 until, by 1983, it was around 35%. In view of the fact that 
amortization payments have continued to rise, this coefficient may also continue to increase. 
Despite its considerable increase in recent years, external indebtedness is still within what 
would be considered manageable bounds under normal circumstances. The outlook for the world 
capital market, however, appears to complicate the situation for Colombia. In 1983, following a major 
borrowing effort on world markets, barely US$ 275 million was contracted with private banks. The 
international banking system has given clear priority to the largest countries of the region, which are 
also the most heavily-indebted countries and could place the world financial system in a difficult 
situation. Consequently, much of the cost of the adjustment appears to fall on the countries which 
followed prudent borrowing policies. In Colombia, this is compounded by the fact that the adjustment 
process has been carried out very slowly, partly because the authorities put their faith in the 
comfortable reserve position they had enjoyed until 1981. In 1983, however, the situation was quite 
different: Colombia had the largest trade deficit in the region, yet the rise in its real exchange rate was 
the most moderate. As a result, the Colombian peso has been revalued in recent years in relation to 
the average level of currencies in Latin America. 
Table 16 
COLOMBIA: INDICATORS OF EXTERNAL INDEBTEDNESS 
(Millions of dollars) 
Debt disbursed (at year-end) 
Public 
Private 
Servicing of debt 
Payments of principal 
Public debt 
Private debt 




Servicing of debt/exports of 













































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of data supplied by the Banco de la República. 
"Preliminary figures. Includes: i) debts registered in the Banco de la República, ¡i) external liabilities of goods and financial 




COLOMBIA: EVOLUTION OF DOMESTIC PRICES 
(Percentages) 
Consumer price index" 
Total for manual workers 
Food 
Total for non-manual workers 
Food 









Consumer price index" 
Total for manual workers 
Food 
Total for non-manual workers 
1976 1977 1978 
























































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of data supplied by the National Bureau of Statistics (DANE) and the Banco de la República. 
"National average. 
4. Prices and wages 
a) Prices 
Inflation has slowed since 1982. After having fluctuated around 26% between 1976 and 1981, 
the rate of variation in the consumer price index dropped to 24% in 1982 and to less than 17% in 
1983. The wholesale price index has followed a similar pattern, although with a time lag which has 
shortened in recent years; in 1982 it rose nearly 25% and in 1983 it climbed by somewhat more than 
18% (see table 17). 
Relative prices changed considerably in the 1980-1982 period. While the growth rate of 
industrial prices fell from 30% to 20%, the rate for agricultural prices increased from 21% to 32%. 
The stability of the inflation rate during this time therefore stemmed from the fact that the changes 
in some prices were offset by opposite changes in others. The drop in inflation only became 
appreciable in 1983, when the growth rates of agricultural and manufacturing prices tended to 
converge. During that year, the upward trend in the rate of increase of agricultural prices was greatly 
diminished and that of industrial prices also fell somewhat. The pattern followed by the latter has 
been very closely linked to the decline in effective demand which began in mid-1979. The drop in the 
rate of production and sales which was initially observed later prompted entrepreneurs to accept a 
reduction of prices in relation to costs. The faster increase in the prices of agricultural products 
stemmed from supply problems caused by the slackening of agricultural production in recent years. 
The change in this trend seen in 1983 was not, however, due to the restoration of normal production 
conditions. What apparently happened was that the effects of supply shortages were neutralized by 
the drop in the demand for foodstuffs due to the decrease in national income. The reduction in the 
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inflation rate is thus accounted for by the industrial slump which has been occurring for some time 
and by the decrease in the demand for foodstuffs brought about by the recession. 
b) Wages and salaries 
In 1983, wages in industry rose 26%, while in commerce they increased 19%. Nominal 
industrial wages have followed a steady pattern: the drop in their growth rate in 1983 was only slight 
and was much less than the decline in inflation. As a result, real wages increased 5 % during the year, 
so that they have risen by an average of 3% per year in the 1981-1983 period (see table 18). 
Although nominal wage increases may seem reasonable when they are deflated on the basis of 
the consumer price index, they appear to be excessive if they are compared with industrial prices, 
whose evolution has been well below the average. In terms of prices in that same sector, industrial 
wages have increased at an average rate of 7% in recent years, and this has been one of the main 
reasons for the large companies' declining profits. 
The pattern followed by daily wages in agriculture and wages in the commercial sector has been 
more erratic. After dropping in real terms during the 1980-1982 period, the former increased in 1983. 
In contrast, the latter climbed nearly 5% in 1982 but dropped slightly in 1983 (see tables 18 and 19). 
Wage trends reflect a series of general patterns which have been observed repeatedly for 
several years. First of all, industrial wages are much more rigid than others and adapt to changes in 
inflation more slowly. These wages are not determined by the market as much as other 
remunerations and are therefore more sensitive to economic policy. 
The Government has had some influence in determining wage levels by virtue of the minimum 
wage and the wages paid in the public sector. The breadth of impact and effectiveness of such 
measures, however, vary according to the characteristics of each sector. Traditionally, the minimum 
wage has been closely linked to industrial wages, has had a more distant relation with wages in 
commerce, and has had practically no link with agricultural day-wages. Thus, variations in the 
minimum wage have been similar to those in industrial wages, not very different from those in the 
commercial sector, and have had no relation whatever to daily wages in the agricultural sector (see 
table 20). This asymmetric pattern is not always taken into account, however, when the minimum 
wage is set; it is often assumed that it influences all wages equally. 
The lack of co-ordination between adjustments in the minimum wage and inflation has pushed 
up real wages in industry, thereby lowering companies' profits. Moreover, a considerable imbalance 
has arisen between those wages which can be regulated and those which cannot. Industrial wages 
have risen much more than wages in rural areas and in the commercial sector, thus distorting the 
Table 18 
COLOMBIA: EVOLUTION OF WAGES AND SALARIES 





























































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of data supplied by the National Bureau of Statistics (DANE). 
a Preliminary figures. Deflated by the consumer price index for non-manual workers. 
manual workers. 




COLOMBIA: AVERAGE DAILY* WAGES IN AGRICULTURE AND STOCK-RAISING 
Pesos Real growth rates" 
Cold (upland) areas 
With food 
Without food 
Hot (lowland) areas 
With food 
Without food 
Cold (upland) areas 
With food 
Without food 































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of data supplied by the National Bureau of Statistics (DANE). 
"Deflated by the consumer price index for manual workers. 
Table 20 

























































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of data supplied by the Banco de la República and the National Bureau of Statistics (DANE). 
"Deflated by the consumer price index for manual workers. Crop-farming, stock-raising, forestry, hunting and fishing. 
'Remaining economic activities. ''in the departmental capital cities and adjacent municipalities. 
'In the remaining municipalities. 
overall operation of the economy. The high industrial wages impede normal operations and provide a 
strong incentive for companies in that sector to use a variety of labour-substituting procedures. 
Furthermore, the relative improvement in urban income encourages people to move to the cities and 
runs counter to the trend which should result from the migration of the labour force from rural areas 
to urban centres. Thus, since the rise in industrial wages has decreased the demand for manpower 
while increasing the supply, it has had a negative effect on the urban employment picture. Its effects 
have also been compounded by the unemployment stemming from the sharp drop in production. 
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5. Monetary and fiscal policy 
a) Monetary policy 
The means of payment grew by over 25% in 1983 in comparison to the preceding year. This 
was the result of a 13.5% increase in the monetary base and a rise of nearly 11% in the bank 
multiplier (see tables 21 and 22). 
The issue of money in various forms to finance the national budget was the main source of the 
expansion in the monetary base. Firstly, the Central Bank granted direct credits to the national 
government. Thus, as may be seen in table 22, credit extended to the Treasury rose by US$ 47 billion. 
The remainder was accounted for by the international reserves, because the fiscal deficit has in large 
part been financed with the artificial income derived from the increased valuation of the international 
reserves. By this means, 55 billion pesos were issued. The input from external credit, on the other 
hand, was very limited. All in all, the Government made a very substantial contribution (44%) to the 
increase in the monetary base. 
Rediscounting was another important factor in monetary expansion and represented a 
considerable change in the way monetary affairs had been handled in recent years. Since 1975 a great 
effort had been made to reduce the Central Bank's direct financing of the private sector as much as 
possible; during the past year and a half, in contrast, ample use has been made of this mechanism to 
ease the situation of companies experiencing difficulties due to the recession. Special lines of credit 
have been created to finance the acquisition of financial institutions, to help some sectors suffering 
from specific problems, and to undertake a series of activities whose purposes have not been clearly 
outlined. It is estimated that over 40 special lines of credit were authorized in 1983. These measures 
reduced the monetary authority's discretionary powers for regulating the amount of credit, inasmuch 
as the opening of a line of credit furnished other groups with a powerful argument for requesting 
similar treatment and exerting pressure to that end. Perhaps the only thing which averted an even 
bigger imbalance was the recession, which dampened the demand by companies. Consequently, bank 
credit expanded by 23 billion pesos, which was significantly less than the amount authorized by the 
Monetary Board. 
Development agencies did not act with a great deal of discipline either. Their disbursements 
rose by 27 billion pesos while the amount they took in rose by only 14 billion pesos, the difference 
being covered by Central Bank issues. The main cause of the imbalance was the Agricultural Finance 
Fund: the Government implemented an ambitious policy for expanding agricultural credit in order to 
help the sector recover, and this gave rise to a 37% increase in credit, which was far in excess of the 
Table 21 
COLOMBIA: EVOLUTION OF THE MAIN MONETARY AGGREGATES 
Means of payment (M^ 
Currency 
Current account deposits 
Quasi-money (M2) 
Deposits in housing 
corporations 
Savings deposits 
Time deposits certificates 
Extended money supply 
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COLOMBIA: ORIGIN OF THE MONETARY BASE 
Monetary base 













Other net assets 
Non-monetary liabilities of 
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circulation 
Bank multiplier 








































































































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of data supplied by the Banco de la República. 
"Preliminary figures. 
possibilities for attracting deposits. Another factor in the imbalance was the construction sector's 
housing saving system. The low rate of return on such deposits spurred a large amount of 
withdrawals late in the year, which had to be covered by loans from the Banco de la República. 
The policy for open market transactions was also highly expansionary. As shown in table 23, 
Banco de la República bonds decreased by a total of 36 billion pesos. This was partially offset by its 
private sector liabilities, which for the most part corresponded to the increase in deposits made in 
order to obtain exchange permits for transfers out of the country. The net expansion under these two 
headings amounted to 16 billion pesos. 
The compulsory bank reserve policy also served the purpose of expanding credit to the private 
sector, since the 100% marginal legal reserve which had been required for several years was 
eliminated in early 1983, and the average cash reserve has been gradually declining. 
The expansion in credit to the private sector was accounted for by the development agencies 
deficit, the opening of new lines of credit, the reduction in open market transactions and the drop in 
bank cash reserves. The first three factors accounted for 27% of the expansion in the monetary base, 
while the last-named was responsible for an 11% increase in the multiplier. 
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The expansion of domestic credit was partially offset by the external sector deficit, which 
prevented a greater increase in the monetary base. 
The most negative aspect of this situation was the lack of co-ordination between interest rate 
and exchange rate policies. Bank loans rose 18% in real terms. One of the primary objectives of this 
policy of expanding financial resources was to lower interest rates, but the exchange policy seriously 
interfered with this, for in effect it provided for what was virtually a pre-announced devaluation of 
28% per year which, combined with international inflation, results in an external interest rate of 
nearly 40%. Under such circumstances, the expansion of financial resources had no major effect on 
domestic interest rates, whereas it did stimulate the outflow of capital. The extent of this 
phenomenon cannot be accurately estimated because of the widespread illegal transfers which took 
place, but judging from the situation with respect to minor and services exports and the parallel 
exchange rate for the dollar, this outflow probably accounted for a large percentage of the decrease in 
the international reserves. 
These sources of expansion did not act in isolation. Domestic credit did not expand due to the 
fact that early action was taken to offset the slowdown in the external sector. Domestic credit, 
budgetary credit and the external sector deficit are normally closely related, but they became even 
more so due to the lack of co-ordination between the policy concerning domestic interest rates and the 
devaluation. The greater profitability of external transactions clearly encouraged the use of resources 
for acquiring foreign exchange and paying the external debt. The expansion in domestic credit 
exacerbated the external imbalance, which in turn increased the fiscal deficit that was necessary in 
order to neutralize the dampening effect which this imbalance had on aggregate demand; and this, in 
its turn, resulted in greater public spending, more imports and a larger drop in reserves. Thus, a large 
part of the monetary policy's negative effects involved the country's international reserves. 
The interaction of these effects resulted in a 25 % increase in the means of payment, which was 
similar to the figure for 1982 and the average in recent years. Although it is higher than the increase 
Table 23 
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Source: ECLAC, on the basis of data supplied by the Banco de la República. 




COLOMBIA: BANKS INTEREST RATES" 
1980 1981 1982 1983 
Effective nominal rate 36.4 38.6 35.9 34.2 
Inflation rate 26.5 26.7 23.9 16.7 
Effective real rate 7.8 9.4 9.7 15.0 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of data supplied by the Banco de la República. 
"Corresponding to time deposit certificates. 
in nominal income as of the end of 1982, generally speaking this percentage is acceptable. The 
amount of installed capacity that is being used, prevailing expectations and the conditions created by 
the recession make it possible to absorb a larger expansion in demand than the average in recent 
years. In this sense, the monetary policy followed during the past two years is compatible, in the short 
term, with inflation of under 20%. These conditions may of course change as past levels of activity are 
regained. In that event, a policy of greater austerity would be needed in order to bring about a 
systematic reduction in the rate of inflation. 
The lack of co-ordination between domestic credit and exchange policies was reflected less in 
the year-end monetary aggregates than in the trends they followed during the course of the year. The 
attempt to compensate for the decline in reserves by expanding domestic credit led to a series of 
adjustments which magnified the phenomenon that the authorities were trying to counteract. The 
efforts in this direction initially proved to be fruitless, and the means of payment decreased during the 
first few months of the year. The contraction caused by the drop in reserves was actually not reversed 
until the last two months of the year. This irregular pattern in the money supply introduced untoward 
elements into the functioning of the economy. The sharp decline which occurred early in the year 
exacerbated recessionary trends, and the big expansion seen late in the year is likely to create other 
types of problems at the outset of 1984. 
Interest rates have been one of the most complex aspects of economic management. The 
process of relaxing financial regulations which was begun in 1973 reached its culmination, in practice, 
in 1980, when intermediaries were authorized to establish interest rates on time deposits without 
restriction. The importance of this step lay in the fact that this rate had traditionally been one of the 
main points of reference used by the intermediaries in order to set the interest rates for loans. The 
elimination of restrictions on the former gave the banks virtually total discretionary powers in setting 
the latter, and since that time the interest rates on deposits have been excessively high. Table 24 
indicates that they have fluctuated between 8% and 15% in real terms, and other less refined 
information suggests that the rate on loans is over five percentage points higher. 
The high interest rates prompted a rapid expansion in transferable savings, which have 
increased much faster than inflation and nominal income (see table 23). Economic agents have 
shifted their stress from securities and direct investments in companies to financial paper, making 
corporate financial structure increasingly dependent on bank credit. 
Up until 1982, the growth of transferable savings was accounted for by the securities of the 
banking system and those issued by the Banco de la República in order to make transactions on the 
open market. This changed in 1983, when the Government reduced the interest rate on stock 
certificates and began to offer high-yield public debt bonds. The main source of expansion in 
transferable savings thus became public debt bonds. 
b) Fiscal policy 
The economy has shown a growing fiscal deficit since 1980. The action taken by the monetary 
authorities to eliminate this by reducing domestic credit speeded up the rise in interest rates and 
posed companies with serious problems of liquidity. In this sense, the fiscal deficit acted as a 
recessionary factor and has definitely contributed to the decline in economic activity during the past 
three years. 
205 
In late 1982 the Government approved a fiscal reform which was then revised and adjusted by 
the Congress in 1983; as a whole, it was presented as a means of expanding the tax base. The 
adjustments made were designed to help incorporate people into the tax system who had been 
operating outside of it, to create and strengthen systems for estimating income in order to prevent tax 
evasion, and to reduce tax rates as a means of encouraging people to fulfil their tax obligations. 
As a first step, an amnesty covering assets was declared and it was provided that individuals 
who brought their tax payments up to date would be exempt from audits of their previous statements. 
At the same time, mechanisms for estimating income which had been introduced as part of the 1974 
reform and whose effectiveness had been demonstrated were extended to include other sectors. Thus, 
the tax on estimated income was extended to cover limited-liability companies, and new estimates 
were established in relation to sales of goods. Systems were also established for deducting taxes at the 
source, thus facilitating the administrative monitoring of tax evaders. The rates of the various taxes 
were also reduced, and some standardization was sought in order to avoid encouraging the creation of 
corporations and the use of substitute names. The double taxation of corporations was indeed 
eliminated in part, and the tax on windfall profits was corrected for inflation. Finally, the penalties for 
tax evasion were increased and the use of substitute names was made a criminal offence. 
Table 25 provides a preliminary indication of the reform's impact. It shows that income tax 
receipts rose 55 %, which was considerably greater than the growth of the gross domestic product in 
nominal terms. It is difficult at this time to ascertain exactly how much of this increase might be 
attributed to the new tax measures; however, a tentative approximation based on a review of 
historical series suggests that the reform accounted for approximately 15 billion pesos of the increase 
in receipts. This is barely 15% of the effective fiscal deficit, and is clearly a very modest result, 
Table 25 
COLOMBIA: EFFECTIVE INCOME AND EXPENDITURE 
OF THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT 
Billions of pesos Growth rates 
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External credit 5.2 16.5 19.5 14.9 9.9 
Domestic credit -11.2 -5.9 -9.5 18.8 63.0 




especially as the reform provides for a number of one-time adjustments. It remains to be seen how 
much the elasticity of tax payments has been changed. What is clear, however, is that the initial 
impact of the reform, which is usually greater in such cases, has been very limited. 
Table 25 also shows that tax receipts from external sector activities plummetted. Customs 
duties rose barely 4% in nominal terms, while exchange profits dropped in nominal terms. 
Surprisingly enough, the receipts derived from the tax reform did not offset the drop in receipts from 
the external sector. As a result, total tax revenue, which rose 9% in nominal terms, fell 7% in real 
terms. The fiscal adjustments did not even manage to counteract the cyclical trends of the external 
sector. 
Operating expenses rose 28%, and investment expenditure climbed 6%. Total expenditures 
thus rose 22 %, which is excessive in view of the fact that this percentage has been calculated on bases 
that have been greatly expanded in recent years. 
The fiscal deficit has gradually increased since 1980. For 1983, it is estimated at 100 billion 
pesos, which is equivalent to 25% of the means of payment and 4% of the gross domestic product. 
This deficit was financed in three ways. Firstly, the Banco de la República opened up special 
lines of credit worth 38 billion pesos in order to finance the treasury deficit. Secondly, the 
Government took very active steps to place 17 billion pesos in securities on the open market. Thirdly, 
the income generated through the special exchange account from the purchase and sale of foreign 
exchange amounted to 55 billion pesos.1 
The fiscal deficit is one of the most difficult aspects of economic policy to analyse, partly because 
its impact has varied as external conditions have changed. Until 1982, it was accompanied by an 
expansion in international reserves which led the monetary authorities to restrict credit to the private 
sector. It acted as a recessionary factor, in that it helped to raise interest rates and reduced long- and 
short-term financing for industry. Given this frame of reference, it was logical to design a policy for 
recovery based on a reduction of the tax imbalance. However, conditions changed drastically during 
the first half of 1982, when devaluations in Venezuela and Ecuador increased the decline in the 
international reserves. This drop could not be offset by increasing the amount of credit extended to 
the private sector because, as a result of the recessionary conditions, at that time the sector was 
reluctant to accept funds. The fiscal deficit was an essential element in compensating for the drop in 
aggregate demand caused by the external sector deficit, and in this sense it clearly played an 
expansionary role during the year. The difficulty did not lie in the fact that this deficit existed, but 
rather in the lack of co-ordination of economic policy as a whole. The stimulus created by the gap 
between interest rates on domestic and external operations accelerated the drop in international 
reserves and caused the fiscal deficit to increase more than was necessary to maintain aggregate 
demand. The short-term economic situation was dealt with in a way which involved an unnecessary 
sacrifice of long-term conditions. The 1983 fiscal deficit will affect the future pattern of expenditure, 
and the outflow of capital will lessen the manoeuvring room open to the authorities in trying to 
reactivate the economy. 
'Despite the fact that revenue under this heading is derived from a monetary issue, in table 24 it is classified as tax income. Strictly 
speaking it should be shown as part of the fiscal deificit financed with credit from the Banco de la República. Therefore, the deficit discussed in the 




1. Recent economic trends: Introduction and summary 
In a framework of widespread economic depression in Central America and amid the constraints 
imposed by a stabilization programme, the economy of Costa Rica achieved, during 1983, a slight 
improvement on the preceding year's very low level. This occurred despite the persistence of some of 
the external factors that had adversely influenced the economy, which, in addition, was faced at the 
beginning of the year with various disequilibria, especially in the financial area.1 However, the gross 
domestic product's growth rate of a little less than 1 % did not suffice to make up for the steep decline 
recorded during the two preceding years. Nor did this growth succeed in reversing the downward 
trend of the per capita product, which decreased for the fourth year in succession and thus dropped to 
a level lower than that of 1973 (see table 1 and figure 1). 
A stand-by arrangement with the International Monetary Fund had been signed at the end of 
1982.2 This agreement, which came into force during 1983, established a number of fiscal, monetary 
and exchange objectives which combined to form an economic stabilization programme. Most of 
these objectives were fulfilled and, as a general rule, economic policy developed within the constraints 
implied, except in the fields where a more favourable evolution of economic variables gave a certain 
amount of elbow-room, or in the few cases in which it was impossible to reach the goals agreed upon, 
because of the disproportionate political and social cost involved. 
If little headway was made in the area of the real economy, in 1983 some important advances 
were achieved in the reduction of certain financial disequilibria. Albeit they were not fully reflected in 
production as regards its quantitative results, they interrupted its downward trend and helped to 
establish more favourable bases for the evolution of the economy in the immediate future. 
In the first place, economic policy was highly successful in stabilizing the exchange rate. As 
from early 1981 and up to the third quarter of 1982, dollar quotations had been affected by marked 
speculative propensities in a free market whose operation was unregulated and chaotic. This led to 
successive devaluations which introduced biases and disequilibria throughout all productive activity. 
Thenceforward the monetary authorities assumed control of external operations, whereby a measure 
of rationality was infused into the management of the exchange rate, and the atmosphere of 
generalized speculation which exerted pressure upon it was mitigated. 
Secondly, and in close relation to the above, during the year there was an exceptional 
deceleration of inflationary pressure, which helped to shape a scenario more propitious to productive 
activity. The consumer price index rose by less than 11% between December 1982 and the same 
month in 1983, as against almost-82% in the corresponding period of the year before (see figure 2). 
Thirdly, a selective and more liberal wage policy was applied, which, given the marked slowing -
down of inflation, resulted in a significant recovery of real wages, especially those earned by the 
lower-income strata. Thus, the increase in the minimum wage was so substantial in real terms as even 
to offset its sharp deterioration during the two preceding years. 
Lastly, in the external sector too results were obtained that helped to curb the downward trend 
of the economy. The renegotiation of part of the external public debt to private creditors and bilateral 
sources was successfully concluded, and the delinquent interest payments which had piled up were 
liquidated. Consequently, in 1983 the economy was no longer subject to the pressures that had 
negatively influenced the balance of payments in the past, and access to external financing was 
reopened to the private sector. Similarly, a considerable inflow of external capital became available,5 
which allowed freer room for manoeuvre in the management of the balance of payments. 
'See the chapter on Costa Rica, in ECLAC, Economic Survey of Latin America, 1982, Santiago, Chile. 
2See section 5 below. 
'Of these inflows 91% was allocated basically to debt service payments. 
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Furthermore, the government made efforts to promote a rapid expansion of external sales, 
with the aim of reactivating the economy and ensuring an increasing flow of foreign exchange by 
virtue of which deferred external debt commitments could be met over the medium term. 
Perhaps the only financial field in which the objectives of the stabilization programme were not 
fully attained was the maintenance of fiscal discipline. Here political pressure, in conjunction with the 
social costs implied by the interruption of high-priority programmes, wage increases, the 
considerable rise in public debt servicing, and expenditure on security made it impossible to reduce 
the central government deficit, despite a significant tax effort. Nevertheless, thanks to the notable 
improvement in the financial situation of the rest of the public sector, its total deficit declined from a 
figure equivalent to 9% of the gross domestic product in 1982 to approximately 3% in 1983. 
Almost all the components of domestic demand, except private investment, reversed the 
downward trend they had been following. Even so, their growth was insufficient to counteract the 
Table 1 
COSTA RICA: MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS 
A. Basic economic indicators 
Gross domestic product at market prices 
(millions of 1970 dollars) 
Population (millions of inhabitants) 
Per capita gross domestic product 
(1970 dollars) 
B. Short-term economic indicators 
Gross domestic product 
Per capita gross domestic product 
Gross income 
Terms of trade (goods and services) 
Current value of exports of goods 
and services 
Current value of imports of goods 
and services 
Consumer prices 
December to December 
Variation between annual averages 
Money 
Wages and salaries' 
Unemployment rate 
Current income of government 
Total expenditure of government 
Fiscal deficit/total government 
expenditure 
Fiscal deficit/gross domestic product 
C. External sector 
Trade balance (goods and services) 
Balance on current account 
Balance on capital account 
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Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
"Provisional figures. 'Gross domestic product plus terms-of-trade effect. 'General real wage index of affiliates of Costa Rican 
Social Security Fund. JPercentages. 'As of July. 'Disbursed public external debt. 
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contractions they had suffered in the two preceding years. Moreover, the evolution of some external 
variables was unfavourable, although less so than in the past. Firstly, during most of the year 
instability in quotations for the main export products persisted, so that the terms of trade 
deteriorated still further.4 Secondly, the volume of exports of goods remained stationary, while their 
unit value was reduced for the third year running. In these circumstances, the value of external sales of 
goods and services declined by almost 4%. This situation was influenced not only by conditions in the 
traditional markets —notwithstanding the economic recovery in the United States—, but also by the 
stagnation of Central American demand and the financial constraints affecting the region's trade. 
In addition, both the very low level at which —despite its partial recovery— domestic demand 
remained, and the public sector's relatively limited financial capacity to provide incentives to the 
production apparatus, contributed to the atony of economic activity. Thus, albeit public investment 
was the most dynamic demand variable, its real amount was still 45% below the figure attained in 
1980. Moreover, in 1983 private investment again declined. This was one of the most serious 
symptoms of weakness in the production apparatus, which is projecting over the medium term and 
shows that the private sector is maintaining a listless attitude, despite the great efforts made by the 
State to reduce disequilibria and restore stability to the system, even at the cost of the social sacrifice 
which the fall in real wages has implied. 
Mainly owing to the limitations imposed by stabilization policy and by the financial straits of 
public institutions, it proved impossible to implement promotional programmes capable of 
encouraging production by way of a considerable expansion of domestic demand. 
On the supply side, the most dynamic variable consisted in external purchases of goods and 
services. Although during the first quarter their evolution was in keeping with the atony of 
production, during the second they underwent an acceleration which, although serving to absorb part 
of the inflationary pressures, once again aggravated the external imbalance; thus the deficit on the 
balance-of-payments current account jumped from under US$ 210 million in 1982 to a little over 
US$ 380 million in 1983. 
From the sectoral standpoint, depression continued in most of the productive activities. 
Outstanding features, however, were the appreciable recovery in the agricultural sector, and the 
further expansion of the energy sector, which was linked with an increase in household consumption 
and with exports of electricity to neighbouring countries. 
In consonance with all this, employment problems also continued to make themselves felt. 
Although the unemployment rate declined towards the end of the year, its annual average was still 
very high (9%). Moreover, such indicators as the decrease in the proportionof the total working-age 
population represented by employed persons and a certain stagnation of the labour force also point to 
the persistence of a difficult employment situation, which had the effect of weakening family income 
in the middle and lower strata. 
Owing to the strong pressure exerted by the consumer sector, and notwithstanding the price 
objectives established by the government, an active policy was pursued to control the widespread 
increases observable since the preceding year. Thus, the number of products subject to control was 
enlarged, authorizations for increases were limited, administrative mechanisms for ensuring 
compliance with ceiling prices were strengthened, and the increments budgeted for in the tariffs and 
prices of public services were deferred and in some cases reconsidered. 
Lastly, monetary policy was directed towards endowing economic activity with the necessary 
resources, while taking care, however, that these were not disproportionately increased, to prevent 
the generation of new inflationary pressures. The money supply, for example, was augmented by a 
percentage similar to the combined growth rates of prices and of production. Outstanding among the 
causes of its expansion was credit to the private sector, while that granted to the public sector evolved 
more slowly. 
In short, in 1983 there were manifest signs of a return to stability, fostered by a restoration of 
confidence in the system on the part of the various economic agents. Proper management of the main 
macroeconomic prices —wages, exchange rate and interest rates— had a steadying effect on 
expectations, and made it possible to eliminate obstacles to the normal operation of the economy and 
to arrest the recessive trends that had been observable. Full recovery of the economy, however, will be 
consolidated only if the external context takes a more favourable turn. 
4During the past six years the deterioration of the terms of trade was continuous. In the whole period they fell by 42%. 
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Figure 1 
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Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures suplied by the Central Bank of Costa Rica. 
"Provisional figures. 
2. Trends in economic activity 
a) Total supply and demand 
With the exception of fixed capital formation and the volume of exports, both supply and 
demand variables discontinued the downward trend they had followed during the preceding three-
year period. Their increments were so moderate, however, that in no instance did they suffice to offset 
the contractions that had taken place in the years in question (see table 2). The expansion of total 
supply was mainly due to import behaviour, while that of total demand stemmed chiefly from the 
reactivation of public expenditure and the rise in private consumption. 
The total supply of goods and services increased by about 2% in 1983, after undergoing a 
marked decline in the preceding three-year period. This improvement was due to a slight recovery on 
the part of the gross domestic product and a more perceptible increase in imports of goods and 
services. Even so, the volume of external purchases reached only the absolute levels that it had already 
attained by the beginning of the 1970s. This suggests that during recent years some structural change 
in the operation of the economy may have occurred under the pressure of the severe constraints 
imposed by the current recession. In fact, while the proportion of the gross domestic product 
represented by imports was nearly 27% in 1970 and in 1980 was still over 25%, in 1983 the import 
coefficient was only 16% (see table 2). 
On the side of total demand, the most striking feature was an almost 5% increase in private 
consumption, together with a partial recovery in public consumption. In contrast, gross fixed 
investment contracted for the fourth consecutive year —although less sharply than in the three 
preceding years— and the volume of exports of goods and services was reduced by more than 8%. 
Despite financial difficulties and the need to reduce the fiscal imbalance —one of the goals of 
stabilization policy—, public expenditure was a dynamizing element in demand. During the past 
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decade, it had played an important role in economic growth, with respect both to investment and to 
outlays in connection with the expansion of social services. However, as tax revenue increased more 
slowly, serious imbalances in the public finances were gradually accumulated. This led to a real 
contraction of public expenditure in the two-year period 1981-1982, which strengthened the 
depressive trends of the economy.5 
The private sector, on its part, continued to maintain a cautious attitude towards investment. 
This could imply that the evident symptoms of stabilization and the still weak indicators of recovery 
have made no substantial difference to the expectations of the entrepreneurial sector. Among the 
factors that are having an inhibiting effect on private capital outlays may be mentioned the following: 
the financial troubles of many enterprises, the problems faced by the Central American Common 
Market, the considerable percentages of idle production capacity, the high rates of interest and some 
credit restrictions. In any case, the decline in investment is of special importance because it has 
repercussions that spread beyond the immediate conjuncture, in so far as it represents the 
decapitalization of certain major sectors of production, an event which would cramp economic 
growth possibilities over the medium term. 
In contrast, private consumption increased by almost 5%, after continuously declining in the 
preceding three-year period. In addition, during the year changes probably took place in its 
composition —as has been pointed out before— in consequence of the differential behaviour of the 
income of the various population strata.6 A wage policy clearly designed to benefit the lower income 
groups was again put into effect in 1983- This necessarily entailed rationalizing the expenditure of the 
middle strata and safeguarding at least the consumption of lower income wage-earners. 
The quantum of exports of goods and services, in its turn, dropped by 8.5%. This behaviour 
reflected the juxtaposition of structural problems and unfavourable conjunctural factors. On the one 
hand, external demand was characterized by weakness and instability. On the other, despite the 
efforts made in recent years to support export-oriented productive activities —development 
programmes, exchange measures, credit preferences, etc.—, no significant results have been noted up 
to now, not only because the effects of the incipient and uncertain economic recovery of the developed 
countries are not yet perceptible, but also because of the abnormal state of intra-Central American 
trade. 
b) Behaviour of the main sectors 
The level of activity of the sectors of production continued to fall, although more slowly than in 
1982. This indicates that the generalized economic crisis persisted. Production of non-basic goods and 
services remained virtually stationary at the preceding year's low levels, despite the appreciable 
recovery in agriculture. Basic services showed a growth rate of about 6%, mainly influenced by the 
notable 18% expansion of production in the electricity, gas and water services (see table 3). 
i) The agricultural sector. After a year in which an irregular rainfall régime affected harvests in 
the preceding crops cycle, the favourable weather conditions in 1983 made it possible to obtain 
normal yields in most crops. With the aid of the traditional agricultural support policies —credit 
assistance, preferential interest rates and other development programmes— and of certain measures 
introduced during the year, the agricultural sector enjoyed a recovery which signified a growth of over 
4%, as against a contraction of nearly 7% in 1982. 
Since the present administration took office in May 1982 agriculture has been one of its main 
concerns. The idea implicit in the slogan "back to the land"7 was to promote measures which will 
invigorate agricultural activities as a means of broadening the domestic market, ensuring food 
security and increasing production for export. But financial difficulties, the need to cope with other 
urgent priorities deriving from the conjuncture, a heap of administrative obstacles, and conflicts 
between economic policy objectives held back this programme. Nevertheless, support measures were 
1 Apparently this is one of the structural factors that has worsened in the present conjuncture, mainly owing to the relative inelasticity of 
public expenditure, which it is difficult to reduce, on the one hand because of its strategic importance in social services and therefore in the degree 
of well-being of large sectors, and, on the other hand, because of its close relationship with economic growth. It is a significant fact that the decline 
of productive activity during the past two-year period was accompanied by contractions in public expenditure and that the slight recovery in 1983 
coincided with its more positive trend. 
6See the chapters on Costa Rica in Economic Survey of Latin America, 1981 and 1982, Santiago, Chile. 
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Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures supplied by the Central Bank of Costa Rica. 
"Provisional figures. 4As the general method applied consisted in extrapolating the individual activities and the totals independently, 
the sum of the former does not coincide with the latter. cIncluding mining. 
launched, such as a programme to increase agricultural production (Programa de Incremento de la 
Producción Agrfcola-PIPA), a national dairy development programme (Programa Nacional de 
Fomento Lechero), and a local irrigation project (Proyecto de Riego en el Tempisque), and progress 
was made with the implementation of a development programme for livestock production and 
animal health (Programa de Desarrollo Ganadero y Sanidad Animal). 
The growth of the agricultural sector was based essentially on crop farming, which showed a 
substantial increase (7%), while livestock production remained stationary, and forestry and fishing 
continued to follow their sharp downward trend (see table 4). 
During recent years, it has been noted that the possibilities of extending the agricultural 
frontier might be approaching exhaustion and that there are signs of a slow but systematic tendency 
towards land concentration, on the basis of an expansion of export-oriented agriculture and especially 
stock-breeding. This would account for the sporadic agrarian conflicts in some localities and might be 
one of the structural factors that restrict the sector's growth. Nevertheless, in the recent years of crisis 
agriculture has maintained an upward trend, supported by efficient organization. 
The coffee crop once again increased (by 3%) thanks to a satisfactory rainfall régime and to the 
Programme for the Improvement of Coffee Production which has made for bigger yields. This 
occurred despite the fact that production costs once again rose -because of increases in imported input 
prices and in wages— and that during the first nine months of the year prices were consistently low.8 
During the last quarter international quotations improved, but sales abroad were limited by the quota 
fixed for Costa Rica. Surpluses therefore began to accumulate of which only part could be sold in new 
markets, at a considerably lower price. 
8In addition, some outbreaks of rust were discovered; this disease may affect future costs and yields of this crop. 
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Production of bananas —the second most important item among traditional exports— slightly 
decreased for a second time. This activity has been stagnating because of the contraction of the area 
planted, since the leading banana producer and exporter enterprise has begun gradually replacing this 
crop by African palms and citrus fruits. Among the factors to which this is due is the maintenance of 
international banana prices at very low levels, while production costs and export taxes have steadily 
increased. Furthermore, the fact that this enterprise primarily exports its own output discourages 
small independent producers. 
Sugar-cane production practically recovered from the preceding year's decline, thanks to bigger 
yields, the application of some support programmes and, furthermore, favourable weather 
conditions. 
Table 4 
COSTA RICA: INDICATORS OF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION 
Index of agricultural 
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Source: ECLAC, on the basis of officia) figures. 
"Provisional figures. Growth rates are given in real, not rounded, figures. 
Millions of litres. 'Millions of units. Thousands of cubic metres. 
e Thousands of tons. 
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In general, production of basic grains sufficed to ensure supplies for the domestic market. 
Outstanding aspects were the spectacular increase in the rice crop and the dynamism of maize 
production, although at the beginning of the year some consignments of basic grains had to be 
imported because output had been small in the preceding year. In the case of rice, for some years now 
abrupt fluctuations have been observable, which have entailed, on the one hand, making purchases 
abroad and, on the other piling up stocks which could not be exported, because domestic costs were 
higher than the international market price. 
Lastly, within the livestock sector, which showed a measure of reactivation, beef production yet 
again suffered a sharp reduction (-13%), which was basically reflected in external sales. It would seem 
to have been the result of over-extraction in the recent past, when on top of the poor yields caused by 
lack of rain, cattle slaughtering was speeded up with the aim of making the most of exchange 
advantages. This behaviour is of special significance inasmuch as it may well project a downward 
trend over the medium term, in an activity which is of considerable importance in the production 
system. 
ii) The manufacturing sector. The decline in manufacturing production which had begun in 
1981 continued, although at a slower rate than in the preceding year. The scanty indicators available 
revealed contractions in almost all the industrial branches, outstanding examples being the textiles, 
leather, wood, chemical products and basic metalworking industries. 
For some five years past, the manufacturing sector has shown symptoms of weakness as regards 
maintaining the same growth rate as in the preceding decade. This is ascribed to the depressive effects 
brought about by the reduction of domestic demand, the loss of dynamism in Central American trade, 
and some degree of exhaustion of import substitution possibilities. In addition to all this, in the year 
1982 there had been difficulties in obtaining an adequate supply of raw materials —because of the 
shortage of foreign exchange—, an increase in costs, basically attributable to the national currency 
price of imported inputs, and a rise in interest rates. Generally speaking, all these adverse factors were 
still present in 1983, with the exception of the obstacles to the purchase of raw materials, since 
exchange policy gave priority to the granting of foreign exchange for that purpose. However, a 
certain reanimation of domestic demand had stimulating repercussions, above all on branches 
producing basic consumer goods. 
Furthermore, the financial difficulties faced by the other Central American countries, combined 
with a real contraction of their domestic demand and operational obstacles in intra-regional trade, 
restricted the favourable effects that might have been expected from the variations in the exchange 
rate. During the year balances were accumulated against El Salvador, Guatemala and Nicaragua which 
had to be covered by the Central Bank of Costa Rica, and this caused some domestic monetary 
expansion. In order to lessen the inflationary effects that this situation might produce, during the 
second half of the year the authorities began to restrict exports to certain neighbouring countries and 
to impose payment conditions for current transactions. It was not until the end of the financial year 
that possibilities of documenting the debts and establishing amortization programmes began to take 
shape. Thus intra-regional sales slackened and manufacturers viewed the region's future prospects 
with even less optimism than before. 
Notwithstanding all this, economic policy was directed towards reactivating the national 
economy by way of external demand, although without underestimating the potentialities of local 
demand. In this connection, activities concerned with the quest of new markets for non-traditional 
products, especially manufactures, were raised to the ministerial category. This decision cannot be 
expected to produce immediate results, but new markets have already been opened up —especially in 
the Caribbean—, advantage being taken of installed capacity and the experience gathered in trade 
with Central America. Sales in these markets, however, still represent only a small proportion of 
Costa Rica's foreign trade as a whole. 
iii) Other sectors. It was the electric energy sector that diverged farthest from the depressive 
trends of the economy. In normal circumstances, this sector maintains a close correlation with the 
other economic activities, at any rate those of an urban character, but the increase that took place in 
the preceding two-year period, and, in particular, the significant 18% expansion achieved in 1983, 
were due to the entry into operation of the hydro power station El Arenal. This permitted an 
appreciable extension of the distribution network basically used for household consumption and for 
the increasing sales of energy to neighbouring countries (Honduras, Nicaragua and Panama). 
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The product of the construction sector went on decreasing, on top of the drastic contractions of 
two years before. Public works, which were mainly concentrated in the continuation of three major 
highway projects and two in the field of hydroelectricity, showed an upturn which proved insufficient 
to neutralize the decline in private construction. The latter activity was one of those hardest hit by the 
crisis, and although the negative implications in the overall picture were enormous, they were even 
more inauspicious with respect to employment. From various indicators it can be seen that 
construction did not entirely keep to its typical seasonal fluctuations. At the beginning of 1983, 
requests for permits indicated that some reactivation might be expected; at mid-year, sales of cement 
—excluding government consumption— and of other building materials pointed to a decline, while 
at the end of the period most of the relevant indicators —including employment— reflected a 
recovery. This recrudescence was based to a major extent on official programmes and on the financial 
backing given to construction of low-cost housing. The other sectors, in particular transport and 
business, remained at about the same levels as in the preceding year. 
c) Employment and unemployment 
Traditionally, the Costa Rican economy has been characterized by the maintenance of a 
satisfactory level of employment with seasonal variations, consistent with the nature of the diverse 
economic activities. As soon as the first symptoms of the present economic crisis appeared (1980), 
the main employment indicators began to reflect the depressive trends of the economy and to show 
changes in seasonal fluctuations. In the past, the different unemployment indexes rose between 
March and July and declined in November, coinciding with the busiest seasons in crop farming, 
especially coffee growing. As from 1981, almost all indexes followed atypical trends, possibly 
reflecting the degree of arrhythmia prevailing in productive activity. According to provisional 
estimates, during 1983 the rate of open unemployment stood at a high level in the months of March 
and July, and dropped abruptly in November (see table 5). It was the second year that this had 
happened, both globally and in the rural and urban areas, which might suggest that towards the end of 
the period certain signs of economic reactivation became more marked. But it might also point to 
phenomena of adaptation to the insufficiency of jobs. 
Table 5 



















































































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures supplied by the Ministry of Labour and Social Security and the Ministry of Economic Affairs, Industry and 
Commerce. 
"Figures obtained from household surveys on employment and unemployment. 
Percentages of labour force unemployed "Underemployed population expressed in terms of open unemployment. 
Labour force as a percentage of total population. 'Based on figures from the census taken in May 1973. 
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In the first place, an increasing proportion of the workers declaring themselves as employed 
had probably found a foothold in the informal sector, both in intermediary activities and in other 
services, for which reason average productivity was perhaps reduced. Secondly, it is also possible that 
a change, although slight, may have taken place in the historical patterns of migration from rural to 
urban areas, while at the same time a larger number of persons ceased trying to find work after 
successive •periods of looking for a job. 
The figures reveal a slight increase in the proportion of rural population^ a surprising 
stagnation of the labour force, a rise in rural unemployment and, in general, a contraction in the 
coefficient of employed persons in relation to the population of working age (over 12 years). This 
seems to suggest that traditional methods of estimating employment indexes in normal periods lose 
some of their validity in face of an abnormal economic situation; it also points to the persistence of a 
significant degree of unemployment, although there are other indicators which support the 
hypothesis that the process of recovery became brisker towards the end of 1983. 
3. The external sector 
a) Introduction 
The external sector variables continued to limit domestic productive activity, but less severely 
than in 1982. Neither the economic recovery in some of the developed countries, nor domestic 
policies designed to expand exports, produced the desired effects. The outlook therefore continued to 
be very uncertain for the export-oriented agricultural sector, both with regard to trends in demand for 
the main products, and in respect of the price instability that characterized their markets. Moreover, 
various obstacles that had been drastically affecting inter-Central American trade remained operative 
and even tended to worsen, combining with the general weakness of demand in the neighbouring 
countries. 
In the financial area, however, some success was achieved in easing the pressure created by the 
formidable burden of external debt servicing and the isolation to which the country was being 
relegated by failure to meet its external commitments. The relief obtained was largely due to the 
rescheduling of the maturities of a considerable proportion of the debts. This, in turn, allowed more 
room for maneouvre in international transactions and safeguarded external supplies within a 
framework of exchange stability. 
Generally speaking, most of the economic policy measures adopted during the year were linked 
to the external sector, with a view to attenuating balance-of-payments disequilibria and reinstating 
exports as an important stimulus to economic reactivation. Thus, early in the year barter regulations 
were established to make operations viable that would rationalize import priorities and permit the 
sale of some production surpluses. Moreover, internal incentives —such as preferential interest rates 
for stockbreeding— were maintained in the case of certain strategic lines of production; debts 
contracted by Central American importers were discharged to domestic producers —assets which 
were absorbed by the Central Bank—; official feelers were repeatedly sent out or support was given to 
private-sector efforts with a view to opening up new markets —especially for manufactures formerly 
exported to Central America—; the task of export promotion was raised to ministerial status and, 
towards the end of the year, an "export contract" was finalized for the purpose of attracting foreign 
investment which would accept a definite commitment to generate exportable production. While 
these and other measures in the same field can only bear fruit over the medium term, their adoption 
reveals how the State strove to give an impulse to foreign trade, in the midst of a lively national 
controversy provoked by the schools of thought which base the possibilities of economic recovery on 
dynamization of the domestic market. 
b) The evolution of the exchange rate 
One of the noteworthy successes of economic policy during 1983 was the feat of stabilizing the 
exchange rate after its abrupt fluctuations during 1981 and part of 1982. This event, which had 
positive effects on most of the macroeconomic variables —not only those relating to the external 
sector—, stemmed from careful management of exchange policy, from the availability of new 
external financial support —which supplemented the country's own resources for smoothly meeting 
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demand for foreign exchange— and from an appreciable reduction of the pressure that external debt 
servicing had been exercising —due to the accumulation of payments in arrears— on the movement 
of foreign exchange. 
Thus, during most of the year only two effective exchange rates were in force:9 the "interbank" 
and the "free" rates, handled by the Central Bank.10 In addition, in the course of 1983 changes took 
place in both markets, some gradual and others punctual. On the one hand, the interbank exchange 
rate was slightly raised on two occasions, and on the other hand, the free market rate was little by little 
reduced. At the end of June the monetary authorities decided to increase the interbank exchange rate 
by 1 colon and to reduce the free rate by the same amount. The aim of this measure was to encourage 
exports —since net payment for 98% of these was made at the interbank exchange rate—, to 
discourage imports and to advance more rapidly towards unification of the exchange rates, which is 
one of the commitments assumed with the International Monetary Fund under the stabilization 
programme. In this way, the buying and selling interbank rates were established at 41 and 41.50 
colones to the dollar, respectively, while the free rate fell to 43.10 colones for the buyer and 43.60 for 
the seller. Additionally, the Regulations for the Application of the Exchange Régime were also 
modified, with the object of giving preferential treatment in the authorization of foreign exchange to 
enterprises exporting goods whose domestic production content exceeded 35%, and to those whose 
annual sales amounted to over one million colones. Lastly, at the beginning of November, the 
monetary authorities established a single exchange rate of 43.15 colones (purchase) and 43.65 colones 
(sale). 
In short, in consequence of the last exchange adjustments, the foreign exchange market was 
successfully rationalized —and the harmful inward effects of instability on the economy were 
averted— by concentrating it in a single exchange rate. Nevertheless, despite its slight recovery in the 
second half of the year, the effective exchange rate was considerably lower in 1983 than in the two 
preceding years (see table 6). 
c) Merchandise trade 
Despite the efforts made to encourage exports and restrict external purchases, merchandise 
trade showed a tendency towards disequilibrium, once the effects of the exchange adjustments were 
exhausted. Up to 1980 the trade deficit had rapidly increased, influenced more by a high 
import/product elasticity than by the slow growth or reduction of external sales. In 1981, as a result of 
modifications of the exchange rate and the generalized economic contraction, this imbalance had 
been drastically reduced, and in 1982, for the first time in many years, a positive balance had been 
obtained, thanks to a decrease in imports. In 1983, although the low levels of production were 
maintained, the balance became negative again —although the deficit was moderate— because of an 
upturn in external purchases and a slight falling-off in exports (see table 7). 
i) Exports. The FOB value of external sales amounted to US$ 850 million, a slightly smaller sum 
than in the preceding year, when a decrease of 13% had already taken place. This behaviour was 
almost exclusively due to a decline, for the third year running, in the unit value of exports (see 
table 7). 
Among traditional export products, the value of coffee sales fell by 4% owing to a 9% drop in 
its average price, which more than offset the effects of the 5 % increase in the volume exported. 
Coffee-growing is, of course, an activity of special importance in the Costa Rican economy, not only 
because of the amount of foreign exchange it brings in to the balance of payments, but because of the 
employment it generates and the considerable quantity of production processes it involves. 
Consequently, a steady reduction of the value of coffee exports has discouraging repercussions on 
several segments of the economy. The basic problem lies in the constraints imposed by the quota 
system when world demand is weak. Although towards the end of the year there was a slight 
improvement in quotations on the markets of the International Coffee Organization (ICO), it was 
impossible to take advantage of this because the quota allotted to Costa Rica had already been covered, 
so that part of the crop had to be sold on other markets, where the price is approximately 40% lower. 
9In addition, there is an official exchange rate of 20 colones to the dollar, which is applied only for a minimum (1%) of operations 
deriving from judicial sentences, and will continue in force until the conclusion of the legal process already begun to abolish the relevant law. 
10 As from July 1982 the extra-bank free market rate known as "Lonja" was legally abolished, and in practice no parallel market rate 





























































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of data supplied by the Central Bank of Costa Rica. 
"Exchange rates supplied by the Central Bank of Costa Rica. Up to September 1980, the official rate is given. As from October 1980 figures 
represent exchange rates weighted by the real transactions of the economy in the different markets. Exchange rates for exports of 
goods and services discounting the exchange differential between this and the official rate, which as a weighted average is a little over 
10%. 'Average of the indexes of the real exchange rateof the colón in relation to the currencies of the main countries with which Costa 
Rica trades, weighted by the relative importance of exports to those countries or imports from them. For the methodology and sources used see 
the technical appendix in the Economic Survey of Latin America, 1981. 
In turn, the value of exports of bananas —a product which in recent years has acquired an 
importance similar to that of coffee in Costa Rica's export structure— remained almost stationary 
(see table 8). This was because an unexpected increase in the international price, towards the end of 
the year, compensated for the decline in production. The high winds that occurred during the last 
quarter in the northern areas of Guatemala and Honduras, together with the damage caused to 
Ecuador's production by the torrential rains and floods that were the effects of the "Niño" current, led 
to a contraction of world supply which pushed up the price. At all events, the historical instability of 
this market, basically because of the monopolistic fashion in which distribution is effected, is 
generating a substitution process in the large producer enterprises and has caused discouragement 
among small-scale producers. 
Owing to the production difficulties mentioned above, beef exports again underwent a serious 
setback (-40%), despite the fact that in contrast to what had happened in previous years international 
market conditions were relatively favourable. In the first place, the quota allotted to Costa Rica by the 
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Table 7 
COSTA RICA: MAIN FOREIGN TRADE INDICATORS 



























































Indexes (1970 = 100) 
Terms of trade (goods) 
Purchasing power of exports 
of goods 
Purchasing power of exports 



















Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
"Provisional figures. Quantum of exports of goods or goods and services, as the case may by, adjusted by the corresponding terms-of-
trade index. 
Table 8 
COSTA RICA: EXPORTS OF GOODS, FOB 




1981 1982 1983" 1970 1980 1983" 1980 1981 1982 1983" 
Total 1 002 860 851 100.0 100.0 100.0 6.2 0.2 -14.2 -1.0 
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Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
"Provisional figures. Percentage breakdown and growth rates are given in real, not rounded, figures. 
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Table 9 













































































































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
"January-September. Provisional figures. ^Percentage breakdown and growth rates are given in real, not rounded, figures. 
United States was covered only in part, and secondly, albeit the price still remained low, it sufficed to 
cover the production costs of such efficient stockbreeding as is found in Costa Rica. But the depletion 
of herds by over-exploitation in the past prevented these advantages from being turned to account, 
even with the incentives generated within the country. 
Thanks to the recovery in sugar prices, the value of sugar sales substantially increased (41 %) in 
relation to the low 1982 value. Nevertheless, it amounted to only 57% of the figure recorded in 1981. 
The proportional increase in non-traditional export products was small (4%), and was mainly 
derived from sales to markets outside Central America, which began to gain importance. Essentially, 
these exports consisted in simple manufactures sold to the United States, Panama, Venezuela and 
some Caribbean countries, as well as a few agricultural surpluses. The fact of paramount importance 
is that for the first time these non-traditional exports to third countries exceeded sales to Central 
America. 
Although Costa Rica obtained a further credit balance with the Central American countries, it 
stemmed from particularly constricted trade. As is common knowledge, the economic integration 
process, in its first phase, facilitated import substitution —principally in respect of certain non-
durable consumer goods— and generated powerful stimuli for the manufacturing sector. This process 
still shows signs of vitality, although in recent years various obstacles have been limiting intra-
regional trade flows, and have had negative effects on production. The difficulties in question range 
from the contraction of domestic demand in the various economies and the financial constraints as 
regards liquidating debit balances through the Central American Clearing House, to the means 
employed by each country to restore its external equilibrium —which include, in the main, measures 
to restrict external purchases—, and even in some cases, extra-economic phenomena such as the 
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socio-political tensions which impede trade movements. All these piled-up difficulties have been 
slowing down Costa Rica's exports to the Central American region, with the result that more 
vigorous efforts have been made to find other markets. 
ii) Imports. Imports of goods increased by about 15%, a rate which although it may be 
considered moderate after the drastic contractions of the preceding two-year period, was high in 
comparison with the growth rate of the gross domestic product and with export trends. During the 
first half of the year, external purchases expanded slightly, in keeping with the moderate progress of 
productive activity; by September they had increased by 8% (see table 9), and during the lastquarter 
their growth was accelerated until the above-mentioned percentage was reached. This may be 
attributed to three causes. In the first place, in view of the stabilization of the exchange rate and the 
prospect of an economic reactivation, the private sector replenished part of the stocks that had 
dwindled in the past; secondly, the effect of the exchange adjustments on containment of external 
purchases gradually petered out; and, thirdly, exchange policy, in an endeavour to prevent the 
emergence of a parallel market, supplied almost all demands for foreign exchange for the purchase of 
goods and services and softened exchange restrictions. This provided a safety-valve for part of the 
internal inflationary pressure, which otherwise might have had repercussions on price levels. 
Certain characteristics of the evolution of the various components of external purchases 
support the foregoing remarks. Input figures up to September show that the global increase of 8% 
stemmed from very different movements on the part of the diverse categories of goods. For example, 
imports of consumer goods rose by 21 %, while those of raw materials expanded only by 9% and those 
of capital goods contracted for the fourth time, on this occasion by 6%. 
As regards consumer goods —which represented over 20% of the total—, imports partly 
consisted in basic grains. These purchases were made at the beginning of the year to supplement 
internal supplies affected by the poor harvests in 1982. In the case of raw materials, most of the 
increase was due to imports of building materials, as well as to purchases of fuels and lubricants and of 
inputs for agriculture. The value of imports of intermediate goods, however, owing to its sharp 
decreases during the preceding two-year period, barely exceeded the level reached in 1978. 
Lastly, purchases of capital goods dropped to a very low value —after four successive years of 
contraction— which will probably not even suffice to compensate total depreciation in 1983. This 
confirms the opinion that the effects of the crisis will stretch over the medium term. 
d) Trade in services and payments for factor services 
For the second year running, trade in non-factor services showed a positive balance, which, 
however, was of little significance (US$ 7 million). This was mainly due to a considerable reduction of 
income which more than offset the effects of the slight fall in expenditure in 1982 (see table 10). 
The deficit with respect to factor services was accentuated. Net payments under this head rose 
to about 420 million —a sum equivalent to almost half the value of exports of goods and 20% larger 
than the amount disbursed under this head in the preceding year. This negative balance, which has 
been rapidly increasing during recent years, reflects the burden of the external public debt. 
It should be noted, however, that in 1983 the sum in question included delinquent interest 
payments which had accumulated in the preceding years and which, thanks to the negotiations 
conducted —among them, an automatically renewable credit, as a function of payments out of 
domestic resources—, were completely liquidated during the period. Had these commitments not 
been outstanding, the deficit would have been considerably lower, since private-sector payments 
under this head were decreasing in accordance with total economic results. 
e) Balance on current account and its financing 
After the significant effort made in 1982 to reduce it, the long-standing balance-of-payments 
deficit on current account —which had fallen from almost US$ 410 million in 1981 to 206 million in 
1982— increased again appreciably in 1983, exceeding US$ 380 million. This result was partly 
attributable to the resurgence of the trade-balance deficit and the resumption of external debt 
servicing, factors which were partly offset by external transfer payments a good deal larger than those 
made in previous years (see table 10). 
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Table 10 
COSTA RICA: BALANCE OF PAYMENTS 
COSTA RICA 
(Millions of dollars) 
Balance on current account 
Trade balance 
Exports of goods and services 
Goods FOB 
Real services4 
Transport and insurance 
Travel 
Imports of goods and services 
Goods FOB 
Real services 







Unrequited private transfer payments 
Balance on capital account 
Unrequited official transfer payments 
Long-term capital 
Direct investment (net) 
Portfolio investment (net) 














Net errors and omissions 
Global balance 
Total variation in reserves 
(- sign indicates an increase) 
Monetary gold 
Special Drawing Rights 
IMF reserves position 
Foreign exchange assets 
Other assets 



























































































































































































































































































































Source: 1977-1982, International Monetary Fund, Balance of Payments Yearbook, magnetic tape, May 1984; 1983, ECLAC, on the basis of 
official data. 
"Provisional figures. ftReal services also include other official and private transactions, but do not include factor services. 
^In addition to loans received and amortization payments made, this entry includes net loans granted and other assets and liabilities. 
rfThe global balance is the sum of the balance on current account plus the balance on capital account. The difference between the total variation in 
reserves with the opposite sign and the global balance represents the value of counterpart entries: monetization of gold, allocation of Special 
Drawing Rights and variations due to revaluation. 
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Nevertheless, for the second year in a row a global surplus was recorded in the balance of 
payments. Gross international reserves thus rose to US$ 311 million, a sum equivalent to 3.5 months 
of imports, i.e., a much higher coefficient than that of 2.8 months, recorded in the preceding year, 
when, moreover, imports had been a good deal lower. 
This result was obtained by virtue of the increase in the net inflow of capital, which rose from 
US$ 330 million in 1982 to 400 million in 1983. At the same time, its composition underwent a 
marked change. Whereas in 1982 the net inflow of long-term capital had fallen short of US$ 40 
million, in 1983 it exceeded 400 million, largely owing to the rescheduling of the external debt. Out of 
the gross inflow of US$ 450 million which passed into the hands of the official sector, 130 million had 
their origin in loans from bilateral sources granted on highly favourable terms, 120 million came 
from compensatory credits and 40 million from the disbursement of loans previously contracted with 
multilateral institutions. 
f ) The external debt 
Another of the year's important achievements was the culmination of a difficult process of 
renegotiation of the external debt. In the first place, at the end of 1982 a new stand-by arrangement 
was concerted with the International Monetary Fund, comprising a loan for a little under US$ 100 
million the whole of which was used during 1983, and a second credit line of US$ 20 million was 
agreed upon to offset the decreases in external sales attributable to the fall in international prices. 
Secondly, agreements were formalized with bilateral creditors (Paris Club) to reschedule 
amortization payments, the first steps to this end having been taken at the end of 1982. Lastly, during 
the first half of 1983 negotiations were conducted with private creditors to establish the schedule and 
method for liquidating interest payments due, amortization payments in arrears and payments 
corresponding to 1983 and 1984. 
The negotiations conducted with the Co-ordinating Committee, formed by 12 of the 170 
creditor banks, dealt with various aspects such as interest payments due, treatment of bonds, grace 
periods, amortization payments and restructuration costs. 
As a result of these measures, the government obtained a rollover credit to finance imports, 
which enabled it to supplement the country's own resources for clearing delinquent interest 
payments. It also secured the restructuration, not only of the 1981 and 1982 maturities, but also of the 
payments corresponding to 1983 and 1984, and to that end the four-year commitments had to be 
renegotiated. The total sum amounted to US$617 million. Out of this, 95% of "Tranche I", 
equivalent to US$ 142 million, was restructured for a term of eight-and-a-half years, including four 
grace years, during which interest payments only will be made. The principal will be liquidated in 18 
quarterly instalments, between March 1987 and June 1991; the remaining 5% will be paid on 31 
January 1984. "Tranche II" (US$ 142 million) was negotiated for a period of seven-and-a-half years 
as from January 1984, and also includes four grace years. 
The foregoing measures involved an increase in costs, owing to the bigger spreads over 
reference rates established in the restructured portion. The spreads fixed by the banks for this 
renegotiated part were 2.25% over LIBOR or 2.125% over the United States Prime Rate. Lastly, the 
surcharges on "deferred payments" and "refinancing" were set at 0.25% and 1%, respectively. 
With these adjustments taken into account, the public sector's external debt approached 
US$ 3.1 billion at the end of 1983, which implied an 8% increase over the year before. 
Disbursements, in their turn, went up to 330 million11 and amortization payments to US$ 94 million; 
these payments mainly represented obligations to multilateral sources (see table 11). 
The absolute level of the external debt, both public and global, reached extremes that were 
almost unmanageable, given the other macro-financial variables. In this sense, the results of the 
rescheduling negotiations merely postponed a problem which, in any event, is of far-reaching 
significance and jeopardizes the medium-term evolution of the Costa Rican economy, unless the 
export effort yields rapid results. In 1983, however, the financial —balance-of-payments, public 
finance, monetary and exchange— variables were temporarily eased of this burden, and the 
authorities thus gained greater freedom in the management of economic policy and time to carry out 
structural changes. 




COSTA RICA: INDICATORS OF EXTERNAL INDEBTEDNESS 
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Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
"Provisional figures. ''Including US$ 351 million in certificates of deposit. 'Not including US$ 351 million in certificates for 
1982 or refinancing of the principal (US$ 475 millions) in 1983. dNot including arrears to the amount of US$ 5 million in 1980, 238 
million in 1981, 125 million in 1982 and 106 million in 1983. Total (US$ 475 million) was renegotiated in 1983. 'Not including 
payments in arrears to the amount of US$ 121 million in 1981 and 250 million in 1982. ^Comprises total interest payments, including 
accumulated arrears. 
In short, notwithstanding the advances made, the global external debt is still one of the worst 
constraints on economic recovery. The amount of the external debt in absolute terms exceeded the 
domestic product by 28%, and 67% of earnings from exports of goods and services was assigned to 
debt servicing, notwithstanding the terms of the restructuration described. The public debt alone was 
equivalent to a per capita debt of US$ 1 250, and its servicing absorbed 23% of the product (see 
table 11). 
4. Prices and wages 
a) Introduction 
Outstanding among the economic policy objectives which were felt to deserve priority attention 
during 1983 were control of inflation —envisaged in the agreement with the International Monetary 
Fund— and defence of the real wages of the lower income strata. In view of the fact that the 
inflationary process had its origins both in phenomena associated with demand —such as the high 
fiscal deficit in the biennium 1979-1980— and in the structure of costs, a programme was launched to 
put the finances of the central government and public enterprises on a sounder footing. At the same 
time, a prudent wage policy and a realistic exchange policy were followed. Although some of the 
provisions adopted caused costs to rise in the short term —for example, the increase in tariffs and 
prices for goods and services supplied by public enterprises—, as a whole the measures applied, and, 
in particular, the stabilization of the exchange rate and wage policy, were contributory to the marked 
deceleration of inflationary pressures. 
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In 1983 the unusually high rate of inflation experienced by the economy in recent years was 
abruptly reduced. The rate of increase of consumer prices, after having gone up to 65 % in 1981 and 
almost 82% in 1982, had dropped to under 11% by the end of 1983. In reality, the turning-point 
occurred at the end of the third quarter of 1982, when the annual rate of inflation attained an all-time 
maximum of 100% (see table 12 and figure 2). 
The success scored in combating inflation is, moreover, particularly significant in view of the 
fact that it was achieved without depressing the overall level of economic activity. 
A factor which unquestionably influenced the results noted was the stabilization of the 
exchange rate. Up to 1982 all economic activities had been establishing domestic prices in relation to 
the effect of devaluation on their costs. The intermediation system therefore fixed prices with due 
regard to this fact, as well as to inventory turnovers and to expectations regarding future dollar 
quotations. When the exchange rate was stabilized, speculation ceased and the price system 
underwent a correlative adjustment, especially as supply was faced with depressed demand in 
consequence of the contraction of real income. For some months in the second half of the year the 
consumer price index even showed downward movements in relation to the preceding months, 
thanks in part to the firmness shown in management of the exchange rate (see table 13). 
In face of the increase in the domestic currency production costs of some public services, as well 
as the rise in the price of various strategic products —especially hydrocarbons—, during the second 
half of 1982 substantial adjustments had to be made in the price of electric energy, fuels, collective 
transport and the potable water and telephone services. The aim of this move was to restore the 
financial capacity of enterprises and to reduce the pressure that their deficits exerted on the public 
finances, but it also had direct and indirect repercussions on the evolution of the overall price system. 
During 1983 new increases in the items mentioned were announced, with a view to mitigating, or 
even eliminating, the deficit of some public institutions and maintaining financial equilibrium in 
those which had already attained it. Nevertheless, the government found itself obliged to give way to 
a variety of pressures, on which account it reconsidered the increases already decreed in the electricity 
service and some fuels and did not put into practice the other increases projected. 
Lastly, monetary policy succeeded to a large extent in adapting the available supply of liquid 
funds to the real needs of the economy, while at the same time the external sector made it possible to 
eliminate some of the internal factors of inflation arising out of shortfalls in domestic supply, 
particularly in the last quarter, when there was an appreciable recrudescence of imports. 
Table 12 
COSTA RICA: EVOLUTION OF DOMESTIC PRICES 
Consumer price index" 
Food 
Wholesale price index 
Imported products 
Domestic products 
Consumer price index" 
Food 
Wholesale price index 
Imported products 
Domestic products 
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 




















































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
a Price index for middle- and low-income consumers in the metropolitan area of San José. Corresponds to the preceding wholesale price 
index. c Variation between November 1982 and November 1983. Variation between January-November 1983 and the same 
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Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
aPrice index for middle- and low-income consumers, in the metropolitan area of San José. 
b) Wages 
The objective of implementing a policy to defend real wages came into conflict with the 
stabilization programme and with the conjunctural priorities imposed by the country's serious 
financial disequilibria. However, the hardening of the trade-unions' bargaining position, the obvious 
necessity of pumping some vitality into domestic demand, and the improved economic prospects of 
the entrepreneurial sector led to wage adjustments which, in view of the radical deceleration of the 
rate of increase of prices, implied that average real wages reversed their downward trend and that the 
minimum wage even recouped the losses it had suffered during the preceding two-year period. 
Average real wages rose by almost 10%, while the minimum legal wage went up by 15%, in real 
terms (see table 13). 
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During the year certain measures were put into effect which gave realistic expression to wage 
policy. The basic consumer basket came into operation and was enlarged, and application of a sliding 
wage scale —mechanisms whereby wages in the public and private sector were adjusted every half-
year— continued in accordance with the absolute variations occurring in the prices of the articles 
comprised in the basket. In addition, a single salary scale with 73 categories was established for the 
whole of the public sector, and the "National Wage Council" was strengthened12 to facilitate 
agreements on minimum wage adjustments. 
Thus, in the course of 1983 several wage increases were accorded both in the public and in the 
private sector. In the case of civil servants, in January an adjustment of 1 000 colones per month was 
granted and remunerations corresponding to higher-level posts were raised to a moderate extent. 
Another feature introduced was a salary compensation to professionals for full-time engagement in 
their functions as public employees. In July a further general increase of 450 colones per month was 
granted and in August a resolution to equalize the wages of professionals and technical personnel was 
promulgated. The wage scale was also restructured. All this involved a total adjustment which ranged 
from 25% to 28% of nominal wages for the different government categories, i.e., on average a 27% 
increase in the first nine months of the year. 
Moreover, in January a blanket rise of 16% in private-sector wages was decreed and in August 
another of 13% was granted. In addition, a generalized revision of collective negotiations was carried 
out. All these adjustments represented an increase of 45.5% in the effective average wage, while the 
nominal minimum wage rose by 52% (see table 14). 
Table 13 
COSTA RICA: EVOLUTION OF WAGES AND SALARIES 






















































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures supplied by the Ministry of Labour and Social Security. 
"Provisional figutes. Estimate based on tabulations of the CostanRican Social Security Fund. 
index for the middle- and lower-income strata in the metropolitan area of San José. 
cDeflacted by the consumer price 




COSTA RICA: CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INCOME AND EXPENDITURE 




On foreign trade 
Non-tax revenue 
2. Current expenditure 
Wages and salaries 
Other current expenditure 
3. Current saving (1-2) 
4. Capital expenditure 
Real investment 
Debt amortization payments 
Other capital expenditure 
5. Total expenditure (2 + 4) 
6. Fiscal deficit ( 1 - 5 ) 




Current saving/capital expenditure 




Financial deficit /GDP d 
Domestic financing'/deficit 
External financing '/deficit 





























































































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures supplied by the Central Bank of Costa Rica, the Ministry of Finance, the Office of the Comptroller-
General of the Republic and the International Monetary Fund. 
"Provisional figures. Central government, unless otherwise indicated including debt amortization payments. 
Not including debt amortization payments. 'Gross. 
5. Fiscal and monetary policies 
a) Introduction 
Many of the financial disequilibria occurring in previous years had originated in the growing 
fiscal deficit and the pressure it exercised on monetary variables. The latter, in their turn, generated 
internal inflationary forces which were reflected in the overvaluation of the colon and in subsequent 
exchange disorders. In face of the increasing constraints imposed by these disequilibria on the 
operation of the economy, and in order to meet the obligations deriving from the heavy external debt, 
the authorities negotiated a one-year stand-by loan with the International Monetary Fund, for an 
amount equivalent to 92 million Special Drawing Rights (SDR). In the agreement, which 
strengthened international liquidity and opened the doors to the process of renegotiation of the 
external public debt, the government pledged itself to put into practice a stabilization programme 
which comprised a group of financial objectives. 
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As is customary in adjustment programmes supported by the Fund, quarterly targets were 
established-for net domestic assets and net international reserves of the monetary authority, and for 
net domestic credit granted by the bank system to the non-financial public sector. 
Goals were also set in respect of restricting the growth of the public sector's external debt and 
the State-guaranteed debts of the private sector. The government also engaged to apply measures 
with respect to the public sector's expenditure and income, interest rates and the exchange rate.13 
Generally speaking, the quarterly goals were successfully attained, as well as those relating to 
the external debt, on which disbursements of the Fund's resources are conditional. The measures 
agreed upon with regard to exchange policy were also applied. The relative abundance of external 
credit had a good deal to do with these achievements. Of equally —or still more— crucial importance, 
however, was the financial performance of the public sector, which even outdid the results proposed, 
despite the increasing social and political pressures.14 
b) Fiscal policy 
On the side of income, taxes on international trade were maintained, and revenue from these 
rapidly increased, partly owing to the variations in the exchange rate and partly to the prorogation of 
the tax on the exchange differential applied to exports. A temporary surcharge was also added to the 
tax on the income of enterprises, the base for the selective tax on consumption of goods was 
broadened and the sales tax was increased from 8% to 10%. In the course of the year, several tax 
projects were also debated, such as those relating to remittances abroad, and increases in the tax on 
income from ownership, but they were ultimately vetoed by the Legislative Assembly or modified by 
the Executive in face of the adverse reactions of the various political and economic groups. All in all, 
the current income of the central government rose by 61%, a rate which, although lower than that 
obtained in the preceding year, implied a real increase of about 20%. Thus the tax burden went up 
from 13% to 16%. 
The pursuit of the objective of reducing the budget deficit was also based on a programme to 
restrict expenditure. To this end, a prudent wage policy w ^ planned, together with reductions in 
respect of current transfer payments, on the basis that public enterprises would regain their financial 
equilibrium through the fixing of realistic prices and tariffs. 
With regard to wages, as the favourable reaction of the tax structure became apparent and the 
demands of wage-earners gradually hardened, the authorities decided upon the adjustments 
mentioned above. This implied a 45% increase in expenditure under this head. Other current 
disbursements expanded by 61%, partly in consequence of the increase in purchases of goods and 
services, but mainly owing to the incidence of interest payments on the public debt. The proportion of 
increases in transfer payments to public enterprises and decentralized institutions was smaller 
(15%). In this connection, only the National Electricity Service (Servicio Nacional de Electricidad -
SNE) continued to face a financial imbalance, attributable to the heavy burden of external debt 
servicing expressed in national currency. Although graduated tariff increases in energy services had 
been decided on reactions in protest made it necessary to reconsider them. Accordingly, the 
institution was obliged to overhaul its expenditure budget and the rate of execution of some 
investment projects had to be slowed down, as in the case of the Ventanas-Garita and Corobisi 
hydroelectric and Miravalles géothermie power projects. 
Capital outlays more than doubled, but once again it was those associated with the public debt 
that increased most rapidly. Real investment continued to be concentrated in the continuation of the 
San José-Guapiles-Siquirres, Borruca and southern coastal highway projects. The reactivation of 
these and other smaller-scale projects, and the initiation of some new ones —connected especially 
with the habilitation of land in the northern and southern regions and the building of low-cost 
housing— had a stimulating effect on economic activity. 
The fiscal deficit —including amortization payments on the internal and external debt— 
almost doubled, in consequence of the rapid growth of capital expenditure. On the other hand, the 
financial deficit —which does not include debt amortization payments— rose much less sharply and, 
in fact, showed a moderate decrease in relation to the product. Of the fiscal deficit 49% was covered 
"See "Carta de intenciones al FMI", La República, San José, Costa Rica, 1 December 1982. 





COSTA RICA: MONETARY POSITION 
Money 
Currency outside banks 
Demand deposits 
Factors of expansion 





Factors of absorption 
Quasi-money (savings 
and time deposits)c 
Long-term foreign loans 
Other items (net)d 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures supplied by the Central Bank of Costa Rica. 
"Provisional figures. According to official estimates, accounts in foreign currency were value at 8.50 colones per dollar in 1980, 36 
colones per dollar in 1981 and 45 colones pet dollar in 1982 and 1983. 'Including securities. ''includes adjustments for 
variations in the rate of exchange. 
out of external resources from loans previously contracted with multilateral sources and external 
financial resources obtained on "soft" terms (see table 14). Accordingly, 51 % of total financing came 
from internal sources, mainly through the sale of bonds to the private sector at rates of interest which 
competed with the bank system's deposit operations, and although this cushioned the immediate 
monetary impact of the deficit, it will imply heavier financial costs in the future. In any event, 
inorganic issues declined appreciably during the period. 
The global financial deficit of the consolidated public sector was substantially reduced. As a 
proportion of the product, it dropped from 9% in 1982 to a little over 2% in 1983. 
c) Monetary policy 
Within the narrow limits set by stabilization policy, both in the sphere of credit and in that of 
the exchange rate, the authorities structured monetary policy with the aim of giving —or rather 
restoring to— the productive system the indispensable monetary resources, in step with the 
alterations in the exchange rate and the evolution of the overall price system, but seeking to ensure 
that the supply of liquid resources did not cause further domestic inflationary pressures. 
Money in circulation increased by 36%, a rate slightly exceeding the growth rate of the gross 
domestic product at current prices. This was due to an increase of 24% in the factors of expansion and 
one of 6% in the factors of absorption (see table 15). Thus the evolution of the monetary variables 
was a good deal more consistent with other aspects of the economy than the trends noted during the 
preceding two-year period. 
As regards the institutional destination of bank credit, priority was given to loans to the private 
sector, while those granted to the public sector increased at a slower rate. Net credit extended to the 
central government contracted for the second year running, in conformity with one of the original 
targets of the stabilization programme, while the growth rate of that granted to public institutions 
was more moderate than in 1982. As a whole, financing accorded by the bank system to the public 
sector expanded by 14%, as against average increases of 25% in the preceding biennium. 
Loans to the private sector increased by 47%, a much higher percentage than the average for 




















































































































between the absolute level and the domestic product (22%) was still much lower than that reached in 
1980 (29%). 
In relation to the loan and deposit interest rates of the bank system, as from the beginning of 
the year a controversy arose between those who held that the maintenance of high rates would 
produce harmful effects on productive activity and those who argued that rates should be sufficiently 
high to encourage saving and prevent the flight of capital abroad. In practice, the moderation of 
inflationary trends and a restoration of confidence in the monetary system and, in general, in the 
performance of the economy gradually determined monetary conditions which made it possible for 
interest rates to be gradually reduced. Even the increase in quasi-money was on such a large scale that, 
in some banks a temporary excess of liquidity was produced, which obliged the monetary authorities 
to raise the legal cash reserve for a time and to cover the cost of the operations in question. 
In short, monetary policy was implemented in conformity with the constraints of the 
stabilization programme, but taking advantage of every possibility that arose of endowing the 
productive system with such credit resources as might help to check the downward trend of the 
economy. All this was achieved in the framework of a managed stabilization of the exchange rate 
which held out favourable economic prospects. However, the attempt to meet total demand for 
foreign exchange caused a resurgence of external disequilibrium and the advantages implied for 
exports by the high level of the exchange rate were gradually lost. 
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CUBA 
1. Recent economic trends: Introduction and summary1 
In 1983, after its moderate growth in the preceding year, the Cuban economy expanded at an 
appreciably higher rate. The global social product increased by 5.2%, which meant that the per capita 
product went up by 4.1 % (see table 1). This relatively favourable evolution —at least in comparison 
with that of the rest of Latin America— was attributable to various factors of both domestic and 
external origin. 
The country had not been exempt from the recessive effects of the international economic 
conjuncture in recent years. The drop in the price of sugar —its main export product— in world 
markets, the rise in interest rates on the debt contracted in previous years with market economy 
countries, and the reduced supply of new external financing in convertible currencies had 
considerably limited its import capacity in the preceding two-year period and had obliged the 
authorities to reschedule the external debt maturities corresponding to 1982-1984. However, the very 
special conditions characterizing Cuba's relations with the other countries members of the Council 
for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) and, in particular, with the Soviet Union; its consumption 
structure, less slanted towards the consumerist patterns; prevailing in other countries of the region; 
and the peculiar role played by the State in the economy, attenuated the effects of the international 
recession, at least during 1983. 
Thus, despite the fact that the quantum of exports apparently contracted on account of a 12% 
decrease in the volume of external sales of sugar,2 their total value rose by 12%, which made it 
possible to increase imports, in their turn, by a similar percentage. This relatively satisfactory result 
was due to three circumstances. In the first place, both the volume and the value of exports other than 
sugar showed a measure of dynamism, thanks to a larger domestic supply of several products. 
Secondly, in accordance with the trade agreements concluded with several CMEA countries, which 
include an indexing system in respect of quotations for the country's main export products, the 
average price that Cuba received for its sugar was significantly higher than in 1982, despite the 
opposite trends observable in the world market. Thirdly, there was a substantial increase in re-export 
of part of the petroleum purchased from the Soviet Union at prices lower than the international 
quotations by virtue of the above-mentioned agreements. In addition, the country had access to fresh 
external financing, even if in non-convertible currencies, for the promotion of specific activities. 
The year 1983 witnessed a rise in the value of exports both to market economy countries (1%), 
and to socialist countries (14%). The absolute amount paid by these latter for their purchases, in 
convertible currencies, was approximately the same as in 1982, which represented over 40% of the 
income received in such currencies. This sum, in conjunction with the renegotiation of the external 
debt maturities falling due in 1983, allowed the country to increase its purchases from market 
economies by 31%. 
In short, although the evolution of the volume of exports was not very satisfactory owing to a 
fall of about 9% in sugar production, sufficient foreign exchange was generated to keep up an 
adequate supply of external inputs for the expansion of both material and non-material production. 
^CLAC has been analysing the Cuban economy in (he Economic Survey of Latin America since 1978, but partially, as in the early years 
the study covered only trends in economic activity and the balance of trade in goods. This was due bot h to methodological difficulties in respect of 
comparability between Cuba's material accounts and the national accounts prepared by the other Latin American countries, and to lack of data. 
Subsequently, the coverage of the analysis was broadened, incorporating information —also partial— on price, balance of payments and State 
budget policies. On the present occasion, the informât ion and the analysis are expanded and are given a format more or less comparable wit h that 
usually adopted by ECLAC in studying economic trends in the other countries of the region, although some shortages of data and indicators are 
still apparent. Since the economic, political and social system under consideration is very different from that of the other Latin American 
countries, it was deemed useful, for a better understanding of happenings during 1983, to include a description of some of the policies that have 
been in process of application since previous years, but were not fully summarized in the notes on recent years because the official statistical 
information supplied on those occasions was less complete than in the present case. 
2 No detailed data are available on export and import volumes. 
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And albeit the total trade deficit was larger than in the preceding year —even though a trade account 
surplus was obtained on transactions conducted in convertible currency—, the positive balance of net 
financing from the socialist countries and the renegotiation of the external debt in convertible 
currency permitted of an increase in international reserves. 
In these circumstances, it was possible to pursue a moderately expansionist policy in respect of 
domestic expenditure. Thus, the population's consumption rose by over 6%, while capital formation 
expanded at an even higher rate. 
Notwithstanding the unfavourable development of agriculture —a result of extremely adverse 
weather conditions, among other factors— the production apparatus in general made an adequate 
response to increasing internal and external demand. The growth rates of livestock production, 
forestry and fishing were sufficiently high to counteract the decline in the material product of crop 
Table 1 
CUBA: MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS 
Basic economic indicators 
Global social product (millions of 
1981 pesos)6 
Population (thousands of inhabitants)c 
Per capita global social product 
(1981 pesos) 
Global social product 
Per capita global social product 
Terms of trade 
Soviet Union 
Market economy countries 
Current value of exports of goods 
Total 
Sugar 
Current value of imports of goods 
Total 
Petroleum and petroleum products 
Average annual wage 





Trade balance (goods) 
Soviet Union 
Other socialist countries 
Rest of world 
Balance on current accounr 
Balance on capital accounr 
Variation in international reserves 










































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of data supplied by the State Statistical Committee and the National Bank of Cuba, and of other international 
statistics. 
"Provisional figures. See footnote " to table 4 below. 'Annual average, taking migratory movements into account. 
Percentages. 'Surplus. ' in freely convertible currency. Excluding a large part of trade with countries members of the Council 
for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA). 
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farming, so that the agricultural sector as a whole achieved a moderate growth (1.4%). Industrial 
production increased by nearly 5%, chiefly under the impulse of the bigger output of durable 
consumer goods, capital goods and some intermediate goods, in particular those connected with 
construction, an activity whose expansion was particularly dynamic (almost 11%). In its turn, the 
non-material product —i.e., that generated in transport, communications and trade— rose at a rate of 
6.2%, outstripping the 4.8% growth rate of the material product. 
These advances did not stem only from greater import capacity, plus a strenuous effort in the 
fields of import substitution, manufacture of spare parts and recovery of raw materials, but were also 
due to major changes in the running of the economy which had been making their appearance since 
1976, and which have gained strength in recent years. Of these changes the following were the most 
noteworthy. 
In the first place, economic units were more intensively encouraged to evaluate their own 
production potential for themselves and determine the best way of turning it to account. In 
application of this principle, they were made responsible for attaining the targets which they 
themselves set up. It was thus that the method of self-management was put into practice ( wh ich gives 
production units greater freedom as regards production and management initiatives), together with 
that of self-financing (which assigns them greater financial responsibility). 
Secondly, in view of the increase in State production, steps were taken to open up new freed 
markets to supply the population. This measure broadened the business networks and was gradually 
applied to all those goods in whose case production exceeded the requirements of the rationed 
market, the essential purpose of which is to ensure equitable minimum consumption.3 
Thirdly, a wage reform was carried out which appreciably increased the "wage fund". This 
reform was introduced in relation, inter alia, to the new levels of productivity, wages being tied to the 
"work productivity norm". In this sense, more emphasis than before was placed on material 
incentives. 
Fourthly, wholesale and later on retail prices were adjusted. The policy pursued in this field was 
that although prices ought to incorporate a social redistribution criterion, they must also be kept in 
line with production costs and the rates of return of enterprises and institutions, in order to encourage 
greater economic efficiency.4 
Lastly, the role of the National Bank of Cuba was strengthened as the formulator and controller 
of a monetary policy which, firstly, gave expression in the financial sphere to the economic 
interrelationships of enterprises and sectors of production and to the more exact measurement of 
their profitability; and, secondly, estimated the value of the money supply in the hands of the 
population and encouraged saving. This orientation was closely allied to fiscal policy which, on the 
one hand, strengthened State income and, on the other, transferred to units and institutions the free 
management of part of the economic surplus they generated. 
In short, the authorities consider that the greater degree of autonomy granted to enterprises as 
regards the formulation of their own economic plans and the distribution between their workers and 
investment requirements of the profits obtained, within the framework of a clearly-defined self-
management system, made possible a rise of over 3% in labour productivity,5 which accounted for 
almost two-thirds of the growth-of the global social product. 
In addition, an effort was made to step up investment which raised it 10% above the value 
reached in 1981. Similarly, a substantial change was introduced in the manner of financing 
investment; whereas in 1981 the State budget had provided 99% of the necessary resources, in 1983 
this share was considerably reduced, since the financing contributed by the enterprises came to 
represent 16% of the total. These resources derived from part of the profits obtained and, in some 
instances, from loan amortization payments. 
Adjustments of wage and price policies continued during 1983. The level of wages was fixed in 
accordance with the above-mentioned productivity norms. This signified a 2% increase in average 
wages in the sphere of production. Prices, in their turn, were progressively adjusted and markets were 
3 In 1960 almost 300 products were distributed through ration-books; in 1983 they numbered barely a score or two, almost all being 
dependent on raw materials imported from market economy countries. 
<The State Pricing Committee is the body responsible for implementing this policy. To that end, it studies the cost records which 
enterprises send it in their applications for price changes and, in the light of the above-mentioned criteria, fixes wholesale and retail prices. 
5 Measured through the global social product per worker in the sphere of production. 
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opened in which unrationed goods were sold, in step with the rising levels of domestic production. 
Part of the production increment recorded in 1983 was thus offered at higher prices in the official 
parallel markets. As a result, the supply and demand ingredient played a bigger part than in 1982 in 
the determination of prices, in which, however, the social utility criterion was still paramount. At the 
same time, the State Statistical Committee went ahead with expenditure studies and surveys for the 
purpose of preparing in 1984, for the first time in 25 years, consumer price indexes differentiated 
territorially and by markets. 
To sum up, the year 1983 seems to have marked a milestone in the application of the new 
measures relating to the management and conduct of the economy which began to be introduced in 
1976. According to official sources, the financial aspects of the annual production plans were more 
faithfully and precisely put into effect through budget plans whose implementation was constantly 
supervised by the National Bank of Cuba and the State Finances Committee of the Ministry of 
Financial Affairs. Stricter control was also exercised over monetary liquidity outside the banks, which 
in 1983 increased by 69 million pesos, in contrast with increments of 448 million in 1981 and 117 
million in 1982. This aspect of monetary policy was closely linked to fiscal policy in respect of 
management of the finances of enterprises, including both their revolving funds and the surpluses 
generated. The national income and expenditure budget closed with a surplus of 385 million pesos, 
after five consecutive years of fiscal deficits. 
For the better application of all these reforms, more precise guidelines were also formulated in 
the Economic Direction and Planning System (Sistema de Dirección y Planificación de la Economía). 
An attempt was also made to enhance the depth and extension of the planning system itself. Thus, 
apparently clearer methodological rules were provided for the formulation of the relevant annual 
plans,6 which are currently reviewed by the Central Planning Board (Junta Central de Planificación 
JUCEPLAN), with the aim of raising the technological level of the new five-year plan for 1986-1990. 
Lastly, the population participated in discussion and monitoring of the plan.7 
2. Trends in economic activity 
a) Use of the global social product 
Although no detailed information was available for 1983 on the use of the global social product, 
from the official data supplied it can be inferred that nominal consumption increased by over 6%. 
Although in this rate is included the rise in retail prices brought about in 1983 by the transfer of some 
products from the rationed market to the State-controlled market —in which higher prices 
prevailed— and by adjustments in this latter, the population's real consumption seems to have 
increased in almost all the main items. Consumption of these accordingly recovered from its decline 
in 1982, equalling or exceeding the levels reached in 1981, except in the case of milk, fruit and 
vegetables. Particularly marked was the expansion of supplies of durable consumer goods; according 
to official statistics, between 1980 and 1983 the number of washing-machines per hundred 
households rose from 24 to 41; that of television sets from 53 to 71; that of refrigerators from 29 to 
38; and that of radio receiving sets from 108 to 133 (see table 2). 
The net capital formation coefficient, in its turn was approximately 11% in 1983 (see table 3). 
It was investment in the sphere of production that showed most dynamism and within it emphasis 
was placed on trade and industry, whereas investment in transport declined. In view of the 
6See Central Planning Board, Indicaciones metodológicas para la elaboración del plan anual de la economía nacional. It should be noted 
that the aim of these rules was to maximize the uniformity of standard methodologies for the formulât ion of the enterprises' plan, as well as of 
methodological indicators, so that the same principles and models could be used both in enterprises and in units working on a budget, and in the 
agencies of the Central Administration and the provincial organs of the Poder Popular. (These organs are production enterprises or units 
providing services to the population which are left to the care and management of the Poder Popular in each of the 169 municipalities existing in 
the country.) These norms also incorporate the concept of territorial planning. 
unconformity with the system in force, the 10 735 delegates from the Municipal Assemblies of the Poder Popular jointly discuss those 
aspects of the Single Economic and Social Development Plan and the State Budget for the forthcoming year which areof concern to the town 
councils. Next the document is analysed by the 1 139 delegates to the 14 Provincial Assemblies, and, lastly, once it has been considered by the 
respective committees with the participation of JUCEPLAN, the plenary meeting of the National Assembly of the Poder Popular, constituted by 
499 deputies, finally sanctions it as a law of the Republic. In 1983, in addition to this procedure, at the end of each quarter the Provincial 
Assemblies discussed, together with the National Bank and the State Finance Committee, the implementation of the budget plans consolidated 
by branches of economic activity in each province. The plan is also discussed by the workers in each establishment. Thus, the 1983 plan was 
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Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures supplied by the State Statistical Committee. 
"Provisional figures. Kilograms. cNumber owned per hundred households, in units. 
constraints on imports of capital goods, preference was given during the year to the completion of 
works under way and stricter project evaluation criteria were applied in permitting new investments. 
Copious resources were also allocated to the repair of the damages caused by metereological 
phenomena. 
Lastly, one of the traditional obstacles faced by the Cuban economy is the evolution of its 
external variables. Thus the proportion of the global social product represented by the deficit on trade 
in goods and services systematically rose from 1 % in 1978 to 4% in 1981, after which it fell to 2.5 % in 
1982 and went up again to 2.8% in 1983. 
b) Growth of main sectors 
The 5.2% increase in the global social product was the result of a 5% growth rate in material 
production and an expansion of the non-material product by rather more than 6%. 
The agricultural product, which in 1982 had fallen by more than 3%, rose by 0.6% in 1983; thus 
it still remained lower than that of 1981, a year in which the biggest output in recent decades was 
recorded. The industrial product grew by almost 5%, while that of construction increased by about 
11%. With respect to the non-material product, a notable feature was the recovery of the transport 
sector, which nevertheless was still beset by serious problems with regard both to the mobilization of 
passengers in the urban area —mainly in the city of Havana— and to road and rail freight. The 
product generated in commerce kept up its high growth rate of the preceding years, thanks to the 
enlargement of the network of commercial establishments; in contrast, the growth rate of 
communications, although high (7%), was lower than in previous years (see table 4). 
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i) The agricultural sector. In 1983 two contrasting movements took place in this sector's 
production. On the one hand, crop farming declined by 3%; on the other, livestock raising increased 
by about 6%, forest production by 25% and fishing by more than 3%.8 Consequently, the joint 
product of these subsectors rose by 1.4 %. The investment placed totalled 767 million pesos, 4% more 
than in 1982. Of this sum, 380 million were allocated to crop farming (7% less than in the preceding 
year), 377 million to livestock production (signifying an increment of 20%) and 10 million to 
agricultural services. 
During 1983 the country suffered —mainly in its western and central regions— the rigours of a 
disastrous winter in which rainfall surpassed the levels recorded in the last 50 years. Along with these 
heavy rains came squalls, tornados and hailstorms of such violence as to cause tidal waves on the 
northern coast, especially in the province of Havana, penetrating farther inland than any that had 
occurred since 1926. The only worse event of this kind in recent times was the hurricane Flora, which 
scourged the country in October 1965. 
As a result, agriculture was seriously affected.9 Indeed, 14 000 hectares under tobacco were lost 
and another 3 000 were badly damaged, so that the harvest was reduced by 33%. In the case of 
tomatoes, 6 000 hectares were ruined (3 000 belonging to the private sector and as many more to the 
State), which meant that the harvest of this product too decreased by 33%; those of onions and 
peppers also contracted by about one-third. In addition, 50 000 tons of potatoes were lost through the 
destruction of 4 000 hectares under seed. Coffee production dropped by 10% while fruit-growing was 
hard hit, the lemon crop being reduced by 26% and production of mangoes by 33%. On the other 
hand, rice production —which is completely mechanized— declined only slightly (-0.4 %). Lastly, and 
perhaps of more significance, the volume of sugar-cane razed to the ground by the tempestuous 
weather was equivalent to one million tons of raw sugar. In contrast, production of maize, grapefruit, 
kenaf and cocoa increased appreciably (between 37% and 16%), and that of beans to a lesser extent 
(see table 5). 
Furthermore, in consequence of thé weather conditions a great deal of damage was done to 
infrastructure works —mainly electric energy transmission and distribution pylons and networks—, 
Table 3 
CUBA: USE OF THE GLOBAL SOCIAL PRODUCT 
(Percentages) 
Global social product 
Intermediate consumption 
Final consumption 
Consumption of the population 
Personal consumption 
Consumption of organizations providing 
services to the population 
Consumption of organizations 
meeting collective needs 



































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures supplied by the State Statistical Committee and the National Bank of Cuba, and other official data. 
"Provisional figures. ECLAC estimates. Productive goods and services. 
8These three last-named activities account for almost half of the sector's production. 
9The damage caused by this phenomenon would have been even worse, had it not been that, after the experience of Flora, empounding 
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Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures supplied by the State Statistical Committee. 
"The global social product is equivalent to the value of gross production. According to official source "the basic criterion for recognizing gross 
production and ascribing it to given sectors, branches and sub-branches ¡s the nature of the basic activities undertaken by the enterprise, 
establishment or department wit h an independent balance, in which the economic activity is carried out" (see State Statistical Committee, Bases 
metodológicas del Sistema de Balances de la Economía Nacional, Havana, November 1981, p. 9). Consequently, the information contained in 
this table does not relate solely to sectors and branches of origin; the classification adopted records not only the main production of the 
entrepreneurial units but also the secondary production carried out in those units, whether or not it corresponds, by origin, to the same branch 
of activity. If a system of classification based strictly on sectors of origin were adopted (in accordance with the criterion applied by the United 
Nations in ISIC), the conclusions at sectoral and branch level would be different. Thus, the data on the agricultural sector include secondary 
production of industry and construction not computed in these sectors. These differences are cancelled out, however, in the total material 
product. 
Provisional figures. eThe percentage breakdown and growth rates were calculated on the basis of non-rounded figures. 
to almost all the tobacco sheds, to a large proportion of the irrigation and drainage channels, and to 
dairies and piggeries. The worst havoc was wreaked in the provinces of Pinar del Rio and Havana. In 
addition, thousands of houses were badly affected or destroyed, a fact which partly accounts for the 
recrudescence of construction. 
The crop losses indicated might have been greater had it not been for intensive mobilization 
whereby some of the harvest was rescued, for the effort made to step up production in less-affected 
parts of the country, and for the rapidity with which the ravage areas were resown, short-cycle crops 
being promoted. Even so, the product of non-sugar-cane agriculture decreased for the second year 
running, this time by a little over 5% (see table 4). The area harvested shrank from 2 261 000 
hectares to 2 230 000 hectares, a contraction which exclusively affected the State sector, since the 
private-sector and co-operative areas remained unchanged at 425 000 hectares. 
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Table 5 










































































































































































































































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures supplied by the State Statistical Committee. 
"Provisional figures. 'Growth rates were calculatedon the basis of non-rounded figures. 
which is expressed in millions of units. ¿ ln State enterprises. "Thousands of head. 
'Millions of heads, final inventory. 'Thousands of tons. Tons. 'Millions of units. 
'Thousandsof tons, except for henequén, 
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In 1983, these last-named sectors represented, in the case of certain crops, a high proportion of 
the total area harvested. According to official data, their shares were as follows: maize 51%, beans 
40%, roots and tubers 39%, vegetables 54% (including tomatoes, 64%) tobacco 76%, coffee 56%, 
plantains 58% and malanga 62%. 
Almost the entire non-State sector is grouped in co-operatives which sell their production to 
the State. Under the stimulus of better utilization of State aid, in 1983 a movement to co-operativize 
independent peasants took place, and merging of co-operatives was speeded up with a view to 
facilitating the provision of technological support and achieving economies of scale. Thus, during the 
year, 131 new co-operatives were created, of which 65 were a product of the fusion of 140 already in 
existence. By the end of 1983 there were 1 742 co-operatives, with 83 000 members and a total area of 
940 000 hectares. 
The process of technifying and mechanizing agriculture also continued in 1983. Of the 
investment placed in the subsector 56% was allocated to sugar-cane agriculture, in which significant 
progress was made. Thus, sugar-cane harvesting has been completely mechanized since the 1979-
1980 crop; for that harvest 2 551 sugar-cane combines were available, and this number rose to 2 954 
in the 1981/1982 harvest and to 3 550 in that of 1982/1983; at the same time, the yield of these 
machines rose from 7 000 to over 7 500 arrobas cut daily.10 This made it possible to reduce the 
number of workers employed in cutting cane by hand (macheteros) from 350 000 in the 1970 harvest 
to 131 000 in that of 1979/1980 and to 85 000 in that of 1983/1984. In addition, more careful 
selection oí macheteros partly accounted for the increase in their productivity between 1980 and 1983 
from 219 to 258 arrobas daily. As part of the technifying process, work was completed on the building 
of a reception centre at each sugar mill for cleaning, stripping and chopping the sugar-cane, a 
technical advance which not only helps to make cutting more efficient, but minimizes the influence of 
dirt on the milled sugar-cane yield. Nevertheless, in 1983 the product of sugar-cane agriculture 
decreased by a little more than 1%. 
With regard to this activity, of strategic importance for the Cuban economy, halfway through 
the year it was decided that as from the beginning of 1984 all sugar-cane and sugar-processing 
enterprises would be integrated in agroindustrial complexes. These units have been on trial since the 
1980/1981 harvest, when the first four were set up; at the next harvest 13 more were added, and at 
that of 1982/1983 94 were in operation. As from 1984, 142 sugar-processing agroindustrial 
complexes will be operating. This resolution was adopted after JUCEPLAN and the Ministry of the 
Sugar Industry had analysed the results of the experiment. u 
Livestock production, in its turn, increased by nearly 16%, thus recovering, after its decline in 
1982, the rates of expansion recorded in the previous decade. This activity was accorded priority 
attention in development plans. As regards stock-raising, between 1970 and 1982 more than 1 800 
dairy farm units were constructed with a capacity of 376 000 head; thus, at the beginning of 1983 a 
total of 4 300 units existed, with a capacity of 960 000 head, a figure equivalent to a little under 20% of 
the cattle population of 5 100 000 head existing at the end of 1982. Partly as a result of this process, 
between 1968 and 1983 the daily yield of milk per milch cow rose from 2.7 kilograms to 6.3 
kilograms.u Consequently, the output of milk amounted to 948 000 tons in 1983, i.e., 570 000 tons 
more than in 1970, since which year it has increased at an average annual rate of 7.3%. Moreover, the 
average weight of the animals slaughtered rose from 320 kilograms in 1970 to 333 kilograms in 1982. 
In 1983, however, meat production decreased by 2% owing to the restrictions imposed on 
slaughtering in order to replenish the herds. 
Poultry-raising was the object of policies similar to those applied in respect of stock-farming. 
They were launched with the setting-up of a technico-administrative apparatus —via the creation of a 
single vertically-oriented enterprise in 1965— and were implemented through a number of 
'"Thus, the proportion of sugar-cane cut with combines was 25% in the 1969/1970 harvest and 45% in that of 1979/1980, and is 
expected to reach 62% in that of 1983/1984. 
11 In March-June 1983 methodological instructions were issued for the preparation of the economic plans of these complexes, including 
an enjoinder to adjust the figures for the years 1980 to 1983 so that they will dovetail smoothly with the preceding series. From the 
methodological standpoint, as from 1984 sugar-cane agriculture will virtually disappear as an independent item, since the only entry under this 
head will be the activity carried out by the sugar-cane co-operatives, while the State sector will be classified under the sugar industry, because of 
the principle of calculation applied in working out the global social product. 
12 As a result of cross-breeding through artificial insemination, in 1983 more than 55% of the total number of cows were dairy cattle, 
whereas in 1962 the corres pond i ng proportion had been only 10%. Between the years mentioned the number of specialists in this activity 
climbed from 200 to 4 400. 
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specialized centres, which were provided with equipment and for which fertile eggs of high-quality 
breeds were imported, enabling them to build up brood stock. As a result of the application of these 
policies, egg production increased from 946 million units in 1965 to 1 456 million in 1970 and to 
2 494 million in 1983 (see table 5). Between these years production per laying hen rose from 210 to 
240 eggs per annum and conversion of feed per dozen eggs dropped from 1.86 to 1.54 kilograms. 
Production of poultry meat grew at an average annual rate of nearly 10% from 1973 to 1983, rising in 
this latter year to 90 000 tons. During this interval average yield per bird increased from 1.16 to 1.40 
kilograms of meat and average conversion of feed into meat decreased from 3.31 to 2.66 kilograms. 
ii) Fishing. As from the mid-1970s this activity was vigorously promoted with the aim of 
improving the quality of the population's diet and bringing in more convertible foreign exchange. 
This drive gained most impetus between 1975 and 1978, when a total of 680 million pesos was 
invested in the sector, increasing the number of fishing craft from 103 to 177 units. " In subsequent 
years there was a notable slackening of effort; between 1979 and 1982 investment amounted to only 
100 million pesos, ten units being added to the fishing fleet.14 
As a result of this effort, the deep-sea catch increased by a factor of 3.5 between 1965 and 1975 
and attained a volume of 213 000 tons in 1978. The application of the 200 ocean miles provision had 
adverse effects on fishing in 1979 and the catch was considerably smaller. From 1980 onwards, 
however, production began to recover and in 1983 reached 251 000 tons. 
The contribution made by this activity to the population's consumption was important. 
Between 1965 and 1975 supplies increased at an average annual rate of 1.6%, amounting to 41 000 
tons; as from that year supplies to the domestic market expanded at an average annual rate of 4.4%, 
which raised their volume to 58 000 tons in 1983. 
Fishing also played a significant part in the trade balance. In 1965 exports of fish products 
represented barely six billion pesos (a figure equivalent to 9-0% of the total value of exports); in 1975 
they went up to 52 million pesos (1.8% of total exports) and in the following five-year period 
continued to grow until they reached 99 million pesos in 1982 and 106 million in 1983. 
iii) Mining and metallurgy.^ During 1983 the product of this sector rose by about 10%, 
resuming the vigorous upward trend of the years 1980-1981, after weakening in 1982. This positive 
evolution was achieved by virtue of the results obtained in metallurgy, particularly in respect of 
ferrous minerals. 
Production of common steel, after decreasing 9% during 1982, increased by 20%, reaching an 
unprecedented level of 360 000 tons. On the other hand, although rolling of corrugated steel bars 
expanded by 23%, it still fell 20% short of its 1979 figure. Similar recoveries occurred in the 
manufacture of steel and cast-iron tubes and forged steel parts. In non-ferrous metallurgy, too, there 
was an interruption of the sharp downward movement which had been observable for two 
consecutive years in production of copper concentrate. Nevertheless, the output achieved in 1983 was 
slightly less than that obtained in the mid-1970s and 1.8% lower than that recorded in 1980 (see 
table 6). 
Output of nickel and cobalt sinter, oxide and sulphide increased to 39 000 tons, the peak figure 
since 1970, that reached in 1980 having been slightly lower. In order to develop this activity, in 1983 
60 million pesos were invested in the improvement of the latérite mines, in the progress of work on 
bringing the nickel combine into operation, and a 90% advance in the construction of the Punta 
Gorda plant, which, with a real production capacity of 24 000 tons of nickel and cobalt sinter, is being 
set up with the co-operation of the Soviet Union. It is expected that as a result this plant's first nickel-
producing line will enter operation in 1984.16 
In the petroleum industry a significant increase took place in extraction of crude oil, which rose 
from 541 000 tons in 1982 to 725 000 tons in 1983- In contrast, production of natural gas continued to 
decline sharply for the third year running (see table 6). In actual fact, although since the 1960s 
'* Excluding those belonging to the Cienfuegos industrial fishing combine. 
1-1 The 187 fishing vessels existing in 1983 were distributed among 20 fishing enterprises, of which eight employed between 1 000 and 
2 000 workers each and another two employed over 2 000. 
n I n Cuban nomenclature ferrous and non-ferrous mining are grouped with the metallurgy of both types of mineral. 
"^Concurrently, in 1983 the project plans and documentation were completed and the necessary measures adopted in respect of the 
earth-moving required for the erection —with the co-operation of the countries members of the Council for Mutual Economic Aid (CMEA)—of 




CUBA: MAIN PRODUCTS OF THE PETROLEUM, 
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Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures provided by the State Statistical Committee. 
"Provisional figures. Millions of cubic metres. cTons. 
petroleum exploration and prospection has been carried on intensively in the Island itself and on its 
continental shelf, the results so far have not come up to expectations. 
iv) Manufacturing industry. In 1983 the industrial product expanded by almost 5%. 
Production of capital and durable consumer goods, which had increased considerably in the last two 
years, soared by over 15%. Production of intermediate goods, in turn, went up by 6%, partly 
recovering from its decline in 1982. Lastly, the growth rate of the non-durable consumer goods 
industry was 2.6%, i.e., considerably lower than the rate achieved in the preceding year (see table 7). 
The constraint deriving from the relative difficulty of obtaining supplies of raw materials and 
of spare parts imported from market economy countries again made itself felt in 1983, although less 
severely than in 1982. However, the experience gained in the latter year led to the adoption of 
measures whereby the obstacles created by this situation were partly surmounted. 
In the first place, strong emphasis was placed on import substitution in respect of purchases 
from market economy countries, and it was estimated that over US$ 52 million were saved on raw 
materials through production and recovery of spare parts. The value of this output was 384 million 
pesos, outstripping the goal envisaged in the plan by more than 80 million and exceeding the 1982 
production figure by 40%.17 It was designed primarily for agriculture and transport, for repairs of 
sugar mills and for construction of new mills, in which the domestic content component has 
substantially increased. 
Secondly, between 1982 and 1983 purchases from market economy countries were made for the 
purpose of building up operational reserves, the use of which was strictly supervised; sources of 
supply were sought in new directions, with the co-operation of the CMEA countries; meticulous 
supervision of the purchase prices of the supplies in question was established, with the result that 
savings were achieved; and imports of raw materials were given preference over those of capital 
goods. 
17See Humberto Pérez, Minister President of JUCEPLAN, Presentación ante la Asamblea Nacional del Poder Popular, fifthsession, 22 
December 1983. 
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All these measures were adopted in the framework of a more general policy geared to raising 
rates of return and productivity through the operation of a system based on self-management and 
self-financing of enterprises, on establishment of work norms, and on more responsible fulfilment of 
the contractual agreements in which enterprises give legal expression to their economic 
i nterrelationships. 
Moreover, the sector's installed capacity, after its sluggish growth in 1982, was strengthened by 
the entry into operation of 17 new plants.18 Noteworthy examples included the expansion of the 
Ecuador sugar plant and the modernization of the Amancio Rodriguez mill, plus the construction of 
three more sugar mills in the provinces of Camaguey, Granma and Cienfuegos, each with a milling 
capacity of 600 000 arrobas daily; two citrus fruit canning plants with a joint capacity of 40 tons per 
hour; the Jagüey citrus fruit complex,l9 with a capacity to produce 28 000 tons of simple and 
concentrated juice, 273 tons of essential oils and 13 000 tons of fodder; the alcoholic beverage 
complex at Santa Cruz del Norte —one of the biggest in the country— with a capacity of 7 000 tons of 
torula yeast, 6 000 tons of carbon anhydride, 50 000 hectolitres of liquors and 194 000 of natural 
alcohol; and two paper mills, with a production capacity of 8 000 tons of toilet paper, 60 000 tons of 
paper and 60 000 tons of bagasse board. Other plants brought into operation were the Jesús 
Menéndez saw mill, with a capacity of 103 000 m2 of board; a wheat mill with a capacity of 141 000 
tons of flour and 4 000 tons of pastas; and the enlargements of the aluminium tubes plant. 
Table 7 
CUBA: INDICATORS OF MANUFACTURING PRODUCTION 
1980 1981 1982 1983" 
Growth rates 
1980 1981 1982 1983" 
Index of material product 
(base 1975 = 100) 
Totalc 
Non-durable consumer goods 
industry 
Foodstuffs (excluding sugar) 
Sugar and sugar products 
Beverages and tobacco 
Ready-made clothing 
Printing matter 





Capital and durable consumer 
goods industries 
Construction of non-electrical machinery 











































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures supplied by the State Statistical Committee. 
"Provisional figures. Growth rates were calculated on the basis of non-rounded figures. 
cExcluding basic metals. Including, Inter alia, the leather, glass and pottery, paper, and forestry and timber-processing industries. 
l8Vigorous impulse was given to another 15 projects with a view to their entering operation in 1984. 
l9Where headway is being made by an experiment in agroindustrial integration in the citrus fruit industry. 
246 
Table 8 
CUBA: MAIN INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTS 
CUBA 














Pain, enamel and varnish 







Unbleached cardboard and 
cardboard 
Capital and durable 
consumer goods 
Refrigerators' 




Electric wire and cables, 
not coated* 
Insulated wires and cables* 

































































































































































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures supplied by the State Statistical Committee. 
"Provisional figures. Thousands of hectolitres. cMillions of units. 
'Thousands of units. Units. gThousands of kilometres. 
Millions of square metres. 
In the capital and consumer goods industries, outstanding features were the production of 624 
sugar-cane combines, with designs worked out entirely in Cuba, adapted to the climate of the country 
and to the characteristics of its sugar-cane plantations; a partial recovery in assembly of 
omnibuses —which had fallen 35% in the three preceding years— and in production of electric 
wires and cables —which had dropped by 44% between 1980 and 1982—; and a boom in the 
production of domestic electrical equipment, with the exception of refrigerators (see table 8). 
Production of intermediate goods also gathered strength in 1983 and output of all items rose 
well above the levels reached in 1982, with the exception of production of anhydrous ammonia (-
13%), superphosphate (-61%), ammonium nitrate (-15%), bottles (-18%) and cement (-3%). 
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Apart from the progress indicated in table 8, production of torula yeast increased by 72%, that of 
inner tubes by 61% and that of corrugated paperboard containers by 7%. 
Output of consumer goods expanded by 2.6%, thanks to the counterbalancing trends followed 
by sugar and beverages and tobacco —which declined slightly— and by production of foodstuffs 
(excluding sugar), ready-made clothing and printed matter, which increased at very high rates (see 
table 7). 
The falling-off in the processing of beverages and tobacco was due to a reduction of over 6% in 
production of twist, among the causes of which was the damage to the tobacco crops already 
described; in contrast, output of beverages and of cigarettes went up by 5% and 1%, respectively. 
In 1982/1983 sugar-cane harvest produced 7 109 000 tons of sugar and was thus the second 
lowest since 1978, and 13% below that of 1982 (see table 9). This drop was not due to smaller 
supplies of cane in the sugar-cane plantations —in fact at the time when harvesting began they 
amounted to 1.5 million tons more than in 1982, which was one of the two years with the biggest 
sugar output since 1960—; rather was it attributable to the effects of the above-mentioned adverse 
weather conditions on cane-cutting and the industrial yield. 
Owing to the deterioration caused by the storms in the access roads for transport to the sugar-
mills, and to the shorter time available daily for cutting, the volume of sugar-cane cut contracted by 
6.5%, notwithstanding that harvesting was prolonged for eight days. Furthermore, the industrial 
yield shrank to 10.35% —the second lowest since the 1952/1953 harvest— because of the excess 
moisture in the cane, the imperfect cutting due to the swampiness of the ground, the difficulties 
encountered in the mechanized cutting and lifting operation, the longer time that the cut cane was left 
on the plantation, and its dirty condition. These decreases occurred in spite of the fact that in 
preparing for the 1983 crop 634 000 tons of compound fertilizers (nitrogen, phospBates and 
potassium) —an unprecedented figure— were applied on the sugar-cane plantations, as well as 
227 000 tons of nitrogenous fertilizers —the third biggest volume on record; and that weeding by 
hand in the sugar-cane plantations covered over 3.3 million hectares and 2 million hectares had been 
irrigated— also unprecedented events in the history of Cuba's sugar industry. 
Thanks to the measures adopted to increase efficiency in the sugar-mills, the actual days of 
milling were considerably reduced, which meant that the amount of sugar-cane milled per working 
day reached almost 609 000 tons —the highest figure since I960. A significant increment was thus 
Table 9 



























































































































Source: I960 to 1970: Central Planning Board, Statistical Bureau, Boletín Estadístico, 1970; from 1975 to 1982, Anuario Estadístico de Cuba, 
1982; and for 1983, data supplied by the State Statistical Committee. 
"Harvest year. Provisional figures. 
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CUBA 
achieved in the economic: yields of the sugar industry complex, mainly on the basis of a perceptible 
stepping-up of the thermal efficiency of the mills. By virtue of this fact, combined with the 
conditioning of the furnaces for burning bagasse, in 1983 consumption of fuel oil during harvest was 
reduced to only 23 000 tons, after having reached 430 000 tons in 1979. Given the average world 
market price of US$ 28 per barrel of fuel oil, this saving of 407 000 tons was equivalent to US$ 76 
million, and was made possible largely by the use of sugar-cane bagasse. 
Moreover, during 1983 the expansion of milling capacity in the sugar-mills continued, with the 
addition of an extra 17 300 tons per day of potential capacity, bringing it up to 596 200 tons. 
Operational capacity increased by 14 300 tons daily, reaching a total of 515 300 tons per day. This 
investment helped to consolidate the fundamental role played by sugar in the economic development 
of Cuba as the principal generator of foreign exchange (between 70% and 80% of the total value of 
exports). 
Lastly, attention should be drawn to the 10% increase observed in production of foodstuffs, 
inasmuch as despite the difficulties encountered in domestic supplies of agricultural products and the 
constraints on external purchases deriving from the international situation, the output planned was 
exceeded by 4% in more than 650 plants in the manufacturing sector. 
v) Construction. After its virtual stagnation in the preceding year, in 1983 construction 
expanded by 10% (see table 10). 
Three main factors influenced this result. In the first place, the volume of investment was 
enlarged by 10% and the maintenance of highway and electric energy transmission networks was 
increased even more (27%). Secondly, bigger supplies of building materials were available, such as 
crushed stone, tiles, cement,20 wire rod, etc., which in some cases came from stocks built up in 1982. 
Lastly, some part was also played by the repairing of the damage due to natural disasters. 
During 1983 the State built 26 320 housing units and 30 000 more were the product of the self-
help construction system.21 Nevertheless, the deterioration of urban housing is still very serious, 
especially in the oldest parts of the city of Havana, since no maintenance work has been undertaken 
for decades. Consequently, during 1982 and 1983 priority programmes were established for 
strengthening the maintenance and repair of housing, particularly in the capital. Two types of 
measures were adopted to further these programmes: firstly, in 1983 five enterprises were set up in 
Havana, some of which specialized in maintenance and repair of housing and others in maintenance 
and repair of public buildings and streets. Secondly, a production plan was put into effect with a view 
to substituting domestic for imported building materials, by increasing production of paint, sanitary 
appliances, ironwork, plastic sanitary piping, materials for electric installations and other materials. 
Concurrently, action on the part of private individuals was encouraged through credits for the 
building and repair of housing, larger direct supplies of building materials being provided. 
Industrial construction increased by 20% and accounted for the largest proportion of the sector 
(21%). Thanks to this the 17 major projects mentioned above were completed, and another 15 were 
in process of execution. As a whole, construction of this kind represented 31% of the investment in 
this sector. Despite its very high growth rate (69%), agricultural construction was equivalent to less 
than half what had been effected annually during the period 1979-1981 (see table 10). Construction of 
railroads more than doubled, thus partly recovering from its precipitous drop in the preceding year. 
This expansion reflected efforts made to finish or reconstruct a total of 700 kilometres of track in the 
central railroad (conditioning it for speeds of up to 140 kilometres/hour), and to maintain the sugar-
cane rail transport facilities damaged by the storms at the beginning of the year. Hydraulic 
construction rose by almost 5%, after three years in which it had fallen continuously, while road-
building (excluding railroads) decreased by 3% and maritime and other constructions dropped 
sharply (by 7% and 19%, respectively). In the sphere of social welfare (excluding housing), 31 major 
construction projects were completed. 
vi) Electricity. The sector's basic activity increased by 5%, with the result that gross generation 
reached an all-time high of 11 533 GWh. Of this 84% came from public utility plants, 9% from the 
sugar-mill plants and 7% from those of the nickel industry and from other isolated plants not 
20 In the case of cement, despite a reduction of 63 000 tons in the volume of output, apparent consumption was able to rise on account of a 
considerable decrease in exports, which in 1981 had been 420 000 tons and in 1982 290 000 tons. 
21 Apparently this figure includes the addition of rooms to dwellings and even major repairs. In most cases the housing u nits constructed 
under this system do not display the same technical characteristics as those built by the State. 
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interconnected with the system. Thermo-electric plants accounted for 98% of total generation. Yet 
consumption of electricity rose by less than 1% (see table 11). This figure excludes, however, the 
electricity consumption of the sugar sector and of the nickel-producing enterprises, as well as that 
corresponding to generation by other producers', which, as a whole, increased by 16%. 
At the end of 1982 generation capacity stood at 2 418 MW, of which only 1.9% is hydro-electric, 
so that Cuba is heavily dependent upon imported fuels. Hence the strenuous efforts made to discover 
deposits of petroleum and natural gas. 
3. The external sector 
In Cuba's case foreign trade is a variable which strongly influences the operation of the economy. In 
addition, the evolution of foreign trade with the market economy countries is highly unpredictable, 
inasmuch as it is heavily dependent upon exports of sugar, whose international price has fluctuated 
widely since 1970. This also makes it difficult to forecast supplies of intermediate goods and 
Table 10 
CUBA: INDICATORS OF CONSTRUCTION 
Construction and assembly 
(base 1975 = 100) 
Agriculture 
















Production of selected 
building materials 





































































































































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures supplied by the State Statistical Committee. 
"Provisional figures. The percentage breakdown and growth rates were calculated on the basis of non-rounded figures. 




CUBA: ELECTRICITY INDICATORS 
Gross generation 
Ministry of the Electricity 
Industry 
























































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures supplied by the State Statistical Committee. 
"Provisional figures. ^Growth rates were calculated on the basis of non-rounded figures. 'Excluding the consumption of the 
Ministry of the Sugar Industry, and of the nickel-producing enterprises, as well as that corresponding to generation by "other 
producers". d Corresponds to the year 1971. 
indispensable capital goods from the countries in question. Furthermore, Cuba's internacional trade 
still suffers from the latent negative effect deriving from the economic embargo imposed on the 
country almost 25 years ago. 
In recent years, trade with the market economy countries has been encountering difficulties 
attributable to international financing constraints, which have been aggravated by the sharp 
upswings in interest rates and by the reduction of the said countries' purchases of Cuban goods. The 
effects of these situations worsened in 1982, when international sugar prices dropped still more 
sharply, the use of new international credits in convertible currency was restricted, and the burden of 
the external debt contracted in convertible currency increased.22 All this led the authorities to begin 
renegotiation of the debt in the year in question, to impose severe restrictions on imports, even 
sacrificing economic growth, and to maximize encouragement of export expansion.23 
The results of the renegotiation and other foreign trade measures adopted —chiefly those 
deriving from the special arrangements concerted with the CMEA countries, and in particular with the 
Soviet Union— produced a positive effect in 1983, easing the pressure of the external sector on the 
evolution of the internal economy. 
Hence, for example, in trade with the market economy countries, despite the unfavourable 
evolution of international prices, exports increased and better external supplies were obtained. At the 
same time, international reserves in convertible currencies rose, partly because the renegotiation of 
the debt carried out in 1982, by reducing expenditure on debt amortization, favoured a bigger net 
inflow of resources from international sources of financing, and, more especially, owing to the 
increase in transfer payments made by the Soviet Union in currency of this type. 
The results obtained in trade with the socialist counries were also more favourable, thanks to 
new transfer payments which counteracted the adverse effect of the fall in the volume of sugar 
exports, both through a rise in the price paid for sugar by the Soviet Union for and through the prices 
charged by that country for certain import items, which were lower than quotations on the 
international market. Similarly, Cuba was allowed to re-export part of its imports of petroleum, with 
the consequent profit deriving from the difference between the import price and the current 
international market quotation. 
"During the second half of 1982 maturities amounting to over 1.25 million pesos fell due. 




Union in force up to 1985, which has proved highly favourable to Cuba. Under its terms, any 
surpluses that Cuba obtains through saving on the use of fuels can be sold to the Soviet Union against 
freely convertible currency and at international market prices. As in recent years the intensive fuel-
saving campaign has yielded positive results, especially in the sugar industry, these petroleum sales 
have become an important source of foreign exchange. 
ii) Imports. In 1983 purchases abroad totalled almost 6 225 million pesos, an amount 12% 
higher than the previous year's figure. Imports from the socialist area increased by 10%, while those 
from other countries rose by 31 %, thus partly recovering from their sharp decline in the preceding 
year (see table 15). Despite the efforts made since long before 1980 to reduce the degree of 
dependency on external supplies, the Cuban economy is still highly dependent upon imports: in fact 
the import coefficient in 1983 (25%) was only slightly lower than that recorded in 1980 (27%). 
During 1983 the authorities continued adopting import substitution measures and 
rationalizing imports that had to be paid for in convertible currencies. As a result, in 1983 the share of 
imports from market economy countries in that year's global social product was 3.3%, a coefficient 
somewhat higher than that of 2.7 recorded in 1982, but much lower than those of 6% and 5% 
coresponding to the years 1980 and 1981, respectively. 
From the partial data available on the composition of imports it appears that the proportion of 
the total represented by intermediate goods purchased in freely convertible currency rose from 62% 
in 1982 to 73 % in 1983. This increase was consequent upon the policy adopted since 1982. In that year 
the government issued instructions to the peffect that imports paid for in convertible currency should 
be kept down to the indispensable minimum and should be geared, in the first place, to guaranteeing 
"production for export and tourism, other activities generating income in convertible currency, and 
programmes directed towards the expansion and diversification of these" and, secondly, "to 
guaranteeing the essential consumption and medical care of the population".26 Given this 
orientation, on the one hand, and, on the other, the increase in domestic production, it may be 
supposed that imports of raw materials and capital goods enlarged their share in total purchases from 
the socialist countries. 
iii) The terms of trade. Although neither export and import price and quantum indexes nor 
data whereby they could be indirectly estimated were available, some trends can be inferred. 
As regards the prices concerted in trade with market economy countries, Cuba was not exempt 
from the trend towards 'ioration of the terms of trade between industrialized and developing 
countries as they presented themselves in 1983. On the one hand, there was a reduction in the 
effective average price of sugar (see table 13) and of other Cuban export products, such as for 
example, nickel; on the other hand, prices of imported goods continued to rise. With the aim of 
palliating the negative effects of this latter trend, the Ministry of Foreign Trade carried out an 
Table 14 
CUBA: SUGAR EXPORTS BY COUNTRIES OF DESTINATION 
Value 
Soviet union 
Rest of socialist countries 
Rest of world 
Volume 
Soviet Union 
Rest of socialist countries 
Rest of world 


































































CUBA: EXPORTS, IMPORTS AND TRADE BALANCE 
Millions of Cuban pesos Growth rates 
1970 1975 1980 1982 1983" 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983" 
Total exports 
Soviet Union 
Rest of socialist 
countries 
Rest of world 
Total imports 
Soviet Union 
Rest of socialist 
countries 
Rest of world 
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Soviet Union 
Rest of socialist 
countries 





































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures supplied by the State Statistical Committee, the National Bank of Cuba and other international 
sources such as Soviet Union, Foreign Trade. 
"Provisional figures. 
indicative programming of the probable evolution of international prices at the level of specific 
products and instructed importer enterprises to adhere to it; strictly controlled any purchase which it 
was sought to make at prices higher than those programmed; and kept precise statistics of every 
contract signed, comparing the agreed price with those quoted on the day of signature in the world 
market or on specific stock exchanges. The application of these procedures resulted in 1983 in a 
saving estimated at US$ 50 million. 
In trade with socialist countries, which represented 86% of Cuba's total foreign trade in 1982 
and 1983, provision is made for compensation in respect of losses on the terms of trade, as is usual 
among the CMEA countries. Thus, in the Sugar Agreement signed by Cuba with the countries in 
question, and in force for the five-year period 1981-1985, a floor price is established which is 
calculated on the basis of world sugar production costs and other parameters. The basic minimum 
price fixed in 1980 was 19-23 US cents per pound for Eastern Europe and 35.4 cents per pound for the 
Soviet Union. Starting from this level, sugar prices were adjusted by means of an indexing process, 
whereby increases in the prices of manufactures and the other products imported from the aforesaid 
countries were applied to the price of Cuban sugar, so that the terms of trade in bilateral transactions 
could be kept stable. 
iv) The balance of trade in goods. After amounting to 161 million pesos in 1975, the trade 
deficit rose rapidly, reaching almost 1 billion in 1981. Although the size of the negative balance was 
substantially reduced in 1982, it increased again in 1983, which meant that the trade deficit in that 
year exceeded 690 million pesos. Of this sum, only 51 million corresponded to trade with market 
economy countries and a little over 420 million to trade with the Soviet Union (see table 15). 
Where the socialist countries were concerned, the financing of these deficits was effected as 
follows: a) payment of accumulated balances with the Soviet Union up to 1972 was deferred, free of 
interest, to 1986; b) subsequent deficits were refinanced through CMEA by means of bilateral and 
multilateral agreements, including three-cornered clearing arrangements; and c) in some cases these 
clearing arrangements included the possibility of using transferable rubles instead of convertible 




In international transactions, the Cuban peso underwent a slight devaluation in relation to the 
United States dollar and one somewhat more marked in relation to the Japanese yen. In contrast, it 
was moderately revaluated in relation to the pound sterling and the Swiss franc, and more strongly 
with respect to the German (Federal Republic) mark (see table 18). 
c) External indebtedness in freely convertible currency 
During 1983 the total disbursed debt increased by 113 million pesos, which brought it up to 
2 807 million. This amount, although 13% bigger than that recorded at the end of 1982, was lower 
than the average figure of 3 230 million recorded in the three-year period 1970-1981 (see table 19). 
In face of the hardening of external financing terms, and in view of the fact that during the 
second part of 1982 the country had to make amortization payments in the neighbourhood of 1 250 
million pesos —a sum equivalent to 43% of the disbursed debt up to the end of June of that year—, 
the government proceeded to make preparations for renegotiating its external debt. 
On the adoption of this decision, and before it was announced, a report was prepared on the 
economic situation, which was presented to the highest financial authorities of the creditor 
countries.29 Until the request for renegotiation was formally and publicly made, Cuba continued the 
servicing of interest payments, but suspended amortization payments on medium- and long-term 
credits. 
According to the Cuban authorities, the presentation of this report meant that when the request 
was submitted to their creditors they received it with all the evidence before them, and thus, once 
some legal drawbacks posited by one financial institution had been overcome, the following 
agreements were concluded with respect to medium-term credits: a) payment of maturities falling 
due between 1 September 1982 and 31 December 1983 was deferred; b) a promise to renegotiate 
1984 maturities was obtained; c) it was established that the amortization of suspended payments 
Table 18 
CUBA: EVOLUTION OF EXCHANGE RATE 










































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of National Bank of Cuba data. 
" 100 yens. 
! ' The non-oil-producing creditor market economy countries numbered 26, and their share in the total debt was 70%. The participation 
coefficients of the main creditors were as follows: France, 11%; Spain, 12%; Japan, 11%; United Kingdom, 7%; Finland, 4%; and other 




CUBA: INDICATORS OF EXTERNAL INDEBTEDNESS 
IN CONVERTIBLE CURRENCY" 
1979 1980 1981 
Disbursed debt 
Bilateral official debt 
Multilateral official debt 
Suppliers 
Financial institutions 
Medium-term bilateral loans and loans 
from consortia 
Short-term deposits 





Amortization payments on long-term debts 
Amortization payments on short-term debts 
Coefficients 
Disbursed debt/global social product 
Debt service/exports of goods and services 
Debt service/disbursements 





























































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of data supplied by the State Statistical Committee and the National Bank of Cuba. 
"Includes commitments in freely convertible currency falling due in one year or less after the data of issue. Provisional figures. 
^Includes long- and short-term loans received, according to the balance of payments. Relates to service payments included in the 
balance of payments (see table 15). c For want of broken-down information, exports of goods and services include factor services, except 
for interest payments on the debt. 
should begin early in 1986, and should be effected over a period of 5 years in equal six-monthly 
instalments; and d) the commissions and spreads applied were equivalent to those obtained by other 
countries in similar conditions. For the amortization of short-term credits, too, more favourable 
terms were secured. 
As a result of these renegotiations, in 1983 all the ratios between elements linked to the 
external debt and the main macroeconomic variables showed appreciable improvements. Thus, the 
debt service/export coefficient decreased by more than one-third and was even lower than in 1979; 
the debt service/global social product ratio (2.5%) returned to the levels prevailing in the years prior 
to 1980, after having risen sharply in the years 1981 and 1982 ( 3 % and 4 % , respectively); and the 
external debt/global social product coefficient was slightly reduced (see table 19). 
4. Wages, prices and productivity 
In the Cuban economic system wages are the population's basic source of income. The nominal wage, 
vis-a-vis the mass of goods available at a given price level, determines the quantitative aspects of the 
population's consumption.30 As an upward trend in real wages is one of the central objectives of 
economic policy and an increase in productivity a sine qua non in the Economic and Social Guidelines 
of the 1981-1985 Plan, the authorities took pains to regulate the interrelationships between the wage 
and productivity variables. 
30In these circumstances, imbalances between wages and prices led to an increase in the liquid resources in the hands of the population. 
Unable to find expression in a generalized price inflation, up to 1981 this surplus liquidity generated a "black" market in some consumer goods 
and excess demand for certain services, such as restaurants and entertainments. 
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a) Wages 
As part of the economic reform begun in 1976, during 1981 the wage reform initiated at the end 
of 1980 was continued in greater depth. The central purpose of this reform was to reorganize labour 
activity, set a higher value on the more efficient use of working time, raise the population's level of 
living, and encourage productive activity.31 The reform was closely linked to the increase in 
productivity, and under it concrete expression is given to this linkage through the organization of 
labour and the establishment of norms of work. These normative efforts were associated with 
material incentives to workers and with political and social motivation to fulfil the norms set. 
The reform, based on the principle of equal wages for equal work in all spheres of production 
and geographical areas, was applied in keeping with the wage system, of which the following are the 
main elements: a) the wage scale; b) theevaluators;c) tariffs; and d) forms of payment.32 In 1982 the 
bases of the system were established and progress was made in its application. During 1983 more 
than 75% of all workers in the country were paid by norm and this mode of payment began to be 
practised in the retail trade and in restaurant services.33 
During 1983 the general wage fund grew by almost 5 %, a figure contrasting with that of 6% 
recorded in 1982 and, above all, with that of 18% achieved in 1981. The average number of workers 
employed during the year in the productive sphere went up by 3 % and the average wage rose by 1.7 % 
(see table 20). 
Average wages increased by nearly 2 % in the sphere of production and about 1 % in the non-
productive sphere. In the former the increases were much smaller than in 1982, and wages even 
decreased in forestry; in contrast, they rose by over 2% in industry, construction and transport. 
Although no precise data were available, it may be noted that to average wages were added significant 
earnings in the shape of premiums for over-fulfilment of norms.34 Furthermore, many enterprises, 
especially in export activities, were authorized by JUCEPLAN to set up material incentive funds. These 
enterprises represented 40% of the total number; in 1983 this proportion rose to over 50%. 
In employment in the sphere of production, a significant redeployment took place to the 
detriment of the agricultural sector —the result of the progress of mechanization in rural areas and of 
the falling-off in sugar-cane activity— and to the benefit of such sectors as industry, forestry, 
construction and commerce, in which last sector a substantial extension of the retail trade network 
was brought about. 
b) Prices 
Between 1963 and 1981, wholesale prices "or producer prices" remained virtually unchanged. 
The reform of these was put into effect on 1 January 1981.35 The objective of this reform was to adapt 
the income obtained by enterprises from the sale of their output to the changes occurring in the 
structure of their internal primary costs and in international market prices. 
To judge from the few figures available, the level of open unemployment is very low.36 This 
does not mean, however, that no unemployment problems exist. On the one hand, in some cases there 
has been a shortage of manpower for specific activities, while in certain areas a persistent problem is 
that of the so-called "interruptos", i.e., workers who are left without jobs (although not without 
"See National Bank of Cuba, Informaciones suministradas al grupo de expertos de los países acreedores, Havana, November 1982. 
32 The scale indicares the degree of complexity of the work done in the various economic activities, from the standpoint of the technical 
requirements for their efficient performance and makes no distinction between branches or local criteria; by the end of 1982 24 scales had been 
established. The evaluators —who are a complement to the scale— discriminate within it in relation to the different techniques necessary, 
including as a criterion the time needed to acquire the requisite know-how. The tariff \s the amount of money paid according to the quantity and 
quality of work done (quality does not imply greater complexity, but rathet extraqualificational conditions which involve more physical and/or 
mental effort). Lastly, the forms of payment are established by time (per hour, per day or monthly wage) and by performance (by the job, by the 
norm with or without adjustment of premiums, etc.). 
31 By their very narutte not all jobs lend themselves easily to the establishment of norms in terms of wotk-working houts petformance; 
this is the case, for example, in an office or a medical centre. 
M In 1983 more than 1.2 million workers wete paid according to the norm; 930 000 of them received benefits in the shape of over-
fulfilment premiums. 
"This reform comprised producer prices of industrial enterprises (consumer, intetmediate and capital goods), agricultural inventory 
prices (sales to the State), construction prices (construction, assembly and infrastructure), tariffs for services to industries, to agricultural 
enterprises and to construction (engineering projects, prospection, cartography, etc.) freight ptices, and domestic prices for imported goods. 
36 According to the population censuses, the rate of unemployment was 1.3% in 1970 and 3.4% in 1981. See JUCEPLAN, Censo de 
población y viviendas, 1970: Datos fundamentales de la población, Havana, Instituto del Libro, pp. 74 to 97; and State Statistical Committee, 
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Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures supplied by the State Statistical Committee. 
"Includes only civilian employment in the State sector. Provisional figures. 
income) because of temporary slumps in production. Then again, there is a marked redundancy of 
personnel in particular activities, as in restaurant and similar services, and also, to a lesser extent, in 
some centres of industrial production and in construction. Certain problems relating to laxities in the 
determination of work norms have also been considered in trade-union and political congresses. 
An additional intention underlying the reform was to secure an improvement in the financial 
situation of State enterprises, on the basis of which they could operate under a self-management or 
self-financing system. In other words, the aim was to obtain adequate rates of return at the enterprise 
level. In actual fact, in the State enterprises as a whole, this reform implied nothing more than a 
rational redistribution of costs. But on comparison of this new wholesale price system, product by 
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product, with the retail price system, it was easy to see the incongruity between the two and the 
obsolescense of the latter, which had remained unchanged for many years. 
To bring the two systems into harmony, the authorities envisaged the application of a price 
policy which, while in keeping with the country's economic policy, would a) introduce into the retail 
price system the changes and the flexibility which the higher levels of productivity and production 
made necessary; b) take into account the correspondence that ought to exist between the population's 
income and its expenditure, in order to avoid exaggerated increases in monetary liquidity; c) advance 
with caution in the process of elimination of the rationed market and develop the State parallel 
market at differential prices; d) correlate prices with the value of goods in demand; ande) encourage 
the production of the local Poder Popular, and other marginal outputs, in order to increase the supply 
of goods and services to the population.37 
On these bases, on 15 December 1981 a new consumer price structure was put into effect which, 
up to September 1982, involved an average rise of about 10%. However, the increases in the prices of 
some wage goods were much higher, as was the case, for example, with those of beef (which went up 
by 27% and 36%, according to the cuts), rice (20%), fruit, vegetables and viandas (40%) and 
detergents 100%).38 
This reform of retail prices was introduced eleven and a half months after that of wholesale 
prices.39 As a result of this dephasing, at least three significant facts occurred: a) the monetary 
liquidity of the population increased by 450 million pesos in 1981, which contributed to the expansion 
of the parallel market for goods; b) heavy losses were incurred in some activities, because the higher 
wage levels had not been incorporated in their prices; and c) these losses not only deducted income 
from the national budget, but also called for large subsidies. To remedy this situation, in 1981 some 
highly important measures were adopted. Among temporary measures were those that have a 
vigorous impulse to the rural free market, a step which, while it relieved the pressure of demand, did 
not necessarily imply a reduction of liquidity, but did involve appreciable speculative price 
movements. Permant measures, linked to the expansion of output available for the market, included 
in the first place an increase in supplies which helped to reduce distribution of products through 
ration books,40 and, secondly, the decision to offer at a single price and without quantitative 
restrictions those goods in which State production was sufficient. 
Thus, in practice, in respect of retail prices four markets came to exist, namely: a) the rationed 
market; b) the controlled State market, comprising products which appear on the list of rationed 
goods but can be purchased in this market in any quantity desired, at higher prices; c) the free State 
market, where products are offered without quantitative restrictions and without price 
discrimination; and d) the rural free market.41 The existence of the first three markets mentioned 
reflects the increasing supply of State production for popular consumption. The rural free market, in 
its turn, is of great significance as regards the supply of certain products such as: garlic, in respect of 
which it satisfied 83% of total demand in 1983; onions, in which it covered 12% of demand; malanga 
(15%) and vianda plantain (9%). It is estimated, however, that in the future this sector will lose some 
of its importance, owing to the widespread co-operativization movement prevailing among small 
independent peasant farmers.42 
Lastly, in consequence of the changes that have taken place in the price system since 1982 and 
the emergence of different markets, the economic authorities perceived the need to possess reliable 
,7See National Bank of Cuba, Informaciones suministradas al grupo de expertos de los países acreedores, Havana, November, 1982. 
"Ibid 
î9That of wholesale prices, while virtually coinciding with an almost 15% rise in wages in 1981 (see table 20), failed to take into account 
the consequent increase in costs under this head. Notwithstanding that Cuba has at its disposal a monthly balance-sheet of sectoral 
interrelationships and a very full and detailed input-output matrix, the reform also failed to incorporate the increase in wholesale prices for 
consumer, intermediate and capital goods, for construction, and for domestic and imported technical services. Hence it is indispensable for the 
adjustment process to be continued with the help of the tools described. 
40The purpose of the ration-book, according to the Cuban authorities, is nowadays exclusively to ensure, in the majority of cases, 
equirable consumption of basic goods. The existence of a parallel market in which rationed products are sold without restrictions, but at much 
higher prices, appears to confirm this assertion 
41 Price differences between the markets are quite considerable. For example, on 30 December 1983, among the prices charged in the 
rationed market (1) the controlled market (2) the free market (3) and the rural market (4) there were appreciable differences in the following 
cases: one litre of pasteurized milk —the price of which was 0.25 pesos in (1) and 0.80 pesos in (2); one kilogram.of rice —which was priced at 
0.52 pesos in (1),2.61 pesos in (2) and 2.11 pesos in (4); one kilogram of garlic—the price of which was 4.35 pesos in (1), 15.40 pesos in (2) and 
14.26 pesos in (4). In contrast, in the free market (3) eggs were sold at 0.10 pesos per unit, butter at 5.22 pesos per kilo, bread at 0.33 pesos per 
kilo, and pork at 7.30 pesos per kilo. 
42It is expected that by 1988 they will all be agrouped in co-operatives delivering their production to the State. 
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and appropriate consumer price indexes. With this end in view, the State Statistical Committee 
carried out a household expenditure survey covering more than 5 000 families. From this were 
obtained the weightings for more than 500 products making up a price index basket which, 
discriminated by markets and by geographical areas, will begin to be published in the second half of 
1984. 
c) Productivity 
In real terms, and excluding commercial activities, productivity per worker increased by 2% 
during 1983, easily improving upon the previous year's increment of 0.6%, but falling far short of the 
14.5% recorded in 1981, in which year, thanks to very favourable exogenous conditions, productivity 
rose by 14% in the gricultural sector, 11% in industry and 23% in construction. 
By sectors, the evolution of productivity was very uneven in 1983. In industry as a whole it went 
up barely 0.3%, in consequence of sharp reductions in output of sugar and of beverages and tobacco, 
due to smaller supplies of agricultural raw materials. In contrast, significant increases were recorded 
in ready-made clothing, textiles, electronic and electrical goods, chemicals, food products, and 
publications and printed matter. Productivity in agriculture, despite the adverse weather conditions 
which affected it, grew by 5 %, reaching a level 20% higher than that of 1980; this was possible thanks 
to increased mechanization, among other factors. In construction productivity rose by 1.4% and in 
transport by about 1 %. In contrast, it decreased in commerce and in the other productive activities. 
As has already been said, an increase in the productivity of labour and rates of return on 
production are a key objective in the running of the economy. The establishment of norms (i.e., the 
fixing of the quantity and quality of output that must be obtained in a given number of working hours) 
is the procedure followed to attain this goal. Up to the end of 1982,60% of workers in normal jobs 
were paid according to norm fulfilment; in 1983 this proportion rose to 90%.43 At the same time, an 
effort was made to perfect the norms established, and to eliminate as far as possible the irrationality, 
superficiality and bureaucratism which were apparent in the fixing of norms in some centres of work, 
and which at times created labour pressures. 
If the criterion applied for measuring productivity is not the value of output but the value 
incorporated or value added, the increases in productivity indicated will be bigger, since they will have 
to be augmented by the saving achieved in the use of raw materials. This saving amounted to more 
than 200 million pesos in 1983, and in the utilization of energy by the production apparatus and by 
the population was equivalent to a reduction of 500 000 tons of petroleum.44 
5. Monetary and fiscal policies 
a) Introduction 
For the purposes of a better understanding of the evolution of the main monetary variables in 
1983, it seems worth while to make a few observations on the operation of the Cuban bank system, 
particularly in view of the fact that, as it pertains to a country with a centrally planned economy, it 
differs notably from that existing in almost all the other countries of the region. 
In conformity with the economic reform begun in 1976 and with the new System of Economic 
Direction and Planning, the Five-Year Plan for 1981-1985 included more precise instructions and 
norms relating to the operation of the self-management or self-financing system in enterprises 
producing material goods and services; the Plan also comprised norms for the strengthening of 
"democratic centralism" in the budgeted redistribution of the global economic surplus. These features 
—considered of fundamental importance for perfecting the running of the economy— and the 
occurrence of other events —such as the general price and wage reforms applied from 1981 
onwards— revealed the increasing significance of the role assigned to financial planning in the 
direction and control of the national economy. 
«Of the norms established, 77% are elementar; and 23% are of a semi-technical character. 
"See Humberto Pérez, President of JUCEPLAN, Exposición ante la Asamblea Nacional, 22 December 1982. 
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In this sense, the year 1983 witnessed a very important change as regards the use of financial 
categories as effective tools for measuring, monitoring and raising the overall efficiency of the 
economic system. To this end, early in the year the "profitability working parties"45 concluded their 
task at the national level, having been initiated on the instructions of the political authorities at the 
level of each individual enterprise to evaluate the factors affecting and ways and means of increasing 
its profitability.46 Thus, at the present time both monetary and fiscal policy have assumed a role of the 
first importance. 
b) Monetary policy 
Up to 1981 the part played by monetary and fiscal policy in the internal operation of the Cuban 
economic system was on the neutral side.47 On the domestic plane, in contrast with its active role in 
external economic relations, the National Bank of Cuba confined itself to the centralized 
management of the monetary flows of income and expenditure generated in the production units, the 
central institutions, and the public administration. True, the corresponding plans, on consolidation, 
afforded a measure of the quantity of money necessary for fulfilment of the planned economic 
interrelations among productive units, for meeting the consequent wage fund needs, and for 
financing the centralized requirements of the State. But as the non-State sector is small, and saving 
and credit play a very modest role, the bank, under this planned system, had very little possibility of 
influencing the volume of the money supply required for the fulfilment of the said plans, or of using 
money as a tool for their more efficient implementation. 
However, the wage and price reform introduced in 1981 acted as a stimulus to the drawing-up 
of an economic policy which would prevent a monetary overflow and would at the same time 
encourage efficient use of money by the production units and by the population. 
For a better understanding of the way in which this policy was applied, reference must be made 
to the tools employed: interest rates and rediscounts (single or differential), credit quotas and others. 
Within the framework of the national economic plans and the State budget of income and 
expenditure, the National Bank consolidated the budget plans prepared by all units of production that 
conduct their monetary operations through the Bank itself.48 This consolidation is carried out by the 
agencies to which the units in question are subordinated and is effected at the municipal, regional and 
national levels. 
The continuous follow-up and periodic review of the budget plan of each executing unit49 
makes it possible, firstly, to control the amounts of money in circulation which, according to the 
degree of implementation of the plan, each economic unit, branch and region requires, and, secondly, 
to evaluate the economic efficiency of the system.50 During 1983 this monetary supervision and 
control procedure was applied more intensively than in any previous year. 
Furthermore, as under the Cuban planning system the balance of the population's monetary 
income and expenditure determines the variations in the money supplied in the hands of the public,5 ' 
the budget controls described permit a timely follow-up of the movements of monetary liquidity 
outside the Bank and the adoption of the necessary correctives, whether through prices, through 
saving or through credit. 
As a result of the 1981 wage reform, its subsequent adjustments, and the lag in the adjustments 
of consumer prices, the population's increase in liquidity during 1981-1983 was 634 million pesos, a 
figure 16 times higher than that recorded in the whole of the five-year period 1976-1980. It was 
45 Assemblies of workers and managers held both at the level of producer units and enterprises and at the municipal, regional and 
national levels, by branches and subordinating agencies, to analyse this question. 
46Profitability is defined in each enterprise as the ratio between profits and the volume of fixed and working capital. 
*7See UNCTAD, Cuba: Recent economic development and future prospects, UNCTAD/MFD/TA/21, Annex II, p. 31. 
48The budget plans are an instrument created by Decree No. 19 of 1978. This law establishes that the Bank will submit the budget plan to 
the Council of Ministers. After its approval, the Bank has to provide the Council with quarterly reports on the budget plan. 
wThis review is carried out quarterly by committees at the municipal, regional and national levels. The chairmen of the committees are 
members of the corresponding Poderes Populares at the municipal and regional levels, and at the national level the President of the National 
Bank. 
™ In the event of deviations from the Plan, provision is made for appropriate remedial measures, including penalties of a financial or 
other type. 
11 This is because the centralized and obligatory management by the National Bank of the monetary flows of economic bodies means that 
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Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
"Provisional figures. ''Comprises income of peasant farmers, transport workers and artisans from sales of goods and services to the 
State, to co-operatives and to other organizations. c Comprises pensions of all kinds, personal subsidies, loans from the bank system, 
interest on savings, foreign exchange drafts and transfer payments received. Comprises amortization and interest payments on loans, 
quotations to political, sports and social institutions, savings deposits and drafts and transfers. 
because of this phenomenon that in 1981 price policy and monetary policy measures were adopted, 
since in that year 70% of the aforesaid increase in liquidity was accumulated. 
The substantial retail price increases which came into force mainly in 1982 and the more 
moderate ones applied in 1983 made it possible for the annual increments in liquidity to decrease, 
despite the population's growing income, from 448 million pesos in 1981 to 117 million in 1982 and 
69 million in 1983. Furthermore, thanks to the monetary policy pursued, the cash in the hands of the 
public —which had increased by 305 million pesos in 1981—was reduced by 80 million the following 
year and by 6 million during 1983- There was a substantial rise, in contrast, in savings deposits (see 
table 21). 
During the 1960s and 1970s, domestic savings had played a meagre role in economic 
development and in the regulation of the money in circulation. Various causes account for this 
behaviour. The chief of these was probably the priority attention that the National Bank had to 
devote to the fundamental tasks assigned to it by the National Direction system in connection with 
the economic control of enterprises and management of international financial relations. Other 
unfavourable conditions were the inadequacy of bank facilities, the lack of incentives to saving (in fact 
in 1968 the payment of interest on the balance of savings accounts was suspended), and the account-
holders' ignorance of their rights over their savings accounts and bank deposits. 
In the Economic and Social Guidelines for the Five-Year Plan for 1981-1985 provision was 
made for a reversal of this situation. Thus, the National Bank was assigned the objective of 
encouraging savings and to that end it created a new vice-presidency and prepared an "Incentives to 
Saving Project" which was submitted to the Council of State. As a result of this initiative, the Council 
issued Decree No. 69 of May 1983, whereby a People's Savings Bank (Banco Popular de Ahorro) was 
created. 
Moreover, in recent years the network of bank agencies has been considerably enlarged; their 
number rose from 74 in 1978 to 421 in 1983. The network now covers 143 of the 169 existing 
municipalities, whereas in 1978 it covered only 25. In 1983 each served an average of 24 000 
inhabitants, almost half the number served per agency in 1980.52 At the same time, the hours of daily 
attention to the public were increased from 5 to 12.5. To strengthen its operations, the Bank stepped 
"The importance assigned to the bank system, in general, and to savings policy in particular, is exemplified in the goal for the end of the 
1980s, namely, that each agency should serve not more than 10 000 inhabitants. 
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up the number of visits made by its savings and credit promoters to work centres, co-operatives, small 
peasant farmers and other associations from 7 000 in 1981 to 53 000 in 1983- It also took more 
intensive action to disseminate knowledge of the individual's constitutional rights over his bank 
deposits, extended the range of services offered to its clients (automatic payment of public service 
tariffs, credit amortization, etc.) and re-established interest payments on savings deposit balances. 
Lastly, between 1980 and 1983 personal credits increased significantly (see table 22). The 
interest rates applied ranged from a maximum of 9.5% per annum for long-term purchases of 
passenger cars and a minimum of 4 % for repairs of dwellings. Between 1982 and 1983 the rates 
corresponding to credits for purchases of refrigerators in the parallel market rose from 7% to 7.5 %; 
but they remained constant at 5% when these articles were bought on credit in the rationed market, 
and those applied to purchases of air-conditioners were reduced from 9% to 7.5%. 
The volume of credit granted to small peasant farmers and to agricultural co-operatives 
increased from 140 million pesos in 1981 to 231 million in 1983. This increase, however, was very 
unevenly distributed. In fact, in consequence of the strong co-operativization drive, between the years 
in question loans to peasant farmers dropped from 65 to 45 million pesos, while those extended to co-
operatives soared from 75 to 186 million. 
By the end of 1983 the balance of State credits had risen to 6 000 million pesos, that is, 804 
million more than on the same date in 1982 and 1 270 million above the figure recorded two years 
before. During 1983 financing of inventories decreased by more than 280 million pesos, whereas 
financing for working capital went up by 30 million and for trade operations (whose share in the 
credits was 35%) by 270 million. In turn, the agricultural sector increased its net commitments by 
almost 60 million and other national activities by 740 million pesos. 
Table 22 
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Monetary saving of the population (1974= 100) 105 101 120 147 157 
Number of credits to the population (thousands) 
For domestic electrical equipment 
For motor-vehicles 
For construction materials and repair of dwellings 
Others 
Value of personal credit (millions of pesos) 
For domestic electrical equipment 
For motor-vehicles 
For construction materials and repair of dwellings 
Others 
Other items (millions of pesos) 
Collection of payments 
Balances outstanding 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of statistics supplied by the People's Savings Bank. 





























































c) Fiscal policy 
Among the instruments of financial policy which the authorities have been applying and 
perfecting since 1976, particularly under the present Five-Year Plan for 1981-1985, the budget has 
fulfilled two basic functions: redistribution of a substantial proportion of national income53 and 
monitoring of national economic activity. Taking into account the results of monetary policy, analysis 
of the execution of the budget permits a global evaluation not only of domestic finances, but also of 
the efficiency with which the system operates. 
In order to perform these tasks in the course of 1981-1983, the State Finances Committee 
(Comité Estatal de Finanzas - CEF) had to devote much of its efforts to systematizing the ways in 
which individuals with tax obligations had to classify and present accounts of their financial action, to 
determining methods of calculating their main tax base,54 to organizing and establishing norms for 
relations between these individuals, their central or subordinating Poder Popular agencies and the 
national budget for the purposes of distribution of the surplus created and, lastly, to laying down 
norms and procedures for fiscal auditing. 
In carrying out this work, CEF, in keeping with the indicators contained in the Single 
Development Plan and with the National Statistical System, established a National Accounting 
System, thereby giving concrete financial expression to the "economic calculation" procedures which 
enterprises are obliged to follow. The system constitutes the tool for checking up on financial 
efficiency at the level of economic units and also, through consolidation of accounts, at the national 
level and by branches of activity. It is also of basic importance for formulating the budget plan 
required by the National Bank and facilitates this institution's financial and monetary control of 
enterprises. 
In 1982 CEF issued resolution 58, which, among other norms, laid it down that as from 1 January 
1983 all State enterprises will have to present once a month to the Finance Department of the Poder 
Popular the set of models indicated by the Information System of the National Accounting System. 
According to the authorities, the experience gathered during the year in question showed increasing 
skill on the part of the Poder Popular in analysing the results obtained and indicated its fuller 
participation in the monitoring of local economic management. 
In this same resolution regulations and norms were established with respect to the financial 
procedures that must be followed by enterprises with regard to the operation of bank accounts;55 to 
relations with the State Budget and with the subordinating central agencies;56 and to debit and credit 
interest payments on these accounts. It stated the method to be used for calculating the free profit 
balance,57 which is the enterprises' principal tax base. Furthermore, dates and schedules were 
established for payment of contributions and details were given of procedures for receiving subsidies 
for planned losses or applying for them when unforeseen results occurred. 
The State Finances Committee also laid down procedural patterns for the central 
administration agencies in charge of production enterprises, for redistributing among these the 
estimated profits collected in order to finance losses or increases in working capital, and for financing 
investment in their enterprises. It likewise indicated to these agencies how the proportions of the 
depreciation reserves which their enterprises had transferred to them should be redistributed and the 
functions which should be fulfilled by this redistribution. 
Lastly, in October 1982 CEF decreed the "General Norms for Auditing" which it began to apply, 
as from 1 January 1983, to all State enterprises and agencies, with the exception of the National Bank, 
with a view to promoting the more efficient utilization of resources, preventing their misuse, 
"According to the estimates prepared by the State Finances Committee, this redistribution represented about 60% of national income. 
u T h e so-called "free profit balance". 
"These include operational accounts, investment financing, capitalizable general reparations and bank credits, in accordance with the 
procedures established by the National Bank of Cuba. 
56These norms indicate what enterprises will contribute to each of the entities in question: for example, to the budget they will 
contribute: the free profit balance; the depreciation of basic means of production (fixed assets) which are not retained or transferred to their 
central agency for the financing of investment; and surplus working capital. Similarly, indications are given of the resources which, under specific 
heads and procedures, they will receive from those same entities; for example, from the budget they will receive resources for financing a) losses 
not covered by their agency; b) losses on account of price differentials as established by the State Pricing Committee; c) increases in working 
capital; and d) investment not financed by funds of their own or by the central agency to which they are subordinated. 
"From the balance-i beet profit (income minus costs) bank interest and fund (fixed and working capital) payments are deducted, so that 
the estimated balance is obtained. From this are deducted, inter alia: provisions for material incentives to workers, own investment, social outlays 
and transfer payments to their agency in accordance with the norms. Thus the so-called free profit balance is obtained. 
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detecting financing anomalies and suggesting remedial measures, strengthening financial discipline 
and ensuring profounder administrative integrity.58 
d) Fiscal action 
After five consecutive years of deficits in the State budget,59 in 1983 it closed with a surplus of 
385 million pesos, notwithstanding the hardships faced by the economy in consequence of the above-
mentioned climatic phenomena. 
This result was due to the significant increase of 14% in current income,60 which, for the first 
time in the last five years, exceeded the amount programmed, and was more than enough to finance 
administrative, social and development expenditure, which, in its turn, rose by 8% (see table 23). 
Table 23 
CUBA: BUDGET OF STATE INCOME AND EXPENDITURE 
Programmed 
(millions of pesos) 
Actual performance 
Millions of pesos Growth rates 
Current income 
Contributions from the 
State sectors 
Taxes and other 
contributions from 
the non-State sector 
Taxes and duties paid 
by the population 
Total expenditure 
Productive sphere 




Other socio-cultural and 
scientific activities 
Poder Popular, Central 
State Government, 
Tribunals and Public 
Prosecutor's Office 
Defence and domestic 
law and order 
Other activities 
Reserves 
Surplus (or deficit) 
1980 1981 1982 1983 1980 1981 1982 1983° 1981 1982 1983° 
9 534 11201 9 413 10 496 9 389 10 802 9 987 11354 15.0 -7.5 13.7 
9 416 11082 9 289 10 324 9 854 11193 13.6 
17 20 14 16 





9 531 11 197 9 834 10 300 9 644 11 577 10 159 10 969 20.0 -12.2 8.0 
3 978 4 672 3 180 3 558 4 566 5 729 3 822 4 196 25.5 -33.3 9.8 
364 412 483 508 391 467 473 570 19.4 1.3 20.5 
1800 1848 2 040 2 158 1779 2 007 2 097 2 267 12.8 4.5 8.1 
1 315 1 437 1 546 1 524 1 325 1 402 1 425 1 641 5.8 6.6 9.8 
















931 1 109 1 117 22.7 19.1 0.7 
444 543 532 21.6 22.3 -2.2 
3 -421 196 -255 -775 -172 385 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures supplied by the State Statistical Committee, the National Bank of Cuba and the State Finances 
Committee. 
"Provisional figures. 
"Resolution 49 of 1982. 
59Mainlv between 1980 and 1982, when the negative balances increased from 255 million pesos in 1980 to 775 million in 1981, 
subsequently falling to 172 million pesos in 1982. 
60 In Decree No. 44 of July 1981 it was established that income received by the State budget came from the following sources: a) from 
State enterprises answerable for i) the circulation tax applied to consumer goods and goods intended for tec h n ico-productive activity as 
determined by CEF; ii) taxes on services rendered; iii) the foreign trade differential, i.e., external price differences between imports and exports 
of goods; iv) contributions on account of amortization payments on basic means of production (capital goods), of sale of these or of surplus 
revolving means (working capital); b) from State and non-State organization answerable for forestry taxation; c) from State enterprises, 
political, social and mass organizations and enterprises subordinated to any of these organizations, under the head of taxation on the circulât ion 
of overland transport motor-vehicles; and d) from social security contributions made by State enterprises, units working on a budget, political, 
social and mass organizations and enterprises subordinated to these. 
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The increase in income was achieved basically as a result of the price policy applied to consumer 
goods and of the growth of the economy. The first of these factors was linked in its turn to the 
strengthening and development of the parallel market for consumer goods and to the application of 
differential prices. According to CEF estimates, revenue increments under this head amounted to 400 
million pesos.61 The second factor was attributable to more efficient economic management, 
enabling State enterprises to generate increasing profits by expanding the volume of production, a 
result which, in turn, was reflected in larger transfer payments to the State.62 
After the decline of 12% in the preceding year, State expenditure increased by 8% in 1983, 
exceeding the planned amount by 6.5 %. Nevertheless, it did not equal the level of the outlays made in 
1981, the year in which, although one of the highest rates of economic growth in Cuba's history 
(15%) was recorded, one of its biggest fiscal deficits (775 million pesos) was also produced. 
Although outlays destined for the productive sphere increased by almost 10%, they still fell 
short of the levels reached in 1980 and 1981.63 This increase in expenditure, although partly 
originating in the additional subsidy granted to the agricultural sector to cover the losses suffered 
during the first quarter, was mainly intended to finance fixed investment and boost working capital. 
To this financing were added the bigger surpluses retained by enterprises and central administration 
agencies. 
Expenditure on housing and community services rose by 21%, reaching an unprecedented 
level. Furthermore, during 1983 the government continued to assign high priority to public 
expenditure on education, health and socio-cultural and scientific activities, whose share in total 
outlays thus rose from 32% in 1980 to 36% in 1983. 
61 See Francisco Garcia Vails, Minister President of the State Finances Committee, Informe a la Asambia Nacional, fifth session, 22 
December 1983. 
62 For example, in 1983 it was possible to shorten the time that goods remained in the warehouses of theGeneralCustomsHouseof the 
Republic and to raise the tax revenue obtained from the Customs House by 58%. 
" Because the wage reform preceded that of prices, in 1981 the enterprises incurred heavy financial losses, which were largely covered 
with State resources. Moreover, the reduction of expenditure in 1982 was the result of deliberate action on the part of the economic authorities, 
who sacrificed an increase in internal economic dynamism for the sakeof not increasingthe external debt and/ or not failing to keep strictly up to 




1. Recent economic trends: Introduction and summary 
After its extremely unfavourable performance in 1982, when the gross domestic product fell by over 
14%, the unemployment rate in Greater Santiago reached the unprecedented level of 22%, inflation 
increased, and the international reserves went down by some US$ 1.2 billion, the Chilean economy 
suffered further setbacks in 1983. 
However, these were much less marked than in the previous year. Thus, the gross domestic 
product went down by a little under 1%, the average unemployment rate in Greater Santiago 
remained at the level of the year before, the rate of inflation increased only slightly from 21 % to 23 %, 
and the international reserves went down by a little over US$ 600 million. At the same time, 
however, real wages, which had scarcely gone down in 1982, suffered a drop of nearly 11% (see 
table 1 and figure 1). 
These overall results were due to a very uneven performance by the economy during the year, 
which was also markedly different from that registered in 1982. Thus, while in 1982 the economic 
situation deteriorated progressively, in 1983 it showed signs of recovery from the middle of the year 
onwards. 
As may be seen from figure 2, after continuing to contract sharply in the first quarter of the year 
and declining at a moderate rate in the second, overall economic activity almost stabilized in the third 
quarter and increased by almost 6% in the last three months of the year. This change of trend was 
influenced above all by the recovery which manufacturing began to show towards the middle of the 
year and, to a lesser extent, by the increase in the construction sector registered a little later. 
Partly because of these changes, but much more because of the enormous expansion of the 
emergency employment programmes of the Government —which came to employ more than 14% 
of the labour force in Greater Santiago in the second half of the year— the unemployment rate in the 
capital went down from almost 22% at the beginning of the year to 16.5% in the last quarter. 
Towards the middle of 1983 there was also a reversal of the upward trend which inflation had 
been following since June 1982. Thus, the consumer and wholesale price indexes, after attaining 
annualized growth rates of over 30% and 60% respectively between May and July, ended the year 
with variations of the order of 24% (see figure 2). The gradual moderation of the rate of inflation and 
the incipient recovery of economic activity also contributed to the fact that in the last few months of 
1983 there was an interruption in the rapid and persistent drop that real wages had been suffering 
since June 1982. 
The contrast between the evolution of the economy registered in the first and second halves of 
the year was also very clearly seen in the external sector. Thus, on account of the acute uncertainty 
caused by the official intervention in mid-January of eight financial institutions —including the two 
main private banks of the country— the price of the dollar on the parallel market rose on several 
occasions to almost 100% more than the official rate, and in the first three months of the year alone 
the international reserves went down by US$ 1 billion. As a result of the considerable trade surplus 
obtained and, above all, the loans made by the International Monetary Fund and foreign commercial 
banks, however, the international reserves increased in the second half of the year by US$ 480 
million, so that the loss of reserves for the year as a whole was even slightly less than that provided for 
in the agreement initially signed with the Fund. 
In essence, both the overall results registered in 1983 and the evolution of the main indicators in 
the course of the year reflected the continued restrictive effects of external factors and of the changes 
made in domestic economic policy. 
Among the external conditioning factors, the three most important were the unsatisfactory 
level of exports of goods and services, the sharp new decline suffered in 1983 by the net inflow of 
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capital, and the agreements signed with the International Monetary Fund and the foreign private 
banking system within the process of renegotiation of the external debt. 
Thus, in 1983 the value of exports of goods and services went down slightly after having 
dropped sharply in the previous two years. As a result, it was 2 3 % lower than in 1980, in spite of the 
act that the volume of exports of goods had risen by over 15% since that year. 
The net inflow of capital, for its part, which had reached the extraordinary and unsustainable 
level of nearly US$ 5 billion in 1981 but had dropped to only US$ 1 billion in the following year, 
suffered a new contraction of over 30% in 1983, so that it did not even amount to US$ 700 million 
and was equivalent to less than 40% of the net payments of profits and interest. 
Table 1 
CHILE: MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS 
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983" 
A. Basic economic indicators 
Gross domestic product at market 
prices (millions of 1970 dollars) 
Population (millions) 
Per capita gross domestic product 
9 960 10 785 11624 12 289 10 527 10 443 
10.81 10.96 11.13 11.30 11.48 11.67 
(dollars at 1970 prices) 
B. Short-run economic indicators 
Gross domestic product 
Per capita gross domestic product 
Gross national income 
Terms of trade (goods and services) 
Current value of exports of goods 
and services 
Current value of imports of goods 
and services 
Consumer prices 
December - December 
Variation between annual averages 
Money 
Real wages and salaries 
Rate of unemployment17 
Greater Santiago 
Nation-wide 
Current income of government 

















Fiscal deficit/total expenditure of government" 3.6 
Fiscal deficit/gross domestic product 
C. External sector 
Trade balance (goods and services) 
Balance on current account 
Balance on capital account 
Variation in net international reserves 
General external debt (gross) 
General external debt (net)* 
0.8 


























































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official data. 
0 Preliminary figures. ''Gross domestic product plus terms-of-trade effect, less net factor payments to rest of world and net private transfer 
payments. Percentages. d Average for second half of year according to National Statistical Institute (INE). 'Surplus. 
'Excluding variation in reserves due to revaluation of gold. 'Including variation in reserves due to revaluation of gold. 
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Thus, on the one hand the country had to effect a large transfer of resources abroad which 
amounted to a little over US$ 1 100 million and was thus 20% higher than the year before, while on 
the other hand it had to drastically restrict imports for the second year running in order to reduce the 
current account deficit. 
In order to facilitate the adjustment process, at the beginning of January the authorities signed 
an agreement with the International Monetary Fund which included two loans. The first of these, 
designed to make up for the drop in export income caused by the deterioration of the terms of trade, 
was for US$ 325 million and was disbursed immediately. The second —a stand-by credit for US$ 550 
million— was subject however to the fulfilment of a two-year adjustment programme and would be 
disbursed quarterly. As is usual in this latter type of credit, the country undertook not to exceed certain 
limits as regards loss of international reserves, expansion of net Central Bank domestic credit, and 
size of the non-financial public sector deficit, and it agreed to follow a restrictive wage policy, to keep 
interest rates free, and to maintain a liberal scheme as regards imports. 
As a result of the intervention of the financial system which was decreed only three days after 
signing the agreement with the Fund, however, some of the goals provided for in the latter were 
rapidly exceeded. Thus, in the month of January alone there was a loss of reserves of US$ 600 million, 
which was the maximum amount authorized in the agreement with the IMF for the whole year. 
Furthermore, because of the support which the Central Bank had to give to the financial system after 
the intervention measures, the net domestic credit granted by the Central Bank rose by 80 billion 
pesos, thus exceeding by nearly 30 billion pesos the maximum expansion agreed on for the whole 
year. 
In these circumstances, it was indispensable to negotiate with the Fund the modification of the 
original agreement, which, in its turn, was essential both in order to obtain the support of the 
international private banking system in the rescheduling of the external debt commitments and in 
order to secure additional net external financing. 
The new agreement was reached injuly, when the Fund approved a waiver whereby, together 
with reaffirming some of the goals agreed on in the original agreement (such as that regarding the 
maximum loss of reserves), permission was given for the modification of others (such as the 
expansion of the maximum deficit of the non-financial public sector from 1.8% to 2.3% of the gross 
domestic product). This authorization by the Fund also facilitated the agreement between Chile and 
the international private banking system whereby the latter agreed to reschedule for eight years (with 
four years' grace) the amortization payments on both long and medium-term credits falling due in 
1983-1984 and the amounts due in respect of short-term credits. In addition, the banking system 
granted additional credits amounting to USS$ 1.3 billion, to be drawn in 1983. 
Largely thanks to these agreements with the Fund and with the international commercial 
banks, the international reserves increased as from the middle of the year and the economic 
authorities were able to apply a more expansive policy as regards public spending in the last four 
months of the year, while the Central Bank was able to establish lines of credit which enabled it to 
reschedule on less onerous conditions the heavy debts which productive enterprises and real estate 
debtors had with the national banks. The issuing institute also set up other lines of credit for 
financing the working capital of enterprises. Although these measures were not enough to solve the 
serious problems of indebtedness faced by many units of production, on the one hand they helped to 
lighten their financial burden by reducing interest rates and lengthening terms of repayment, while 
on the other they raised demand in sectors such as construction where the under-utilization of 
installed capacity and the labour force were enormous. 
The positive effects of these measures on the level of activity were strengthened in industry and 
agriculture by the raising of the general tariff from 10% to 20% and by the imposition of import 
surcharges on a number of manufactures and agricultural commodities. 
2. Trends in economic activity 
a) Total supply and demand 
After having suffered a drastic decline of over 17% the year before, the total supply of goods 
and services went down a further 2.5% in 1983 as a result of the drop of almost 1% in the gross 
domestic product and a substantial new contraction of 15% in the volume of imports (see table 2). 
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Figure 1 
CHILE: MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS 
Gross domestic product1 
^ 
J L 
Gross national incomea 
J I J L _L 
Net movement of capital" 
Trade balance" *''>•.. 
Balance on current account' 
Net factor payments". 
J i i i i L J I 
Interest m , , , A S 
e Total external debt" / , 
- Exports of goods / \ S^^"^ 
_ and services / ^^*v 
1 ! 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
-
1980 1970 1975 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official data. 
aAnnual growth rate. ''Annual average rate for Greater Santiago. 





CHILE: QUARTERLY EVOLUTION OF MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS 
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Source: ECLAC, on the basis of industrial information. 
Quarterly variations in the gross domestic product, industrial production anctthe construction 
product. ''Average rate for Greater Santiago. cVariation with respect to the same month in the 
preceding year. ''Balance on trade in goods and variations in international reserves, in millions of dollars. 
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Due mainly to the marked drop in the volume of imports and, to a lesser extent, a small increase 
in the volume of exports, the domestic availability of goods and services went down for the second 
year running by a larger amount than the product and total supply. Thus, over the last two years the 
volume of goods and services available per inhabitant, which is what ultimately determines the 
present and future level of living of the population, has fallen by 30%. 
As was to be expected in view of the sluggishness of demand, the existence of abundant 
underutilized capacity in many sectors, and the uncertainty which prevailed especially during the first 
half of the year, the decline in investment was even more serious. Thus, fixed capital formation, 
which had already gone down by 37% in 1982, went down by almost 14.5% more in 1983, so that the 
coefficient of fixed investment stood at not even 9% of the gross domestic product: the lowest 
proportion registered in the last 25 years. 
Furthermore, because of the persistence of a very high unemployment rate and the drastic fall 
in real wages, private consumption suffered a considerable drop of over 6% which came on top of the 
decline of 17.5% registered the year before. General government consumption, for its part, went 
down for the third time in the last four years. 
Thus, as in 1982, the only component of demand which showed some dynamism was exports of 
goods and services. Even so, however, the real increase in these exports was far below the almost 11 % 
rise registered the year before (see table 2). 
b) Evolution of the main sectors 
As well as being much smaller than the year before, the decline in economic activity in 1983 was 
also a good deal less generalized. Thus, in contrast with what happened in 1982, when the product of 
all the main sectors of the economy except mining went down, in 1983 the drop in economic activity 
was concentrated in the services sectors (see table 3). In the goods-producing sectors, in contrast, 
there was a slight recovery in the manufacturing product and that of the construction sector held its 
Table 2 
CHILE: TOTAL SUPPLY A N D D E M A N D 
Total supply 
Gross domestic product 
at market prices 
Imports of goods and 
Total demand 
Domestic demand 
Gross domestic investment 
Gross fixed investment 
Construction 
Machinery and equipment 




Exports of goods and 
services' 
Millions of dollars 




1980 1981 1982 1983° 1970 1980 1983° 1980 1981 1982 1983" 
13 651 14 478 11953 11652 112.7 117.4 111.6 8.6 6.1 -17.4 -2.5 
11624 12 289 10 527 10 439 100.0 100.0 100.0 7.8 5.7 -14.3 -0.8 
2 027 2 189 1 426 1 213 12.7 17.4 11.6 13.4 8.0 -34.8 -14.9 
13 651 14 478 11953 11652 112.7 117.4 111.6 8.6 6.1 -17.4 -2.5 















































































3 335 3 078 3 392 3 463 13.8 28.7 33.2 15.2 -7.7 10.8 1.6 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of data supplied by the Central Bank of Chile. 
Preliminary figures. The figures for exports and imports of goods and services were taken from balance-of-payments data expressed 
in dollars at current prices, which were converted to constant 1970 values using price indexes calculated by ECLAC for the 




CHILE: GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT, BY KIND OF 
ECONOMIC ACTIVITY, AT FACTOR COST 
Gross domestic product 
Goods 
Agriculture, hunting, forestry 
and fisheries 




Electricity, gas and water 






insurance, real estate 
and business services 
Ownership of dwellings 
Community, social and 
personal services 
Government services 




























































































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures supplied by the Central Bank of Chile. 
"Preliminary figures. 'As the individual activities and the totals were calculated independently, the sum of the former does not 
correspond exactly with the latter. 
own, although the agricultural sector continued to decline and the mining product went down for the 
first time since 1975. 
i) Agriculture. In 1983, the agricultural sector suffered a contraction of 1.5%, which came on 
top of the decline of a little over 3% registered the year before. This new drop was due to the falls in 
both livestock production and that of traditional crops, which were not offset by the growth of the 
fruit and forestry subsectors, since these are still of minor relative importance. Among the main 
factors responsible for this new decline in agricultural activity were the poor financial situation of 
producers due to high interest rates and low prices, and the drought which affected the southern area 
of the country. 
The value of the fourteen traditional crops went down by over 7%, thus intensifying the 
negative trend which, except for 1979, has been observed since 1978 (see table 4) and bringing this 
value down to only three-quarters of that registered in 1970. There were increases in production in 
the case of only three of the fourteen traditional crops: sugar beet (71%), oats (24%) and maize 
(6%). In contrast, there were some very marked drops in the harvests of other products such as barley 
(-38%), beans (-48%) and rape (-78%). 
As in the previous two years, there was a substantial reduction (-8%) in the area devoted to 
these crops, which only came to just over 870 000 hectares in the 1982-1983 season. This area was one 
of the smallest registered for over half a century and represented only 70% of that sown in 1970. 
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The area sown with wheat, which is the most important traditional crop, went down by 4% in 
1983 and thus stood at less than half the area sown in 1970. That corresponding to cereals as a whole, 
however, increased by a little over 2%, since the above-mentioned reduction, together with that in 
the areas planted with rice and barley, was offset by the big increases in the area» sown with oats 
(25%) and maize (10%). 
The evolution of crop farming yields, in contrast, was diametrically opposed to that of 1982. 
Whereas in that year the yields increased in the case of all products except two, in 1983 there was a 
general decline, with only three exceptions: sugar beet (4%), rice (9%) and lentils (46%). The effects 
of this decline thus compounded those of the reduction in the area sown in causing the general drop in 
production of the traditional crops. 
Fruit-growing also turned in a less favourable performance. Thus, after several years in which 
the great majority of lines of fruit-growing expanded steadily, in 1983 there were increases in only 
eight of the fifteen main varieties (see table 5). 
Table 4 
CHILE: INDICATORS OF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION 

























































































































































































































































































































































Source: National Statistical Institute UNE). 




CHILE: INDICATORS OF FRUIT-GROWING ACTIVITY 
Growth rates 
1975 1980 1981 1982 1983" 
1980 1981 1982 1983' 

























































































































































































































































































































Source: Ministry of Agriculture, Agricultural Planning Office (ODEPA). 
"Preliminary figures. 
Among those where there was an increase in production, the most outstanding examples were 
table grapes and nectarines. In the case of grapes (which is the type of fruit with the biggest planted 
area), although the increase was a good deal less than the very high rates registered in the previous 
two years, it was nevertheless considerable (21%). This made a total increase of 130% over the three-
year period 1981-1983, so that the 1983 production was three times greater than in 1975. This notable 
increase was due largely to the recovery in yields, which in 1983 reached a similar level to that of 1975 
(10.5 tons per hectare), after having gone down by 1980 to only 5.8 tons per hectare. Production of 
nectarines, for its part, expanded by 15% after having grown by 12% in each of the two preceding 
years; this increase, too, was influenced by the positive evolution of yields. 
Production of apples (the second most important fruit as regards area planted) and walnuts 
both increased by 6%; in the case of apples, however, this represented a marked slackening of the 
trends of previous years. 
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As regards the types of fruit whose level of production went down in 1983, the most noteworthy 
was the drop of 20% in lemon production. This marked the continuation of the negative trend of 
recent years, and the 1983 output thus stood at only 70% of that obtanied in 1975. There were 
also substantial reductions in the output of olives (-10%), quinces (-8%), almonds (-7%) and 
pears (- 5%). In all these cases the reason was a sharp drop in yields, since the area planted with olives 
remained unchanged, while that devoted to the other three types of fruit increased. 
In the livestock sector, the total production of undressed meat went down by 1.6% in 1983 to 
only about 378 000 tons (see table 6). This was due fundamentally to the considerable drop (-31%) in 
poultry meat production. In contrast, cattle slaughtering expanded by 7%, thus completing a cycle of 
three years of growth, and apparent per capita consumption rose from 17.4 kilogrammes in 1982 to 
18 kilogrammes in 1983. In the light of this, when the drop in the production of mutton and the slight 
increase in that of pork are taken into account, the total per capita meat production is seen to have 
gone down from 33-5 to 32.4 kilogrammes between 1982 and 1983. 
Milk production dropped markedly (-15%) after having already gone down by 12% in 1982. 
This performance was influenced by the financial problems faced by producers because of the high 
domestic interest rates, the competition of low-cost imported products,1 etc. These problems caused 
them to slaughter an excessive number of animals, and the difficulties were accentuated by the 
drought in the south of the country. 
Table 6 
CHILE: INDICATORS OF LIVESTOCK PRODUCTION 


















































































Source: Beef, pigmeat and mutton: National Statistical Institute (INE); other livestock items: Agricultural Planning Office (ODEPA). 
"Preliminary figures. 'Thousands of tons. ' Millions of litres. Millions of units. 
Table 7 
CHILE: AREA AFFORESTED 
(Thousands of hectares) 
1971 1973 1975 1977 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983° 
Total 28.0 30.3 82.6 93.2 52.0 72.3 93.2 68.6 76.3 
21.8 
68.6 54.5 
Source: National Forestry Corporation (CONAF). 
"Preliminary figures. 
1 It should be noted, however, that in September the customs tariffs for milk, butter and cheese were modified, so that the respective import 





















CHILE: INDICATORS OF FISHERY PRODUCTION 
Growth rates 
1970 1975 1980 1981 1982 1983° 
















Source: Ministry of Agriculture: Ci 
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)f tons of finished products. 
As regards forestry activity, the area planted grew by 11% (see table 7). With this new increase, 
the total area exceeded one million hectares, of which almost 80% were planted in the last ten years. 
A noteworthy fact in 1983 was that the National Forestry Corporation (CONAF) reactivated its 
afforestation activities after four years in which direct activities by CONAF in the planting of trees had 
been suspended. Thus, in 1983 CONAF planted almost 22 000 hectares, or 29% of the total. In 
contrast, private activity in reafforestation and the planting of new forests went down by over 20%. 
Production of lumber in the nearly 1 500 sawmills existing in the country increased 
considerably (37%) to the level of 1.6 million cubic metres, thus marking a substantial recovery 
compared with 1982, when the lumbering industry had registered its lowest production for the last 
eight years. 
ii) Fisheries. The product of the fishery sector increased by 4.6% in 1983. Although this rate 
was a little below those registered in 1981 and 1982, it nevertheless represented a continuation of the 
upward trend of recent years (see table 8). 
The fishery catch increased by 8%, or a little less than in 1982. Noteworthy was the big (59%) 
increase in the catch of sardines. The seafood catch also increased by quite a large amount (18%), 
although this was a good deal less than the exceptionally high growth rate of 27% registered on 
average during the period 1980-1982. Noteworthy in this category was the increase of 170% in the 
catch of crustaceans. 
Industrial fishery production, however, which had grown at an average rate of 25% over the 
five-year period 1978-1982, went down for the first time in several years (see table 8). Almost all 
categories showed reverses in their evolution with respect to 1982. Thus, frozen products, after 
increasing fourfold in 1982, went down by 14%, while production of fish oil, which had grown by 
14% in 1982, went down by 60%. In contrast, the production of the canning industry increased 
by 77%, thus reversing its strong negative trend in 1981 and 1982. Finally, production of fish 
meal —which is by far the most important line of activity in this area— did not suffer such abrupt 
changes and continued to grow as in previous years, although at a considerably lower rate. 
Fishery sector exports came to US$ 455 million or 11% more than in 1982. External sales 
accounted for 80% of national production and consisted especially of fish meal, fish oil, canned goods 
and frozen products. 
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iii) Mining. The mining product contracted in 1983 (by 2%) for the first time in several years. 
Its average annual growth rate in the previous five years had been over 5 % (see table 9). 
Among the main minerals, there were declines in the production of iron ore (-8% in the case of 
the ore itself and - 9 % in the case of pellets) and of molybdenum (-24%), as well as in that of 
petroleum. The latter went down by 8% after having grown by only 3 % in 1982. This marked the end 
of its period of rapid growth (1979-1981 ), when it expanded by 160%, largely thanks to the execution 
of the Costa Afuera project in the Straits of Magellan. These oilfields currently provide three-quarters 
of national production, involving the use of 21 marine platforms. During 1983 this project was 
further developed with the entry into service of a gas processing and recompression station which 
makes it possible to collect gas together wih the crude and subsequently convert it into products such 
as butane, propane and natural gasoline. A 33 kilometre gas pipeline was also placed in operation 
between the terminals of Tierra del Fuego and Cabo Negro, the latter being on the mainland. 
Among the minerals whose production increased, the most noteworthy was silver, which grew 
by 2 3 % after having increased by 6% in 1982. Its production thus rose for the fifth year running. Coal 
mining also increased considerably (10%) and thus partially recovered from its sharp decline the year 
before. For their part, the outputs of nitrates, iodine and sodium sulphate increased by 8% after 
having all suffered declines in 1982. Finally, gold production increased by only 5%, thus ending the 
period of very rapid growth which it had enjoyed between 1980 and 1982, when it expanded at an 
annual average rate of 70%. 
Production of copper, the country's most important mineral, grew only marginally (1%) after 
having increased by 15% in 1982, which had made Chile the leading world producer of this mineral. 
The small increase registered in 1983 was due to a decline in the first half of the year, followed by a 
recovery in the second. The structure of production by institutional sectors also showed opposing 
tendencies: the production of the large-scale mining sector went down by 2 %, while that of medium-
sized and small-scale mining (which usually accounts for some 15% of total production) increased at a 
rapid rate (18%) for the fourth consecutive year. 
Table 9 
CHILE: INDICATORS OF MINING PRODUCTION 
1970 
Production 
1975 1980 1981 
Growth rates 
1982 1983" 1980 1981 1982 1983" 
Mining sector 
product' 802 866 
Copper' 692 828 
Large-scale mining 541 683 
Medium-and small-
scale mining 151 146 
Iron ore' 
Ore 11265 11007 
Pellets 
Coal'' 1 382 1 460 
Nitrates'' 669 726 
Iodine' 2 250 1 962 
Sodium sulphate' 
Petroleun/ 1 977 1 423 
Molybdenum' 5 701 9 091 
Gold* 1 623 3 997 














































































































Source: Copper: Chilean Copper Corporation and State Department of Mines; iron ore: National Statistical Institute; coal: National Coal 
Corporation; nitrates, iodine and sodium sulphate: Chilean Chemical Corporation; petroleum: National Petroleum Corporation; 
molybdenum: State Department of Mines and National Statistical Institute; gold and silver: National Statistical Institute. 
"Preliminary figures. Millions of dollars at 1970 prices. 'Thousands of tons. ''Thousands of gross tons. 
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Source: Industrial produce. National Planning Office (ODEPLANV, industrial output-. National Statistical Institute (INE) and Suciedad de 
Fomento Fabril (SOFOFA); industrial sales: Sociedad de Fomento Fabril. 
"Preliminary figures. Millions of dollars at 1970 prices. 
The Chilean Copper Corporation (CODELCO), which is the State enterprise responsible for 
operating the large-scale mining deposits, contributed almost US$ 680 million to the State in 1983: 
an increase of almost 30%. This contribution was accounted for by income tax, import duties, value 
added tax, a share in the profits, etc. CODELCO also began investment programmes in its 
Chuquicamata and El Teniente divisions which will enable copper production to be increased by 
142 000 tons per year. For this purpose it received a loan of US$ 268 million from the Inter-American 
Development Bank (1DB), which will finance part of the project, whose total cost amounts to US$ 670 
million. The IDB will contribute a similar amount in 1984 and the difference will be covered partly by 
other loans and partly by drawing on the resources of CODELCO itself (US$ 85 million). 
As regards mining area policy, two facts were particularly worthy of note: the promulgation of 
the new Mining Code, and a number of measures aimed at relieving the financial situation of 
producers. The new Code changed the nature of mining concessions by making them more stable. 
Among the measures designed to aid producers, the most noteworthy was the reactivation plan 
carried out by the National Mining Corporation (ENAMl). This included in particular the 
establishment of government purchasing arrangements for the output of small and medium-sized 
mining enterprises in areas where there were processing plants with idle capacity and potential 
supplies of raw material; chus, a purchasing facility was opened in Illapel for sulphide ores, another in 
Combarbalá for oxide ores, and others in Andacollo and Tocopilla. Secondly, ENAMl was authorized to 
assume indebtedness in order to continue its programme of loans to small and medim-sized mining 
enterprises. It will also act as guarantor for these enterprises in the purchase of machinery on a long-
term basis. Finally, action was begun to set up various gold washing facilities. 
iv) Manufacturing. In 1983 the industrial product recovered slightly (3%) after the sharp 22% 
contraction suffered in 1982. Even so, the level finally reached was 12% lower than in 1979 and 7% 
below that obtained as far back as 1970. The industrial production indexes of the National Statistical 
Institute (INE) and the Sociedad de Fomento Fabril both showed similar trends (see table 10). 
The recovery registered in 1983 was the result of a radical change in the behaviour of 
production in the course of the year. Thus, whereas in 1982 the rates of variation of industrial 
production were not only systematically negative but also became progressively more unfavourable, 
in 1983 industrial production showed a recovery as from the second quarter of the year and the rate of 
this recovery gradually increased in the second part of the year.2 
1 After having gone down by 4% in the first quarter (compared with the same period of the year before), industrial production rose by 4% 
in the second quarter, 5% in the third, and rather more than 13.V7c in the fourth. 
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Also in contrast with 1982, when there was a contraction in the production of all branches of 
industry, in 1983 there was a good rate of recovery in the sectors producing everyday consumer goods 
(9%) , intermediate products for industry (6%) and miscellaneous manufactures (10%), which 
account altogether for about three-quarters of the total industrial value added. In the sector producing 
everyday consumer goods, the most outstanding features were the increases of 26% in textile 
production, 11 % in that of beverages, and 9% in that of footwear; in contrast, the foodstuffs industry 
—which is the most important industrial subsector with 16% of the total industrial value added— 
grew by only 1 %. Among intermediate products for industry the most outstanding features were the 
growth of 27 % in the output of petroleum products, 11 % in petroleum refining, and 7 % in basic iron 
and steel industries. Finally, among miscellaneous articles, there was a noteworthy expansion of 53 % 
in the production of rubber goods. 
In contrast, the sectors producing consumer durables and transport equipment continued to 
decline —by 2 8 % and 29%, respectively— after having registered even bigger falls in 1982. Finally, 
the production of intermediate goods for the construction sector continued to stagnate (see table 10). 
The result achieved by industrial production as a whole was due to the opposing influence of 
positive and negative factors. Among the former was the increase in the real exchange rate, which 
succeeded in increasing the profitability of exports and products competing with imports, although 
somewhat slower than had been expected. The latter products were also favoured by the increase in 
the general tariff to 2 0 % and the imposition of specific surcharges on various products. Among the 
negative factors, for their part, was the high real cost of credit, the low international prices obtained 
for such products as wood pulp, and the low level of construction activity. 
v) Construction. In 1983, the performance of the construction sector was marked by sharp 
contrasts. Whereas there was a further accentuation, in the first half of the year, of the profound 
Table 11 
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bars for construction 
Index of real sales 
of intermediate goods 
for construction 












Source: Construction product: ECLAC, on the basis of data provided by the National Planning Office; building materials: Cámara Chilena de la 
Construcción; building: National Statistical Institute (1NE). 
"Preliminary figures. Millions of dollars at 1970 prices. 'Millions of bags. JThousands of tons. 












































































CHILE: UNEMPLOYMENT IN GREATER SANTIAGO 
(Percentages) 
Total rate of unemployment 
Department of Economics of 
the University of Chile 
National Statistical Institute 
Rate of unemployment among 
the established labour force 
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Source: Department of Economics of the University of Chile and National Statistical Institute (INE). 
depression which had affected the sector the year before, in the second half there was a clear recovery 
which exactly made up for this drop. Thus, for the year as a whole the construction product remained 
at the same very low level registered in 1982 (see table 11). 
In building construction, the recovery was reflected in a 16% increase in the area of 
constructions begun or approved. Because of the enormous drop of almost 60% registered in 1982, 
however, the area constructed was equivalent to less than half that registered on average in the two-
year period 1980-1981. Furthermore, the increase in the area constructed was due entirely to housing 
construction, whereas the area accounted for non-housing building suffered a further considerable 
reduction. i 
The recovery in housing construction was influenced both by the measures taken by the 
Government and by the reduction in construction costs. Notable among the former were the system 
of supplementary financing of dwellings established by the Central Bank —whose central objective 
was to reduce the considerable number of completed dwellings which still remained unsold— and the 
programme of housing subsidies made available by the Department of Housing and Town Planning 
for the purchase of middle and low-priced dwellings. The real cost of construction, for its part, went 
down by over 10%, according to the index of the Chilean Chamber of Construction, as a result of 
declines of 19% in wage costs and 6% in materials. 
c) Tbe employment situation 
In 1983, the extremely unfavourable employment situation of the previous year continued. 
Thus —mainly as a result of the fresh drop suffered by overall economic activity— the average rate of 
open unemployment in Greater Santiago, which had already doubled in 1982, remained at slightly 
over 22% according to the statistics of the Department of Economics of the University of Chile, or 
'Moreover, both the increase in the area of residential building andíhe number of dwellings built exaggerate the magnitude of the new 
construction work begun, since they include an effect caused by the hurried regularization of permits. This effect was due to the very short 
deadline given by the authorities for the regularization of the status of dwellings which had been begun without the respective permit, so that 
advantage could be taken of the housing subsidy programme. This effect was particularly marked in April, when the number of dwellings begun 
or approved came to almost 11 600 —five times the monthly average registered before and after that month. 
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went down slightly from 20% to 19%, according to the data of the National Statistical Institute (see 
table 12). 
In line with the moderate recovery in manufacturing and the slight increase in construction 
activity, the average rates of unemployment in these two sectors went down slightly from the very 
high levels they had reached the previous year (27% and 49%, respectively). On the other hand, the 
fresh contraction suffered by commerce and the even sharper drop in financial, social, personal and 
government services caused the unemployment rates in all these activities to rise. As was to be 
expected, the slight progress made by the urban goods-producing sectors and the setbacks suffered by 
services were reflected on the one hand in a reduction from 29% to 25% in the unemployment rate 
for manual workers, and on the other in a further increase in the proportion of unemployed non-
manual workers (see table 12). 
The very unfavourable nature of the employment situation was also reflected in the 
extraordinary expansion in the Minimum Employment Programme (PEM) and above all in the 
Employment Programme for Heads of Households (POJH). 
The average number of participants in the PEM, after reaching the hitherto unprecedented 
number of 225 000 persons in 1982, exceeded 340 000 in 1983. As may be seen from table 13, this 
Table 13 
CHILE: GOVERNMENT EMPLOYMENT PROGRAMMES 
Number of participants" 
Total 
Metropolitan Region 
Rest of country 
Monthly allowance paid 
Nominal 
Real' 
Number of participants" 
Total 
Metropolitan Region 
Rest of country 



















1976 1977 1978 1979 
Minimum Employment Programme 
157.8 187.7 145.8 133.9 
34.9 36.4 29.0 21.8 
122.9 151.2 116.8 112.1 
461 704 834 992 
1 690 1 209 954 831 











































Source: National Statistical Institute (INE). 
"Thousands. Pesos. 'Pesos at December 1978 prices, on the basis of the corrected consumer price index given in table 22 
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Source: For labour force, employed and unemployed, 1974-1981: ODEPLAN estimates based on data of the National Statistical Institute (INE) 
for same items for October-December 1981, October-November 1982, second half of 1985 and all PEM and POJH figures: data of the 
National Statistical Institute (INE). 
"Minimum Employment Programme. Programme for Heads of Households. ' Average October-December. 
' Average October-November. ' Average for second half of year. 
increase was particulary marked in the Metropolitan Region, where the number of people registered 
in the PEM more than doubled. At the same time, the purchasing power of the allowance paid for 
working in the PEM went down by almost 5 %, thus reaching its lowest level since the establishment of 
the Programme, except for the level corresponding to 1981.4 
In relative terms, the increase in enrolment was even greater in the case of the POJH, the 
number of whose participants doubled in the country as a whole and almost quadrupled in the 
Metropolitan Region. Thus, in the second half of the year almost 14% of the labour force was 
working in the Government's emergency employment programmes: a proportion which, as may be 
seen from table 14, was only slightly below the percentage of workers openly unemployed. 
The incidence of the expansion of the PEM and POJH on the decline in the rate of unemployment 
can be seen especially clearly from figure 3, which presents the quarterly evolution of open 
unemployment in Greater Santiago, the proportion of the labour force in the capital enrolled in the 
PEM and POJH schemes, and the percentage of the labour force employed in "normal" productive 
activities in the period 1981-1983. 
As may be seen from figure 3, the steady and marked descent of the unemployment rate in 
Greater Santiago from a record level of almost 24% in the third quarter of 1982 to 16.5% in the last 
quarter of 1983 was not due to an increase in the proportion of workers employed in "normal" 
economic activities, but to the extraordinary growth of the government employment programmes. 
These programmes, which absorbed only 2.6% of the labour force in the third quarter of 1982, came 
to employ 14.5% of the economically active population in the last three months of 1983. In contrast, 
the proportion of workers employed in the other activities of the economy, which had begun to 
decline at the end of 1981 and continued to go down in 1982 with the accentuation of the recession, 
maintained a downward trend, although this was less marked, in the first half of 1983 and only 
registered a slight increase in the last quarter of the year, when the recovery of industry accelerated a 
little and the Government expanded its construction expenditure. 
4 Converted at the official exchange rate, the monthly allowance paid for working in the PEM in 1983 was equivalent to a little over USS 25. 
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3- The external sector 
As in the previous year, two of the main features of the performance of the external sector were the 
violent drop in external financing and the marked fall in imports of goods and services. Although this 
new reduction in external purchases made it possible to achieve a trade surplus, the heavy outflow in 
respect of payments of interest —which were more than three times the amount of the trade 
surplus— and the very low level of net inflow of external capital generated a further appreciable 
deficit on the global balance of payments. Nevertheless, this deficit was well below that registered in 
1982, and moreover there was a marked slackening in 1983 in the very high growth rate previously 
displayed by the net general external debt, which had more than doubled between 1980 and 1982. On 
Figure 3 
CHILE: 'NORMAL* EMPLOYMENT, MINIMUM EMPLOYMENT PROGRAMME, 
EMPLOYMENT PROGRAMME FOR HEADS OF HOUSEHOLDS, 
AND UNEMPLOYMENT IN THE METROPOLITAN REGION 
(Percentages) 
Employment programme for 
heads of households 
Minimum employment programme 
Unemployment rate 
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Source: ECLAC, on the basis of information from the International Monetary Fund. 
Note: A: For deflation, the domestic products sub-index of the wholesale price index was used. 
B: For the purpose of deflation, the consumer price index prepared by R. Cortázar andj. Marshall was used for the years 1975-1978, and 
the INE consumer price index from 1979 onwards. 
"Official exchange rates. 'These indexes correspond to the average of the real peso exchange rate indexes vis-a-vis the currencies of 
Chile's main trading partners, wheighted by the relative importance of the exports to or imports from those countries. For further details on 
the methodology and sources used, see the technical appendix of the Economic Survey of Latin America, 1981. 
the economic policy level, the domestic adjustment measures —such as the raising of the general 
tariff rate, the introduction of specific surcharges on some imports, and the maintenance of a 
relatively high effective real exchange rate— were complemented with important initiatives on the 
external front, such as the loan agreements signed with the International Monetary Fund and the 
renegotiation of part of the external debt agreed with the foreign private banking system. 
a) External trade 
i) Exports of goods. After having gone down sharply in 1981 and slightly in 1982, the current 
value of exports of goods increased by a little over 3% in 1983. Although this offset the drop of the 
previous year, the value of external sales was still about 19% below that reached in 1980. 
Unlike 1982, however, when the volume of external sales increased very vigorously, the growth 
in volume in 1983 was relatively modest, despite the further increase in the average effective real 
exchange rate (see table 15). The average price of exports, for its part, remained stable in 1983 after 
having gone down drastically in both 1981 and 1982. Consequently, although the volume of exports of 
goods was 15% greater in 1983 than in 1980, their unit value was almost 30% lower (see table 16). 
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Table 16 
CHILE: MAIN FOREIGN TRADE INDICATORS 
1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983" 








Terms of trade 
Terms of trade 
Purchasing power of exports of goods 













































































95.6 93.5 96.5 126.9 138.1 106.3 105.6 110.2 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official data. 
"Preliminary figures. 
Table 17 
CHILE: PRICE OF COPPER ON THE LONDON METAL EXCHANGE 









































































































CHILE: VALUE AND BREAKDOWN OF EXPORTS, FOB 
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Source: Central Bank of Chile and data on direct sales to the exterior supplied by CODELCO and Molymet. 
"Preliminary figures. 'including sale of molybdenum oxide and ferromolybdenum: 1980, USJ 337 million; 1981, USJ 223 million; 
1982, USJ 178 million and 1983, USJ 149 million. 
The slight recovery in the value of external sales reflected the favourable evolution of 
traditional exports as a whole and copper in particular. The value of copper exports increased by 11 % 
thanks to the improvement in the international price of the metal and a further expansion in the 
volume exported. Thus, copper's contribution to the overall value of exports rose slightly for the third 
year running, after having gone down steadily from 82% in 1973 to 45% in 1980. However, despite 
its rise in 1983 the international price of copper was still 28% below that obtained in 1980, and in real 
terms it was equivalent to less than half that registered on average during the period 1960-1974. 
Moreover, at the end of 1983 the price of copper on the London Metal Exchange again deteriorated 
markedly (see table 17). 
In 1983 there was also an appreciable recovery in the amount of other traditional export 
products such as fish meal (20%), paper and paperboard (17%) and nitrates and iodine (12%). 
However, there were sharp declines in those of wood pulp and, above all, iron ore (see table 18). 
The value of non-traditional exports, for its part, declined for the third year running, although 
less sharply than in 1982 and above all in 1981. In 1983, the contraction was due mainly to the drop of 
almost 11 % in the value of sales of manufactures, although the 13% decline in those of agricultural 
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and marine products also had a substantial influence in that result. The non-traditional export lines 
where sales fell most were metal products, machinery and electronic items (with a decline of over 
43%), chemicals and petroleum products (down 33%) and fishery products (which diminished by a 
little over 21%). In fact, among traditional exports only those of transport equipment showed a 
significant recovery. Because of the steady drop in the value of non-traditional exports between 1980 
and 1983, their share in the overall value of external sales went down from almost 38% to 33% in 
that period (see table 18). 
ii) Imports of goods. The sharp reduction in external financing, the increase in tariffs and the 
further reduction suffered in 1983 by domestic economic activity were contributory factors in causing 
the value of imports to continue to go down sharply and systematically during the year. Thus, this 
value went down by 22% after having already fallen by 44% in 1981. Consequently, in 1983 the value 
of external purchases was only 43% of that registered in 1981 (see table 19). 
Although the unit value in dollars of imports of goods once again went down substantially in 
1983, the contraction in the overall value was due mainly to the 16% reduction in volume (see 
table 16). 
As in the previous year, the compression of imports most seriously affected capital goods, the 
amount of which went down by almost 44% so that it represented less than 27% of the 1981 value of 
imports of such goods. Imports of consumer goods, for their part, fell by over 31%, while those of 
intermediate goods declined by almost 9%. Among consumer goods, the 45 % reduction in imports of 
non-food items was once again specially noteworthy. In particular, imports of automobiles came to 
only a little over US$ 30 million in 1983, compared with US$ 124 million in 1982 and almost 
US$ 430 million in 1981 (see table 19). 
iii) Terms of trade and purchasing power of exports. In 1983, the terms of trade for goods 
improved by 7.5 %. This increase was due exclusively to the reduction in the average price of imports, 
however, and moreover it was only the second rise registered in the last seven years. In these 
circumstances, and also as a result of the very serious deterioration which the terms of trade had 
undergone in the first half of the previous decade, they remained at an extraordinary depressed level 
in 1983 which was only 37% of that registered in 1970 and was even 27% below that prevailing in 
1931-1935, which represented the most critical period of the Great Depression. 
Table 19 














































































































































The decline in the unit value of imports and the growth in the volume of exports helped to raise 
the purchasing power of external sales by 11%. Even so, this purchasing power was still 13% below 
the peak registered in the two-year period 1979-1980 and was even 5% below that registered in 1970. 
This occurred in spite of the vigorous expansion of the volume of exports over almost the whole of 
the period in question and reflected the singularly unfavourable evolution of the terms of trade.5 
Furthermore, the growth in the purchasing power of exports in 1983 was completely offset by 
the effect of the contraction in the net flow of capital to the country. Because of this, the overall 
import capacity —which had already fallen violently in 1982— went down once again in 1983, 
although this time only by a small amount. 
b) The current account position and capital movements 
The ongoing adjustment of the economy as from mid-1981 not only led to the elimination of 
the trade deficit during 1983 but also made it possible to build up a considerable surplus by the end of 
the year (see table 20). Thus, 1983 was the first year since 1976 in which the gross domestic 
expenditure was less than the gross domestic product, and it was one of the few years since the Second 
World War in which domestic saving exceeded domestic investment.6 In the present crisis 
conditions, however, the turnaround in the trade account has not been accompanied by a similar 
change in the current account results, as happened in the crisis of the mid-1970s. The main reason for 
this difference has been the heavy external indebtedness accumulated since then and the rise in 
international interest rates in recent years. Thus, in 1976 a trade surplus of US$ 433 million helped to 
generate a current account surplus of US$ 132 million, whereas in 1983 a trade surplus of US$ 538 
million was accompanied by a deficit of US$ 1 222 million on current account. Moreover, despite the 
very drastic reduction in imports and the considerable increase in the volume of exports, the economy 
only generated enough saving in 1983 to take care of about 30% of the payments of interest on the 
externa] debt. 
Furthermore, although the reduction in the deficit on current account was 50% with relation to 
1982 and 75% compared with 1981, the financing of this deficit involved a loss of international 
reserves, since at the same time there was a sharp fall in the net inflow of capital from abroad. In 1983, 
this fall amounted to 30%, so that the overall balance of payments closed with a deficit of almost 
US$ 530 million (see table 20). 
The performance of the capital account reflected the very steep fall in long-term loans to the 
private sector and the outflow of private short-term capital. In net terms, the results of private sector 
capital transactions with the exterior became markedly negative in 1983 after having attained a 
positive balance of nearly US$ 4 800 million only two years before. In contrast, the public sector 
markedly increased its procurement of external financing in 1983 through the agreements signed 
with the International Monetary Fund and the renegotiation of part of the external debt with the 
commercial banking system. The public sector obtained total net direct financing of over US$ 1 400 
million, while at the same time its negotiations with the international financial community made it 
possible to reduce the amortization payments that the private sector had to make. 
Finally, despite the loss of a substantial part of the international reserves in recent years, the net 
holdings of the monetary authority at the end of 1983 still came to the equivalent of six months of 
imports of goods and services (at the very depressed level registered by these during the year). On the 
other hand, the reduction in external assets meant a marked decline in income from interest. 
c) The external debt 
Another marked factor of contraction in the net inflow of capital was the virtual halting of the 
expansion of the external debt. Thus, between the end of 1982 and of 1983 the gross general external 
debt increased by less than 2%. The net general external debt, for its part, which had more than 
doubled between 1980 and 1982, increased by 7% in 1983 (see table 21). At the same time, however, 
there was a marked improvement in the debt profile, since short-term indebtedness was reduced by 
'The incidence of the terms of trade is obvious when it is borne in mind that in 1985 the volume of exports of goods was 1569Í greater than 
in 1970, while that of imports was 12% less than in that year. 
6These conclusions are drawn from an analysis of the evolution of the national accounts at current prices. At constant prices, domestic 




CHILE: BALANCE OF PAYMENTS 
(Millions of dollars) 
Balance on current account 
Trade balance 
Exports of goods and services 
Goods FOB 
Real services 
Transport and insurance 
Travel 
Imports of goods and services 
Goods FOB 
Real services 







Unrequited private transfer payments 
Balance on capital account 
Unrequited official transfer payments 
Long-term capital 
Direct investment (net) 
Portfolio investment (net) 

































































































































































































































































































Total variation n reserves 
sign indicates an increase) 
Monetary gold 
Special Drawing Rights 
IMF reserve position 
Foreign exchange assets 
Other assets 
Use made of IMF credit 


















































Source: 1977-1982: International Monetary Fund, Balance of Payments Yearbook; May 1984; 1983: ECLAC, on the basis of official data. 
"Preliminary figures. Real services also include other official and private transactions, but not factor services. cIn addition to 
loans received and amortization payments made, this entry includes net loans granted and other assets and liabilities. The global 
balance is the sum of the current account balance plus the balance on capital account. The difference between total variation in reserves of 
opposite sign and the global balance represents counterpart items: monetization of gold, allocation of Special Drawing Rights, and variations 




CHILE: EXTERNAL DEBT" 
(Billions of dollars) 
I. Medium-and long-term 
external debt 
1. State- guaranteed public 
and private debt 
2. Private debt 
a) Supplier credits 
b) Lines of credit for importation 
of capital goods 
c) Financial credits* 
II. Short-term external debt'' 
Public sector 
Private sector 
III. Gross general external debt 
(I + II) 
IV. Net international reserves7 
V. Net general external debt 





Total as a percentage of exports 






























































































































































Source: Central Bank of Chile, Deuda externa de Chile, 1982, August 1983, and Informe del Ministro de Hacienda, 2 July 1984. 
"Amounts disbursed and pending payment at 31 December of each year. Preliminary figures. 'Including balances and credits 
contracted by some private enterprises subsequently incorporated into the public sector. Includes US$ 470 million corresponding to 
100% of the reprogrammed short-term financial debt. 'includes US$ 747 million corresponding to 100% of the reprogrammed short-
term financial debt. Also includes US$ 130 million of private sector deposits in the Central Bank which will be reprogrammed 
later. Excluding balances in respect of credits contracted by enterprises subsequently incorporated into the public 
sector. ^Credits entering under articles 14, 15 and 16 of the International Exchange Law and credits under Decree-Law 
600. Excludes commercial credits to the non-financial sector estimated at US$ 780 million at the end of 1982 and US$ 550 at the end of 
1983. 'Excludes US$ 1 217 million corresponding to 100% of the reprogrammed short-term financial debt. Corresponds to 
the international assets of the Central Bank, less liabilities with the International Monetary Fund. Gold is value at market prices and mutual 
credit agreements are taken at their net value. This explains the difference compared with table 20, where gold is valued at 35 SDR units per 
ounce. The servicing is lower because of the renegotiation of the external debt. Before the renegotiation of the external debt, 
amortization payments came to US5 2063 million. 
58%,7 while long-term indebtedness grew by 16%. This increase was almost entirely accounted for 
by credit mobilized by the public sector. 
The coefficient of external debt servicing, for its part, which had gone up between the period 
1979-1980 and 1980-1981 from an average of 40% to one of a little over 60%, went down slightly in 
1983 as the result of a slight drop in amortization payments (see table 20). 
4. Prices and wages 
a) Prices 
During 1983, consumer prices rose by 23%: that is to say, slightly more than the year before 
(see table 22). Both the variation between the annual averages of the consumer price index and the 
7 This figure does not include the evolution of commitments of the Government with the International Monetary Fund, which are recorded 
under net international reserve holdings. 
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wholesale price index and the evolution of the rate of inflation in the course of the year, however, 
were very different from those registered in 1982. 
Thus, as may be seen from figure 4, during the year under review the price rises were radically 
different in the two halves of the year. In the first half, consumer prices were completely stabilized, 
while wholesale prices actually went down in absolute terms. As a result of this phenomenon, the 12-
month variations of the two indexes showed a persistent downward trend up to the middle of the 
year. This trend was abruptly reversed, however, after the devaluation of the peso decreed in June, 
which marked the end of almost three years of complete exchange rate stability. Thus, during the 
second half of the year consumer prices rose by 20% and wholesale prices —in which internationally 
tradeable products have a more important incidence— rose by 40%. The upward trend in inflation 
continued during the first half of 1983, as the rises in costs caused by the June devaluation and the 
subsequent increases in the exchange rate8 were gradually transferred to price levels. As a result, the 
annual rate of increase of consumer prices rose by mid-year to around 32%, while that of wholesale 
prices exceeded 60%. 
With the gradual weakening of the effects on the cost of tradeable goods caused by the exchange 
rate rises that took place in the second half of 1982, however, real wages continued to go down, and as 
the real level of interest rates also went down, the intensity of the inflationary process began to 
decline, gradually in the case of consumer prices and a good deal more rapidly in that of wholesale 
prices (see figure 4). 
Table 22 
CHILE: EVOLUTION OF DOMESTIC PRICES 
1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 
Variation from December to December 
Consumer price index 
Food 
Corrected consumer price index" 






































































































Variations between annual averages 
Consumer price index 
Food 
Corrected consumer price index" 





































































































Source: National Statistical Institute; Cámara Chilena de la Construcción; José Yáñez, "Una corrección del índice de precios al consumidor, 
1971 -1977", in Comentarios sobre la situación económica, Departament of Economic of the University of Chile; and René Cortázar and 
Jorge Marshall, "Índice de precios al consumidor en Chile: 1970-1978", Estudios CIEPLAN, NQ. 4, November 1980. 
"1974-1978: based on the index of Cortázar and Marshall. 
8 It is worth recalling in this respect that both the effective real exchange rate for exports and that for imports continued to increase up to 




CHILE: EVOLUTION OF DOMESTIC PRICES 
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Source: ECLAC, on the basis of information from the National Statistical Institute (INE). 
As in 1982, these changes in inflationary trends were accompanied by important variations in 
relative prices. Thus, the average variation in the prices of imported goods (63%) once again 
considerably exceeded that of domestic products (42%). Among.the latter, and in contrast with what 
happened in the previous two years, the increase in the prices of agricultural goods was much greater 
than in that of manufactures and mining products. Construction costs, for their part, increased for the 
second year running much more slowly than the other indexes, as a consequence of the acute decline 
in real wages in the construction sector and the low level of construction activity, which persisted for 
most of the year. 
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b) Wages 
As part of its efforts to reduce the external imbalance and slow down inflation, the Government 
followed a restrictive wage policy in 1983. The first element in this was the elimination of the 
automatic readjustment of wages subject to collective bargaining.9 Secondly, wages in the public 
service were increased in June by only 5%, which was far below the rate of inflation, and moreover 
this was the first readjustment granted since August 1981. Finally, between April and November 
1983 three compensatory bonuses, each amounting to 30% of the monthly basic wage, were given to 
public sector workers who do not negotiate collectively. 
Because of this restrictive policy and the low level of economic activity, real wages went down by 
almost 1 1 % in 1983 (see table 23). Most of this decline took place during the first nine months of the 
year, when wages went down at an average rate of 0.6% per month in real terms. Largely because of 
the recovery in domestic activity which took place in the second half of the year, however, their rate of 
decline slackened towards the end of the year and they rose again slightly during the last two months. 
5. Monetary and fiscal policy 
Monetary evolution during 1983 was conditioned mainly by the problems that arose as a result of the 
excessive domestic and external indebtedness. In order to overcome the domestic financial crisis, the 
Government was obliged to intervene officially in the banking system, and it agreed on a restrictive 
monetary and credit policy with the IMF. It was hoped that in combination with the real devaluation 
effected in 1982 this policy would make it possible to reduce the current account imbalance, restore 
confidence in the peso and stabilize external capital flows. 
a) The agreements with the International Monetary Fund 
ï)The initial agreement. The drop in the net inflow of capital —from US$ 5 billion in 1981 to 
only US$ 1 billion in 1982— meant a net loss of reserves of the order of US$ 1 300 million. Even so, 
the level of net reserves existing at the end of 1982 (US$ 2 600 million) would have been adequate in 
a normal situation. The evolution of the economy in 1982, however, had been very far from normal, 
with a drop of 14% in the gross domestic product, a nominal increase in the exchange rate of almost 
100%, and a marked deterioration of the financial system. In these circumstances, there was 
considerable uncertainty. This was reflected, in turn, in a marked decline in the demand for money 
and a corresponding increase in the demand for dollars on the parallel market, as well as declines in 
the international reserves every time that the authorities tried to increase liquidity and a sharp rise in 
real national currency interest rates in the last quarter of 1982. 
In order to be able to bring about reactivation, it was ultimately indispensable to solve the 
financial crisis, to generate confidence and to reverse the downward trend in the inflow of capital. To 
this end, the authorities reached an agreement with the IMF. This agreement had been in course of 
Table 23 
CHILE: EVOLUTION OF REAL WAGES AND SALARIES 
(7970 = 100) 
1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 
Index of real wages 
and salaries" 108.2 71.4 64.8 62.1 63.0 71.1 75.7 82.0 89.4 97.5 97.1 90.8 
Variation during 
the year -9.3 -34.0 -9.1 -3.3 0.5 12.9 6.4 8.3 9.0 9.1 -0.4 -10.6 
Source: Index of nominal wages and salaries of the National Statistical lnsitute (1NE), deflated for the period 1971-1973 by the consumer price 
index prepared by José Yáñez, op. cit.; fot the period 1974-1978 by the corrected consumer price index prepared by René Cortázar and 
Jorge Marshall, op. cit.; and for the period 1979-1983 by the consumer price index of the 1NE. 
"For the years 1970-1976 the figures correspond to the average for April,July and October, while for 1977-1982 they represent averages for the 
whole twelve months. 
9 Between July 1979 and June 1982, the nominal wages and salaries of workers subject to collective negotiation were increased by at least the 
same percentage as the rise in the consumer price index during the preceding period. 
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negotiation since the beginning of 1982, but it was not approved until 10 January 1983. The 
agreement included two credit arrangements: one for compensatory financing of US$ 325 million, 
designed to make up for the drop in export income caused by the deterioration in the terms of trade, 
and the other a stand-by agreement subject to the fulfilment of a two-year economic adjustment 
programme. The main provisions of this latter were as follows: 
a) a maximum permissible fall in the international reserves of US$ 600 million (equivalent to 
the total credits that the country would receive from the IMF in 1983); 
b) a maximum increase in domestic credit (net Central Bank domestic assets) of 50 billion 
pesos; 
c) a maximum non-financial public sector deficit equal to no more than 1.8% of the gross 
domestic product (i.e., an amount equivalent to a little over 29 billion pesos). 
The programme also provided for a goal of 4% growth of the gross domestic product and an 
inflation rate of the order of 20%, compared with the rate equivalent to 40% per year registered in 
the second half of 1982. 
With regard to the goal fixed in respect of the permissible loss of reserves, the most important 
feature seems to have been the control of the rapid fall of these reserves, which had led in 1982 to a 
total loss of US$ 1 300 million, of which US$ 750 million had been lost in the second half of the year 
alone. The projected level of reserves for the end of 1983 (US$ 2 billion), however, was adequate. 
As regards the expansion of domestic credit, on the other hand, this did indeed signify a severe 
restriction, since it represented a nominal increase in money issue of only a little over 10%, 
corresponding to the difference between the expansion of domestic credit and the drop in reserves 
envisaged. This increase would be compatible with the goals of 20% inflation and 4% overall 
economic growth only if the demand for money were to continue going down. This latter evolution, 
however, assumed in turn a continued loss of confidence in the peso and/or lack of credibility of the 
inflationary goal fixed. To the extent that confidence in the peso or in the inflationary goal were 
restored, the demand for money would grow and thus create liquidity problems and ultimately hold 
back the recovery of the economy. 
On the other hand, without restriction of the supply of credit it would be difficult to reverse the 
growing loss of confidence in the stability of the peso unless more external credits were obtained 
(which was very difficult) or controls were placed on imports (which the IMF was unlikely to accept). 
Likewise, the doubt remained as to whether there were not accumulated cost pressures deriving 
from the rise in the exchange rate in June 1982 which were still in existence but had not yet shown 
themselves in price rises because of the big stocks of imported goods on hand when the devaluation 
was announced. If so, these pressures would have an impact on prices as soon as the stocks of 
imported goods were exhausted. One index as to this possibility was the fact that between June and 
December 1982, in the course of which period the exchange rate rose by 86%, the wholesale price 
index rose by 41 % while the consumer price index only increased by 20%. If all this were true, it was 
felt, the effort to bring about a reduction in inflation would force an additional fall in the product. 
In short, although the goals proposed in the agreement were plausible, their achievement 
would call for the satisfaction of a number of difficult conditions, and if these were not fulfilled, the 
goal regarding reserves could only be achieved at the cost of economic contraction or greater inflation 
than that envisaged. 
ii) The modification of the agreement. Everything provided for in the agreement with the IMF 
was placed in a different context, however, only three days after the signing of this instrument, 
because of the official intervention of part of the financial system on 13 January. This intervention 
meant that the ceilings laid down in the agreement were rapidly exceeded. On the one hand, the 
greater uncertainty caused by the intervention led depositors to reduce their deposits and buy dollars. 
On the other, the unsuccessful attempt by the authorities to persuade the foreign banks to absorb part 
of the losses incurred by the Chilean private banks and enterprises to which they had granted loans 
which did not enjoy a State guarantee caused these foreign banks to drastically reduce their short-term 
credits to Chile. In the face of this reaction, the government authorities retreated and promised to 
respect external commitments in respect of the debts without a State guarantee as well as those which 
enjoyed this backing. Finally, the rise in the value of the dollar on the parallel market, which rose 
during the first quarter to a level 50% higher than the official rate and at one time even amounted to 
double the latter, caused those with debts expressed in dollars to pay their commitments in advance. 
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The result of all these reactions was that the Central Bank lost US$ 1 billion of reserves in the first 
quarter alone, thus exceeding by US$ 400 million the maximum loss permitted under the IMF 
agreement for the whole year. For its part, the backing which the Central Bank had to give to the 
financial system because of the intervention of the banks and the consequent withdrawal of deposits 
led to an increase of nearly 80 billion pesos in domestic credit: a figure which was almost equivalent to 
the US$ 1 billion lost from the reserves and which also meant that in the first quarter alone the 
maximum expansion of domestic credit permitted for the whole year under the terms of the initial 
agreement with the IMF had been exceeded by almost 30 billion pesos. 
It therefore became essential to modify the initial agreement, and this was finally achieved in 
July, when the directors of the IMF approved a waiver which included a series of changes in the 
original programme. It was agreed that the intervention of the financial system had been necessary, 
but that this should not substantially alter the original goals. The loss of reserves for the whole year 
was to continue to be limited to US$ 600 million. As US$ 1 billion had already been lost, however, it 
was agreed that in the course of the second half of the year the international banking system would 
grant new medium and long-term credits for a total of US$ 1 300 million, which was equivalent to the 
approximately 100 billion pesos of additional domestic credits made necessary by the intervention of 
the financial system. It was also agreed that the international banking system should restore the 
short-term credits which had been suspended and which amounted to approximately 
US$ 200 million. Since the resources that the country would obtain from the international banking 
system for this purpose were intended to replace credits which theoretically could have been obtained 
by the domestic financial sector from the international banking system if it had not been intervened, 
it was agreed with the IMF that these additional external credits should be considered "monetized", 
i.e., that they would replace the 100 billion pesos of domestic credit previously supplied by the Central 
Bank to bolster up the financial system. In this way, it was possible to comply by the end of the year 
with the goal originally agreed on for the expansion of domestic credit, as may been from table 24. 
The cost for Chile was that, unlike previous credits, these new credits granted by the 
international banking system were to bear a State guarantee. Despite this —and as a reflection of the 
greater risks which such credits involved in the view of the banks— their cost rose from 3 /4% over 
LIBOR, which was the spread charged to State enterprises up to the first half of 1982, to 2 1/8%, plus a 
fixed commission of US$ 42.5 million. 
Table 24 
CHILE: ORIGINAL AND MODIFIED TARGETS OF AGREEMENT WITH 
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Finally, it was agreed to raise the limit of the fiscal deficit to 2.3% of the gross domestic product, 
i.e., approximately 35 billion pesos. In order to achieve this goal, and also on account of the smaller 
fiscal revenue due to the drop in imports, the Government decided to raise customs tariffs from 10% 
to 20% and to replace public sector wage adjustments with several individual bonus payments which 
would not raise the nominal wages of public servants by more than 10% during the year. 
Thanks to the support of the external banking system, it was possible to restore the level of the 
reserves during the second half of the year and the loss of reserves for the year as a whole was thus 
kept down to the level contemplated in the original agreement. 
This support from the banking system was due to various factors: firstly, the granting of a State 
guarantee for the loans; secondly, the pressure exerted by the IMF on the international commercial 
banks, and lastly the fact that it was difficult to demand a greater effort from the Chilean economy. All 
this brought greater confidence in the stability of the peso, so that the price of the dollar on the 
parallel market dropped markedly to around 25% over the official rate (the difference had previously 
been more than 50%). Likewise, the increase in the authorized fiscal deficit from 1.7% to 2.3% of the 
product gave the economy more room to manoeuvre, since in such a serious recession it was difficult 
to finance the public deficit at the expense of the resources available for the private sector. Indeed, in 
view of the prevailing uncertainty and lack of confidence, an increase in credit to the private sector 
would lead rather to the paying off of debts than to the expansion of production, and this therefore 
justified the assignment of a more active role to the State. 
b) The State intervention of the banking system 
i) Background. The domestic indebtedness problem had deteriorated so much during 1982 that 
what was at stake was no longer merely the solvency of many productive enterprises but that of the 
financial system as a whole. The enterprises had been able to withstand the very high real interest 
rates of the period 1975-1981 —of the order of 20% to 30% per year— only because the (apparent) 
value of their assets showed similar rises. The value of these assets began to go down sharply as from 
the beginning of 1981, however, so that the level of the index of the value of securities on the stock 
exchange at the end of 1982 was exactly half, in real terms, of that reached two years before. Over the 
same period, in contrast, real interest rates had risen from 14% per year in 1980 to an average of 35% 
per year in the period 1981-1982. Finally, sales and production had gone down by almost 20% since 
mid-1981. It was therefore hardly surprising that a growing number of enterprises went bankrupt or 
were on the verge of doing so, or that they were only capable of "paying" the interest on their debts to 
the extent that the banks gave them new loans to cover both principal and interest payments. Even 
so, in the course of 1982 many enterprises ceased paying off their loans, so that the portfolio of bad 
debts of the banks grew alarmingly. 
It was for this reason that in 1982 the Central Bank offered to buy a considerable part of the 
portfolio of bad debts of the banks and promoted the renegotiation of debts between enterprises and 
the banks. However, the burden of indebtedness accumulated by the enterprises was so great and the 
interests of the banks and of the enterprises were so similar —either because recognizing the 
insolvency of the latter would also compromise the solvency of the banks, or because the ownership of 
the banks was closely related with that of the enterprises themselves— that the demand for credit 
continued to be very high. Consequently, at the end of 1982 the authorities designated supervisors for 
the banks to help to distinguish between viable and non-viable debtors and to liquidate the latter. In 
this way it was hoped that the demand for credit would be reduced, that the pressure on interest rates 
would be relieved, and that the available resources could be used to promote a suitable renegotiation 
with viable debtors. 
ii) The measures taken. As already noted, on 13 January 1983 (only three days after signing the 
agreement with the IMF) the authorities decided to officially intervene the banking system as the only 
way of achieving the vital objective of placing the financial system on a sound basis. This intervention 
affected five banks, including the two main private banks. In addition, two banks of lesser importance 
and one financial institution were dissolved, and inspectors representing the Government were 
placed in another two banks. These measures, together with the interventions made in previous 
years, meant that (in terms of the assets involved) the State came to control 70% of the national 
banking system. 
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In order to avoid a massive withdrawal of funds from the banks, the State guaranteed all 
deposits in banks and financial institutions, regardless of whether they were intervened or not, with 
the sole exception of deposits in the banks which had gone into liquidation. In the case of the latter, 
the losses were to be absorbed by the owners of the banks and by the biggest depositors, to the extent 
of up to 30% of the value of their deposits. 
The fundamental mission of the government delegates in the intervened banks consisted of 
clarifying and putting an end to the practice of crossed credits granted to enterprises which were 
related to the banks either directly or through the so-called "paper companies", the purpose of which 
was to obtain for these related companies a volume of credit greater than that which was prudent and 
permitted by the banking legislation. The authorities considered that only in this way would it be 
possible to put an end to a situation in which the State was saving all tottering enterprises, regardless 
of whether they were viable or not. Indeed, up to the time when the banks were intervened injanuary 
1983, the State had provided US$ 2 200 million to support debtors: US$ 650 million in respect of the 
intervention of four banks and four financial institutions in November 1981; US$ 550 million in 
respect of the intervention of another four financial institutions in April 1982, and nearly 
US$ 1 billion as a subsidy for the "preferential dollar" (foreign exchange made available to certain 
debtors at less than the official exchange rate) during 1982. Moreover, the authorities estimated that 
the total loans that could no longer be recovered were of the order of US$ 2 billion. 
iii) The immediate effects. The most immediate consequence of the intervention of the 
financial sector was the drop in deposits, which went down by 8% during the first quarter. Of course 
they would have gone down much more if they had not been given a State guarantee and if the Central 
Bank had not backed up the banking system by expanding domestic credit. The funds withdrawn from 
the banks were largely used to purchase dollars on the parallel market, on which, as already noted, the 
price of the dollar was almost 50% higher than the official exchange rate. 
A second immediate consequence was the reduction of the flow of short-term credits to Chile by 
the foreign banks when they realized that the authorities would not necessarily back up the 
commitments contracted by the national banking system with the exterior. In fact, these credits were 
not restored until the Government made it clear that it would fulfill its commitments and formalized 
this promise with the modification to the initial agreement with the IMF. Meanwhile, because of the 
withdrawal of deposits, the advance payment of commitments with the exterior and the reduction of 
the short-term credits, the country's reserves went down by around US$ 1 billion. 
A third consequence of the intervention action was the reduction of the flow of credits from 
banks to their related enterprises, so that some of these firms, because of shortage of liquidity or 
insolvency, entered into cessation of payments, especially in respect of the commercial instruments 
they had placed on the market. This meant heavy losses for holders of securities and of the 
instruments in question, especially for the mutual funds linked to the intervened banks and their 
related enterprises. 
The total value of the portfolio of bad debts and the portfolio sold to the Government by the 
intervened banks rose from 86% of the total amount of their capital in December 1982 to more than 
2.6 times that value in March 1983 and four times that value at the end of the year.10 
iv) Measures for the renegotiation of credits. The intervention action made it possible to 
separate the credits granted to related enterprises from the other credits, to determine more exactly 
which credits were overdue or risky, and finally to distinguish the situation of the genuine productive 
enterprises, termed "enterprises with chimneys" from the "paper companies". This distinction was 
essential in order to be able to discriminate between viable and non-viable credits or in order to 
establish the conditions for certain credits to become viable. To this end, starting with the emergency 
plan set forth in March, machinery was set up to facilitate the renegotiation of producers' credits with 
the financial sector. This fact, together with the decline in interest rates achieved through the 
reduction of the demand for credit by the enterprises related to the financial groups and the lower rate 
of interest "suggested" by the authorities for deposits, brought some relief to the viable debtors. 
Although it was not a final solution, it did stop their situation from continuing to get worse. 
1(11r should be noted that this ratio was of the order of two to one at the end of 1983, even for the non-intervened national private banking 
system, which not only shows the generalized nature of the crisis but also suggests that the intervention of the banks may have been somewhat 
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The machinery set up included five lines of credit one of up to 250 billion pesos to renegotiate 
the debts of productive sectors with the financial system at a real interest rate of 7% per year; another 
of 50 billion pesos to finance the supply of dollars at a preferential exchange rate to help those with 
debts in foreign currency; a third of 7 500 million pesos for special lines of credit for the sale of 
dwellings with a 20 year repayment period and at a real interest rate of 8% per year (which enabled 
construction firms to dispose of part of their stock of unsold dwellings) ; a fourth for a further 4 billion 
pesos to enable mortgage debtors to reduce their monthly repayments in "Unidades de Fomento" 
(readjustable units of account) for the next four years through a Central Bank loan at a real interest 
rate of 8% per year; and finally a line of credit of 31 billion pesos to provide credits in order to enable 
enterprises to finance their working capital. 
Finally, at the end of 1983 the Central Bank permitted financial institutions which had not been 
intervened and had participated in the programme of selling their portfolio of bad debts in 1982 to 
sell this portfolio to the Central Bank up to a maximum of 1.5 times their capital and reserves, in 
return for bank promisory notes bearing interest at a real rate of 7% per year and eligible to be 
redeemed at 5%. 
While these measures did relieve the financial burden of enterprises by reducing interest 
payments and extending repayment terms, they were nevertheless far from solving their problems 
definitively. Indeed, as was to be expected in a year in which the product went down, the profits of 
limited companies during 1983 were negative in 10 of 14 economic sectors (see table 25). The relief, 
then, such as it was, was achieved by stabilizing the very high levels of financial costs with respect to 
operating income and increasing the already very high level of indebtedness, as occurred in 11 of the 
14 sectors of the economy. 
c) Monetary policy 
i) The money supply. Because of the deflationary policy applied during the first half of 1982 
and the generalized uncertainty regarding the value of the peso caused by the devaluation and the 
numerous exchange policies tried out in the second half of that year, the money supply went down by 
20% in 1982. Ultimately, it was obvious that in order to reactivate the economy it was necessary to 
expand the money supply. The problem, however, was how to do this without losing reserves, for if 
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the demand for money continued to go down, an increase in the money supply would lead to a loss of 
reserves or a higher level of inflation. 
As already noted, the initial agreement with the IMF appeared to be contractive, since it 
provided for only a relatively small nominal expansion in money issue and credit (less than 15%) 
compared with the projected inflation (20%) and economic growth (4%). Indeed, most of the main 
monetary aggregates went down in real terms during 1983. Thus, real money issue went down by 8% 
and only private sector money (M,) grew, and even then only 3% in real terms. Furthermore, as this 
increase was more than offset by the 36% drop in time deposits, the broader money supply (M2) went 
down by 27% in real terms. At the same time, real loans by the banking system went down almost by 
10% (see table 26). 
Though the evolution of the money supply was generally contractive for the year as a whole, its 
behaviour varied widely in the course of the year. Thus, as a result of the intervention of the financial 
system, money issue grew by 10% and M, increased by 30% in real terms during the first quarter of 
1983. Subsequently, however, both money issue and the money supply went down, reaching their 
lowest levels of the year in real terms during the last quarter. Indeed, it was only in December that 
money issue and the other monetary aggregates registered real increases once again. This shows how 
cautious the monetary policy was after the invervention of the banking system, as well as the effort 
made by the authorities to comply strictly with what had been agreed with the IMF. 
ii) Interest rates. The restrictive character of the monetary policy cannot be judged, however, 
only from the evolution of the supply of money and credit. It is essential to take into account also what 
happened with the demand for credit and consequently with interest rates. 
Table 26 
CHILE: MONETARY INDICATORS 
Money issue (E) 
Total money supply 
Private sector (M,) 
Public sector (PS) 
Term deposits (TD) 
From 30 to 89 days 
From 90 to 365 days 
Readjustables 
Non-readjustable 
Over one year 
Private money + 
term deposits 
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Source: Central Bank of Chile, Síntesis Monetaria. 
"Preliminary figures. Includes bonds of rhe Department of Savings and Investments (DAI). 
than 30 days. Millions of dollars. 























































































Source: Central Bank of Chile. 
" Annual rates projected on the basis of quarterly rates. Calculated on the basis of the nominal rates published by the Central Bank, the 
corrected consumer price index given in table 22, and the consumer price index of the National Statistical Insitute (period 1979-1982). 
For the year as a whole, the real interest rate for loans went down to less than half (16%) of 
what the rate had been in the period 1981-1982 (see table 27). Thus, with the exception of the level 
registered in 1980, the real interest rate was the lowest since the freeing of interest rates in 1975. 
There was a similar decline in the rate of procurement of deposits, because of the use by the 
authorities of the mechanism of "suggesting" an interest rate to the banks, together with the 
slackening of the inflationary process compared with the second half of 1982. As a result, the nominal 
rate of procurement of deposits went down rapidly from an annual rate of 73% in the last quarter of 
1982 to a rate of 35 % in the first quarter of 1983. At the same time, the real interest rates on deposits 
went down from 22% per year in 1982 to only 4% in 1983; their lowest level since the liberalization 
of the financial system. 
Had it not been for this policy of suggested interest rates, the adjustment to smaller inflationary 
expectations would probably have been much slower in 1983, especially in view of the uncertainty 
prevailing at the beginning of the year. In fact, it is probable that the suggested interest rates 
encouraged the withdrawal of short-term deposits for use in the acquisition of dollars or in order to 
increase longer-term deposits at readjustable interest rates (see table 26). The fact that the bulk of the 
decline in deposits took place in the first quarter, however, suggests that it was due rather to problems 
of general uncertainty and not to the fact that inflationary expectations were higher than the 
suggested interest rate. As a matter of fact, the monthly decline,in deposits in real terms was very 
even from April onwards (although a good deal slower than in the first quarter), even though the 
interest rate on deposits was low and very unstable. Consequently, the "cost" of the policy of 
suggested deposit interest rates does not seem to have been very high. 
For its part, the reduction in the interest rates on loans is attributable almost entirely to the 
decline in the rate on deposits. Thus, between 1982 and 1983 the latter went down by 18 percentage 
points in real terms, while the former went down by 20. 
Nevertheless, an explanation must be found for this extra drop of two points in the interest rate 
on loans, especially in view of the fact that the supply of money was rather contractive. What 
happened, it would appear, is that the demand for credit went down in the course of the year as much 
as or even more than supply. Because of the intervention of the banks and the subsequent 
reprogramming of debts, there was a decline in the "artificial" pressure of enterprises seeking credit 
at any cost, that is to say, the almost unlimited pressure for credit coming from the related and/or 
non-viable enterprises. If these 'circumstances remained unchanged, this would tend to reduce the 
interest rate on loans. This was particularly evident after the intervention of the banks and was 
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Table 28 
CHILE: CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INCOME AND EXPENDITURE 
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983a 
A. Income and expenditure in national currency 
(Billions of current pesos of each year) 




2. Total expenditure 
Service of public debt 
Other expenditure 
3. Deficit (1-2) 
4. Deficit/total 
expenditure (percentage) 
1. Current income 
Copper 
Other 
2. Total expenditure 
Service of public debt 
Other expenditure 
3. Deficit (1-2) 
4. Deficit/total 
expenditure (percentage) 





2. Total expenditure 
Service of public debt 
Other expenditure 
3. Deficit (1-2) 
4. Deficit/total expenditure 
5. Deficit/gross 
domestic product 
6. Current income/ 
gross domestic product 
7. Total expenditure/ 
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Source: Ministry of Finance, Budget Office. 
"Preliminary figures. Including advance payments of 9 565 million pesos. 'Surplus. Including advance payments of 
US$ 422 million. 'Including advance payments of US$ 867 million. 'including advance payments of US$ 346 million at 1976 
prices. * Including advance payments of US$423 million at 1976 prices. 
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reflected in the fact that the interest rate on loans went down by 23 points between the first and third 
quarters of 1983, while over the same period the rate for deposits went down by 19 points. This 
suggests that the demand for credit went down, on the one hand, due to the intervention of the banks 
and the subsequent placing of the financial system on a sounder basis, and on the other, because the 
enterprises tried not to increase their already very high levels of indebtedness. 
In these circumstances, then, the increase in the supply of credit in the first half of the year 
helped to bring down interest rates. On the other hand, the apparent increase in the real interest rate 
in the fourth quarter would seem to indicate that, as the impression that the reactivation had begun 
became more general, the demand for credit increased more than the supply. 
At all events, at the end of the year there were still three problems which needed to be solved in 
order to normalize financial flows and ensure reactivation: defining the terms of a definitive 
renegotiation of the debts of the productive sector; determining how the losses were to be absorbed 
and who should shoulder them, and finally, deciding who the owners of the intervened banks 
should be. 
d) Fiscal policy 
In 1983 the fiscal deficit was finally equivalent to 3.8% of the gross domestic product: the 
highest proportion registered in the last nine years (see table 28). The ratio of the deficit to the 
product was thus more than double the goal (1.8%) laid down in the initial agreement with the IMF 
and 1.5 percentage points greater than the goal in the modified agreement (2.3%). This discrepancy 
was due to the fact that in the agreements with the Fund it was assumed that the economy would 
grow. In practice, however, the economy did not grow, and finally, in order to meet the target deficit 
foreseen, it would have been necessary to reduce the level of expenditure even more, which would 
have made the recession even more serious. It is hardly surprising, then, that finally it was decided to 
give way over the fulfilment of the fiscal deficit goal, since in essence this represented the counterpart 
of the unforeseen fall in the product. 
Even so, fiscal expenditure in national currency went down by 3% in real terms between 1982 
and 1983, so that the bigger deficit obviously did not act as a factor of reactivation. The bulk of this 
decline was due to the contraction in current expenditure, especially payments of wages. This 
reflected the effect of the wage adjustments granted, which represented a nominal increase of the 
order of 10% but a drop in real terms of around 15%. Even the expenditure of the Ministry of Public 
Works, which had already suffered a very drastic reduction in 1982, went down by a further 7% in 
1983. 
Outstanding among the cases of increased expenditure was the Ministry of Housing and Town 
Planning, whose expenditure grew by 70% and thus more than offset the decline in expenditure on 
public works, and the outlays to finance the programmes for the absorption of unemployment. This 
latter expenditure increased by 144% in real terms between 1982 and 1983, amounting to the 
equivalent of US$ 300 million, or more than 6% of the total central government expenditure. 
Total fiscal revenue, for its part, went down by 7% in real terms on account of the recession. 
The most significant declines were in revenue from income tax and value added tax (35% and 9%, 
respectively). On the other hand, foreign trade taxes increased by 73% in real terms, mostly because 
of the rise in tariffs from 10% to 20%. Revenue from taxes on certain specific products also 
considerably increased (33%) as a result of the increased rates of taxation on tobacco and cigarettes 
and the increase in the taxable basis (price) of the fuel tax. 
As real fiscal revenue went down by 1% whereas total fiscal expenditure dropped by only 1%, 
the fiscal deficit increased by 60% even though, as already noted, the authorities did not try to use 




1. Recent economic trends: Introduction and summary 
The progressive worsening of the economic situation since the beginning of the decade had become 
even more marked in 1982, and in 1983 it degenerated into a crisis which affected with various 
degrees of intensity the entire economy, even in the case of those activities which had recorded some 
growth. The gross domestic product, which had shown scant dynamism during the preceding year 
(1.4%), dropped in 1983 by 3.3%, while the per capita product fell by 6.3%. In the last two years the 
per capita product has thus decreased by 8%. The fall in national income was somewhat greater than 
the year before —nearly 4%— due to a new deterioration in the terms of trade, which since 1981 have 
gone down by more than 20% (see table 1 and figure 1). 
The decreases exhibited by other other important variables during the year illustrate the depth 
of crisis. Imports shrank by nearly 35%, both in value and in volume, on account of the increasingly 
restricted purchasing capacity, which led the authorities to establish severe import controls. 
On the other hand, gross fixed investment, which had already stagnated in 1981 and dropped 
10% in 1982, decreased 26% in 1983. This fall in investment was at once the cause and the 
consequence of the recession. The low level of economic activity and the 7.3% contraction in domestic 
consumption discouraged private investment completely, while public investment was sluggish, 
inhibited as it was by the policy of austerity and containment of public expenditure. 
The conjunction of different factors and circumstances contributed to the progressive 
worsening of the economic situation in recent years. However, two facts in particular hastened the 
critical situation which emerged in 1983. On the one hand, the weakening of exports in 1981 and their 
decrease in 1982 raised the trade deficit. At the same time, the external debt service increased rapidly, 
and in 1982 it equalled the earnings from exports of goods and services. This generated important 
balance-of-payments deficits in both years, leading to a reduction in the international reserves. On 
top of that situation, in the second half of 1982 there was an unexpected fall in foreign financial flows, 
compelling the authorities to apply for the rescheduling of the external debt falling due in 1983 and to 
restrict imports severely. 
On the other hand, the heavy rains which fell for 11 months, especially in the coastal region, and 
which (together with the appearance of the El Niño ocean current) caused enormous losses in 
production and damage to communications and facilities, impaired the entire economy.1 
Mainly as a consequence of these disasters, the agricultural product fell by 29% and the fishery 
product by 20% (sea fishing decreased by half, although it was partly compensated by an excellent 
shrimp catch). The decrease in agricultural and fishery production affected the supply of raw 
materials for manufacturing, and this, together with import restrictions, serious financial difficulties 
in the enterprises and a fall in demand, led to a drop of nearly 6% in the manufacturing product. 
Construction, for its part, suffered a decrease of the order of 15 %, due to problems similar to those of 
industry, which were aggravated by the deferment of important public works. 
Among the few activities which grew during the year were electricity, gas and water services 
(around 10%) and crude petroleum production, which rose 12.5% thanks to the entry into operation 
of new fields and wells in the eastern region. On the other hand, the output of petroleum products 
diminished approximately 16% and domestic fuel sales decreased 7%, making it possible to allocate a 
larger share of crude production for export. Among the factors which had an influence on the drop in 
domestic fuel sales were price increases, lower fuel consumption in industries and in other productive 
activities due to the recession, and the replacement of some thermo-electric power plants (which 
require large quantities of fuel) by the first three units of the Paute hydroelectric power project ( 100 
MW each), which were incorporated to the transmission network in the second half of the year. 
'These losses were estimated by ECLAC at around USS 640 million. See the report entitled Los desastres naturales de 1982-1983 en 
Bolivia, Ecuador y Perú, E/CEPAL/G.1274, 27 December 1983. 
309 
The decrease in agricultural and fishery production severely affected the supply of food and raw 
materials for importaot industrial sectors, and the shortage got even worse due to the hoarding of 
merchandise which led to huge price increases, particularly in the case of food. Price increases due to 
these reasons came on top of the increments in fuel prices (except gasoline, which had gone up the 
preceding year) and electricity rates. Furthermore, prices of imported goods went up with the 
currency devaluation and tariff surcharges. The food price index increased at a rate of 9% per month 
in the period between April and July, but slackened in the following months and even showed 
negative growth in November and December. All in all, the December to December consumer price 
index increased 5 3 % (more than doubling its rise of 24% in 1982) while food prices went up by 86% 
(see table 1). 
The inordinate price increases led to numerous protest demonstrations, work stoppages and 
strikes in demand for higher wages. At the beginning of July, the minimum wage for industrial 
workers was raised from 4 600 to 5 600 sucres per month, and the basic wages for workers in 
agriculture, small enterprises etc., went up by a similar proportion. Given the considerable increases 
in domestic prices, however, these rises were not enough for wages to retain their purchasing power. 
Table 1 
ECUADOR: MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS 
1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983" 
Baisc economic indicators 
Gross domestic product at market 
prices (millions of 1970 dollars) 
Population (millions of inhabitants) 
Per capita gross domestic product 
(dollars at 1970 prices) 
4 985 5 313 5 595 
7.32 7.54 7.78 
681 
Growth rates 
B. Short-run economic indicators 
Gross domestic product 6.5 
Per capita gross domestic product 3.3 
Gross national income 6.1 
Terms of trade (goods and services) 2.3 
Current value of exports of goods 
and services 12.3 
Current value of imports of goods 
and services 35.2 
Consumer prices 
December - December 9.8 
Variation between annual averages 13.1 
Money 31.0 
Minimum wage in real terms -13.1 
Current income of government 12.3 
Total expenditure of government 16.9 
Fiscal deficit/total expenditure of government 26.2 















Millions of dollars 
External sector 
Trade balance (goods and services) 
Balance on current account 
Balance on capital account 
Variation in net international reserves 











5 869 6 136 6 221 6 018 
8.02 8.28 8.54 8.81 





























































































"Preliminary figures. Includes various bonuses and allowances. 'Percentages. 
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Thus, real wages diminished by an average of 16% during the year, or 9% if special bonuses and 
additional benefits are considered. 
Before the occurrence of the natural disasters already referred to and the decline in economic 
activity in the coastal region, the urban unemployment rate was estimated at nearly 5% and that of 
underemployment between 40% and 60%. As a result of the events that occurred in 1983, however, 
urban unemployment rose to between 9% and 10%. 
As mentioned earlier, one of the causes that speeded up economic deterioration in the last year 
was the critical external situation, aggravated by the fall in external credit flows. At the end of 1983, 
however, the results shown by the balance of payments were fairly favourable and quite different 
from those recorded in 1982, although this was accomplished by sacrificing one-third of imports. 
Thus, the negative trade balance of US$ 370 million in 1982 changed to a positive one of US$ 590 
million in 1983, while the current account deficit decreased by US$ 1 090 million and international 
reserves recovered US$ 150 million of the US$ 710 million lost in 1981 and 1982. 
The 34% drop in imports of goods and services in 1983 was a consequence of prohibitions 
instituted at the end of 1982, the progressive devaluation of the sucre, and tariff surcharges, as well as 
the establishment of new provisions on the exchange rate and prior deposits. Another major cause of 
the import contraction was the economic recession. 
On the other hand, total exports diminished 2.5% and those of goods recorded only a tiny 
increase. Crude petroleum exports amounted to US$ 290 million more than in 1982, even though 
their average sales price decreased from US$ 32.40 to US$ 27.60 per barrel. Moreover, shrimp 
exports increased from US$ 122 million in 1982 to US$ 175 million, and coffee exports also rose 
although more slowly. The increase in sales of these three products offset the fall in other 
items (-87% in the case of cocoa beans and -45% in manufactures). 
After protracted negotiations, an agreement was reached with creditor banks for the 
refinancing of US$ 1.2 billion of the external public debt and approximately US$ 1 billion of the 
private debt falling due between November 1982 and December 1983. The renegotiation covered a 
seven-year period, including one year of grace. Furthermore, agreement was reached with the Paris 
Club for the refinancing of US$ 155 million of the public sector debt with governments and State-
guaranteed supplier credits falling due up to mid-1984. The State made itself responsible for 
renegotiating the private debt and debtors signed agreements with the Central Bank to pay their 
commitments in sucres. 
Among the agreements with the international banking system, the Government obtained a 
"fresh money" loan of US$ 431 million, designed mainly for the payment of commercial credit 
arrears. Likewise, the opening of lines of trade credit for US$ 700 million was agreed. The granting of 
these loans and the rescheduling of the debt proper were to some extent conditional on the signing of 
an agreement with the International Monetary Fund for the granting of a stand-by loan of US$ 171 
million, to be disbursed in four equal quotas upon certification of fulfilment of the purposes expressed 
in the Letter of Intent which the monetary authorities had sent to the IMF in March. 
At the end of 1983 the total external debt came to approximately US$ 6.7 billion: US$ 500 
million more than in December 1982. Disbursements made in 1983 amounted to US$ 2 720 million 
and amortization payments to US$ 2 200 million.2 In addition, there were interest payments of 
US$ 680 million, i.e., US$ 130 million less than in 1982. 
The objectives expressed in the Letter of Intent sent to the IMF were included in an Economic 
Stabilization Programme proposed by the Monetary Board in March. In order to fulfill them, a series 
of exchange rate, monetary, fiscal and foreign trade measures were adopted during the year. Thus, at 
the end of March the official exchange rate was increased from 33 to 42 sucres per dollar, and a daily 
devaluation system was implemented, so that the rate came to 54 sucres per dollar by the end of the 
year. Likewise, a free exchange rate was established (somewhat lower than that of the free market) at 
which the Central Bank purchases foreign exchange arising from 30% of non-traditional export 
earnings and resells it for importing less essential goods (classified in Schedule II). Together with 
these measures, the issuance of tax credit certificates in respect of exports was eliminated. 
In addition, frequent transfers of goods from Schedule I to Schedule II were made during the 
year and the amounts of the prior deposits demanded for imports were increased, while payments to 
2The disbursements and amortization payments effectively made were lower, since the figures mentioned include the accounting 
movements which took place as a result of the debt renegotiation; 
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Figure 1 
ECUADOR: MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS 
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Gross domestic investment 
Gross fixed investment 
Millions of dollars 
at 1970 prices 
1981 1982 1983" 1970 1980 1983° 1980 1981 1982 1983" 
7 428 7 427 6 815 114.4 122.2 113.2 3.8 3.6 - -8.2 
6 136 6 221 6 018 100.0 100.0 100.0 4.9 4.5 1.4 -3.3 
1 292 1 206 797 14.4 22.2 13.2 -0.7 -0.7 -6.7 -33.9 
7 428 7 427 6 815 114.4 122.2 113.2 3.8 3.6 
1 179 1 061 808 18.2 20.9 13.4 
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Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures supplied by the Central Bank of Ecuador. 
"Preliminary figures. The figures for exports and imports of goods and services correspond to those of the balance of payments, 
deflated by means of price indexes calculated by ECLAC. 
the exterior in respect of them were deferred. Likewise, tariff surcharges were imposed: imports of a 
long list of luxury items had already been prohibited and those of some capital goods had been 
discontinued. 
The interest rate for loan operations was also raised from 15% to 19%, but even so the real 
rates remained highly negative. Furthermore, several taxes were increased and measures for the 
containment of public expenditure and reduction of the fiscal deficit were adopted. 
One of the purposes of the Stabilization Programme was to regulate the money supply and 
credit according to the essential needs of the economy with the aim of preventing inflationary 
pressures. During the year money increased only 2 5 % : much less than the gross domestic product at 
current prices. It was also laid down that the public sector deficit should not exceed 4 % of the gross 
domestic product. In fact, the fiscal deficit/GDP ratio decreased from 5.3% in 1982 to 3 % in 1983, 
thanks to a 29% increment in current income and an increase of only 15% in total expenditure. 
2. Trends in economic activity 
a) Total supply and demand 
The rapid growth of the gross domestic product recorded in the 1970s gradually began to lose 
momentum towards the end of that decade. This trend persisted in the following years and already by 
1982 the economy recorded an increase of only 1.4%, while there were evident signs of recession and 
deterioration in the main economic variables. The situation worsened and became critical in 1983 due 
to the drastic reduction in external financing and the natural disasters that devastated the coastal 
region. The gross domestic product fell by 3-3% and the per capita product dropped by 6.3%: an 
unprecedented event, at least in the last 35 years. 
The immediate causes of the crisis must be ascribed to the aggravation of the external situation. 
In 1981 and 1982 the external debt service absorbed export earnings almost completely and external 
financing became insufficient to cover imports and other commitments, thus leading to significant 
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reductions in the international reserves. In the last quarter of 1982 the external deficit became still 
more acute as the external credit flow decreased, and it was therefore necessary to adopt immediate 
measures to restrict imports and to take steps for the rescheduling of external debt payments falling 
due during 1983. 
The other factor which triggered the critical situation of 1983 was the heavy rain and floods 
which, together with the appearance of the El Niño ocean current, caused enormous losses in 
production and heavy damage that affected the entire economy. 
All components of total supply and demand, except the volume of exports of goods and services, 
showed substantial declines in 1983 (see table 2). 
The slowdown in the growth of the gross domestic product, and later its fall, were accompanied 
in the 1980-1981 biennium by a slight decrease in the volume of imports of goods and services, which 
worsened in 1982 and became extraordinarily acute in 1983, when this volume shrank by 34%. In the 
years of greatest economic activity of the preceding decade the import coefficient reached over 2 3 % ; 
in 1983, in contrast, it only came to 13%. 
Furthermore, fixed capital formation dropped by one-third since 1980, thus reversing the 
vigorous capitalization process which existed in the period of rapid economic growth extending from 
1973 to 1978. In 1978, the fixed investment coefficient was nearly 2 5 % ; but in 1983 it dropped to 
12%, thus jeopardizing the recovery of production in the years to come. 
There has been a parallel between the fall in investment and the course followed by 
construction and also by imports, particularly in 1983, when purchases of capital goods decreased by 
one half at current values. However, two other important factors explain the decline in investment: 
the contraction of private consumption and the containment of public expenditure. 
In the periods 1976-1980, 1981-1982 and in 1983, important changes occurred in the 
composition of investment financing sources. Between the two first periods the share of external 
savings in such financing increased remarkably, with a concomitant drop in domestic savings. The 
cause of this increment was not so much the decrease in domestic savings, or the deterioration in the 
terms of trade, as the rapid increment of net factor payments to the exterior, especially interest 
payments (see table 3). 
Table 3 



























1. Gross domestic investment 
2. Gross national savings (a + b + c) 
a) Gross domestic savings 
b) Net factor payments to the exterior' 
c) Terms-of-trade effect 
3. External savings 23.1 35.0 45.1 6.2 
Percentages of gross domestic product 
1. Gross domestic investment 20.4 19.2 
2. Gross national savings (a + b + c) 15.7 12.5 
a) Gross domestic savings 9.6 8.0 
b) Net factor payments to the exterior 2.8 4.7 
c) Terms-of-trade effect 9.0 9.2 
3. External savings 4.7 6.7 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official statistics. 
"Preliminary figures. The original information is expressed in constant values (see preceding table). 


















ECUADOR: GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT, BY KIND OF 
ECONOMIC ACTIVITY 
Gross domestic product 
Goods 
Agriculture 





Electricity, gas and water 





insurance, real estate 
and business services 
Ownership of dwellings 
Community, social and 
personal services 
Government services 
Less: imputed bank 
service charges 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of information provided by the Central Bank of Ecuador. 
"Preliminary data. As the individual activities and the totals were calculated independently, the sum of the former does not correspond 
with the latter. ' Oil refining has been included under petroleum industry and excluded from manufacturing. The original values in 
millions of 1975 sucres are as follows: 
1980 1981 1982 1983 
Mining and petroleum industry 15 070 15 780 15 172 16 446 
Manufacturing (oil refining excluded) 26 807 28 181 29 467 27 812 
The financing structure of investment changed drastically in 1983, when domestic savings 
financed 94% of gross domestic investment, which recorded a decrease of 24% during that year. 
External financing thus amounted to only 6%. In spite of the deterioration in the economic situation, 
domestic savings were able to show an extraordinary increment, which is undoubtedly related to the 
large current savings obtained by the central government. 
b) Evolution of tbe main sectors 
All economic activities, except petroleum production, and electricity, gas and water services, 
contributed in different degrees to the reduction experienced by the gross domestic product in 1983 
(see table 4). 
The largest drops were recorded in agriculture, particularly in cropfarming (-29%) and fishing 
(-20%), due to climatic phenomena, and also in forestry (-10%). Likewise, activity in the previously 
dynamic construction sector dropped by more than 15% and manufacturing by over 5%, due to 
various problems which included in particular financing difficulties, fall in demand, etc., and the lack 
of raw materials due to losses in agricultural and fishing production and a decline in imports, which 
also became more expensive. 
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Sectoral product estimates unfortunately do not include that of services; however, according to 
partial data available on some activities, and in view of the extent and depth of the economic 
recession, it may be concluded that very few activities achieved any real positive results during 1983. 
i) Agriculture. The heavy and persistent rains which led to the overflowing of rivers and 
extensive floods in the coastal region, as well as the heavy seas and the decline in the level of sea 
salinity, caused huge losses and damage to important crops and a drastic reduction in fishing. 
The rainy season, which started prematurely at the end ôf October 1982, continued until 
September, and its effects on harvests and sown land naturally lasted even longer. In some coastal 
provinces, the volume of rainfall in that period was five times that of a normal year.3 Harvests were 
lost, yields diminished due to excess humidity and the proliferation of pest attacks, and some products 
were spoiled because they could not be removed from farms due to damage to roads and other 
facilities. 
In addition to natural disasters, the situation was made worse by several other longstanding 
problems in Ecuadorian agriculture, which have progressively undermined production. Between 
1975 and 1982 the agricultural product, in real terms, dropped by slightly over 4%, but in 1983 alone 
it diminished by 29%. The fishing and forestry products contracted 20% and 10%, respectively, 
while, the growth rate of livestock production went down slightly. The behaviour of these activities 
led to a fall of 15% in agricultural and fishing production (see table 5). 
Table 5 




































































































































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of information from che Central Bank of Ecuador, the Ministry of Agriculture, and the National Development 
Council. 
"Preliminary figures. 




ECUADOR: AGRICULTURAL AREA HARVESTED 






















































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of information from the Central Bank of Ecuador, the Ministry of Agriculture, and the National Development 
Council. 
"Preliminary figures. 
Among agricultural goods intended for the domestic market, the largest falls in production 
were recorded by major industrial raw materials such as cotton, soya and sugar cane, as well as hard 
maize intended mainly for animal feeding. Only the production of African palm exhibited an increase 
during the year, because the plantations are in the highlands. 
It is estimated that cotton production diminished by approximately 80% as a consequence of a 
reduction in the area planted. Rains and floods prevented sowing, and part of the area previously 
planted with cotton was occupied by other crops, mainly maize. On top of that there was a drop of 
approximately 30% in yields. Already in 1982 the cotton harvest had declined 4 0 % due to the 
drought that affected the province of Manabi. 
Soya production also diminished (by nearly 80%), seriously affecting supplies to the industries 
producing edible oils and balanced feed for animals. As in the case of cotton, rains prevented the 
sowing of a considerable area, while due to the excess rainfall an important part of the harvest was 
lost and yields diminished. 
Sugar-cane plantations were concentrated around four sugar mills in the coastal region. During 
the five-year period 1975-1980 sugar-cane production increased only slightly, while in 1981-1982 it 
decreased by more than one-third. Heavy rains at the end of 1982 seriously hindered the 1982-1983 
harvest and the rains that followed damaged plantations and delayed from June to September the 
beginning of the 1983-1984 harvest. As a consequence of the above, the area of cane cut diminished 
approximately 37% and the harvested volume dropped by 4 5 % . Likewise, the excess rainfall lowered 
the cane saccharose content. 
Furthermore, it is estimated that the hard maize harvest diminished by more than one half, in 
spite of the cultivation of a larger area on lands which before the rains were arid. Heavy rains between 
May and July hindered the harvest and in many cases prevented transport to consumption centres. 
Among staple foods, rice production —which in 1982 had already declined 1 1 % — was that 
which dropped the most (around 30%). Floods prevented or hampered sowing and the harvested 
area dropped by 44%, despite the fact that when rains subsided in March, 20 000 new hectares had 
been sown (see tables 5 and 6). 
There were also drops in the harvests of potatoes (-8%), wheat (-13%) and soft maize and 
barley (approximately 3%). With respect to wheat, it should be borne in mind that approximately 
317 
300 000 tons must be imported each year (7.5 times more than domestic production in a normal year), 
and this figure was probably higher in 1983. 
For the same climatic causes the production of three main export products also dropped: 
bananas, coffee and cocoa. The most hit was banana production, which is estimated to have 
diminished by around 24%. Part of this was lost due to floods; besides, excess humidity favoured the 
proliferation of fungi and, to make matters worse, their prevention and control was delayed by a 
strike of fumigation workers and by the shortage of fungicides and other chemical products. To this 
should be added the damage to bridges and roads, which hindered the transport of fruit to shipping 
ports. 
Coffee plantations also suffered from the rains and humidity. However, it is estimated that the 
drop in the coffee harvest was only around 3%, and indeed the volume of exported coffee increased 
slightly thanks to the availability of stocks. 
The cocoa harvest, however, dropped nearly 40%. The plantations suffered heavy losses from 
the floods while the flowering was partially destroyed by the rains. Moreover, the yield of this crop 
has declined in recent years because, for economic reasons, an adequate renewal programme has not 
been implemented. The National Development Bank launched a rehabilitation programme covering 
27 000 hectares of cocoa plantations affected by the rains. 
The drastic falls in food production and the difficulties in transporting products to consumption 
centres caused serious shortages, aggravated by hoarding and speculation. This led to inordinate food 
price increases, so that the food component of the consumer price index rose between April and July 
at a rate of 9% per month. However, both the supply and prices of most essential products began to 
return to normal as imports intended to replace the missing products began to arrive. 
Authorization was given for the importation of 100 000 tons of rice, 120 000 tons of sugar, 
130 000 tons of hard maize, 18 000 tons of soya beans, 3 000 tons of soya cake and 5 000 tons of cotton 
fibre, plus the imports of wheat, barley and powdered milk which are normally effected each year.4 
For its part, the Ministry of Agriculture prepared and implemented a plan of action for 
production rehabilitation and the normalization of domestic supply. 
The National Agricultural Marketing Corporation (ENAC) had a storage capacity of 170 000 
tons during 1983, and this, together with the much smaller capacity available to the National Staple 
Commodities Corporation (EMPROVIT), helped to relieve the shortages. On the other hand, price 
fixing and price control arrangements at the producer and consumer levels were incapable of 
preventing the high prices reached by many products in the domestic market. 
In general, stock-raising activity suffered less than crop farming, or fishing from the 
phenomenon of the El Niño ocean current. The stock-raising product increased by 5% during the 
year, i.e., slightly less than the preceding year. Cattle losses were not heavy, but the average cattle 
weight dropped owing to feeding changes and irregularities and to the fact that animals had to be 
evacuated from flooded land. Poultry farming was the most seriously affected activity. Rains and 
floods destroyed facilities and killed large numbers of poultry in the province of Manabi, while there 
was also an acute shortage of maize and basic products for the processing of balanced feed. 
Despite the problems caused by the bad weather, livestock profitability seems to have improved 
in 1983, since whereas the added value increased 5% in real terms, beef production increased slightly 
more than 2%, that of milk 1.5% and swine slaughtering 3.5%. In contrast, it is estimated that 
poultry meat production decreased by one-third and that of eggs by 25%. 
It is estimated that the offshore fishing catch dropped to less than half in 1983- On the one 
hand, heavy seas and bad weather hampered the sailing of fishing vessels, while an increase of several 
degrees in the sea temperature and a drop in its salinity caused some types of fish to migrate or 
perish. The volume of fish exports dropped drastically; thus, exports of frozen tuna fell from 7 900 
tons in 1982 to 5 120 tons in 1983 and those of processed seafood products diminished from 134 000 
tons to 40 000 tons. Shrimp exports, however, increased from 16 500 to 21 600 tons in the same 
period. The damages suffered by shrimp facilities from the rains and floods were not too extensive 
and their timely repair allowed this activity to recover and to carry on its dynamic expansion. 
As part of the plan for the rehabilitation of agricultural production fostered by the Ministry of 
Agriculture, the National Development Bank channeled an important share of external 
financing —nearly US$ 200 million— to agricultural development in areas affected by floods. Thus, 
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Source: Cenrral Bank of Ecuador. 
"Preliminary figures. 
the Bank granted credits for sowing 80 000 hectares of rice, 54 000 hectares of hard maize, 5 500 
hectares of soft maize and 5 000 hectares of potatoes. 
ii) Petroleum. Crude oil production, which had increased very little in recent years in spite of 
efforts made to offset the decline in the natural flow of oil through injection and pumping, 
experienced a significant boost in 1983, going up from 77 to 86.7 million barrels, that is, by 12.5% 
(see table 7). 
The increase in oil production was due to the entry into operation of the Secoya, Shushuqui and 
Shuara fields at the end of 1982, and of the Charapa and Cononaco fields and the Secoya 8 and 9, 
Pichincha (in the Libertador field) and Rumiyacu I wells in 1983. Twenty-nine wells were drilled 
during the year, twelve of which (two more than the preceding year) were development wells. 
The average production capacity went up from 211 000 barrels per day in 1982 to 238 000 in 
1983. In September, however, there was already an output of 250 000 barrels per day and it was hoped 
that by the end of the year and the beginning of 1984 the output would rise to 270 000 barrels per day 
with the entry into operation of the Cuyabeno, Tétete and Bermejo fields. Besides the entry into 
operation of the above fields, a factor that also helped to raise crude production was the increase in 
maximum extraction rates established by the National Hydrocarbons Bureau with the aim of 
regulating production and preventing the rapid exhaustion of the fields. 
The significant increase achieved by crude production and the drop of nearly 17% in the 
amount of petroleum processed by refineries increased by 46% the volume of foreign sales, thus 
offsetting the lower price of hydrocarbons in international markets. Thus, the value of crude oil 
exports increased from US$ 1 180 to US$ 1 470 million (24%) between 1982 and 1983, even though 
the average sales price dropped from US$ 32.4 to US$ 27.6 per barrel. 
The marketing difficulties encountered in the first months disappeared progressively during 
the year, but problems arising from insufficient storage capacity persisted and were finally relieved by 
renting ships for that purpose. 
In contrast with the increment recorded by crude production, the volume processed by 
refineries in 1983 was lower than that of the preceding year. The Esmeraldas refinery, with a capacity 















production of gasoline and kerosene dropped by 19% and that of other fuels between 14% and 16%. 
The volume of fuel oil exported, for its part, decreased 24% and its value fell from US$ 137 million in 
1982 to USf 106 million in 1983 (see table 7). 
The decrease in the output of petroleum products was linked, in the first place, to the economic 
recession and the decline in production which led to lower fuel consumption. Moreover, the doubling 
of domestic gasoline prices in October 1982 and the rise of the other fuels in 1983 helped to 
rationalize their consumption.5 Domestic fuel sales, which had increased at a rate of 6.3% in the three 
preceding years, thus diminished by 7% in 1983. Despite the reduction in domestic fuel consumption, 
however, fuel imports (mainly of liquefied gas) increased nearly 24% in 1983- In October eleven big 
oil companies sent in bids for the exploration and exploitation rights of selected areas, according to 
the new Hydrocarbons Law adopted in August 1982. At the end of September, proven oil reserves 
were estimated at 1 100 million barrels and probable reserves at 670 million barrels. An important 
volume of oil reserves may change from the probable category to the proven category due to the 
secondary recovery works conducted in Shushufindi, Aguarico and Sacha. 
The new wells which entered into production have increased the reserves and the Ecuadorian 
State Petroleum Corporation (CEPE) has continued to perform drillings in the northeastern region 
with very good results with respect to the volume and quality of the oil extracted. Light crude was also 
discovered in the south-east region in the Balsaura well, which produces nearly 1 800 barrels per day. 
iii) Manufacturing. The sluggishness which manufacturing had been exhibiting since 1980 led 
to a substantial (5.6%) fajl in its gross product in 1983, with impacts on employment and the rest of 
the depressed economy which have not yet been assessed (see table 8). 
Several factors have contributed to the decline in manufacturing production. In the first place, 
there is the contraction of domestic demand: an eloquent expression of the overall recession which 
affects the economy and of the crisis of some activities in particular (such as construction) which are 
important buyers of manufactured goods. Also, in the case of some products —wood, canned seafood, 
processed cocoa products, etc.— external demand has suffered restrictions. 
Table 8 
ECUADOR: GROSS MANUFACTURING PRODUCT 
Manufacturing product' 
Food, beverages and tobacco 
Textiles, clothing and 
leather goods 
Wood and wood products 
Paper and publishing 
Chemical and rubber 
products' 
Basic metal and non-
metallic products 
Machinery, equipment and 
transport equipment 














































































Source: Central Bank of Ecuador, Presupuesto económico, ¡983 y ¡984, November 1983. 
"Preliminary figures arid estimates. The index of manufacturing production normally included in this section has been replaced by the 
gross product of the manufacturing sector at constant prices, due to the considerable differences observed betwen rhe trends of the two 
indicators. ' Excluding petroleum refining. 
5 In 1982 gasoline prices were doubled. That of 80-octane gasoline went up to 30 sucres per gallon and that of 92-octane gasoline rose to 
40 sucres per gallon. In March 1983 prices for the other fuels were raised between 14% and 18%. That of kerosene rose to 7 sucres per gallon, rhat 
of diesel oil to 13 sucres and that of fuel oil to 8 sucres per gallon. Likewise, quarterly adjustments were established which raised the price of 
kerosene to 10 sucres and that of diesel oil to 19 sucres per gallon by the end of the year. 
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Another major cause of the decline in manufacturing has been the extensive losses in 
production suffered by the agricultural and fishing sector, which caused an acute raw material 
shortage for many industries, particularly these producing food, beverages, textiles, animal feed, 
canned fish, etc. Furthermore, the shortage generated huge increases in prices and, therefore, in costs: 
a situation which helped to lead a large number of industries into bankruptcy. Imports to make up for 
raw materials shortages were not always timely, while devaluation, changes in goods classification 
(from Schedule I to Schedule II) and tariff surcharges made them more expensive. For the same 
reasons, the prices of other imported inputs and of equipment and spare parts for industry went up 
sharply: a phenomenon that affected still further the precarious financial situation of enterprises. 
This was a third contributory element in the deterioration in manufacturing. 
The value of imports of raw materials and intermediate goods for industry declined by 7% in 
1983 and that of capital goods by 48%, a fact that reflected very clearly the scant investment in the 
sector. 
It is estimated that the output of the food, beverages and tobacco industries diminished by 
approximately 9%. Among the most affected industries were those producing canned seafood, sugar, 
processed cocoa products, edible oils, balanced animal feed and rice. The lack of sugar affected several 
other food and beverage industries and the lack of molasses negatively influenced alcohol production, 
which in turn had an impact on the pharmaceutical and cosmetics industries. 
Textile plants were affected by the lack of cotton and by the difficulties in importing other 
fibres. But the biggest decline, estimated at 13%, was recorded by the timber and wood products 
industries, owing to the fall in construction activity and to certain problems which arose regarding 
their export to Colombia and Venezuela. 
As regards cement production, the three existing large-scale industries were affected by strikes 
and by severe financial problems, which were finally overcome through the fixing of higher sales 
prices. 
According to the economic surveys carried out jointly by the Central Bank and the National 
Development Corporation (CONADE), industrial activity experienced a slight recovery in the third 
quarter of 1983, mainly in the production and sale of some non-durable consumer goods and certain 
intermediate goods. In this period there was also a slight upturn in the production of some durable 
consumer goods and capital goods, but sales of the latter kept on declining. For the fourth quarter, the 
slow recovery in industrial production and sales was expected to continue, although the same was not 
foreseen with respect to employment. The estimates for 1983, made on the basis of surveys, 
anticipated a fall of 4.9% in manufacturing production and a decrease of 1.9% in the number of 
persons employed in industry. 
Also according to the same surveys, at the end of the third quarter there was a slight increase in 
the percentage of installed capacity used, which had declined from 71 % to 63% between September 
1982 and March 1983. In industries producing non-durable consumer goods, the figure was only 55 %, 
but by September 1983 it had gone up to 65%. 
The contraction in demand and rise in production costs during the year rapidly aggravated the 
financial situation of companies highly indebted in both foreign and national currency. The 
renegotiation of the private debt together with the public external debt and its conversion into sucres 
therefore constituted an enormous relief for many companies. 
An attempt was also made to diminish the pressure of domestic indebtedness and to provide 
companies with the necessary financial resources for their rehabilitation. That purpose was to be 
fulfilled through the consolidation of debts, the capitalization of companies' liabilities and the 
granting of new loans. The Central Bank would open special credit lines for financing rehabilitation 
plans approved for each company, especially those which had high social and economic priority and 
were economically viable. 
During the first ten months of 1983, industry received 75 670 million sucres in credits granted 
by the national banking system: 60% more than in the same period of the preceding year. Moreover, 
in March the World Bank granted a credit of US$ 40 million to the National Finance Corporation to 
develop a programme for the promotion of small industry and handicrafts in the 1983-1984 
biennium. 
iv) Construction. Construction declined by approximately 15% during 1983. Since 1979 it had 
remained virtually stagnated due to various problems related to the gradual deterioration of the 
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economy, but the situation became critical in 1983 when those problems got worse and others 
emerged. 
The rapid increase in prices of construction materials affected the companies which were highly 
indebted both internally and externally and were in a poor financial position owing to increasing 
dollar interest rates, whose cost increased further with the devaluation of the sucre. In these difficult 
circumstances enterprises had to face a demand for housing which decreased simultaneously with 
economic activity and income, and a public sector which drastically reduced it expenditure by 
postponing the implementation of public works. 
Heavy rains and floods, which affected mainly the coastal provinces, caused enormous damage 
to communication routes and dwellings. It has been estimated that they damaged or destroyed around 
13 700 urban and rural dwellings, some 1 800 kilometres of highways, 10 important bridges and 
approximately 5 000 kilometres of secondary roads, besides destroying and damaging railway lines 
and bridges, landing strips, and water and sewage systems. Direct damage and losses were estimated 
at US$ 173 million.6 
It was hoped that the beginning of rehabilitation works would help to reactivate construction, 
and indeed something of the sort did happen. In spite of a long winter which delayed the 
implementation of works —and the fear of an early and heavy rainy season such as the preceding 
one— in the third quarter there was already a certain recovery from the downward trend that activity 
had shown in the first half of the year. This change was due mainly to rehabilitation work on the road 
infrastructure, particularly,in Guayas province, and to housing programmes in flood-affected areas.7 
The National Housing Board (JNV) an<J the Ecuadorian Housing Bank (BEV) promoted a loan 
programme for the reconstruction of dwellings destroyed by floods. The programme envisages 
granting 2 000 loans of 40 000 sucres each with a ten-year repayment term and at a nominal interest 
rate of 12%. In addition, the BEV launched a national popular housing plan, which will favour more 
than 5 000 families and cost 3 000 million sucres. The JNV planned to build 1 850 housing units in 
Quito and around 6 000 in Guayaquil during 1983, as well as to initiate more than 20 rural housing 
programmes in the coastal region. In the period August 1983-August 1984, 20 000 housing units 
were scheduled to be delivered as part of the "floor and roof" programme, as well as "plots with 
services", especially in Quito and Guayaquil. 
Furthermore, with the aim of fostering the demand for housing the Ecuadorian Social Security 
Institute increased from 850 000 to 1 300 000 sucres the total amount of mortgage credits. However, 
the purpose of this measure was not fulfilled, because higher construction costs absorbed the rise in 
loans. 
Once again, construction permit records do not match the trend exhibited by the sector's gross 
product, nor the economic surveys of the construction industry. For instance, in the Municipalities of 
Quito, Guayaquil and Cuenca, permits were granted in 1983 for the construction of a surface area 
4.6% less than that of the preceding year, but the approved surface area for residential construction 
—included in the above— exceeded by 11.5% that allowed in 1982. 
v) Electricity. In May, July, and September three 100 MW units forming part of the first two 
stages of the Paute hydroelectric project came into operation. This addition meant an increase of 25 % 
over the public service electric power capacity existing at the end of 1982 (1 184 MW). Part of the 
new installed capacity served to permit the shutdown of an undetermined number of thermal plants 
with high operating costs and heavy fuel consumption. 
It is estimated that when the whole of the first two stages of the Paute project, with a total of 
500 MW, come into operation, there will be an important drop in the thermal installed capacity 
belonging to self-producers (239 MW and 17% of the total installed capacity in 1982) and that 
thermal electricity generation, which in 1982 accounted for three-quarters of total capacity, will be 
reduced to 23% in 1984. 
The energy generated by the new power station has been integrated into the National 
Interconnected System through a 180 kilometre 230 kV transmission line to Guayaquil, and a 70 
kilometre 138 kV line to Cuenca. 
In addition, during 1983 construction work continued on the 156 MW Agoyán hydroelectric 
project, which is expected to come into operation in 1987. Likewise, progress has been made in the 
6See ECLAC, Los desastres naturales..., op.cit. 
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Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
" As petroleum exports have great significance for Ecuador, and bearing in mind that in 1970 the country initially did not export hydrocarbons, 
the quantum index of exports of goods has been calculated on a sliding basis, using prices of the immediatily preceding year instead of constant 
1970 prices. Therefore, the indexes of the volume and unit value of exports, as well as the indexes of the terms of trade and the purchasing 
power of exports, may not coincide with those included in Part One of the licanomic Survey, which deals with the evolution of the 
latinoamerican economy. Preliminary figures. 
studies on the hydroelectric power stations which form part of the Daule-Peripá and Paute-Mazar 
projects (130 MW and 174 MW, respectively). In contrast, due to lack of financing the 
implementation of the Toachi and Coca projects was postponed, and for the same reasons there was a 
delay in some works pertaining to the National Interconnected System and rural electrification 
programmes, the latter of which includes the construction of small hydrolectric power plants. 
Finally, in July electricity charges were raised by 10%, and a monthly readjustment of 2 % was 
applied to the highest levels of consumption. 
3. The external sector 
a) Merchandise trade 
The principal measures adopted during the year —which supplemented those established in 
1982 with the purpose of reducing imports— were new foreign exchange price increases and changes 
in the classification of a large number of imported goods, to which considerably higher exchange rates 
were applied. It was hoped in this way to improve the trade balance in order to be able to face up to the 
interest payments due on the external debt, to reduce the imbalance on the balance-of-payments 
current account, and to restore the foreign exchange reserves, which were reaching extremely low 
levels. 
The effects of these restrictive measures were strengthened by the economic recession. Thus, in 
1983 imports of goods diminished around 35% in both value and volume (see table 9). 
On the other hand, the value of exports of goods increased barely 1%, in spite of the fact that 
the export volume experienced an extraordinary increment of 18%. Had it not been for the 
remarkable increase in the volume of crude petroleum exported and the rapid expansion of shrimp 
sales, exports of goods would have suffered a decline of approximately 38% in 1983, mainly as a 
consequence of losses in agricultural and fishing production. 
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Even though exports of goods amounted to only US$ 22 million more than in 1982, the drastic 
US$ 770 million fall in imports left an unprecedented favourable balance of approximately US$ 960 
million on merchandise trade, whereas in the two preceding years that amount had barely exceeded 
US$ 180 million. 
The remarkable increase in the quantum of total exports in 1983 was largely outweighed by a 
decline in prices of slightly over 14%, due to a fall in hydrocarbon prices. In contrast, the unit value of 
non-oil exports decreased barely 1% during the year. 
Following the rapid increment experienced by the unit value index of exports in the 1979-1980 
biennium, when oil prices nearly trebled, that index has dropped 18% since then, while the unit value 
of exports other than oil and petroleum products has diminished 25% (see figures 2 and 3). 
Furthermore, the reduction in export prices, plus the slight increase in import prices from 1981 
onwards, has led to a deterioration of 23% in the terms of trade since then, with the deterioration in 
1983 alone exceeding 13% (see table 9). 
However, thanks to the considerable increase in the quantum of exports in 1983 —due to the 
greater volume of oil exported— the purchasing power of exports of goods improved 2%, although 
this improvement in only minimal compared with the reduction of 14% exhibited in the 1981-1982 
biennium. 
i) Exports of goods. The value of exports went up slightly less than 1% in 1983, after having 
shown an extraordinary expansion in the 1970s, when oil exports were incorporated and the price of 
this commodity rose sharply,8 followed by an 8% decline in the 1981-1982 biennium. This very slight 
increase is explained by the fact that the considerable increment of 18% in the volume exported was 
offset by a drop of 14% in prices. Sales of petroleum and petroleum products, which currently 
constitute 72% of total exports, had a decisive influence on this result. If hydrocarbons sales to the 
exterior are excluded, the value of other exports decreased 25% in 1983 and their volume by asimilar 
percentage. In contrast, the decrease in the price of petroleum from US$ 32.40 per barrel in 1982 to 
US$ 27.60 in 1983 was more than offset by a considerable increase in the volume exported, so that the 
Table 10 

































































































































































Source: Central Bank of Ecuador. 
"Preliminary figures. The data are based on export permits, so that the totals do not necessarily match the data in table 13. 
" During that period the value of exrernal sales of goods went up from US$ 240 million to US$ 2 540 million, and that of non-oil exports 
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value of crude petroleum exports went up 24%. This increment, plus the even greater increase (43 %) 
in shrimp exports and the more moderate one exhibited by coffee sales, offset the drastic fall of 40% 
in other exports (see table 10). 
The huge losses in agricultural and fishery production caused by climatic phenomena led to a 
remarkable decline in the export volumes of many primary and manufactured products. Thus, 
external sales of bananas diminished nearly 30%, those of cocoa beans fell 87% and those of 
processed cocoa products dropped 54%. Exports of frozen fish and processed sea products also 
decreased (by around 65%). 
In addition to losses in production, the blockage of transport routes by rains and floods often 
prevented the dispatch of goods to shipping points. Other problems were the shortage of raw 
materials and supplementary inputs, such as some types of packing or products used in crop 
disinfection. 
Fuel-oil exports diminished for the third consecutive year (by approximately 23% in volume 
and 24% in value), partly because of a decrease in the production of derivatives in 1983 on account of 
the temporary shutdown of the Esmeraldas refinery. On the other hand, the entry into production of 
new oil wells and the efforts made to increase the flow from others enabled oil extraction to be 
increased by over 12% and the volume exported to be expanded by 46%,. In the first months of the 
year, and again towards its end, difficulties in sales and the accumulation of stocks made necessary the 
hiring of floating storage capacity. However, prices did not vary much during the year, ranging 
around an average of US$ 27.60 per barrel. Consequently, the value of crude oil exports went up 24%, 
representing an increase in earnings of US$ 290 million compared with 1982. 
Shrimp sales rose 31% in volume and 43% in value. The damage caused to shrimp facilities by 
the rains was overcome and the industry continued the rapid development begun in 1980. Thus, 
whereas 5 500 tons of shrimp worth US$ 31 million were exported in 1979, in 1983 the volume rose 
to 21 600 tons and the value to US$ 175 million, so that shrimps became the second most important 
export product (see tables 10 and 11). 
In 1983 coffee exports also increased, although only by 7%, which was considerably less than 
the rise recorded in 1982 (31%). In actual fact, the coffee harvest was not as bad as initially expected. 
Moreover, at the beginning of 1983 stocks came to approximately 55 000 tons, allowing a slight 
increase in the volume exported during the year. As this volume —around 75 000 tons— exceeded 
the export quota of 67 800 tons established by the International Coffee Organization for the coffee 
year 1983-1984, sales to countries which are not members of the International Coffee Agreement had 
to be increased. 
The rate of return of exports was favoured by certain measures taken by the economic 
authorities in March. Together with an increase in the official exchange rate from 25 to 33 sucres per 
dollar and its daily adjustment which brought it to 53 sucres in December, the Central Bank was 
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Figure 2 
ECUADOR: EXPORTS OF GOODS 
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authorized to purchase 30% of the foreign exchange receipts from exports (except those stemming 
from sales of hydrocarbons, bananas, coffee and cocoa beans) at the Central Bank intervention 
exchange rate in the free market, which went up from 70 sucres per dollar in March to 87 sucres at the 
end of December. In October, the Monetary Board decided to extend the purchase of foreign exchange 
on those terms to 10% of the export receipts for those products which had been excluded under the 
previous system, except for petroleum and its derivatives. However, together with those measures, 
which favoured exporters of non-traditional products, the granting of tax credit certificates for 
exports was eliminated, thus partly offsetting the benefits achieved. 
ii) Imports of goods. The rapid drop in the international monetary reserves, plus the 
paralyzation of external trade credit flows, led the monetary authorities in October 1982 to adopt 
strict measures to restrict imports. Thus, an import prohibition was applied in respect of 123 goods 
from Schedule I (i.e., those considered most essential), in particular capital goods, and 510 goods from 
Schedule II. It should be remembered that the importation of automobiles had already been 
prohibited in 1981. 
As a result of these prohibitions, the value of import permits granted in November and 
December 1982, dropped to less than one half with respect to the same months of the preceding year 
and the value of imports in the year diminished by nearly 8%. This decline occurred after nine years of 
continuous growth, although there had been a loss of momentum since 1980. 
In addition to the restraints imposed in 1982, several other measures were taken in 1983 with 
the aim of reducing imports even more and attaining a favourable external trade balance which would 
make it possible to cope with the high external debt service and the lower capital inflow. Among 
those measures, one of the most important was the devaluation in March. In addition, the authorities 
decreed that 30% of the foreign exchange earnings from exports (except those of hydrocarbons, 
bananas, coffee and cocoa) should be changed at the intervention exchange rate of the Central Bank in 
the free market, which is somewhat lower than that of the free market proper, to pay for imports 
considered less essential (Schedule II). Later on, in October, the availability of foreign exchange for 
that category of imports was expanded with 10% of the export earnings from bananas, coffee and 
cocoa. 
Table 12 
































































































































































Source: Central Bank of Ecuador. 
"Corresponds to imports permits granted. The total includes a relatively insignificant group of unclassified imports. 
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The amount of foreign exchange sold by the Central Bank was insufficient to cover imports of 
goods under Schedule II. Between the end of March and the end of December, permits granted for the 
import of goods from that Schedule amounted to US$ 112 million, whereas foreign exchange 
availability only came to US$ 71 million. The difference had to be covered with foreign exchange 
purchased in the free market at a higher price. 
In addition, with the aim of discouraging imports, the classification of certain goods was 
changed from "essential" to "less essential" on several occasions during the year. However, in 
September, after 35 products had been transferred from Schedule I to Schedule II, 40 transfers were 
made in the opposite direction. Likewise, in March prior import deposits were increased, but at the 
beginning of November they were reduced again, thus freeing monetary resources and relieving 
somewhat the existing situation of illiquidity.9 
The prohibitions and other measures described, plus a lower demand attributable to the 
recession, led to an extraordinary réduction of 35% in the value and volume of imports of goods (see 
table 9). 
Furthermore, this drop was very widespread. Thus, according to import permits granted during 
1983, the only imports which increased were those of inputs for agriculture, due to the extraordinary 
imports of animal feed made in order to compensate for the lack of production. In contrast, imports of 
all other types of goods diminished considerably. The biggest drops were in imports of transport 
equipment (-54%) and capital goods for agriculture (-60%) (see table 12). 
Imports of raw materials and intermediate goods for industry, for their part, dropped by 7%, in 
spite of the greater imports of cotton, soya and crude oils effected in order to offset the drop in 
domestic production. On the other hand, imports of chemical inputs, which are of considerable 
significance, were 9% lower. The decline was even more substantial (-34%) in the case of imports of 
construction materials, which reflected the critical situation of that activity. Imports of lubricants also 
diminished considerably (-27%).10 
There was an appreciable decline in imports of consumer goods during the year, particularly in 
the case of durable goods (-24%). The prohibition on importing motor-vehicles was the main reason 
for that downturn. Purchases of non-durable consumer goods for their part, decreased 13%, in spite 
of the extraordinary food imports which were made to supplement domestic supply. 
The flow of imports was also disturbed during the year by the Central Bank's delays in making 
repayments in respect of imports, which totalled some US$ 600 million by October. By November, 
however, the total outstanding unpaid letters of credit had sunk to US$ 400 milllion, and it was 
estimated that by the end of the year they had dropped to US$ 150 million. In order to pay them, use 
was made of some US$ 200 million of the country's own resources and part of the US$ 431 million 
credit granted by the international banking system. 
Finally, in November a line of credit for external trade operations not exceeding 13 months in 
duration was established under an agreement signed by the Central Bank with foreign private banks. 
b) The current account deficit and its financing 
Thanks to a drastic decrease in imports and the decline in net payments for real services, 
remittances of profits and interest payments, the current account deficit shrank by nearly 90%. Thus, 
after having rapidly expanded since 1980 and reaching in 1982 the unprecedented amount of 
US$1 215 million, it: dropped to less than US$ 130 million in 1983 (see table 13). 
With the slight increase in exports of goods and the considerable drop in imports (-35%), the 
merchandise trade balance went up from US$ 160 million to US$ 960 million between 1982 and 
1983- Furthermore, there was a decline in the negative balance of payments in respect of freight and 
insurance (due to a reduction in the amount of commercial transactions), travel, and other real 
services. As a result of these changes, the trade balance moved from a deficit of US$ 370 million in 
1982 to a surplus of US$ 590 million in 1983. This surplus was the first recorded since 1976 and its 
amount considerably exceeded those achieved in the best years of the oil boom. 
9ln March prior import deposits were set at 2Q% of the import value for merchandise included in Schedule 1-a and at 50% for those in 
Schedule II. Likewise, holding periods of deposits for merchandise in Schedules 1 and 11 were set at 180 and 270 days, respectively. The above 
percentages were reduced in early November to 10% and 25%, respectively, while the holding period of the deposits remained unchanged. 
'"Import permits do not include fuels exchanged for crude petroleum which in 1983 amounted to approximately USS 250 million,or 
16% more than the preceding year. 
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Table 13 
ECUADOR: BALANCE OF PAYMENTS 
(Millions of dollars) 
1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 
Balance on current account 
Trade balance 
Exports of goods and services 
Goods FOB 
Real services 
Transport and insurance 
Travel 
Imports of goods and services 
Goods FOB 
Real services 







Private unrequited transfers 
Balance on capital account 


















Errors and omissions 
Global balance 
Total change in reserves 
(- sign indicates an increase) 
Monetary gold 
Special Drawing Rights 
IMF reserve position 
Foreign exchange assets 
Other assets 





























































































































































































































































































Source: International Monetary Fund, Balance of Payments Statistics, 1983, and ECLAC, on the basis of data from the Central Bank of Ecuador. 
"Preliminary figures. Real services also include other official and private transactions, but not factor services. 'In addition to 
loans received and amortization payments made, this entry includes net loans granted and other assets and liabilities. The global balance 
is the sum of the current account balance plus the balance on capital account. The difference between total variation in reserves (of opposite 
sign) and the global balance represents counterpart items: monetization of gold, allocation of Special Drawing Rights, and variations due to 




ECUADOR: NET INTERNATIONAL RESERVES 
(Millions of dollars) 



















































































































































Source: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistic.!, and Central Bank of Ecuador, Información Estadística. 
" Coincides with the concept of international reserves whose variation appears in the preceding table on the balance of payments, expect that in 
table 13 the revaluation of gold reserves carried out in October 1982 was not taken into account. Corresponds to the figures published 
by the Central Bank, converted into dollars at the official exchange rate. 
In 1983 there was also a decline in net factor service payments which went down by nearly 
US$ 130 million. According to preliminary data, it may be assumed that remittances of profits to the 
exterior increased, but at the same time, that net interest payments dropped by around US$ 150 
million. This, plus the favourable trade balance result, led to the notable reduction in the current 
account deficit. 
The net inflow of capital also showed a substantial drop, from US$ 875 million in 1982 to 
approximately US$ 275 million in 1983. In spite of the small amount of the net capital inflow in 1983, 
however, it was enough to offset the lower current account deficit, giving a balance-of-payments 
surplus and an increase of US$ 146 million in the international reserves." 
In the two preceding years the international reserves had diminished by approximately 
US$ 300 million each year, due to the enormous size reached by the current account deficit in spite of 
the high levels of capital inflow. 
It is worth noting that although foreign exchange assets increased by US$ 328 million, reaching 
a total of US$ 630 million at the end of the year, up to July foreign exchange availability only ranged 
around US$ 260 million —less than the December 1982 level— while in March it only came to 
slightly over US$ 200 million. Only in August, October and November did the foreign exchange 
reserves experience substantial increases, partly related to an increase in liabilities with IMF (see 
table 14). 
c) The external debt 
The external debt increased rapidly between the mid-1970s and 1981, rising from 
approximately US$ 510 million at the end of 1975 to US$ 1 260 million two years later,12 and to 
"Itshoulldbenoted, however, that according to the preliminary data on the 1983 balance of payments supplied by the Central Bank of 
Ecuador (19 March 1984), in 1983 there was a decrease of US$ 58 million in the net international reserves. 
12 It should be pointed out that both this figure and that for 1975 do not include the short-term debt; hence, they are not fully comparable 
with those of more recent years. 
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nearly US$ 5 900 million by the end of 1981. Indebtedness continued to increase in 1982 and 1983, but 
at a slower rate, and at the end of 1983 it came to nearly US$ 6 700 million. Since 1979 there has been 
a persistent growth in the relative significance of the external debt as a proportion of the gross 
domestic product, and in 1983 this proportion amounted to 52% (see table 15). 
Up to 1982 the private debt increased much more rapidly than the public debt (228% and 84%, 
respectively, in the period 1978-1982). However, the latter continued to represent an important part 
of the total debt in 1982. Likewise, until 1982 the short-term indebtedness increased rapidly, although 
its proportion with respect to the total debt was only slightly over 13% in that year. 
Loan disbursements grew considerably between the years 1978 and 1981, particularly those of 
the private sector, which increased nearly fivefold. Until 1981, the amount of disbursements 
markedly exceeded that of service payments, although the difference between them tended to go 
down. Interest payments grew more steadily and rapidly than payments of principal, and their share 
as a proportion of exports of goods and services rose from 10% to 24% between 1978 and 1981. If 
payments of principal are added, these proportions rose to 35% and 76%, respectively, in that period 
(see table 15). 
The above situation changed drastically from 1982 onwards. The debt service increased 
substantially and its amount exceeded that of disbursements: that is to say, for the first time there was 
a net transfer of financial resources to the exterior. In addition, expenditure on account of payments 
of principal and interest equalled in 1982 and exceeded in 1983 the earnings from exports of goods 
and services. 
Table 15 
ECUADOR: EXTERNAL DEBT 
Total external debt 
Public'' 
Private 











Total external debt/GDP' 
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Source: ECLAC, on the basis of data from the Central Bank of Ecuador. 
" Preliminary figures. Balance at end of year. ' The GDP has been calculated in dollars on the basis of the official exchange rate. 
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The external debt structure changes in 1983. At the end of the year the total debt came to 
US$ 6 690 million, i.e., 8% more than in December 1982. Almost all the short-term debt existing at 
that date was converted into long-term debt through renegotiation. For the same reason, the share of 
private debt in the total decreased from 26% in 1982 to 23%. 
On the other hand, during the year credits in the amount of US$ 2 720 million were drawn 
(22% more than in 1982). These were mainly allocated to payments of principal and of part of the 
interest on the portion of the debt that was renegotiated. The debt service exceeded the gross inflow 
of loans. Payments of principal amounted to US$ 2 200 million, while interest payments reached 
US$ 680 million. Since the amount of net credit flows (US$ 500 million) was less than that of interest 
payments, there was a net transfer of resources to the exterior for the second consecutive year. 
The rapid decline in the flow of external credit in the third quarter of 1982, and the gloomy 
prospects shown by the 1983 balance of payments, due to a downward trend in oil prices,15 prompted 
the adoption of some additional measures in order to reduce imports and the initiation of discussions 
with private banks in order to reschedule external debt payments falling due in November 1982 and 
December 1983. Only the public debt was considered initially in this process, but later on the 
renegotiation of the private external debt falling due in that period was also included. 
The renegotiations with the international banking system began in October 1982 and 
continued for a year before the final agreement was signed. In June, an agreement was reached with 
the Management Committee representing creditor banks. This agreement included the refinancing 
of approximately US$ 2 560 million of the debt and the granting of a "fresh money" credit for 
US$ 431 million. As a prerequisite, an agreement had to be signed (1 June) with the International 
Monetary Fund for the granting of a stand-by credit for US$ 171 million. 
The agreement with the IMF, for a one-year term, was based on a Letter of Intent whose terms 
were included in the economic stabilization programme of March 1983. At the end of November, the 
IMF approved the third disbursement of US$ 42 million of the stand-by credit, after having assessed 
the fulfilment of the goals established in that programme, and granted an additional loan of 
approximately US$ 91 million as compensatory financing. 
In the second week of October the following agreements with the representatives of the 
international private banks were formalized: 
a) Refinancing of US$ 1 200 million of amortization payments on the public debt falling due 
between November 1982 and December 1983. These were renegotiated for a term of seven years, 
including one year of grace. During 1984 amortization payments will be made equal to 10% of the 
debt and from 1985 onwards equal quarterly payments will be made until the end of the term in early 
1990. Interest rates of 2 1/4% over LIBOR or 2 1/8% over United States prime rate and a conversion 
commission of 1.25% were established. 
b) Renegotiation of around US$ 1 000 million of the private external debt recorded in the 
Central Bank falling due in the same period (November 1982 and December 1983). The Central Bank 
took responsibility for these debts, as a guarantor for the creditors.14 
c) Fresh money loans totalling US$ 431 million, mainly designed to normalize import payment 
arrears. These loans were granted over a term of six years (until July 1989) and their repayment will 
begin injanuary 1985 in equal quarterly quotas. Interest was set at 2 3/8% over LIBOR or 2 1/4% over 
prime rate and commissions at 1.25%, to be paid 30 days after signing. 
d) Opening of a line of trade credit for US$ 700 million. This is a revolving credit, to be 
disbursed for terms not exceeding 13 months. The interest rate on the portion loaned to the private 
sector is to be negotiated and that to be paid by the Central Bank was set at 1 5/8% over LIBOR or 
1 1/2% over prime rate. 
In addition, US$ 155 million were renegotiated with the Paris Club. This represented part of 
the public sector debt contracted with governments and suppliers (with State guarantee) which fell 
due between the beginning of June 1983 and the end of May 1984: a period coinciding —not by 
accident— with that of the agreement signed with the International Monetary Fund. Refinancing 
11 When the first contacts with creditors for the renegotiation of the external debt were established, nobody envisaged the possibility of 
the floods in the coastal region which severely damaged Ecuadorian exports. 
14 In a decision dated 20 June 1983, the Monetary Board established the mechanism to be followed in refinancing the private external debt 
guaranteed by the State. The Central Bank was authorized to convert these liabilities into sucres and to supply, subject to certain conditions, the 
foreign exchange for the service of the debt. 
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was granted over an eight-year term, including three years of grace, for 85 % of that amount. Another 
10% was to be paid when it fell due and the remaining 5% in December 1984. 
Up to September 1983, US$ 242 million in long-term loans had been contracted for the public 
sector: a quarter of the amount contracted in the same period of the preceding year. Of that amount, 
all of which was agreed for the long term, nearly 90% (US$ 213 million) was contracted with 
international organizations and only 10% with governments. These figures do not include US$ 431 
million contracted with international private banks. In the first nine months of 1982 the structure of 
credit contracts had been quite different: 24% of public sector contracts had been signed with 
international organizations, 6% with governments and 70% with international banks. 
d) Exchange policy 
On 18 March 1983 —a little less than a year after the last devaluation of the sucre in May 1982, 
which raised the exchange rate from 25 to 33 sucres per dollar— the authorities established a new 
parity of 42 sucres per dollar, to be increased at the rate of four cents per working day. At the end of 
June the progressive devaluation was accelerated to five cents per day, including holidays (see 
table 16 and figure 4). 
Thus, the official dollar price reached 54.10 sucres by the end of the year, that is, 64% higher 
than that existing at its beginning. On the contrary, the free market exchange rate increased only 
37%: from 65 to around 89 sucres per dollar. However, in the months of June.July and August, the 
free dollar price ranged between 93 and 98 sucres. 
The greater speed at which the official exchange rate rose compared with the free market rate 
reduced the difference between the two during the year, so that the gap between them, which had 
Table 16 
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Source: ECLAC, on the basis of data from the Central Bank of Ecuador, información Estadística; and from the FMI, Supplement of Exchange 
Rates and International Financial Statistics. 
"These correspond to indexes of the exchange rates used in foreign trade operations with respect to currencies of countries with which Ecuador 
has trade relations, weighted by the relative importance of exports or imports, as the case may be, to or from those countries. The methodology 
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reached 120% in February and a similar figure in July, dropped to 64% in December. Among the 
package of economic measures adopted by the Monetary Board in March, the most significant was the 
devaluation of the sucre and the programme of daily devaluations which was simultaneously adopted. 
In another resolution of the board, on the same date, the Central Bank was authorized to intervene in 
the free exchange market to buy foreign exchange for the equivalent of 30% of the value of 
exports —except those of petroleum and its derivatives, bananas, coffee, cocoa beans and sugar— and 
to sell it for the importation of merchandise included in Schedule II, deemed to be non-essential. 
The foreign exchange transactions effected by the Central Bank in the free market are made at a 
rate which is fixed daily and which is somewhat lower than that of the free market proper. In March it 
was set at 70 sucres per dollar and by the end of December it had gone up to 87 sucres. The purposes 
taken into account in establishing this new exchange rate were, on the one hand, the discouragement 
of imports of less essential items by insisting on use of a more expensive dollar, and, on the other 
hand, the containment of the rapid increase in the dollar price in the free market, which had reached 
86 sucres in March. 
Foreign exchange from exports of products excluded from the list in the previous resolution, as 
well as 70% of the earnings received from exports of other products, are sold by the Central Bank for 
importing essential goods classified in Schedule I, for servicing the public and private external debt 
registered in the Central Bank, and for covering the expenses of students abroad. 
According to a resolution of the Monetary Board dated 19 March, foreign exchange from 
foreign investment inflows, from private external credits registered in the Central Bank, and all 
foreign exchange received by the government and public or private institutions must be sold in the 
official exchange market. 
The fact that the official exchange rate rose during the year by a higher percentage (64%) than 
that of the increase in domestic prices (53%) —something that did not happen, however, with the 
free market rate— represented a significant and timely export incentive. The purchase of 30% of the 
foreign exchange income from non-traditional exports at an exchange rate quite close to that of the 
free market also favoured the exporters of those goods. However, since such exports are not yet very 
significant the weighted average exchange rate was only 3% over the official one. 
For the importers of goods classified in Schedule II, that provision of the Monetary Board had a 
greater significance, because the availability of foreign exchange of the Central Bank free market 
price was insufficient to cover those imports and it was necessary to buy the rest of it in the true free 
market at a higher price.15 In brief, total imports during the year were made at an average dollar price 
9% higher than the official one. 
Because of the devaluation in 1982, the effective real exchange rate index recovered some of the 
ground it had lost in 1981, but very little of what it had lost between 1970 and 1978, particularly in the 
case of the effective real exchange rate related to exports. With the devaluation in March 1983 and the 
daily adjustment programme which followed, however, the average effective real index with respect 
to 1982 rose by 7%. In other words, with the devaluations implemented in 1982 and 1983, Ecuadorian 
exports improved by around 10% their competitive possibilities in external markets, whereas 
imports increased their prices with respect to national products by approximately 17% (see table 16 
and figure 4). 
4. Prices and wages 
a) Domestic prices 
The anual rate of increase in prices, which had gone up gradually since 1980 until it reached 
24% in 1982, measured from December to December, rose unexpectedly to a little over 52% in 1983. 
The price increases on the basis of annual averages, for their part, speeded up from 16% in 1982 to 
over 48% in 1983 (see table 17). 
The strengthening of inflationary pressures was due exclusively to the extraordinary increase in 
prices of food products and some raw materials, as a consequence of the enormous losses produced by 
rains and floods, especially in agriculture. Thus, the food component of the consumer price index 
increased by 86% from December to December or by 78% on the basis of annual averages. 
n At the end of July, the Central Bank discontinued foreign exchange sales for the importation of goods included in Schedule II, so users 
were compelled to resort to the free exchange market. 
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Consumer price index 
Food 
Consumer price index 
Food 
Table 17 
ECUADOR: CONSUMER PRICE INDEX" 
1978 1979 1980 
Variation from December to December 
11.7 9.0 14.5 
10.6 7.0 12.3 
Variation between annual averages 
11.7 10.3 13.0 
















Source: Central Bank of Ecuador and the National Institute of Statistics and Censuses. 
"Up to 1980, corresponds to the consumer price index for Quito. Since 1981, corresponds to the national consumer price index for urban areas. 
As a consequence of the natural disasters, a serious shortage of several basic foods developed, 
which became even more acute due to hoarding for speculation purposes and the smuggling of food 
products to neighbouring countries. The shortage was relieved by importing those products that were 
in shortest supply —rice, maize and sugar— as well as those imported regularly, such as wheat and 
powdered milk. However, in the period which elapsed until those imports arrived huge price 
increases occurred. 
Among staple foods, the biggest price increases in the first six months of the year were for rice 
(52%), bread (81%), chicken (63%), sugar (43%), oil (34%), potatoes (133%) and eggs (112%). 
The acceleration of food price increases began in October of the precedingyear (3.6% per month). In 
the first three months of 1983, that rate rose to 6.1% and in the next four months to 8.9%. From 
August onwards, however, the monthly rate of inflation began to decrease and it even became 
negative in November and December. 
The trend of the general consumer price index during the year followed approximately that of 
food, although at a considerable lower level. The highest annual rate of variation (63%) was reached 
in September and October, when the annual price variation of food reached 110% (see figure 5). 
The daily devaluation process of the currency which began in March with an exchange rate of 42 
sucres per dollar also contributed to the rise in domestic prices by sending up the prices of imported 
goods, including essential goods imported with foreign exchange purchased at the official exchange 
rate, which, as mentioned earlier, rose 64% during the year. 
b) Wages 
By the middle of the year, eight months had elapsed since the last readjustment of minimum 
wages in November 1982. Since then the consumer price index had increased 38% and that of food 
had gone up 68%, thereby substantially eroding the purchasing power of wages. This situation led to 
a wave protests, stoppages and strikes on the part of the workers, demanding higher wages. 
On 1 July the general minimum wage for workers was raised from 4 600 to 5 600 sucres per 
month. The minimum wage for agricultural workers was raised from 3 600 to 4 400 sucres in the 
coastal region and from 3 200 to 3 900 in other regions. The minimum wage for workers in small-
scale industry went up from 3 500 to 4 400 sucres and that for handicraft workers from 3 400 to 4 150 
sucres. 
Taking into account the dates of the readjustments, the nominal increase in average wages in 
the year was 24%, which in real terms meant a reduction of 16%, on top of the declines of 14% and 
12% recorded in the previous two years. Thus, in the last three years the real minimum wage has lost 
36% of its purchasing power. This seems to be a compensation for the substantial real increase 
(77%) achieved in 1980 (see table 18). Workers in small-scale industry, experienced an 18.5% 
decline in their real minimum wage during 1983, but the wages of agricultural and handicraft workers 
went down less, while those of domestic servants improved slightly. 
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Figure 5 
ECUADOR: CONSUMER PRICE INDEX 
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Source: ECLAC, on the basis of data from the Central Bank of Ecuador. 
"Real wages are expressed in 1978 sucres and were calculated by deflating nominal wages by the national (urban) consumer price index. 
Table 19 
ECUADOR: EVOLUTION OF ANNUAL MINIMUM WAGES 





Total real remuneration 










































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of data from the Central Bank of Ecuador and W. Spurrier Baquerizo, Análisis semanal, various issues. 
"Corresponds to three additional monthly wages per year (13th, 14th and 15th months). Includes an allowance known as 
"Compensación", the allowance proper, and the transport allowance. 
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Taking into account the allowances and bonuses which are usually added to the minimum wage, 
annual income increased 35% during 1983, representing a drop of 9% in real terms (see table 19). 
During July 1983 there was also an increase in the basic salary for teachers from 5 000 to 6 300 
sucres per month, although only half of that adjustment was put into effect during the year. In 
October, the "fourteenth month" salary bonus for public servants was raised from one to two monthly 
minimum wages (from 5 600 to 11 200 sucres) and a similar proposal in favour of the private sector 
was submitted to the Congress. 
As the adjustment in the minimum wage was insufficient to compensate for the increase in 
domestic prices, especially those of food, labour protests and demand for higher wages continued 
during the year. The workers' confederation (FUT) demanded an increase in the minimum wage to 
10 000 sucres per month and an increase of 3 000 sucres in all wages up to 20 000 sucres. 
5. Monetary and fiscal policy 
a) Monetary developments 
Among the purposes and goals included in the Economic Stabilization Programme of March 
1983, there are several which helped in different ways to contain monetary expansion. Thus, the 
Programme limited the public sector deficit to a maximum of 4% of the gross domestic product and 
established that net indebtedness of the non-financial public sector should not exceed 6 billion sucres 
by the end of the year, in order not to affect credit to the private sector. Likewise, ceilings were placed 
on the increase in liabilities of private banks (23.5%) and on the net domestic assets of the Central 
Bank, which must not exceed 21 billion sucres at year-end. Moreover, it was laid down that the 
expansion in money and credit should be the minimum necessary to support the anticipated growth 
of the economy, so as to avoid excessive pressure on foreign exchange availability and on domestic 
prices. 
In line with these objectives, the money supply increased 25% between December 1982 and 
December 1983: a percentage which was not even half that of the rise in domestic consumer prices 
and which was also well below the increase in the gross domestic product at current prices (see 
table 20). The lack of money in circulation which has affected the evolution of economic activity for 
Table 20 
ECUADOR: MONETARY BALANCE 
Money 
Currency outside banks 
Demand deposits 
Factors of expansion 





Factors of absorption 




















































































































Source: International Monetary Fund, Internationa/ Financia/ Statistics, April 1984. 
"Balances at end of September. Balances at end of September 1983 with respect to the same month of 1982. 'Increase from 
December to December. 
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some years and has helped to increase the recession thus became more acute during the year. In the 
last months of the year, however, the adoption of some measures such as the reduction of the 
compulsory cash reserves of banks, an increase in rediscount levels and the gradual elimination of 
prior import deposits, freed monetary resources and partly relieved the problems of lack of liquidity. 
Currency outside banks and demand deposits (including those in the Central Bank) both 
increased around 25%. During the year, up until November, however, the former increased much 
more rapidly than the latter. Up to September, the means of payment increased 27% with respect to 
the same month of the preceding year. As in the previous two years, the expansion of domestic credit 
(47%) was the main cause of money creation. Unlike what happened in 1981 and 1982, the increase 
in net international reserves also helped to foster the expansion of the means of payment, which grew 
by 30% between September 1982 and September 1983, although its influence was much less than that 
of domestic credit because of its lower amount in absolute terms. 
Among the various components of credit, that channelled to the private sector was much more 
important and contributed decisively to the expansion of the money supply. For its part, credit 
granted to the government increased 58% between September 1982 and September 1983, despite the 
decrease in the fiscal deficit. This increase was due to the fact that external credit was hard to obtain 
and the government had to resort with increasing frequency to the Central Bank in order to finance its 
deficit. Finally, credit granted to financial institutions increased 56% in that period. 
Government deposits played an important role in offsetting the factors which contributed to an 
increase in the money supply. At the end of September they exceeded time and savings deposits, after 
having increased nearly 2.5 times with respect to September of the previous year. Furthermore, in the 
first nine months of 1983 government deposits in the Central Bank increased from 6.5 billion sucres 
to nearly 23 billion, while in October they went up to 78.3 billion. The absorption effect exerted on the 
money supply by this remarkable increase in deposits, however, was cancelled out to a great extent by 
the increase from 7.9 to 66.6 billion sucres in October of credit granted to the government by the 
Central Bank. 
Savings and time deposits, in contrast, increased very little in the period September 1982-
September 1983, and they even decreased slightly with respect to their level at the end of 1982. Due to 
the acceleration of inflation, the rise in the nominal interest rate was insufficient to encourage 
savings. 
In the first 10 months of 1983, credit granted by the banking system increased 52 % with respect 
to the same period of 1982. Loans intended for agriculture increased 37% in that period, those for 
industry grew by 60%, but those granted to commerce rose by only 20%. In contrast, loans for other 
activities more than doubled. 
At the end of the year the outstanding balance of credits granted by the Central Bank came to 
around 92 billion sucres, or 41.6 billion more than the year before. Of that amount, 20.2 billion were 
stabilization credits related to the conversion into sucres of the external debt of the private sector. 
The Central Bank was authorized to discount documents arising from credits obtained abroad 
(assuming the debt) and to convert the liabilities into sucres. Furthermore, among the agreements 
signed with creditor banks for refinancing the external private debt, a line of credit for financing 
imports, to operate through the banking and financial system, was established in the Central Bank. 
With the aim of promoting domestic savings and, at the same time, relieving the liquidity 
problems of banking and financial institutions, and activating their operations, interest rates were 
raised on two occasions during the year, rediscount quotas were expanded, and the compulsory cash 
reserves of banks were reduced by 2 points, both for demand deposits (to 20%) and savings (to 10%), 
thus freeing around 1.2 billion sucres for the use of the banking system. 
In March the interest rate for loans was raised from 15% to 16%, and in October it went up 
again to 19%. The interest rate for time deposits was set at between 13% and 15%, but savings and 
loans associations (known as Mutual Societies) were authorized to pay up to 1 point more to 
depositors. 
b) Government income and expenditure 
Since 1982, a strict policy to control and restrict public expenditure has been implemented with 
the aim of reducing the fiscal deficit, which had reached extremely high levels in previous years and 
which was increasingly difficult to finance, particularly with external resources. In fact, in that year it 
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was possible to halt the increase in the deficit, and its proportion with respect to the gross domestic 
product was slightly reduced (from 5.8% to 5.3%). The same objectives remained in force during 
1983, and a series of measures designed to increase income and to reduce expenditure were adopted. 
.-• Thus, in the Economic Stabilization Programme of March 1983 the intention of continuing 
with the rearrangement of public finances and the restriction of expenditure was reaffirmed, while 
taking into account the need to grant additional resources to repair the damage caused by floods in the 
coastal region, as well as the funds which might be required for wage increases. It was also laid down 
that the overall deficit of the public sector should not exceed 4% of the gross domestic product in 1983 
(in 1982 the proportion had been 7.5%), and recommendations were formulated on the need for the 
prices of public goods and services to be sufficiently high to cover production costs, together with 
others about the maximum limits of public sector indebtedness. 
The following measures taken during the year brought more resources to the State directly or 
indirectly, or contributed to a reduction in expenditure: increased fuel prices (except that of gasoline, 
which had gone up in 1982); increased rates for electricity and other public services; the elimination 
of Tax Credit Certificates which favoured exporters; additional surcharges on imports, and several 
tax increases. In addition, the number of public service posts was frozen, except in education and 
health, a law on economic regulation and control of public expenditure was adopted, and a National 
Emergency Fund was established. 
The budgetary income of the government increased 32% in 1983, while total expenditure rose 
only 15%. As a result, income covered 77% of total expenditure, compared with only 67% in 1982. 
The deficit, for is part, which in 1982 had amounted to 21.6 billion sucres, dropped to 17.4 billion in 
1983, a sum equivalent to 3% of the gross domestic product (see table 21). 
Table 21 
ECUADOR: STATE BUDGET INCOME AND EXPENDITURE 











































































































2. Total expenditure 
3. Deficit (1-2) 
47 557 59 395 66 536 76 777 7.8 68.7 24.9 12.0 15.4 





Use of special resources 
Cash balances^ 





























Source: Central Bank of Ecuador. 
"Preliminary figures. Total net income. Taxes paid with tax credit certificates and agrarian reform bonds have been 
deducted. ' Utilization or net accumulation of funds during the period in question, according to whether the balance is positive or 
negative. Payments deferred to the following year, less payments made ¡n respect of expenditures of the preceding year. 
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However, the increases in income and expenditure during the year were a good deal less than 
the rise in domestic prices. Income, and especially expenditure, consequently diminished in real 
terms. In the case of expenditure this was achieved despite the high cost implied by wage adjustments, 
disbursements made to deal with the emergency caused by national disasters, and the increase in 
construction costs and in prices of imported goods caused by the rise in the exchange rate. The 
external debt service also grew (in sucres) with the devaluation, although payments of principal 
diminished due to the debt renegotiation. Thus, while interest payments on the external debt 
increased 26% in 1983, payments of principal (which are not included in total expenditure) 
diminished to less than one half in sucres. 
On the other hand, the devaluation helped to raise fiscal income from exports of crude 
petroleum and derivatives effected by the State petroleum corporation (CEPE). Petroleum income, 
which constitutes 45% of current income, increased 32% in 1983- The rise in domestic fuel prices 
(except for gasoline) also contributed to this increase. 
Tax revenue, for its part (which represents 42% of total income), increased 28% during 1983, 
mainly due to a substantial rise (53%) in indirect taxes. Among these, taxes on transactions and 
services, on beer and on cigarettes grew by 56% and taxes on the sale of petroleum derivatives 
increased by 35%. 
In contrast, according to preliminary data direct tax revenue seems to have increased very little, 
while that from duties on foreign trade probably rose 18%. The decrease by one-third in the value of 
imports of goods in 1983 meant a fall in tax revenue for the State estimated at around 4.5 billion 
sucres. However, this lower income was compensated by the special duties imposed on imports: 5% 
on imports of essential goods (Schedule I-a); 8% on necessary goods (Schedule I-b) and 15% on 
purchases of non-essential goods (Schedule II). Another measure which helped to improve the 
government's financial situation was the elimination of the Tax Credit Certificates (CAT) issued to 
exporters. In 1982 this subsidy cost the government 1 790 million sucres, but the amount dropped to 
655 million in 1983-
There were also fundamental changes in the way the fiscal deficit was financed. In the first 
place, it was entirely financed by indebtedness, which, unlike the preceding year, was 100% domestic. 




1. Recent economic trends: Introduction and summary 
It is becoming increasingly difficult to examine the recessive situation in El Salvador by applying 
traditional categories of economic analysis. The protracted political conflict suffered by the 
Salvadorian community is a central issue in political, economic, social and institutional spheres. The 
country's depressed economy —made apparent by a considerably reduced level of activity, an 
extremely high rate of unemployment and severe maladjustments in balance of payments and fiscal 
accounts— has aggravated the factors deriving directly from the above-mentioned conflict, namely a 
large and continuing loss of life and widespread damage to the economic infrastructure. ' In addition, 
the internal armed confrontation has become progressively more international in its effects owing to 
the recent influence of external participants. 
Nevertheless, in spite of this prolonged and intense political struggle and the particularly 
adverse local conditions arising from international economic developments over the past four years, 
the national economy still shows some signs of normality within a framework of severe depression 
and undeniable deterioration in average living standards. In this respect the progresssive decline of 
the gross domestic product in the four preceding years was detained in 1983 when levels similar to 
those of 1982 were recorded. Although the gross domestic product per capita fell for the fifth 
consecutive year —to a level equivalent to that of 1961— the fact that the total product remained 
static in 1983 represented a turning point in the trend observed in preceding years (see table 1 and 
figure 1). 
This development was influenced by two circumstances. In the first place there was a modest 
revival in the volume and value of exports in comparison with the extremely depressed levels of the 
year- before, although in the case of coffee —the country's main export commodity— it was necessary 
to resort to considerable stock withdrawals. Secondly, government expenditure rose significantly, 
especially in the case of capital investment, thereby exerting some dynamic influences through its 
direct and indirect effects. 
A considerable inward flow of external financing —especially from official bilateral sources— 
also influenced the performance of the economy in the year under review. This financing was not only 
of assistance in boosting public investment (as already mentioned) but also enabled the country to 
maintain a higher importing capacity than any other Central American country. 
Private investment, on the other hand, continued to contract for the fifth consecutive year, a 
situation attributable to the generalized climate of uncertainty affecting the private sector and the 
depressed economic outlook. To this was added the fact that existing capital availabilities continued to 
diminish rapidly owing to lack of adequate replenishment. Private consumption, too, again declined 
because of the contraction of real wages and supply maladjustments deriving from the abnormal 
situation of the country. The dramatic nature of this decline is only too evident when it is borne in 
mind that real per capita consumption in 1983 barely reached the level attained in I960. 
As regards internal supply, farming output again fell, although less than in the three preceding 
years. The lower rate of contraction was due to expansion in the cultivation of sugar-cane and most 
basic grains partly carried out on land formerly subjected to agrarian reform. On the other hand 
building activity rose for the first time since 1977, as a result of a higher level of government 
investment. Manufacturing production also rose for the first time since 1978, though only to a very 
limited extent owing to low domestic demand and a drop in intra-Central American trade. A growth 
1 Several estimates have been made of the material damage caused by the armed conflict. The press makes frequent mention of a figure of 
USS 600 million, whereas, according to an estimate drawn up by the Chamber of Industry and Commerce of El Salvador, the figure is around 
USÎ 1 billion. 
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of almost 3% was also recorded in value-added for basic services together with a small decline in the 
case of other services. 
The management of economic policy in 1983 was affected by the decidedly sombre underlying 
economic situation and by the very tense political conditions that had built up in previous years. In 
1982 a civilian coalition government had taken over the administration after an electoral process in 
which the complete range of Salvadorian community groups had not been represented. The 
continuation of civil and military confrontation within the country, coupled with a growing 
polarization of positions and the breakdown, in practice, of the governing coalition, caused the revival 
in 1983 of an atmosphere of scepticism among the country's economic agents. 
The aggravation of internal and international controversy and its coincidence with the 
intensification of armed conflict resulted in a gradual decline in efficacy of the policy of economic 
Table 1 
EL SALVADOR: MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS 
A. Basic economic indicators 
Gross domestic product at market prices 
(millions of dollars at 1970 prices) 
Population (millions of inhabitants) 
Per capita gross domestic product 
(in dollars at 1970 prices) 
B. Short-run economic indicators 
Gross domestic product 
Per capita gross domestic product 
Gross domestic income, in real terms 
Terms of trade (goods and services) 
Current value of exports 
(goods and services) 
Current value of imports 
(goods and services) 
Consumer prices 
December - December 
Variation between annual averages 
Money 
Real minimum wages 
Unemployment rates' 
Current government income 























Fiscal deficit/total government expenditure' 11.3 
Fiscal deficit/gross domestic product' 
C. External sector 
Trade balance (goods and services) 
Balance on current account 
Balance on capital account 
Variation in net international reserves 
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Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official data. 
"Preliminary figures. Gross domestic product plus terms-of-trade effect, less net factor payments to the rest of the world and net 
private donations. 'Variation between October 1982 and October 1983. Real minimum wages of agricultural workers, except 
for harvesting of coffee, sugar cane and cotton. 'Percentages. 
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adjustment and stabilization, the main mechanisms for which were established in 1982.2 To the 
extent that the main imbalances and maladjustments progressively acquired the character of 
permanence and continuity, the administration (regarded as transitory in view of the electoral 
calendar established by the Constituent Assembly) endeavoured to fulfill certain goals as laid down in 
the stabilization programme, but at the same time had to bow to unforeseen pressures. 
Thus, with respect to government finances, a substantial reduction of the fiscal deficit had been 
envisaged at the beginning of the year to be attained through the combined expedients of raising 
revenue —in particular from taxation— and restricting expenditure. Some amendments in tax 
legislation were introduced but proved insufficient owing to delays in the discussion and legalization 
of the proposed reforms and the fact that they were less comprehensive than had been foreseen. Thus 
tax coefficient only rose from 10.7% in 1982 to 11.3% in 1983. As for the policy of restricted 
expenditure, two circumstances conspired against the fulfilment of the originally approved budget: 
firstly, the larger outlays assigned to security and defence and the repair of damage to physical 
infrastructure and, secondly, the increasing debt-servicing (interest and amortization) costs. 
Moreover, although an austere current expenditure budget had been considered, a more expansive 
capital expenditure policy was deliberately adopted with a view to safeguarding minimum levels of 
economic activity and employment. The joint effect of sluggish income performance and severe 
expansion of expenditure was that the fiscal deficit, far from contracting as programmed early in the 
year, rose from the equivalent of 8.1% of gross domestic product in 1982 to 9.3% in 1983. 
The country's external accounts, for their part, showed a certain improvement. The balance-of-
payments current account deficit fell from US$ 271 million in 1982 to US$ 239 million in 1983 as a 
result of a recovery of 12% in the value of exports of goods and services and a much smaller rise in the 
cost of imports. The growth of exports of goods was basically due to a significant increase in the value 
of non-traditional exports, which rose from US$ 44 million to US$ 67 million, partly in response to 
the considerable effort made by the authorities in recent years to increase and diversify exports. On 
the other hand, however, the improved position in the trade deficit was partially offset by an increase 
in net factor service payments. Even more significant than the evolution of the balance-of-payments 
current account was that recorded in the capital account. This showed a notable surplus (of almost 
US$ 420 million) which enabled the level of international reserves to rise by US$ 180 million. Net 
incoming capital came from bilateral official sources —including approximately US$ 150 million 
donated by the Government of the United States, from multilateral sources and from the rephasing of 
part of the short-term external public debt. The external imbalance was thus attenuated in 1983 and 
the country acquired greater scope for manoeuvre owing to the rising levels of external credit. 
The slackening of inflationary pressures was another economic policy objective in 1983. With 
this in mind, and in contrast with developments in preceding years, public service tariffs were frozen 
and maximum price levels were established for basic food products. However, and despite the fact 
that import prices rose only slightly, inflation continued to rise, reaching an average annual variation 
of 13.2% compared with 11.7% in 1982. This acceleration of inflation took place mainly in the second 
half of the year, food products being those most affected. 
To the foregoing was added a very restrictive wage policy which kept minimum nominal wage 
levels totally unchanged. This led to a drop in average real wages which in turn contributed to the 
already-mentioned reduction in the levels of private consumption and most probably to a further 
deterioration in income distribution. 
Finally, monetary policy was kept essentially consistent with the economic adjustment 
programme. The supply of means of payment rose moderately, as did the expansion of credit. In 
addition, deposit receipts in the financial intermediation system rose steeply —consisting almost 
entirely of time deposits— partly as a result of the difficulty of converting local financial holdings into 
foreign currencies under the exchange control system in force. As for the exchange rate policy, the 
operation ôf a dual rate was maintained and neither the official nor the preferential rate underwent 
any substantial alteration in 1983. 
To sum up, under the prevailing conditions of political tension, it is extremely difficult to apply 
any economic policy programme, especially when the Government is not at all times in control of the 
2 A contingency agreement amounting to USS 50 million was reached with the International Monetary Fund in 1982 together with a 
compensatory financing agreement for 37 million subject to a disbursement period which covered the whole of 1983. 
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Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official data. 
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Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures supplied by the Central Reserve Bank of El Salvador. 
" Preliminary figures. bThe figures for exports and imports of goods and services were taken from balance of payments data expressed in 
dollars at current prices which were converted to constant 1970 values using price indexes calculated for this purpose by ECLAC. 
country's entire territorial area. While it is true that international aid, especially that provided 
bilaterally by the United States, made it possible to increase the net international reserves, the 
generalized debility of the economy and reluctance on the part of the local private sector to maintain 
—and even less to expand— its productive activities continued. 
All the foregoing developments took place in the framework of continuing armed conflict at a 
high cost in human lives and the cumulative backwardness implicit in a fifth consecutive year of 
decline in per capita gross domestic product, with the consequent high level of unemployment 
(despite a strong emigratory flow), deteriorating real wages and, in general, the dramatic situation 
facing the Salvadorian people. If to these circumstances is added a severe contraction in the formation 
of private capital and the complex web of factors underlying the prevailing political tensions, the 
possibilities of short-term improvement are constantly diminishing over the years. 
2. Trends in economic activity 
a) Total supply and demand 
The total supply position in 1983 was similar to that of the preceding year, causing a consequent 
break in the steady deterioration observed in this respect since 1979. Between the latter year and 1982 
this contraction had been equivalent to a total of 26%. The performance in 1983 was the result of a 
combination of two factors: stagnation in the evolution of the gross domestic product and a slight 
increase in the volume of external purchases (see table 2). 
In the case of domestic productive activity, the continuing negative trend of recent years was 
halted by the positive effect of a certain dynamism in some sectors such as manufacturing, 
construction and transport (which are high sources of employment), as against the persistent decline 
of others, such as agriculture and mining. 
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From the point of view of demand, a notable increase in the volume of external sales coincided 
with a further deterioration in overall domestic demand (though to a lesser extent than in preceding 
years). As for exports, the 15% expansion in the year represented a welcome recovery after a drop of 
36% recorded in the three preceding years. This increase was due on the one hand to larger export 
volumes in the case of some important items (this in turn being the result of a degree of recovery in 
agricultural output), and on the other —as in the case of coffee— to stock reductions in view of the 
policy of seeking new external markets in the light of the precarious foreign exchange situation. 
With regard to domestic demand, an increase in gross internal investment was offset by 
contractions in government and private consumption (for the fifth year running in the latter 
instance). 
Efforts were made to invigorate the economic system by resort to public expenditure, though 
this was somewhat contradictory to the stabilization policy envisaged in the agreements reached in 
1982 with the International Monetary Fund. In the case of public capital expenditure —by both the 
central government and decentralized agencies— the increase was attributable to the continuation of 
some important public works, to the need to replace a significant part of the infrastructure destroyed 
or damaged by acts of sabotage against communication installations, power transmission lines, 
bridges and roads and to other undertakings carried out for defence purposes. The overall increase 
recored, however, was lower than that foreseen since it was decided to proceed only with fully 
financed projects. 
Part of the investment expenditure referred to above was financed by resort to the national 
credit system and to international financial support (from the U.S. Agency for International 
Development and the Inter-American Development Bank). Resources were thus devoted to road 
works and housing; although these activities were of little significance in absolute terms when 
compared with the levels of construction carried out in the first years of the second half of the 
preceding decade, they nevertheless contributed to an upswing in investment, which contrasted with 
the constant deterioration that had taken place from 1979 to 1982. 
Finally, private consumption fell by almost 3% in 1983, to a level of 30% below that of 1978. 
One of the determining factors in this reduction was the effect of the official wage-freeze policy 
applied at a time when inflation was increasing at a higher rate than in the preceding year. Thus 
during the crisis of 1983 the level of satisfaction of basic needs continued to fall, adversely affecting 
one of the most significant welfare indicators. 
b) Evolution of the main sectors 
After four years of substantial reductions in the gross domestic product, this pointer remained 
static in 1983. The production of goods dropped by 1% and that of other services by 0.5%, being 
compensated by an increase of 3% in basic services. In the case of the production of goods, farm 
output fell by 3% while that of the building and manufacturing sectors rose by 4 and 1% respectively 
compared with the preceding year (see table 3). 
i) Agriculture. As already noted, the index of agricultural production (including livestock) fell 
by almost 3%. The level reached was 21% lower than in 1980 and was equivalent to that recorded in 
1970 (since when there had been an increase in population of close on 40%). A point deserving 
mention in this connection is the considerable variety of results in the case of individual commodities. 
In the export group a marked decline in production occurred in the two main crops —coffee and 
cotton— with an increment for the second year running in the case of sugar cane. As for items 
produced predominantly for local consumption, a high rate of increase was observed in the output of 
most basic grains (maize, beans and rice) though the production of sorghum fell sharply (see table 4). 
The armed conflict that has persisted in the country for the past few years continued to 
influence results in the farming sector, probably to a greater extent in 1983 than formerly. In fact, this 
conflict generated great uncertainty owing to its political nature and especially because part of the 
farming area could not be fully exploited. It also caused a reduction in levels of productivity by area 
and by worker occupied in view of its persistence on various fronts. This, however, did not affect the 
main sugar-cane production areas, which are situated in the western part of the country. On the other 
hand, in some instances, such as cotton, the postponement of precise decisions on the application of 




EL SALVADOR: GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT BY TYPE OF 
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Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures supplied by the Central Reserve Bank of El Salvador. 
"Preliminary figures. *As the individual activities and the totals were calculated independently, the sum of the former does not 
necessarily tally with the latter. c Includes restaurants, hotels and business services. 
In the case of coffee, production levels once again fell steeply. There were various reasons for 
this, among which were the effects of climate, the existence of plant rot (rust), uncertainty among 
producers concerning the terms of land reform with reference to areas of between 100 and 500 
hectares (a doubt only cleared up in the last few days of the year), and the military conflict itself, which 
made it impossible to give adequate attention to plantations in certain parts of the country. A further 
aspect in this connection was that, according to official reports, agricultural producers failed to make 
efficient use of bridging loans offered by the banking system, thereby allowing fertilization levels to 
decline. Coffee exports, however, rose as a result of considerable withdrawals from stocks. 
Cotton output fell for the fifth successive year. Determining factors in this respect were 
uncertainties arising from the land reform project and its possible expansion and the circumstance 
that the most important cotton-growing area lies in the eastern part of the country, which has been 
the main scene of the armed conflict. 
With the 27% i ncrease in production of sugar cane a level similar to that of 1975 was reached. 
This increase was the result of a substantial expansion in areas under cultivation and a significant 
growth in productivity per area. This was partly due to the programme of subsidies in favour of 
producers conducted by the official institution 1NAZUCAR by means of prices, credit concessions and 
special terms for the use of fertilizers. 
With regard to basic grains, most of the crops showed a certain degree of recovery after the 
considerable falls recorded in preceding years. In particular, incentives were granted to some land-
reform beneficiaries by means of relatively attractive guaranteed prices and adequate credits. Rice 
production rose by 22% and that of maize by 11%. These higher output levels, however, were still 
lower than those attained in 1980 (by 13% in the case of maize and 29% in that of rice). On the other 
hand bean production, which is relatively less important, was almost 9% higher in 1983 than in 1980. 
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At all events, the comparatively favourable results of the output of grains alleviated to some extent 
the pressure on foreign exchange required to supply some of these basic food products habitually 
consumed by the population. 
As for meat production, partial information from official sources indicates that results were 
comparatively negative, although less so than in previous years. The number of cattle slaughtered 
apparently remained unchanged in 1983 after the marked contractions recorded in 1981 and 1982; 
while pig slaughtering fell by 2 % compared with the year before when a fairly high increase had been 
recorded. 
The country's animal stock —both cattle and pigs— remained precarious throughout the year. 
Four factors combined to reduce the livestock inventory: the armed conflict which had continued for 
several years, the high extraction rate —carried out in a disorganized manner to meet urgent food 
requirements and keep up the flow of exports—, the reactions of stock breeders vis-a-vis land reform, 
and, finally, the limited scope of animal health and reproduction programmes. In practice, despite 
preliminary estimates which had envisaged an almost continuous reduction in slaughtering rates, 
extraction figures have risen progressively as a result of depletion of the total stock, thereby 
establishing one of the main obstacles to the country's future livestock development. 
On the other hand, although precise official estimates are not available, it should be mentioned 
that some fairly important efforts have been made to increase poultry production in terms of meat as 
well as eggs. 
Finally, milk production fell again in 1983, although at a noticeably lower rate than in preceding 
years. Unlike the case of grains, this reduction stemmed from additional pressures on the demand for 
imported supplies. 
Table 4 
EL SALVADOR: INDICATORS OF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION 
Index of agricultural 
produaion (1968 = 100) 
Crop farming 
Livestock raising 









































































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures supplied by the Central Reserve Bank of El Salvador. 
"Preliminary figures. Estimated on the basis of variations in value added at constant prices. f In thousands of quintals, with the 
exception of sugar cane which is shown in thousands of tons. Thousands of head. 'Millions of pounds of meat. 




EL SALVADOR: INDICATORS OF MANUFACTURING PRODUCTION 
1975 1980 1981 1982 1983" 
Growth rates 
1980 1981 1982 1983a 
Index of value added 
(1970 = 100) 
Foodstuffs, beverages and 
tobacco 
Textiles, clothing and 
leather products 
Textiles 
Clothing, footwear and 
other leather products 
Wood and paper 
Wood and its manufactures 
Paper and paper products 
Chemicals and petroleum and 
rubber products 
Chemical products 
Petroleum and rubber 
products 
Non-metallic mineral products 
Machinery and metal products 
Metal products 
Machinery and equipment 
Other manufactures 
138.2 133.4 U9.5 109.5 110.4 -15.5 -10.4 -8.4 0.8 
144.0 136.7 126.8 119.9 117.5 -14.1 -7.2 -5.4 -2.0 
72.3 95.8 102.3 89.6 71.2 
64.7 62.0 49.7 33.6 
-16.5 -12.4 -20.5 1.5 

































































































Source: ECLAC, on che basis of figures supplied by the Central Reserve Bank of El Salvador. 
"Preliminary figures based on partial indicators. 
ii) Manufacturing. The negative trend of manufacturing production in the period 1979-1982 
was detained in 1983, when output rose by almost 1% compared with a contraction of 33% in the 
former period (see table 5). 
This important upturn would have been greater had it not been for several factors. On the one 
hand, the general weakness of the economy and consequent depressed domestic demand for 
manufactured products was reflected in a continuing high level of unemployment and 
underemployment. To this circumstance was added a severe contraction of real wages in 1983. 
Moreover, the growth of public expenditure in the year, except in some very specific items such as 
building materials, was not sufficiently swift. Government purchases of non-personal goods and 
services declined in real terms. On the other hand, the critical state of the economy throughout the 
Central American countries adversely affected export sales of manufactured products. To these 
factors was added the climate of uncertainty in the private sector caused by the persistence of the 
armed conflict so often referred to. 
Official data by industrial branches were incomplete. It was, however, possible to observe 
severe contractions in the output of chemical products (-10%) and in the metal products and 
machinery branch (-9%), though the latter is of little importance in the manufacturing sector as a 
whole. The production of foodstuffs, beverages and tobacco also contracted (-2%), reaching a level of 
14% below that of 1980. 
Several other sectors, in contrast, showed a degree of dynamism which offset the above 
reductions. Prominent among the branches for which details are available were the wood and paper 
industry, where output rose by 3% in 1983 after decreasing at an average annual rate of more 
than -13% in the four preceding years. Similarly the production of textiles, clothing and leather 
manufactures increased by almost 2 % after having diminished at an annual rate of -17 % in the period 
1980-1982. 
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iii) Construction. The building sector product rose by 4% in 1983. This, however, represented 
only a weak recovery after an accumulated fall of 45% between 1979 and 1982. The 1983 growth rate 
was basically attributable to the public sector, since private sector activity again deteriorated. Public 
construction was concentrated in some large projects such as the San Lorenzo Hydroelectric Plant 
(which was completed in the course of the year), several communications installations, the 
reconstruction of infrastructure affected by acts of sabotage and other projects necessary for defence. 
Thanks to some external financial support an as yet incipient recovery in the building of medium-
sized housing also began to acquire a degree of importance in some urban centres. 
iv) Basic services. A recovery of some significance in electricity generation (7% in the year)i 
occurred in this service group as against the reductions recorded in the three preceding years. This 
recovery was mainly due to the bringing into service of the above-mentioned San Lorenzo Dam. The 
product of the transport, storage and communications sector also rose (by 2%) after several years of 
successive declines. This was due to the fact that the increase in agricultural handling requirements 
was greater than the contraction in industry and imported products. 
v) Other services. Prominent in the rest of the service group were increases in home 
ownership —for the fourth year running— and in community, social and personal services, for the 
first time in several years. On the other hand, government services fell in value by more than 1%, 
despite staff increases, essentially for non-civilian duties. Finally, the product of the commercial, 
financial and insurance sector remained stationary after having fallen at an average annual rate 
of -11% in the four preceding years. 
c) Employment and unemployment 
Although no final figures have been available concerning the evolution of employment in 
recent years, everything appears to indicate that employment levels can scarcely have improved in 
1983. In fact, no advance was recorded in the gross domestic product though some additional 
employment is known to have taken place in the building sector. The small increases in 
manufacturing and in the services group, combined with a lower output of farm crops requiring a 
high proportion of manual labour for harvesting purposes —as in the case of coffee and cotton— and 
the fact that the increases in basic grain production were largely attributable to small and medium 
producers, would seem to confirm that there were no variations of importance in the employment 
situation. Official sources estimated the unemployment level as being in the neighbourhood of 30% 
of the economically active population —a level comparable with 1982 and greater than the 25% 
estimated for 1981. Only three years earlier (i.e., in the first half of 1980), the unemployment rate was 
16%. The situation in 1983 might have been even worse had it not been for the considerable flow of 
emigration which slackened the increase in the economically active population. 
3. The external sector 
a) Introduction 
The year 1983 saw an improvement in the evolution of external and balance-of-payments 
variables. Exports of goods expanded in volume by 10% after a 36% deterioration over the period 
1980-1982. On the other hand, import purchases fell in volume for the sixth consecutive year to a 
level equivalent to only 55 % of that recorded in 1977. Terms of trade fell by 7%, thereby completing a 
drop of 19% since 1980 and 53% since 1977 (see table 6). 
Similarly, the value of exports rose and that of imports fell. The external trade deficit thus 
decreased by 31%, this being partially offset by a further increase in factor payments. As a result of 
this development the deficit on current account was somewhat less than in the year before, but higher 
than that envisaged by the authorities early in the year. 
For the second year running, therefore, the country benefited from external financial support 
greater than the current account deficit. Since the foreign debt was also partially rephased —part of 
the short-term commitments being added to long-term indebtedness— the level of net international 
reserves, which had decreased in each of the four preceding years, rose by approximately US$ 180 
million. 
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Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official data. 
"Preliminary figures. Volume of exporcs of goods, or of goods and services where applicable, adjusted in accordance with the 
corresponding terms-of-trade index. 
b) Merchandise trade 
i) Exports. Owing to a 4% increase in 1983, the trend of contraction in the value of exports 
recorded in the preceding three years was successfully reversed. This increase was due in part to 
efforts seeking on the one hand to gain new markets for a number of products and on the other to 
expand sales to those countries and regions with which trade relations had traditionally been 
maintained. 
Several factors, however, prevented exports from increasing further. Outstanding among these 
were: that the effects of the international crisis remained latent throughout the year; that the crisis 
prevailing in the Central American Common Market —and the consequent problem of unpaid 
balances in various directions— coupled with existing political tensions, once again obstructed 
trade in the area in 1983; and, finally, that the problems of armed confrontation within the 
country —especially the acts of sabotage against production and distribution already mentioned— 
particularly affected some agricultural export products. Sales of merchandise to Central America thus 
continued to drop (-3% in 1983), although an increase of 6% was attained in exports to the rest of the 
world. Included in the latter were some non-traditional products, although of comparatively scant 
significance (see table 7). 
The value of the main traditional export sales rose as a whole in 1983 by almost 3% after a 
cumulative fall of 40% in the three preceding years. In the case of coffee—which accounted for more 
than half of total exports— the decline in external sales during the previous few years was 
successfully halted as the result of efforts made to reduce accumulated stocks. Sales of this commodity 
were even made to non-traditional markets, with which negotiations were subject to the vicissitudes 
of price movements (customarily erratic) but in general at lower levels than those obtainable under 
multilateral agreements. The higher volume of coffee sold was therefore more than offset by a 
contraction in the average price obtained. 
Results proved much more satisfactory in the case of cotton, the country's second most 
important export commodity. In this case, apart from a slightly higher export volume than in 1982 
(again assisted by inventory depletions) the international price rose by almost 10%. The impact of 
this price improvement, which offset the deterioration in coffee sales, was nevertheless very small 
considering the country's supply possibilities, had sowings not been so markedly affected in recent 
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years. Owing to the country's endowment of natural resources, El Salvador is one of the Central 
American countries with the greatest possibilities of expanding its cotton production. 
With regard to sugar, the value of exports rose to the unusual extent of nearly 70%. This 
was due to an increase of approximately 40% in the export volume and a rise of more than 
20% in contracted selling prices. The larger volume sold was due in turn to an increase in 
production —influenced by rationalization in the use of certain resources, as was the case atone large 
sugar plantation— and the concession by the United States to El Salvador of part of the diminished 
quota to Nicaragua. 
Finally, in the case of shrimps a small increase in price was partially offset by a relatively lower 
contraction in volume sold. 
Complete official information on trade with the Central American countries for the whole year 
has not been available in broken-down form. Results for the first three quarters of the year, however, 
show a drop in exports to all countries except Honduras. Nonetheless, since export sales to the latter 
country in 1982 were almost non-existent, their relative significance in 1983 was small (barely 4% of 
the total). In the case of Guatemala, traditionally the largest buying country in the area, there was a 
considerable drop in sales (more than 10%). Influencing this result were a number of administrative 
measures adopted unilaterally by that country towards the end of the year with regard to import 
permits which inhibited purchases not only from El Salvador but also from other regional countries. 
Exports to Costa Rica and Nicaragua, which were at practically the same level in 1982, fell with very 
differing degrees of intensity in 1983, namely by 10% and almost 40% respectively. 
ii) Imports. External purchases of goods diminished in nominal value by 3% in 1983 as the 
result of a 4% contraction in volume, partially offset by an increase of nearly 2% in unit value4 (see 
table 6). 
Table 7 
EL SALVADOR: EXPORTS OF GOODS, FOB 
Total 
To Central America 
To the rest of the world 











Cotton yarn and thread 
Clothing 
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Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures supplied by the Central Reserve Bank of El Salvador. 
"Preliminary figures. 
4 Table 8 shows a somewhat different result in the case of total imports. The discrepancy is due to the fact that the sources of information are 




EL SALVADOR: IMPORTS OF GOODS, CIF 
Total 
From Central America 




Raw materials and 
intermediate products 




























































































































Source: ECLAC, on rhe basis of figures supplied by the Central Reserve Bank of El Salvador. 
"Preliminary figures. 
In view of insufficient foreign exchange the country continued to apply a restrictive policy in 
external purchases in line with procedures adopted in previous years. Nonetheless, in 1983 purchases 
ceased to decline owing to two associated circumstances. First, despite the widespread depression of 
the economy, the country has been gradually exhausting its minimum inventories of raw materials 
and imported products in general, which had to begin to be replenished. Imports of raw materials and 
intermediate products thus ceased to decline as formerly. 
Secondly, and partly as a result of the above circumstance, the monetary authorities introduced a 
measure midway in the second half year whereby some current restrictions were suspended to the 
extent made possible by improvements in the level of net international reserves. However, since this 
decision was adopted in the final months of the year and the availability of foreign exchange, although 
somewhat less limited than in the preceding year, was nevertheless still insufficient to allow the full 
replacement of inventories, no increase was recorded in the year's external purchases (see table 8). 
iii) Terms of trade and the purchasing power of exports. The terms of trade in merchandise 
fell by 7%, since export prices went down by 6%, while import prices rose by almost 2%. Quoted 
prices for almost all foreign supplies rose with the exception of the main imported input.petroleum. 
On the other hand, despite this deterioration in the terms of trade, the considerable increase in 
volume of external sales caused an improvement of close on 3% in the purchasing power of exports 
of goods after a contraction of 53 % in the three years 1980-1982. At all events, the purchasing power 
of exports in 1983 remained lower than in the early 1970s. For its part, the total purchasing power of 
exports of goods and services rose in the year by almost 11%. 
c) The services trade and factor payments 
The deficit on the non-factor services account decreased in 1983 from US$ 97 million to US$ 80 
million, although to some extent maintaining a structure similar to that of 1982. In the case of 
tourism a high proportion of hotel capacity remained vacant —especially in San Salvador— as a 
result of the tense situation prevailing in the country in recent years. As regards imported services, 
efforts made to reduce them did not prove effective, at least to the extent envisaged, because of their 
heavy dependence on developments in the external purchase of goods and on the evolution of 
freighting and insurance costs, or —to cite a further factor— on foreign travel which had already 
contracted considerably in previous years, leaving no appreciable margin for further economies in 
this respect (see table 9). 
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Table 9 
EL SALVADOR: BALANCE OF PAYMENTS 
(Militons of dollars) 
Balance on current account 
Trade balance 
Exports of goods and services 
Goods, FOB 
Real services 
Transport and insurance 
Travel 
Imports of goods and services 
Goods, FOB 
Real services 







Unrequited private transfer payments 
Balance on capital account 
Unrequited official transfer payments 
Long-term capital 
Direct investment (net) 
Portfolio investment (net) 














Errors and omissions, net 
Global balance 
Total variation in reserves 
(- sign indicates an increase) 
Monetary gold 
Special Drawing Rights 
IMF reserve position 
Foreign exchange assets 
Other assets 































































































































































































































































































































Source: 1977-1982: International Monetary Fund, Balance of Payments Yearbook; {magnetic tape, May 1984); 1983: ECLAC, on the basis of 
official data. 
"Preliminary figures. Real services include other official and private transactions, but exclude factor services. 'In addition to 
loans received and amortization payments made, this entry includes net loans granted and other assets and liabilities. The global 
balance represents the sum of the balance on current account plus the balance on capital account. The difference between the total variation in 
reserves of opposite sign and the global balance represents the value of counterpart entries: monetization of gold, allocation of Special Drawing 
Rights and variations due to revaluation. 
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A large part of the reduction in the negative trade balance was offset by a further increase in the 
deficit on factor services. The negative balance in the latter instance, which in 1979 had amounted to 
only US$ 40 million, reached a level of US$ 150 million in 1983. This was in fact the most distorting 
item in the current account and continued to conspire against the recovery of the external finances. 
Moreover, this situation could worsen in the next few years owing to the intensified growth of 
the country's foreign debt since 1980, despite the fact that El Salvador has been one of the countries of 
the region receiving support under relatively favourable conditions, such as that obtained from the 
United States. 
d) The current account balance and its financing 
After a considerable deterioration in 1978, the total trade balance in goods and services in the 
first two years of recession (1979 and 1980) proved positive. In this two-year period the volume of 
imports fell by approximately one third. Although an increasingly strict economic adjustment policy 
was subsequently applied, the rapid descent in volume and value of exports again led to a large trade 
deficit in the following two years (1981-1982). Moreover, net payments on factor.services began to 
rise rapidly as from 1980 with the result that the current account deficit reached a very high level 
(about US$ 270 million in 1981 and 1982). Finally, in 1983, a reduction of nearly US$ 40 million in 
the trade deficit was partly counteracted by growing external factor service payments. Together with 
an increase of 15 % in private unilateral transfers, this resulted in an improvement of only 11 % in the 
1983 current account balance, equivalent to more than 6% of the country's gross domestic product. 
In 1983 bilateral aid of some magnitude continued to be received from the United States in the 
form of official donations which, after amounting to only US$ 15 million in 1981, rose in the 
following two years to US$ 113 million and almost US$ 150 million respectively. Similarly, after a 
two-year hiatus, the net inflow of capital exceeded the current account deficit in absolute value. Hence 
net international reserves rose in 1983 by nearly US$ 180 million after a contraction of almost 
US$ 290 million in the period 1979-1982.5 
In view of constant imbalances in the balance of payments, the country had requested and 
received support from the International Monetary Fund already in 1981. In that year compensatory 
financing was obtained amounting to 32 million Special Drawing Rights. Later, in 1982, under the 
new administration, a contingency agreement was signed for 43 million Special Drawing Rights in 
addition to another compensatory financing loan of US$ 32 million SDRs. These arrangements took 
place in the context of an economic adjustment programme whose objectives, as in other instances in 
the region, could not be fully achieved. Negotiations with the International Monetary Fund were 
again set in motion towards the end of 1983 without any agreement being reached by December. 
e) External indebtedness 
With the exception of Guatemala, El Salvador is the Central American country with the lowest 
per capita external debt. Even so, external liquidity difficulties during the period under review 
induced the authorities —as in the case of other governments in the region, although somewhat 
later— to seek support from public and private international sources. From the end of the 1970s part 
of the foreign commitments undertaken, especially in the sphere of private indebtedness, had been 
contracted with commercial sources with a consequent hardening of conditions in terms of 
repayment periods and interest rates. In view of this, and faced with ever greater maladjustments in 
public finances and in the balance of payments, the Central Reserve Bank contracted additional and 
increasing external loans as a way of contributing in a co-ordinated manner to the process of financial 
regularization envisaged in the economic adjustment policy, which was more intensively applied as a 
result of the agreement reached with the International Monetary Fund. 
Together with the foregoing, the above-mentioned financial support from the United States, 
which in part took the form of various types of donations and loans via the U.S. Agency for 
International Development, brought about a change in some characteristic features of the structure of 
the country's external debt, as a result of which the monetary authorities took over part of the 
Mn rhe first months of 1983 net international reserves continued to drop to a level of less than USS 88 million. In June they began to rise 
and reached USS I.V1 million in August. In October the level of net international reserves was USS I 16 million, a sum equivalent to slightly less 
than 40 days of imports of goods and services. 
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external commitments of the private sector. For example, between 1978 and 1982 private 
indebtedness fell from US$ 470 million to US$ 196 million —i.e., from 48 to 12% of the total 
national indebtedness— while the debt of the Central Reserve Bank increased fourfold, reaching a 
level of US$ 700 million. The latter increase, however, has been used primarily, to solve balance-of-
payments difficulties rather than to promote production and development. According to official 
information, the trends prevalent up to 1982 were accentuated in 1983 but with an important change 
in the structure of repayment periods since, as a result of successful rephasing negotiations, short-
term obligations amounting to more than US$ 300 million were converted into medium- and long-
term commitments. The external indebtedness of the public sector increased in 1983 by 22%, a 
proportion similar to that of previous years, the average annual rate between 1979 and 1982 having 
amounted to 23% (see table 10). 
For their part, public debt servicing costs, excluding those of the Central Bank, rose in the year 
by 27% owing especially to the higher interest payments made. Expressed as a percentage of exports, 
these costs —although of comparatively limited significance— have risen continuously between 1979 
(2.4%) and 1983 (6.7%). Figures are not available concerning servicing costs for the rest of the 
Table 10 
EL SALVADOR: EXTERNAL INDEBTEDNESS INDICATORS 
External public debt 
Balances 
Total 















Global foreign debt/GDP 
External public debt/GDP 
Servicing of global foreign debt/ 
exports of goods and services 
Servicing of external public debt/ 
exports of goods and services'7 
Servicing of external public debt/ 
loans received^ 
Servicing of global foreign debt/GDP 
Servicing of external public debt/GDPc 
1978 1979 



























































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official data. 
"Preliminary figures. Central Reserve Bank indebtedness amounted to US$ 701 million at 31 December 1982. According to official 
information, between that date and 31 October 1983 the institution's long-term foreign debt increased by US$315 million, but its short-term 
commitments decreased in the same period by US$318 million. r Excluding Central Reserve Bank indebtedness. 
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Table 11 
EL SALVADOR: EVOLUTION OF DOMESTIC PRICES 
EL SALVADOR 
Consumer price index" 
Food products 




Fuels and energy 
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Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official data. 
"Corresponds to the metropolitan area of San Salvador. Base for 1978: June 1954 = 100. For the years 1979 to 1983 this has been linked with the 
new index based on December 1978= 100. Base 1955 = 100. Excludes coffee. 'Variation between October 1982 and October 1983. 
''Average variation between January-October 1982 and the same period in 1983. 
foreign debt, which is of much greater importance. In 1982 this portion of servicing costs represented 
25% of the value of exports, compared with only 9% three years earlier (see table 10). 
To sum up, the country's difficult external financial situation, which had dragged on for several 
years, underwent a fairly significant change in composition in the year under review, together with 
increasingly significant direct support from the United States, which influenced the attitude of other 
sources of foreign credit. Nevertheless, in view of the prevailing trade constraint, the apparent 
improvement in the liquidity situation is fragile and only likely to be maintained if international 
financial support continues to grow under comparatively soft conditions, such as those recently 
obtained. 
4. Prices and wages 
a) Prices and anti-inflationary policy 
An intensification of inflation occurred in 1983, although the year's rate of 15.5% was lower 
than that of other Central American countries. The higher rate was due to difficulties in the supply of 
essential products, aggravated by the fact that distribution problems at the national level resulting 
from the internal armed conflict caused distortions in the pricing system. Many cases of speculation 
also occurred for the same reasons. Finally, the improved external liquidity position also exerted 
pressure on price levels through its effect on monetary aggregates. 
In the case of consumer prices, average food prices rose by 17.9%, i.e., more than the general 
index. The situation prevailing in 1980 and 1981 was thus repeated, and further aggravated in those 
sectors of the population in whose budget food is the largest item (see table 11). 
The evolution of variations between 12-monthly periods showed a notable change as from 
August 1983. During 1982 and up to July 1983 this variable fluctuated monthly around 12%, but rose 
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to around 15% from August 1983 onwards. This circumstance was most noticeable in the case of 
foodstuffs, which in the final months of the year showed cumulative annual variations of 17 and 18% 
compared with the variations of 10 to 11% ruling in 1982 and up to July 1983 (see figure 2). Hence 
one of the principal aims of the adjustment policy, which was to reduce inflation, remained unfulfilled 
in spite of the freezing of public service tariffs. 
In the case of wholesale prices, information has only been obtainable up to the month of 
October. The diversity of price fluctuations by category was nevertheless a notable feature in the year. 
The greatest increase affected building materials which was due to the fact that the resumption of 
some construction work —although modest considering the severe contractions in this activity in 
preceding years— came up against very low input inventory levels. Farm-product wholesale prices 
also rose considerably more than those of manufactured goods. 
Figure 2 
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Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official data. 
b) Wages 
A greater number of labour disputes than formerly arose during the year in pursuit of wage 
adjustments. Two factors, however, prevented this trend from developing still further: on the one 
hand the persistence of a tense political climate and, on the other, the fact that, in the light of the 
difficult unemployment and under-employment situation already referred to, there was a prevailing 
need to retain jobs rather than demand wage increases. Nominal minimum wages remained 
unchanged for the third year running, in line with the current economic adjustment policy. As a 
result, real minimum wages fell by almost 12% in the year after a reduction of close on 11% in the 
preceding year. In the case of farm workers, this meant a fall of more than a third in real wages in four 
years. The severe drop in real minimum wages was reflected in a further reduction in the level of 
satisfaction of basic needs in the lower-income strata of the population (see table 12). 
5. Monetary and fiscal policy 
a) Monetary policy 
The adjustment policy agreed with the International Monetary Fund with the aim of 
attenuating the negative effects of financial imbalances continued to be applied in 1983 —perhaps 
more rigorously than in previous years. In practice, however, the application of this policy could not 
fully achieve some of the objectives established at the beginning of the year and in other instances 
proved more restrictive and contractive than had been envisaged. 
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In the first place, total means of payment rose by only 1% between October 1982 and October 
1983,6 as against an increase in 1983 of almost 9% in the gross domestic product at current prices or 
7% applying the nominal value of total supplies of goods and services in the country. The lower rate 
of expansion of means of payment was due to the relatively uneven performance of currency outside 
banks and demand deposits. The latter increased by rather less than 3% while the former remained 
static (see table 13). 
The scant movement in demand deposits contrasted with the high growth rate of quasi-money 
(18%). This in turn was the result of a slow rate of increase in savings deposits (6%) compared with a 
markedly dynamic expansion of time deposits (31%). This situation reflected in part the growing 
liquidity in local currency in view of difficulties in the acquisition of foreign exchange in the context of 
exchange control. The country's economic agents, for their part, preferred to direct their resources 
towards the banks in order to ensure profitability through interest rates rather than devote them to 
operations in real terms with the consequent risk deriving from unstable political, economic and 
financial prospects. 
Absorption factors increased in total by 27%. Among them two items in particular rose 
considerably between October 1982 and October 1983, namely, bond issues which expanded by 40% 
and long-term loans which increased by 33%- In view of the critical situation of the private sector the 
latter were concentrated in the Central Bank while bond placings were transacted mainly with social 
security institutions. 
Expansion factors evolved at a more moderate rate, prominent among them being an 
improvement in net international reserves, primarily as a consequence of debt renegotiation.7 On the 
Table 13 
EL SALVADOR: MONETARY BALANCE 
Money 
Currency outside banks 
Demand deposits 
Expansion factors 
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Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures supplied by the Central Reserve Bank of £1 Salvador. 
"Preliminary figures. Growth rates for the period October 1982-October 1983- eNet government credit (credits less deposits) 
was negative in 1977 and 1978 (127 million colones and 98 million respectively) and positive in 1979(21 million colones). ^Includes 
foreign currency deposits involving low amounts. 
6October was the last month in 1983 for which information has been available. All 1983 growth rates relating to monetary aggregates 
correspond to the period mentioned. 
^Significant changes were observed between May andjune 1983 in the position of the banking system with regard to the external sector. 
Net international monetary reserves rose in those two months from -139 million colones to +151 million, while long-term foreign 
commitments increased from 894 million colones to 1 125 million. This increment of 231 million colones was absorbed in its entirety by the 
Central Reserve Bank. 
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other hand, expansion by way of credit was relatively limited, although consistent with the 
availability needs of goods and services in nominal terms. Domestic credit rose during the 12-month 
period ending in October 1983 by slightly more than 10%. The Government was again the main 
recipient of monetary resources supplied by the banking system. In this context, credit received by the 
former rose by 18% in nominal terms while that granted to the rest of the country's official entities 
increased by 4% and that devoted to the private sector by 9%. Main destinations in the last-named 
category were the agricultural and building sectors. 
Few new measures in the sphere of monetary policy were introduced during the year. Thus both 
obligatory bank-reserve percentages and active and passive interest rates were maintained at the 
same levels as in the preceding year. Among the few changes introduced that of greatest significance 
was the rephasing of overdue loan repayments to the financing system. This measure sought to 
relieve: first, those who had totally or partially lost their capital assets or farm crops as a result of the 
internal armed conflict; second, those who had been affected by a drastic fall in demand or in the 
prices of goods or services produced; and finally, those who had been adversely affected by delays in 
the implementation of legal reforms in connection with property. 
Another development, introduced in the second half of the year, established maximum 
amounts for deposits in savings and loan associations. It was feared in official circles than an 
inordinate increase in these deposits, attracted by high interest rates carried over from previous 
periods, might encourage speculative or potentially destabilizing moves in the event of massive 
withdrawals. 
b) Fiscal policy 
The critical situation of government finances was again one of the main difficulties created by 
the recession in 1983. As already pointed out, in view of the serious financial situation prevailing 
since 1980, the authorities continued to apply an adjustment policy wherein a significant role was 
assigned to efforts to increase the procurement of resources —in particular from taxation— and to 
the intensification of restrictive measures in government expenditure. It was not possible, however, 
to achieve either of these objectives, with the result that, instead of contracting, the fiscal deficit rose 
once more, reaching a level of over 41% of total expenditure and over 9% of the gross domestic 
product (see table 14). 
Current government income increased in nominal terms by 14%, i.e., slightly more than prices, 
although economic activity on the whole remained static. This was mainly the result of a number of 
provisions adopted in the taxation field which, however, failed to produce the desired effects owing to 
the widespread weakness of economic activity and the fact that hindrances deriving from 
administrative practices in some cases, and legal issues or political negotiations in others, impeded 
the immediate application of certain changes in tax rates and in collection methods. These last-named 
obstacles caused the evolution of direct taxation to remain unchanged in nominal terms although 
indirect tax revenue rose by almost 22%. 
Changes in direct taxation could not be introduced in 1983, these being partly postponed until 
1984. This was true both in the case of income tax (traditionally the main source of fiscal revenues) 
and of taxes levied on capital and real-estate transfers. By contrast, some satisfactory results were 
attained in the area of indirect taxation. These were attributable to the conjunction of two factors: on 
the one hand an increase in revenue from the stamp tax as a consequence of a further increase in rates 
and on the other a relatively favourable result in revenue derived from taxes on exports, in view of the 
larger external sales and an important growth in the current value of these transactions. Contrasting 
with this last-named factor was the scant significance of the tax increases levied on imports owing to 
the official policy of austerity in external purchases. Although some import restrictions were 
suspended early in September, thereby opening the way to a resurgence of foreign purchases towards 
the end of the year, no significant results were obtained from a fiscal point of view. The coefficient of 
taxation continued to oscillate around 11%, one of the lowest such ratios in Latin America. 
During 1983 a tax-reform project was submitted by the Executive to the General Assembly, the 
purposes of which were to bring about a relative increase in tax revenue in relation to the evolution of 
the gross domestic product, and to empower the fiscal system (which had hitherto been far from 
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flexible) to introduce progressive changes in some aspects of income distribution.8 The lack of 
political consensus, however, delayed approval of a large number of the proposed amendments, 
severely limiting their effects in 1983 and confining them almost exclusively to the above-mentioned 
change in stamp-tax rates.9 On the other hand, however, the peremptory need to increase tax revenue 
in the shortest possible time weighed more in the definition of the group of reforms referred to than 
in a more radical fiscal change whose effects would only have been felt in the medium term. It is 
Table 14 
EL SALVADOR: CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INCOME AND EXPENDITURE 
(Millions of colones) 




On foreign trade 
Non-tax revenues 
2. Current expenditure 
Remunerations 
Purchase of goods and services 
Interest payments 
Transfers and others 
3. Current savings ( 1 - 2 ) 
4. Capital expenditure 
Real investment 
Debt amortization 
Other capital expenses 
5. Total expenditure (2 + 4) 
6. Fiscal deficit ( 1 - 5 ) 
7. Financing of deficit 
Domestic financing 
Central Bank 
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Source: ECLAC, on the basis of data supplied by the Finance Ministry and the Central Reserve Bank of El Salvador. 
"Preliminary figures. Growth rates are shown in actual figures (not rounded off). 
"The main tax increases proposed were: motor vehicle licenses {100Ç? ), air and sea fares ( 1009? ), national lottery prices ( 109? ), stamp 
taxes on sales of merchandise and services (150'/?), and sales of beer (42'/? ). 
9The stamp-tax rate, which until 1981 had been of the order of 19?, was raised in 1982 to 29?, and again in 1983 to 4 9? on transactions 
involving raw materials and intermediary products and to 5'/? on all other transfer operations. 
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possible, moreover, that the transitory nature of the ruling administration (from May 1982 to mid-
1984) and the difficulties in achieving a full consensus may have contributed to the partial nature of 
the proposed reform. In practice the delay in its approval, and especially the deferment of changes in 
income-tax requirements, brought about a situation in which, as a result of the stamp-tax increase, the 
comparatively more affected population groups were those in the lower-income category. In 
November, however, a new tax reform project was submitted for consideration based on the value-
added tax and was approved in the final days of the year. 
The main lag in the fulfilment of the year's programmed financial objectives occurred in the 
sphere of expenditure. Both current and capital expenditure considerably exceeded forecast values, 
especially in the second of these instances. The policy of restriction and selectivity in the use of 
resources therefore proved insufficient. In the case of current expenses, which rose by a little over 8% 
(a rate similar to the evolution of the nominal gross domestic product), an increase in expenditure on 
goods and services was successfully avoided and a significant contraction in current transfers (-20%) 
was also attained. On the other hand there was an unforeseen increase in the payment of 
remunerations (16%) —in spite of the intention not to create vacancies and to freeze wages— 
resulting in particular from a larger number of military appointments. In the second place debt-
interest payments also grew (by 33%). This item, which in 1980 represented only 4% of total 
expenditure, rose in 1983 to 15%. 
Capital expenditure was that which most exceeded the forecast objectives, since it rose by 48% 
in nominal terms (or 31% in constant values). This was mainly the result of higher investment 
disbursements in real terms, which accounted for nearly 94% of the increase in these expenses. 
Although efforts were made to apply a criterion of strict selectivity in the continuation or completion 
of some public works such as in the fields of energy and communications, part of the higher 
expenditure was due to the need to reconstruct damaged or deteriorated infrastructure caused by acts 
of sabotage. Certain expenditure of a military character was also incurred although this was mainly 
covered by external donations. As for debt-amortization payments, these rose by a moderate 7% 10 in 
consequence of favourable conditions obtained in negotiations with international creditors. 
With regard to State-owned enterprises, attempts to ensure that they would be self-financing 
brought about a decrease in current and capital transfers made to them from central government 
funds. In this connection, since in practice no increases were introduced in public-service tariffs and 
the demand situation remained depressed, the activity of government-owned enterprises in general 
tended to stagnate. 
The total result of the combined factors outlined in the preceding paragraphs was therefore 
that in 1983 the maladjustment of the government financial balance continued or even became worse. 
The fiscal deficit coefficient in respect of total government expenditure and of the gross domestic 
product rose to even higher levels than those considered critical in the preceding year. Finally, with 
regard to the financing of this deficit, almost the same proportions were maintained in 1983 in 
respect of credit of domestic origin (approximately two thirds of the total) and that covered from 
external sources. Hence the pressure on the monetary variables observed in preceding years was 
maintained. 
,0 At all events the increase of only 5 million colones in the amortization payment from a global standpoint was due to a reduction of 6 




1. Recent economic trends: Introduction and summary 
In 1983 the recessive situation experienced by the Guatemalan economy since 1980 persisted and in 
some respects got worse. The gross domestic product experienced a sharp (-2%) contraction for the 
second consecutive year, after a drop of 3.5 % in 1982, and this was reflected in the continued decline 
of levels of employment and real income and, at the microeconomic level, in a growing number of 
enterprises with liquidity and even insolvency problems (see table 1 and figure 1). 
Although the decline described above was not quite so notable as that of the preceding year, the 
seriousness of the overall climate of recession consists in its cumulative and persistent nature, which 
has brought the per capita gross domestic product down to a level comparable with that of 1973. 
Thus, after a long period of sustained and relatively dynamic expansion of the per capita real product 
between 1950 and 1980, the plunge in economic activity in the past three years has resulted in a 
downturn equivalent to the loss of a whole decade of growth. Furthermore, the already long period of 
recession has begun to be reflected in adverse consequences of a persistent nature, among which 
mention may be made of the continuous drain on domestic savings by flights of capital, the lack of 
maintenance of industrial plants and agricultural plantations, and the incipient exodus of skilled 
labour and entrepreneurs (the former because of lack of job opportunities and the latter owing to the 
unfavourable prospects), all within the context of a climate of generalized uncertainty which has 
affected the expectations of the various economic agents. 
The factors contributing to this situation were the same, with differences in degree and scope, 
as have affected the Guatemalan economy during recent years.1 In the first place, the international 
market continued to provide very limited opportunities for the country's traditional export 
commodities, so that the volume of external sales fell by over 11%. Although unit values increased 
slightly (2.4%), they were far from making up for the 10% loss accumulated in the preceding 
biennium, and moreover the unit prices of imports rose faster, producing a new, albeit slight, 
deterioration in the terms of trade. Secondly, Guatemala encountered increasingly serious problems 
in obtaining external financing, both from official and private sources, due to the unfavourable 
conditions prevailing in the international financial markets, while the burden of servicing the 
external liabilities showed a tendency to increase. Thus, net inflows of capital decreased from US$ 340 
million in 1982 to less than US$ 330 million in 1983 (nevertheless, because the deficit on current 
account was considerably less than in 1982 owing basically to the drop in imports, the international 
monetary reserves increased by US$ 90 million). Thirdly, trade among the Central American 
countries continued to deteriorate not only because of the contraction in the subregion's overall 
demand, but also because of the acute shortage of foreign exchange which was felt by all the countries 
in the area, forcing them to take import-containment measurers which in some cases affected trade in 
goods originating in the subregion.2 
In addition to all these depressive factors stemming from the external sector, there were others 
of internal origin. Notable among these were the already chronic political and social tensions which 
have affected Central America in general and Guatemala in particular, one of whose manifestations 
was another change in government.3 The general uncertainty which prevailed as regards the future of 
intra-Central American relations and the course which might be taken by the programme designed by 
'See the chapters on Guatemala in Economic Survey of Latin America, 1981, United Nations publication, Sales No. E.83.1I.G.2, 
November 1983, and Economic Survey of Latin America and the Caribbean, 1982 (E/CEPAL/L.286/Add.3). 
2 Guatemala has traditionally shown a high surplus in intra-Central American trade, since among the areas receiving its exports, the rest 
of the region has been in first place in respect of value. Thus, the sharp decline in intra-regional trade had a particularly adverse effect on the 
country's economy. 
'In March 1982 the army deposed the régime in power, and in August 1983 there was another change of Head of State. 
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the new authorities for a gradual return to a constitutional régime was generally aggravated by the 
recessive economic climate described above and was all the more strongly felt owing to some 
perplexity concerning the management of the economic policy. All this undoubtedly contributed to 
the severe reduction (-18.6%) for the fourth year running in private capital formation and to the 
behaviour of private financial flows in the capital account of the balance of payments. 
In addition, public expenditure, far from offsetting the effect of the recessive factors on total 
demand, helped to strengthen them in that, as part of the policy adopted by the authorities in 1982 
within the context of an economic and financial adjustment programme, general government 
consumption expenditure fell by nearly 3% in real terms, while capital expenditure dropped by over 
15%, so that the total public expenditure coefficient fell from 139% in 1982 to 13.5% in 1983. 
Adverse factors of domestic origin accompanied and strengthened those of external origin and 
brought on a decrease in global demand and all its components. Private consumption decreased for 
Table 1 
GUATEMALA: MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS 
A. Basic economic indicators 
Gross domestic product at market prices 
(millions of dollars at 1970 prices) 
Population (millions of inhabitants) 
Per capita gross domestic product 
(dollars at 1970 prices) 
B. Short-run economic indicators 
Gross domestic product 
Per capita gross domestic product 
Gross income 
Terms of trade 
Current value of exports of goods 
and services 
Current value of imports of goods 
and services 
Consumer prices 
December - December 
Variation between annual averages 
Money 
Nominal salaries and wages 
Current income of government 
Total expenditure of government 
Fiscal deficit/total expenditure 
of government' 
C. External sector 
Trade balance (goods and services) 
Balance on current account 
Balance on capital account 
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the second consecutive year, undoubtedly influenced by rising unemployment and by the drop 
recorded in real wages: the fact that private per capita consumption was 11.6% lower than the figure 
recorded in 1980 speaks eloquently of the magnitude of the recession. What is of even greater concern 
on account of its consequences for the future, however, is the fact that public and private investment 
was one of those components of demand which contracted most, as a result of which the coefficient of 
domestic fixed capital formation fell from 13.3% in 1981 to 10.3% in 1983. 
On the supply side, all productive activities contracted, with the exception of a few services and 
the exploitation of mines, quarries and hydrocarbons, whose share in the product is still not very 
significant and which, in any case, only showed a slight increase of 2.0%, due to the steady expansion 
of the petroleum sector. Agriculture, manufacturing and, in particular, construction performed 
negatively, under the impact both of the contraction in demand and of special factors which are 
examined in greater detail below. The only activities which showed slow but steady growth were in 
the services sector —banking, insurance, ownership of dwellings, public administration (basically due 
to the increase in defence expenditure) and private services. In contrast, imports plunged by 21 % in 
real terms, as a result of which the import coefficient reached the lowest level recorded since 1950, 
which is probably below the minimum requirements for imported components for the effective 
development of the Guatemalan economy. 
In evaluating the response of the public sector to this accumulation of adverse circumstances, 
the recent tendencies in respect of the main imbalances facing the economy may be recalled. To begin 
with, at the onset of the recessive period under review, the Government acted rapidly to increase its 
expenditure (especially its capital expenditure), partly in order to counterbalance the drop in private 
investment. Thus, between 1978 and 1981 the ratio of total expenditure by the central government to 
the gross domestic product rose from 11.0% to 15.4%, while the tax coefficient, already hit by the 
incipient recession, fell from 10.3% to 7.9%. This naturally caused the fiscal deficit to rise, from 
negligible levels in 1978 to nearly 7% of the gross domestic product in 1981. These deficits were to a 
large extent financed by means of domestic indebtedness with the Central Bank, and this contributed 
to a growing internal financial imbalance. 
In the second place, for reasons closely associated with the phenomenon described above on 
account of the impact of public expenditure at the import level and the increasingly unfavourable 
behaviour of international demand, the country came up against a growing external imbalance. Thus, 
the current account deficit of the balance of payments rose from moderate levels in 1979-1980 
(US$ 200 million or less than 3% of the gross domestic product) to nearly US$ 570 million (6.4% of 
the product) in 1981. Moreover, as from 1981 the international reserves were exhausted, marking the 
onset of a period in which foreign exchange was increasingly hard to come by, this being reflected, 
inter alia, in quantitative import restrictions, the emergence of an incipient "parallel market" in 
foreign exchange and a backlog of foreign currency applications awaiting authorization on the part of 
the monetary authorities, for an amount which reached close to US$ 400 million by the end of 1982. 
For the purpose of addressing both these imbalances (internal and external), the authorities 
already adopted in 1982 an adjustment programme supported by the International Monetary Fund 
under its Compensatory Financing Facility, while a stand-by loan agreement had been approved in 
October 1981. It is true that the critical trends of both imbalances were reversed in 1982 (the central 
government deficit fell from 6.9% to 4.7% of the gross domestic product betweem 1981 and 1982, 
while the deficit on the current account of the balance of payments dropped from US$ 570 million to 
less than US$ 380 million during the same period). Nevertheless, the two imbalances have persisted 
and could be reversed only temporarily at the cost of the sacrifices described above in terms of 
economic activity and the well-being of the people. 
In 1983 the authorities placed emphasis on the continuation of the adjustment programme, 
along with certain supplementary measures designed to prevent further deterioration in production 
activities or even to revive them. Among the decisions adopted with respect to the adjustment 
programme and the solution of the problems which remained from previous years, brief mention 
may be made of the following: i) an attempt was made to relieve the fiscal deficit by applying a tax 
reform while at the same time effecting a marked contraction in public expenditure; ii) the Central 
Bank issued stabilization bonds for the purpose of absorbing the excess liquidity in the intermediation 
system and establishing a definitive register of liabilities which had come to term and on which 
payment was pending with the exterior; iii) a new letter of intent was signed with the International 
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Monetary Fund, providing for a more rigorous adjustment programme, and iv) the parallel exchange 
market was virtually institutionalized. 
As regards tax reform, during the first half of 1983 there was an intense debate between 
government authorities and various private sector producers' associations concerning the timeliness 
and content of the reform. Towards the middle of the year, with the agreement of some sectors and 
the opposition of others, the Government announced the application as of 1 August of a new 10% 
value added tax (in replacement of the stamp tax on transactions) and of a series of small individual 
taxes. In addition, changes in income tax went into effect, and the taxes on exports of the main 
commodities were reduced gradually and progressively. Finally, a change was made in the tax base of 
certain consumer taxes, including those on tobacco and alcoholic beverages. It was estimated that, 
with these changes, the overall reform would yield almost an extra 60 million quetzales in 1983 (a 
little over 0.5 % of the gross domestic product) and an extra 200 million quetzales in 1984 (2 % of the 
gross domestic product) and that, in addition, the gradual reduction of taxes on export commodities 
would provide a stimulus for economic reactivation. 
However, the date on which the new tax law went into effect coincided with the change of 
government, which occurred early in August, and this caused the debate on the merits and drawbacks 
of the reform to be reopened. The controversy finally ended late in September when the authorities 
decided to reduce the rate of the value-added tax from 10% to 7% and to expand the list of 
exemptions significantly. The cumulative effect of the late application of the original initiative, the 
final reduction of the rate and, in particular, the exemptions granted from the new tax (which caused 
serious difficulties in its collection and administration), as well as of the tax reductions described 
earlier, meant that far from generating additional income the tax reform had a negative net effect on 
global tax receipts. Thus, instead of the 770 million quetzales envisaged in the 1983 budget even prior 
to the application of the tax reform, the real amount collected was 730 million quetzales, which was 
only about the same as the preceding year. The taxation coefficient came to only 6.5 %, compared with 
7.1% in 1982 and 10.3% in 1978. In brief, although the overall financial situation of the central 
government did not deteriorate (the deficit fell from 4.7% of the gross domestic product in 1982 to 
3.1 %) , this was due solely to the sharp contraction in expenditure, which contributed to the recessive 
tendencies of the economy and helped to jeopardize the Government's capacity to provide the 
population with a minimum of basic services while at the same time maintaining a reasonable 
programme for expanding the physical, energy and social infrastructure of the country. 
The second important economic policy measure adopted during the year was the decision taken 
by the monetary authorities to issue stabilization bonds in an amount of 400 million quetzales for the 
purpose of absorbing the excess liquidity generated by the economy (basically as a result of the local-
currency counterpart of arrears of payments owed to the exterior) and obtaining a definitive record of 
the amount of the liabilities. By the end of the year, nearly 300 million quetzales of bonds had been 
sold, of which nearly 30 million were purchased by creditors in the exterior. These instruments 
fulfilled their dual role of establishing a definitive record of liabilities in foreign currency and 
absorbing excess liquidity; the total deposits in the intermediation system at the end of December was 
a mere 2.2% higher than the amount recorded in the same period the preceding year. 
The third important economic policy decision related to the signing, in September, of a new 
letter of intent with the International Monetary Fund to make use of the second stand-by credit 
tranche.4 This letter, whose contents are described below, committed the authorities to the 
application of a new adjustment programme with a view to the stabilization of the balance-of-
payments position and the reduction of the global deficit of the non-financial public sector. By the end 
of the year the quantitative targets set in this letter had been met, and the country had used close to 
US$ 27 million of the stand-by credit, which was scheduled to total approximately US$ 125 million 
by the end of 1984. Because of the changes subsequently made in one of the main pillars of the 
adjustment programme (the tax reform), however, it was already foreseeable that the country would 
not be in a position to meet the quantitative targets of the programme in the immediate future unless 
new changes were introduced either in public expenditure or in the volume of income. This posed 
new dilemmas with regard to the management of economic policy in the short term. 
Finally, 1983 saw the consolidation and institutionalization of a phenomenon which was 
relatively new in Guatemala —a "parallel market" in foreign exchange which was tolerated and to 
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some extent even encouraged by the authorities.5 In effect, this meant that the exchange policy 
operated in a market with two exchange rates— the official rate, which preserved the traditional 
parity of the quetzal with the United States dollar, and the non-official rate, which varied on the basis 
of supply and demand, with no intervention by the Central Bank, and which fluctuated during the year 
between 1.25 and 1.50 quetzales per dollar. Although no information is available concerning the 
magnitude of the transactions made on this "parallel market", a very rough estimate suggests that 
between a quarter and a third of all imports were financed through it.6 Thus, contrary to what 
happened in 1982, businesses did not suffer an absolute shortage of foreign currency but were rather 
forced to have recourse to this non-official instrument to obtain it, and costs were affected 
accordingly. In other words, the consolidation and virtual institutionalization of the "parallel market" 
resulted in a certain amount of flexibility for transactions in foreign currrency but raised the average 
price of imports in local currency terms, especially in the case of those not regarded as essential. 
This, in turn, partially explains the acceleration of inflationary pressures (the annual average 
variation in consumer prices was 4.3% in 1983 compared with a rate of 0.2% in 1982). It should be 
noted that these pressures were more intense in the second half of the year than in the first, which 
suggests that the new value-added tax —firtst the mere expectation that it would be applied and then 
its gradual application— helped to speed this process up. This phenomenon in turn contributed to 
the abrupt drop in the level of real wages (-6.4%), shown by the records of the Guatemalan Social 
Security Institute. 
The monetary authorities also maintained a system of exchange controls, supplemented by 
import quotas applied on the basis of criteria of need. In addition, towards the end of the year a 
measure requiring advance registration and licenses both for imports from the rest of Central 
America and for exports within the area came into force, and it became obligatory for the latter to be 
paid for in a period of 45 days from the date of issue of the export license. This provision, which 
contravenes, at least in part, the integration commitments of the Central American Common Market, 
was adopted, according to the official announcement, for the purpose of guaranteeing that payments 
for those exports actually entered the country and furthering reciprocal trade, in view of the 
restrictions which had been placed on Guatemalan exports in other Central American countries. 
Seemingly, however, the measures described did not accomplish their purposes; rather they evoked 
reprisals on the part of most of the neighbouring countries which rapidly resulted in the virtual 
paralysis of intra-regional trade: a situation which had still not been overcome at the year-end. Thus, 
the Guatemalan export sector, and in particular its manufactures branch, suffered an additional 
setback. 
Among the measures adopted by the Government to prevent greater deterioration of the 
production sector, mention should be made of the proclamation of a new Hydrocarbons Law 
(September 1983), one of whose aims was to promote the prospection and exploitation of 
hydrocarbons by offering greater incentives for this activity than the former laws. Similarly, a series 
of measures was adopted to promote traditional and non-traditional exports, partly in order to take 
advantage of the potential offered by the "Caribbean Basin Initiative" fostered by the United States 
Government. These measures included the elimination of the traditional export taxes and, from 
September on, the selective extension of Tax Credit Certificates for non-traditional exports.7 Finally, 
although the policy as regards credit for the private sector was not particularly expansionist (in 
keeping with the adjustment programme which had been adopted), some activities such as the 
construction of low-cost housing received special incentives from the Central Bank. In addition, the 
authorities kept in effect the machinery established towards the end of 1982 to facilitate the 
4The first stand-by credit agreement expired in October 1982. 
5 Although the Monetary Law did envisage the possibility of establishing multiple rates of exchange, the legislation in force strictly 
speaking provides for only one single, official rate of exchange. During the year, however, the finance authorities announced an agreement 
which, for tax purposes and within certain limits laid down in it, permits the costs of enterprises to include the higher exchange rate paid in the 
parallel market. 
6On the other hand, a much lower percentage of the value of exports was changed on that market because of the export registers kept by 
the Bank of Guatemala under the exchange control regulations, although there might have been some under-invoicing, part of the proceeds of 
which must have been changed on the "parallel market" (the remainder would have had to be registered as "errors and omissions"). Seemingly, 
the main source of foreign currency on that market was family remittances, income from tourism and some capital inflows, including the 
repatriation of resources which Guatemalans had been keeping abroad. 
7On the other hand, in October the Government took the unexpected decision to close down the National Exports Centre 
(GUATEXPRO) and incorporate some of its functions in the Ministry of the Economy, seemingly for budgetary reasons. 
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refinancing of the overdue debt portfolio of the agricultural sector, so as to bring repayment periods, 
amortization programmes and guarantees in line with the debtors' capacity to pay. 
In brief, during 1983 the recessive tendencies of the preceding biennium continued and to some 
extent grew worse. The action taken by the public sector to mitigate their effects did not always prove 
efficacious, and in some respects, such as in the matter of containing expenditure, it even helped to 
aggravate the problems. Moreover, the adverse trends shown by the Guatemalan economy for a 
number of years will probably have lasting consequences. The level of well-being of the population 
has deteriorated seriously, the coefficient of savings and investment has declined notably from its 
historic levels, and there has been a change in the relative share of both exports and imports in the 
gross domestic product. In addition, just when more decisive action on the part of the public sector 
was needed to relieve the economic crisis, the State's role in the economy as a whole has been reduced. 
Apart from the many consequences already referred to, this suggests that the structure of distribution 
has become even less equitable, since public expenditure has traditionally been the most effective 
instrument for meeting the basic needs of majority groups. The rising level of unemployment and the 
lag in real wages has strengthened that tendency. In sum, Guatemala, like the other small agro-
exporting economies of the region, was severely affected during 1983 by the combination of factors 
referred to herein. 
As a result of all this, the last quarter of the year saw the return of one of the phenomena which 
has had the most adverse effects on the economy in recent years; i.e., the continued deterioration in 
the purchasing power of exports. The rise in the prices of some of the main export items, together 
with the slackening of the inflationary pressures in the industrialized countries, suggests that during 
1984 Guatemala may experience an improvement in its terms of trade for the first time since 1977, 
thereby benefitting from the incipient recovery of the developed economies. The country's capacity to 
take advantage of the potential offered by this recovery will depend inter alia, on the rearrangement 
of public sector finances and the restoration of a minimum of confidence in order to promote the 
reactivation of private investment, as well as on the ability of the Central American countries as a 
whole to surmount the severe problems they face and give renewed impetus to the integration 
process. 
2. Trends in economic activity 
a) Total supply and demand 
As already noted, in 1983 the gross domestic product fell by 2% in real terms, which meant a 
drop of close to 5 % in the per capita gross domestic product and a 4.5 % decline in gross per capita 
income (see table 1). 
All the components of demand decreased, but the most meaningful ones —and those which 
undoubtedly had a decisive effect on the highly adverse behaviour of the economy— were exports and 
gross fixed capital format ioa With regard to the former, the volume of exports of goods and services 
decreased for the third consecutive year, this time by over 12%. This was due both to restrictions in 
external demand and to certain phenomena affecting exportable production. It must be borne in mind 
that the behaviour of theGuatemalan economy is very sensitive to variations in the traditional export 
sector, so that it is not surprising that the systematic drop in the volume of exports (external sales in 
1983 barely amounted to 75% of those recorded in 1980) has had an adverse effect on the other 
supply and demand variables. 
With regard to capital formation, both public and private investment decreased dramatically. 
The investment coefficient fell from 14% in 1981 to 11.2% in 1983; public investment contracted for 
the second year running, owing, in particular, to the financial restrictions which the central 
government has been encountering. Private investment fell for the fifth consecutive year due to the 
general climate of uncertainty prevailing in the country for both economic and non-economic 
reasons. 
The austerity of fiscal policy also explains the drop in general government consumption 
(-2.8%), which seems to have been reflected in a severe reduction in purchases of goods and a slight 
increase in the contracting of services. As for the drop of over 2% in private consumption (for the 
second consecutive year), it was a consequence of the downward trends in employment and real wages 
and of the general restrictions on demand associated with the economic depression (see table 2). 
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On the supply side, imports of goods and services plummeted in the past two years —by 25 % in 
1982 and by 21 % in 1983. This brought the import coefficient down to its lowest level since the war, 
which suggests, among other things, that the economy has reached, or even passed, the minimum 
level of imports needed by the production apparatus in order to operate effectively.8 The drop in 
imports was due not only to the widespread contraction of demand but also to the rise in the cost of 
external purchases owing to the emergence of the "parallel market" mentioned above and the 
establishment of quantitative controls which made import procedures relatively complicated. 
b) Evolution of tbe main sectors 
Domestic supply, by branches of activity, evolved in accordance with the global picture 
described above, except in the case of mining, whose share in the total product is not very significant. 
Thus, the production of goods declined, and the supply of services contracted or grew only modestly 
(see table 3) 
i) Agriculture. The restrictions on external demand affected the supply of agricultural products 
primarily in terms of the low prices of the majority of export commodities on the international 
market, especially during the first few months of the year. This helped to discourage the production of 
coffee and cotton, the two main export items. In the case of the former, the propensity of coffee 
growers to cut expenditure on such items as fertilizers and the upkeep of coffee plantations 
contributed to a cyclical drop in the yield from the plantations, whose volume of production shrank by 
close to 11 % compared with the previous year's harvest. This phenomenon was accentuated by the 
continued spread of rust, a disease which diminishes yields and raises the cost of cultivation 
significantly, and which was particularly harmful to small producers who use outdated techniques. In 
the case of cotton, the low prices expected caused the area sown during the 1983/1984 season to fall to 
some 60 000 hectares, compared with the more than 100 000 hectares which are traditionally 
Table 2 
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Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
"Preliminary figures. The percentage breakdown and the growth rates are based on real, not rounded, figures. 
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Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
"Preliminary figures. As the individual activities and the totals were calculated independently, the sum of the former does not 
correspond exactly with the latter. ' Includes financial institutions, insurance and real estate, except for ownership of dwellings. 
harvested. Nevertheless, yields surpassed those of the preceding year owing to favourable climatic 
conditions and to the fact that towards the end of the year international prices began to rise, so that 
this activity may be reactivated in the next season. All in all, cotton production in 1983 was some 35 % 
lower than in 1982 (see table 4). 
Although climatic factors were in general favourable for crop raising, in March a phenomenon 
consisting of strong wind streams occurred and caused serious destruction to banana plantations and, 
to a lesser extent, to coffee growing. This phenomenon was the main reason for the sudden 35 % drop 
in the production of bananas and was a contributing factor in the drop in the production of coffee 
mentioned above. On the other hand, the production of basic grains remained close to the high levels 
achieved in the preceding season, even though the area sown with maize, beans and rice was reduced. 
As a result, near self-sufficiency was achieved with regard to basic grains (with the exception of 
wheat), and in the case of rice there was even a small surplus. The wheat harvest, which supplies 
approximately 15% of demand, was similar to that obtained the preceding year, while the sorghum 
harvest was nearly 30% higher owing to the expansion of the surface under cultivation and to 
improved yields. 
The cultivation of sugar cane also benefited from the favourable climatic conditions and was not 
so adversely affected by the low prices which prevailed during most of the year in the international 
sugar market, since the domestic price is set so as to compensate for declines in international prices, in 
order to guarantee producers an acceptable level of profits.9 Furthermore, Guatemala obtained a 
slight increase in its quota for sales to the United States market at preferential prices. Because of these 
incentives and perhaps also because of the expected rise in international prices, although in the end 
this did not occur, the production of cane increased by nearly 60%, basically due to an expansion in the 
area planted. 
'The main factor behind the government's economic policy on sugar was a heated debate between cane producers and sugar processers 
concerning the prices set by the Ministry of the Economy per ton of cane. That problem was not settled to theentiresatisfactionof either party. 
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The relatively unfavourable performance of the main export commodities, with the exception, 
of sugar cane, offset the satisfactory evolution of the production of crops for domestic consumption, 
so that the product of the crop-raising sector as a whole fell by 3.0%. The aforementioned climate of 
uncertainty which prevailed in the country had its impact on agricultural activities, especially on 
account of the violence often experienced in certain rural areas. Some agricultural entrepreneurs were 
also disturbed by the debate which occurred towards the middle of the year on an announced agrarian 
reform programme, although the authorities rapidly withdrew that initiative. 
Finally, the livestock sector showed slightly more dynamism than crop-raising. Cattle 
production, measured in terms of number of head, rose by slightly more than 4%, while milk 
production grew at a similar rate (see table 4). 
ii) Mining and hydrocarbons. Up to 1979 the extraction of nickel was the main mining activity 
of the country. However, this activity has been suspended since 1980 owing to the adverse 
international market conditions, and this situation persisted throughout 1983. Since the suspension, 
the production of the mining sector has been of very little significance in the gross domestic product, 
and the most important branch has been the still incipient but growing petroleum activity (see 
table 5). 
Petroleum production amounted to some 6 600 barrels a day on average, by comparison with 
5 600 in 1982. This figure is still far from covering the country's domestic needs, which are close to 
25 000 barrels a day, but at least it holds out some hope for the possibility of achieving self-sufficiency. 
With that goal in mind, a new petroleum law was promulgated in September, the central aim of 
which was to stimulate investment in the exploration and exploitation of hydrocarbons by providing 
more favourable conditions than in the past for enterprises engaged in that activity.10 At the same 
Table 4 
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Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
"Preliminary figures. On the basis of figures at 1958 prices. ' Thousands of quintals. 
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10 The initial reaction of the transnational petroleum corporations to this new legislation was, however, not entirely favourable, possibly 
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"Preliminary figures. 
time, the old decentralized unit concerned with mining and petroleum activities was upgraded with 
the establishment of the Ministry of Energy and Mines. Also during the year a law was passed on the 
promotion and development of small-scale mining, with the aim of reactivating the exploitation of 
abandoned mines and encouraging the opening of new mines operated by co-operatives or small 
entrepreneurs. 
iii) Manufacturing. The industrial sector was one of those most severely affected by the 
contraction of global demand and the decrease in exports to the rest of Central America. Although 
little quantitative information on specific branches of activity is available, the survey conducted in 
October by the Bank of Guatemala on activities in this sector showed that in the case of over half of 
those interviewed, the volume of production during the first half of the year was less than in the same 
period in 1982, while it had increased in the case of only 14% of them (see table 6). This was true of 
nearly all branches of industrial activity; indeed, in some cases (textiles, wearing apparel, wood and 
furniture) close to two-thirds of the replies indicated that production had fallen. Other indicators 
confirmed this trend. For example, the volume of sales of electric power to industrial clients in 1983 
dropped by 3.8% on average. For a few lines of production, tax revenue figures were available which 
make it possible to conclude, for example, that the volume of production of cigarettes stagnated while 
that of beer fell by 14% and that of soft drinks by 8.2 %. The volume of exports of manufactures to the 
rest of Central America fell by over 10.0%. In these circumstances, according to estimates by the Bank 
of Guatemala, the value added for the sector fell by 2.1% (see table 7). 
Among the main economic policy measures adopted by the Government to bring this situation 
under control, or at least to prevent further deterioration, were the contracting of a loan for US$ 60 
million from the Inter-American Development Bank to support industrial reactivation, the 
extension for one year of the fiscal incentives granted under the Central American Agreement on 
Industrial Development Incentives (by mutual agreement with the other Central American Common 
Market Countries), and the granting of additional incentives for the exportation of non-traditional 
products to the rest of the world. Towards the end of 1983, however, some industrial entrepreneurs 
expressed disagreement with the reclassification procedure established by the national authorities for 
extending fiscal incentives, as well as with the aforementioned measures adopted by Guatemala 
which had caused an interruption in intra-regional trade. 
Directors of the leading association of industrialists estimate that industry as a whole operated 
at only 60% of capacity. In such circumstances, it is understandable that investment in new plants or 
in the expansion of existing plants has been very low. The main project under execution during the 
year was a wood pulp plant initiated years ago with the support of the National Finance Corporation 
(CORFINA), aided by Spanish capital. This project was 90% complete at the end of the year. 
iv) Construction. For the second consecutive year the Government continued to stimulate the 
construction of dwellings by extending lines of credit on preferential terms. The home building 
permits granted in Guatemala City between January and October increased by 2.1 % in terms of area 






GUATEMALA: RESULTS OF THE SURVEY OF ENTREPRENEURS CONCERNING 
INDUSTRIAL ACTIVITY DURING THE FIRST HALF OF 1983 
(Percentages) 
Volume of production 
Branch of activity 




Wages Level of employment 
In- c De- In- _ De-, same • . same , creased creased creased creased 
In- c De- In- . De- 50 . same • , same . -creased creased creased creased < 
Use of installed capacity 
51- 61- 71- 81- 91-
60 70 80 90 100 
Manufacturing 
Food industry 
Beberages and tobacco 
Textiles 
Wearing apparel and 
leather goods industry 
Wood and furniture 
industry 
Paper, printing and 
publications industry 








Manufacture of metal 
products 
Other industries 
14.0 34.3 51.7 16.9 35.1 48.0 26.5 72.6 
17.1 32.9 50.0 11.8 42.1 46.1 27.3 72.7 
48.3 51.7 17.2 27.6 55.2 41.4 58.6 
6.1 28.6 65.3 6.1 49.0 44.9 14.3 85.7 
7.7 31.9 60.4 13.2 29.7 57.1 7.7 89.0 
7.0 29.8 63.2 13.6 20.3 66.1 15.8 82.5 
19.6 15.7 64.7 17.7 29-4 52.9 11.8 88.2 
23.9 21.7 54.4 19.6 26.1 54.3 39.1 60.9 
16.7 41.7 41.6 21.7 31.7 46.6 26.7 70.0 
19.1 33.3 47.6 31.0 31-0 38.0 21.4 76.2 
46.2 53.8 - 46.2 53.8 30.8 69.2 
25.8 24.2 50.0 25.8 32.3 41.9 25.4 74.6 
14.3 14.3 71.4 14.3 21.4 64.3 14.3 71.4 14.3 
0.9 4.7 63.8 31.5 31.3 
3.9 75.3 20.8 28.6 
69.0 31.0 41.4 
42.9 57.1 38.8 
3.3 7.7 63.7 28.6 25.3 
1.7 8.8 35.1 56.1 52.6 
5.9 54.9 39.2 23.5 
6.5 60.9 32.6 26.1 
3.3 - 68.3 31.7 15.0 
2.4 16.7 47.6 35.7 40.5 
69.2 30.8 38.5 
16.1 46.8 37.1 43.5 
64.3 35.7 42.9 
19.7 23.6 15.6 6.7 3.1 
19.4 23.4 19.5 5.2 3.9 
3.5 31.0 6.9 17.2 
24.5 10.2 8.2 12.2 6.1 
23.0 29.7 13.2 7.7 1.1 
26.3 8.8 3.5 3.5 5.3 
19.6 25.5 17.6 7.9 5.9 
21.7 34.8 17.4 
23.3 33.3 26.7 - 1.7 
40.5 14.2 4.8 
38.5 23.0 
9.7 8.1 19.3 11.3 8.1 
28.6 - - 14.3 14.2 
Source: Bank of Guatemala. 
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Table 7 
GUATEMALA: INDICATORS OF MANUFACTURING PRODUCTION 
Index of manufacturing 






Other indicators of 
manufacturing production 


































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of officia! figures. 
"Preliminary figures. The growth rates correspond to real, not rounded, figures. 
year. Towards the end of the year, however, the firms responsible for these programmes were 
complaining that the market was to some extent saturated and had plans for reducing the scale of 
their activities. At all events, the slight increase shown in the building of certain kinds of dwellings 
was not enough to counterbalance the severe depression in the construction branch caused by the 
dramatic drop in public investment and the virtual absence of new commercial and industrial 
buildings in Guatemala City. An indicator of this state of affairs, which also had adverse repercussions 
on the industrial sector, was that the consumption of cement during the first nine months of the year 
was 17.1% lower than during the same period in 1982, which was also a year of recession for the 
construction sector (see table 8). 
v) Other sectors. Curiously enough, most services expanded, albeit slowly, in contrast to the 
negative rates in the production of goods. Thus, the tertiary sector seems to have been the only one 
which managed to provide new employment, although only to a modest extent. Only commerce and 
transport showed decreases, in line with the trends in both foreign trade and the supply of goods and 
services. Similarly, the value added by the electricity, gas, water and sanitary services sector fell by 
nearly 1% (see table 3). 
c) Employment and unemployment 
Two estimates were available on the evolution of employment. The first, prepared by the Office 
of the Secretary-General of the National Economic Planning Council, indicates that open 
unemployment for the economically active population rose from 5.2 % at the end of 1982 to 8% at the 
end of 1983 and that equivalent unemployment rose from 33.2% to 33-7% (see table 9). The second 
estimate is taken from the records on workers registered in the Guatemalan Social Security Institute. 
According to that source, the number of jobs in enterprises which are members of the Institute fell by 
1.4% in 1983; the fall being particularly notable in agriculture (-7.4%) and the construction sector 
(-33.8%) (see table 10). The increase in the number of workers in the services sector (3.4% in 
commerce and 4.5% in other services) seems to support the aforementioned hypothesis of the 
National Economic Planning Council that underemployment rose even among workers who are 
members of the Social Security system. 
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3. The external sector 
For the third consecutive year, the country's external transactions on both current and capital account 
were seriously restricted, in particular with regard to import capacity. Both the value of exports of 
goods and services and the net mobilization of external capital went down markedly compared with 
the preceding year. Although the balance of external transactions showed an improvement (even the 
trade account closed with a surplus of US$ 11 million, compared with a deficit of US$ 84 million in 
1982, while the deficit on current account dropped from US$ 376 million to US$ 238 million), this 
was due to the virtual collapse in the value of imports, which was reflected domestically in the 
contraction of economic activity already examined in this Survey. 
Table 8 
GUATEMALA: CONSTRUCTION INDICATORS 
1980 1981 1982 1983° 
Growth rates 
1980 1981 1982 1983° 
Area of new buildings' 









194 -56.2 -33.8 25.8 2.1 
111 -44.0 -32.0 48.3 -14.2 
Cement production 
(1972 = 100) 228.4 227.2 178.5 148.0 4.8 -0.5 -21.4 -17.1 
Employment' 
(number of persons) 27 738 23 440 26 894 17 817 -34.4 -15.5 -14.7 -33.8 
Source: ECXAC, on the basis of official figures. 
"January-October, Refers to building permits granted in the capital. Does not include reconstruction programmes. 
'Social security contributors. 
Table 9 
GUATEMALA: ESTIMATED LEVEL OF LABOUR FORCE UTILIZATION 
1980 1981 1982 1983° 
Economically active population 
Employment 




Economically active population 
Employment 




Source: ECLAC, on the basis of calculations by the Population and Employment Department of the Secretariat of the National Economic 
Planning Board. 
"Preliminary figures. Three premises were employed in calculating the use of labour for 1983: I ) that the gross geographic product 
shows negative growth of 2.39? ; 2) that the new economically active population is in a situation of open unemployment and 3) that the average 
producriviry of the economic sectots is the same as the preceding year. 
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Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
"Number of persons affiliated with the Guatemalan Social Security Institute. 
'Includes public administration. 
Preliminary figures. 
Furthermore, 1983 witnessed the expansion and consolidation of the parallel foreign exchange 
market which had appeared some years earlier, with the result that some balance of payments items 
(income from tourism, family remittances) virtually disappeared. One of the effects of this was to 
raise doubts concerning the reliability of the data published on the external sector and the country's 
trade relations with the rest of the world. 
The net overall result of the international transactions conducted in 1983 was a positive 
evolution of US$ 89 million in the gross monetary reserves, but this was not enough to make up, even 
to a minimal extent, for the losses sustained in previous years, and at the end of the year the net 
international monetary reserves still showed a negative balance. 
a) Merchandise trade 
The value of exports of goods fell by 9% compared with 1982. This drop was caused solely by a 
marked contraction in volume, since on average unit prices increased by 2.4% over the preceding year 
(see table 11). 
The only two export items which showed any dynamism were sugar and, to a lesser extent, 
petroleum, in keeping with the increase in the supply of these two commodities. The drop in volume 
and value of coffee exports was greater than the contraction in coffee production because in 1982 it 
had been possible to export a large amount of surplus coffee which had accumulated in previous years 
to the so-called "new markets" outside the quota allocated under the International Coffee 
Agreement.11 The decline in the volume of external sales of coffee was only partially offset by a 
moderate rise in unit prices. A similar situation occurred in the case of cotton exports, where an 
increase in unit prices partly compensated for a fall of nearly 25% in volume. The pattern in respect 
of meat exports was different: the volume of external sales rose, but that rise was offset by a drop in 
1 ' See the Economic Survey of Latin America and the Caribbean, 1982, chapter onGuatemala, op.cit. During 1982, total exports of coffee 
beans amounted to 3.3 million quintals, of which slightly over 1 million quintals was sold outside the quota system. In 1983, total exports 
amounted to less than 2.6 million quintals, but only 150 G00 quintals were marketed outside the quota system. 
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unit prices. Finally, among the other traditional export commodities, the volume of bananas shipped 
to the exterior declined significantly owing to the smaller amount produced, as mentioned above, 
while unit prices stayed at the level reached the preceding year (see table 12). 
The value of export to the rest of Central America also decreased, but at a lower rate than the 
value of exports as a whole. This meant that sales to the rest of the Central American Common 
Market were responsible for nearly 30% of the total value of foreign sales, compared with 28.8% in 
1982. Moreover, the country continued to maintain a marked surplus position in intra-regional trade; 
although its imports from the rest of Central America increased from US$ 215 million to US$ 230 
million, so that in the past biennium the positive balance has gone down from US$ 122 million to 
US$ 92 million. 
In 1983 the volume of imports of goods fell by 19% and their value by 16%. This reflected the 
global contraction of the economy as well as the additional constraints represented by the application 
of exchange controls, the quota system and the rise in the price of some imports financed with foreign 
exchange acquired in the parallel market. The unit value of external purchases increased slightly 
faster than that of exports, with the result that the terms of trade again showed a deterioration (see 
table 11). 
The drop in imports affected all kinds of goods, but it was particularly notable in the case of 
external purchases of building materials (-17%) and of machinery, equipment and tools (-51%), 
which are the very items associated with capital formation (see table 13). There were also indications 
of a marked decline in the value of fuel imports.12 
b) The services trade and factor payments 
Exports of services declined even faster than external sales of goods, although it may be held 
that this was due to the fact that some of the main items, such as tourism, were channelled towards the 
parallel foreign exchange market. The balance of payments showed only US$ 7 million of income 
from tourism and travel (compared with US$ 12 million in 1982 and close to US$ 80 million in 
Table 11 
GUATEMALA: MAIN FOREIGN TRADE INDICATORS 








Terms of trade (goods) 
Terms of trade (goods) 
Purchasing power of exports 
of goods 
Purchasing power of exports 






































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
"Preliminary figures. 
12 This reflects not only the contraction in total energy demand but also the relative drop in the degree of dependence on energy imports 
due to the increase in the production of petroleum and, in particular, the entry intooperationof the new hydroelectric plant at Aguacapaandthe 
decline in the demand for electric power. In addition, for a short period of a few weeks beginning in October, the new 300 MW Chixoy 
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Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
"Preliminary figures. ''The percentage breakdown and growth rates are based on real, not rounded, figures. 
previous years). This income seems to be very much underestimated in view of the number of foreign 
travellers entering the country (which increased by 4.8% up to October, compared with the same 
period of the preceding year) and the figures for rooms occupied in the main hotels (which, although 
very low, by no means confirmed a foreign exchange income as small as this). The same trend towards 
underestimation can undoubtedly be observed in other items of the services account, particularly in 
the case of transfers, since one of the main sources of the foreign exchange available on the parallel 
market is family remittances, which are openly exchanged in a number of centres, including the main 
post office. 
In imports of services, factor payments are still the most important variable. The flight of 
foreign currency in this connection was somewhat less marked than in 1982, not only because of the 
slight decrease in nominal interest rates on international financial markets, but also because some of 
the short-term debt in respect of which these payments were made was amortized the preceding year. 
Furthermore, the external debt of Guatemala is still relatively low, at least by comparison with that of 
the other Central American countries, and is favourably structured in terms of periods of maturities 
and average interest rates. 
In brief, the balance on the services account continued to be highly negative and constituted the 
sole source of the balance-of-payments current account deficit, since both merchandise trade and 
transfers were in surplus (see table 14). 
c) The current account position and its financing 
As a result of the trends described above, the deficit on current account fell from some US$ 376 
million in 1982 to US$ 238 million in 1983- As indicated above, this decrease was achieved basically 
through the severe contraction of imports. 
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The deficit was financed through net inflows of capital, largely derived from public sources, in 
an amount which even made it possible to raise the level of the gross monetary reserves by US$ 89 
million. This was achieved basically through a significant increase in the lines of credit contracted by 
the Bank of Guatemala (US$ 157 million by comparison with US$ 31 million in 1982) and through 
the incipient use (US$ 27 million) of the second tranche of stand-by credit obtained from the IMF, 
since both the amount of official loans disbursed and the private capital contracted decreased. At the 
same time, direct foreign investment (in recent years largely oriented towards the petroleum sector) 
dropped from US$ 77 million in 1982 to US$ 45 million in 1983. In these circumstances, the net 
inflow of capital fell from US$ 338 million to US$ 327 million, reflecting the austerity prevailing in 
international financial markets and the persistent difficulty experienced by the country in mobilizing 
more external resources. 
d) External indebtedness 
In 1983 the finance authorities continued their efforts to obtain external financing to support 
both the public investment programmes and the balance of payments. As part of this effort, the 
Government contracted 11 new loans with bilateral and multilateral finance institutions, totalling 
US$ 190 million,13 and the Central Bank acquired nearly US$ 90 million in new credit lines, including 
some renegotiations, in addition to the aforementioned disbursement of the second tranche of stand-
by credit granted by IMF. The coefficient of disbursement of new credit contracted by the public sector 
was relatively low, while the external public debt increased by slightly more than US$ 200 million in 
the past year. 
As may be seen, by comparison with the other countries of the region the external public debt is 
still relatively moderate in size (19% of the gross domestic product), and its servicing absorbs a 
reasonable, although in recent years rapidly rising, percentage of the foreign currency generated by 
exports of goods and services (see table 15). This is due to the prudent policy followed by successive 
Table 13 
























































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
"Preliminary figures. The percentage breakdown and growth rates are based on real, not rounded, figures, 
, JThe sources of financing were as follows: four loans from the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) for US$ 123 million; four 
loans from the Agency for International Development (AID) for US$ 22.5 million; one credit from the World Bank for US$ 18.5 million and two 
from other official sources for US$ 26 million. 
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Table 14 
GUATEMALA: BALANCE OF PAYMENTS 
(Millions of dollars) 
GUATEMALA 
Balance on current account 
Trade balance 
Exports of goods and services 
Goods FOB 
Real services 
Transport and insurance 
Travel 
Imports of goods and services 
Goods FOB 
Real services 







Unrequited private transfer payments 
Balance on capital account 
Unrequited official transfer payments 
Long-term capital 
Direct investment (net) 
Portfolio investment (net) 
Other long-term capital 
Official sector' 












Errors and omissions (net) 
Global balance 
Total variation in reserves 
(- sign indicates an increase) 
Monetary gold 
Special Drawing Rights 
IMF reserve position 
Foreign exchange assets 
Other assets 














































































































































































































































































































"Preliminary figures. ftReal services also include other official and private transactions, but not factor services. ' In addition to 
loans received and amortization payments made, this entry includes net loans granted and other assets and liabilities. The global 
balance is the sum of the current account balance plus the balance on capital account. The difference between total variation in reserves (of 
opposite sign) and the global balance represents counterpart items: monetization of gold, allocation of Special Drawing Rights, and variations 
due to revaluation. 
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governments (the period 1980-1982 may constitute somewhat of an exception to this rule) not only 
as regards the amounts contracted but also as far as the sources of this financing are concerned. Nearly 
all of the external debt of the public sector is obtained from official sources on highly concessionary 
terms. 
Even so, in view of the scarcity of foreign exchange which has been making itself felt, the 
authorities have been forced to apply for the restructuring of some of the debt with the exterior. Thus, 
the Bank of Guatemala renegotiated some of the credit lines contracted in previous years with 
commercial banks, and towards the end of the year the National Finance Corporation (CORFINA) was 
negotiating the restructuring of its financial commitments with official sources in Spain. 
4. Prices and wages 
During 1983, some acceleration was noted in inflationary pressures, although it is difficult to 
determine how much owing to methodological and conceptual problems relating to the preparation 
of the consumer price index, the scope of which is described below. Up to October 1983, the variation 
of this index compared with the same month the previous year was 8.1%, while the variation 
between annual averages over the period October-October was 4.3% (see table 16). 
The problems referred to were due basically to the fact that in April the statistical authorities 
decided to change the food basket made up of 145 articles, on which the consumer price index had 
been based since January 1975. That index was based on all those families whose annual income was 
between 1 560 and 6 000 quetzales. The new index, whose base is April 1983, uses a food basket made 
up of 212 articles and refers to three social strata. The two indexes also differ with regard to the 
regional distribution of the population covered by periodic surveys. Thus, although the two indexes 
have points in common —they both use the Laspeyres method of calculation— and many of the 
commodities in their baskets are the same, it is not feasible to carry out a rigorous technical 
comparison of them. In spite of the shift in methodology which occurred in April, the estimate given 
in the paragraph above was made on the basis of the criteria available. 
Table 15 
GUATEMALA: INDICATORS OF EXTERNAL ENDEBTEDNESS 
(Millions of dollars) 





Public and State-guaranteed 





Total external debt service, as 
a percentage of exports of goods 
and services 
Public external debt service, as 



































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures supplied by the Bank of Guatemala and the World Bank. 




GUATEMALA: EVOLUTION OF DOMESTIC PRICES 
Consumer price index 
Food 




Consumer price index 
Food 














































































Source: HCLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
"Variation October 1982 to October 1983. 'Variation between average for January-October 1982 and that for January-October 1983. 
Furthermore, the statistical authorities reported that owing to problems relating to the 
application of the methodology used up until April, the data relating to 1982 were not entirely 
reliable. Consequently, because the variations in the 1982 index were underestimated, the data for 
1983 might be overestimated if the two years are compared. This being the case, the variations 
registered in both the 1982 and the 1983 indexes should be viewed with a certain amount of caution. 
The April to October series does, however, appear to be reliable and correct from a methodological 
point of view. 
While the index for the former series remained virtually unchanged between January and April, 
from April to September an increase of 11.2% was shown. The items most responsible for the 
resumption of inflationary pressures include wearing apparel and footwear (23.9%) and food and 
beverages (12.6%), while other entries, such as household expenses, showed only a slight increase 
(2.5%). The price variation was slightly less than average in Guatemala City and above average in 
other places, especially in rural areas. 
In contrast with previous years, when part of the inflationary pressure was due to excess 
demand, as a result of a growing fiscal deficit together with restrictions on the capacity to import, the 
rise in the consumer price index in 1983 was basically due to cost inflation. There were two main 
causes for this: first, the higher cost of imports due to the fact that an increasing proportion of them 
was financed with foreign exchange acquired in the parallel market,14 and second, the price increases 
made by the commercial sector in response to the application of the new value-added tax, which even 
spread to articles not subject to that tax. In other words, at least during the first few months that this 
tax was enforced, its impact on the price structure was magnified, especially if we take into account 
that the legislation did not provide for credit in respect of the stamp tax already paid on merchandise 
which would be subject to the new value-added tax, so that for a short period of time some goods were 
subject to double consumer taxes (the old stamp tax and the new value-added tax). It should be noted 
that this phenomenon was by its very nature temporary; by October the index was already showing 
deceleration. Thus, the variation for October compared with the same month the preceding year was 
8.1%, in comparison with 11.2% for the September-September variation. 
l4During the last years of the past decade, the rise in the cost of imports due to the inflationary process recorded in the main countries 
supplying goods and services to Guatemala was an important factor in the local inflationary process. This kind of "imported inflation'' 
diminished considerably in 198} (the unit price of imports rose by less than }%), as a reflection of the decline of inflation in the international 
market and also of the revaluation of the dollar with respect to the majority of European currencies and the Japanese yen, which was partially 
responsible for a relative drop in the costs of goods and services frotri'chose countries in terms of the official Guatemalan exchange rate. 
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With regard to wages, the only indicator available was that relating to wages paid to workers 
who contribute to the Social Security System. According to those data, both the total payroll and 
average wages experienced a drop even in nominal terms. Consequently, real wages appear to have 
declined by 6.4% and the real purchasing power of total wages by nearly 8% (see table 17). These 
data must be viewed with a certain amount of caution, since they do not refer to all wage-earners, 
although the trend they indicate is at all events consistent with the global economic situation 
described in this report. On the other hand, the decline in average nominal wages was not felt in every 
sector; increases were in fact recorded for workers in the agricultural (11.0%) and industrial (9.0%) 
sectors, while the most significant drops occurred in the construction (-2.5%), the commercial 
(-1.6%) and especially the services (-19-6%) sectors. 
5. Fiscal and monetary policy 
a) Fiscal policy 
In recent years public finances have been one of the weakest elements in the Guatemalan 
economy, due to the exceptionally low incidence of taxation and the heavy demands on the public 
sector to raise its expenditure. As already noted, during the recent recessive period tax receipts tended 
to diminish, while at the same time the Government decided to tackle the contraction of economic 
activity with increased expenditure. This of course resulted in a growing fiscal deficit. 
During 1983 the Government attempted to meet this situation head on, first by promoting a tax 
reform and second by reducing expenditure. Details are given below of the rather erratic way in which 
this reform was applied and the consequences thereof, the result being a net loss of income during the 
last months of the year. This forced the financial authorities to go in for even greater expenditure 
than that originally provided for, especially in the area of public investment. 
Thus, as the year began the State's income and expenditure budget provided for revenue of 
nearly 770 million quetzales, in the face of operating costs of 796 million quetzales and capital 
expenditure of 518 million quetzales. The estimated income did not take account of the additional 
yield which a tax reform might bring. At the end of 1983, total revenue amounted to 729 million 
quetzales — 5 % less than the amount provided for in the budget— while operating and capital 
expenses amounted to 707 and 394 million quetzales, respectively (in all, nearly 20% less than the 
amount budgeted). 
Total income did not even manage to exceed the amount received the preceding fiscal year, 
while tax revenue actually fell from 626 to 599 million quetzales, so that the tax coefficient reached its 
lowest point in the past 30 years (6.5% compared with 10.3% only five years previously). This fall 
was partially atttributable to the tax reform mentioned above. The situation would have been more 
dramatic, had it not been for the fact that, because many tax payers decided to reschedule their tax 
periods in line with the new law, many income tax payments were received in December 1983 which, 
Table 17 





















































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 




GUATEMALA: CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INCOME AND EXPENDITURE 
(Millions of quetzales) 




On foreign trade 
2. Current expenditure 
3. Current saving ( 1 - 2 ) 
4. Capital expenditure 
Real investment 
Debt amortization payments 
Other capital expenditure 
5. Total expenditure (2 + 4) 
6. Fiscal deficit ( 1 - 5 ) 
7. Financing of deficit 
Domestic financing 
External financing 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official 
































































































































strictly speaking, pertained to the next fiscal year. This explains the relative dynamism of direct tax 
revenues, in contrast with the negative results from other taxes (see tables 18 and 19). 
As the financial authorities noted the unsatisfactory performance of receipts during the year, 
expenditure was increasingly curtailed, especially in the case of public investment. Thus, at the end of 
1983 the current expenditure of the central government was lower than that of the preceding year 
(707 and 710 million quetzales, respectively).15 The reduction in capital expenditure was even 
greater, since it dropped from 548 million quetzales in 1982 to 392 million in 1983. In brief, the fact 
that the fiscal deficit went down from 528 million quetzales in 1982 to 370 million in 1983 (3.8% and 
3.1 % of the gross domestic product, respectively) was due basically to the severe contraction in total 
expenditure. 
Undoubtedly the most important occurrence of the year in the fiscal domain related to the effort 
to restructure the tax system. In July, after an intense public debate, the Government agreed to 
introduce a reform which included a number of provisions. The main one envisaged the 
establishment of a 10% value-added tax as a substitute for the 3% cumulative stamp tax on 
transactions. It was felt that this new tax would provide more equitable treatment, would be more 
efficient for purposes of fiscal and administrative control and would yield additional revenues. Mass 
consumption items and medicines, agricultural inputs, exports and a few other activities regarded as 
basic were exempted from the new tax. As a second measure, the income tax law was changed, one 
rate being established for enterprises and another for individuals, in order to avoid double taxation 
and encourage the capitalization of enterprises (previously, both legal entities and natural persons 
were subject to a single progressive rate). Thus, a less progressive rate was established for enterprises 
than for persons; some financial institutions were even subject only to a proportional tax of 20%. A 
third provision of the reform was to convert the specific tax base of the duties on the consumption of 
15 It appears that at the close of the period there remained a very large floating debt which must be paid in the next fiscal year. 
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distilled alcoholic beverages, beer and other beverages to an ad valorem base so as to make them more 
sensitive to price variations. This also resulted in a slight increase in the levels of taxation. Finally, 
some minor increases were made in respect of existing surcharges, such as for example, the tax 
applied to travel abroad. The reform also contained a provision for selective taxes on the 
consumption of non-essential articles, but this provision was not put into effect owing to the 
opposition it generated among various producers' associations. 
The reform also provided for the elimination of some taxes. Not only was the stamp tax on the 
value of sales eliminated, but the application of the stamp tax on the value of imports and on contracts 
for credit extended by banks was also suppressed. In addition a large number of taxes which were of 
little importance in terms of their contribution to the total levy but which entailed high 
administrative costs were eliminated. In this connection, mention may be made of a tax on the 
production of salt, a number of permits to carry out activities in the country and various taxes on the 
provision of services or the sale of goods. But the most significant case of tax reduction was that which 
occurred with respect to the tax on the value of exports, the objective being to provide an incentive for 
external sales by reducing the duties applied to exports of coffee, cotton, bananas, sugar, meat and 
shrimps by 50% up to 30 June 1984 and by 75% between that date and 30June 1985, after which they 
were to be entirely eliminated. 
In brief, the reform was aimed at bringing in additional fiscal income in the amount of 60 
million quetzales during 1983 (slightly more than 0.5% of the gross domestic product) and some 200 
million quetzales more in 1984 (2% of the gross domestic product). It was also aimed at promoting 
non-traditional exports by gradually eliminating the taxes on them. It was thought that, taken 
together, the new provisions would probably make the tax system more regressive and give it less 
elasticity by eliminating or reducing some progressive taxes such as the income tax on enterprises and 
the export tax. On the other hand, it was felt that the reform would increase the State's capacity to 
administer and control taxes, through the management and control system inherent in the value-
added tax. There was, however, no opportunity to assess the exact consequences of the set of measures 
described, since in August, a few days after the value-added tax went into effect, there was a change of 
government and the whole debate on the tax reform was reopened.16 
Table 19 
GUATEMALA: CURRENT INCOME OF THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT 
























































Indirect 477 519 524 578 541 519 463 
Imports 97 106 115 110 103 76 66 
Exports 152 158 126 146 68 49 40 
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Source: Bank of Guatemala. 
"Preliminary figures. 
16 At the first press conference given by the new authorities, at which the reasons for the change which had occurred were explained, 
mention was made of the possibility of reviewing the recently adopted tax reform. 
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As long as the debate lasted, very few enterprises complied with the new provisions, and 
although some of them collected the tax, they did not declare it to the financial authorities. The debate 
ended towards the end of September, when the Government decided to reduce the rate of 10% to one 
of 7 % and to increase the number of tax exemptions significantly, thus weakening one of the primary 
motivations for the original law, which was to improve the administration and supervision of 
consumer and income taxes. In addition, since the three-taxes which have historically been the most 
elastic in terms of variations in income (sales taxes, export tax and the income tax on legal entities) 
were eliminated or reduced, it must be assumed that any reactivation of the economy in the future will 
not necessarily imply an increase in the amount collected in taxes. 
With regard to the budgetary reductions made in the course of the year, they affected virtually 
all activities, projects and programmes. The reduction in operating expenses was not always based on 
criteria of selectivity and had an adverse impact on the Government's capacity to supply basic health 
and education services. In the cuts made in the investment programme an attempt was made to 
safeguard priority projects and projects with external financing, but this was not always possible, and 
some works regarded as being of high priority had to be suspended or at the very least their execution 
had to be deferred. 
Finally, detailed figures were not available for the rest of the public sector, whose current 
income and operating expenditure represent close to 40% of total central government outlays. Some 
of the most important institutions in this category are the Guatemalan Social Security Institute, the 
National Electrification Institute, some municipalities and a number of enterprises which supply 
public services. 
b) Monetary policy 
The monetary picture in 1983 changed radically between the first and second parts of the year. 
Up to June, the banks in the system had surplus liquidity because there was a moderate increase in 
new deposits and a let-up in credit pressure due to the widespread economic recession which affected 
the private sector and to the increasingly severe restrictions on public expenditure. On 30June, for 
example, the means of payment available to the intermediation system had grown by 8.9% by 
comparison with the same date in 1982, while credit activity had increased by 11.6%. Towards the 
end of the year, in contrast, the system was in a position which was characterized rather by a lack of 
liquidity, due not so much to a slight reactivation in the demand for credit (total credit activity as of 31 
December was 14.8% higher than in the same period in 1982) as to the rapid absorption of deposits 
by the Bank of Guatemala through the issue of stabilization bonds. 
As in the previous three-year period, the net credit provided by banks to the public sector grew 
faster (17.4%) than that supplied to the private sector (13.0%), which meant that at the end of 1983 
more than 40% of the portfolio of the consolidated banking system was in the hands of the public 
sector (see table 20). This is a reflection of the central government's deficit position noted earlier, 
since although the deficit was smaller than in 1982 it was still high in nominal terms. It should be 
noted that all the net financing to the public sector came from the Central Bank and that the financing 
granted to the central government was higher than that directed to the sector as a whole since the rest 
of the sector was a net creditor of the bank. 
In addition to credit activity, another factor responsible for the monetary expansion was the 
growth of the net international reserves. Although the absolute figure continued to be highly 
negative (-US$ 255 million), it was more favourable by nearly US$ 100 million than that recorded at 
the end of 1982.17 
With regard to new deposits, the amount placed in current accounts grew by only 3.8%, while 
quasi-money expanded even more slowly (1.9%). This reflects both the sluggishness of the economy 
and the substantial transfer of resources to the Bank of Guatemala through the stabilization bonds 
issued from July on. Thus, at the end of the year, the figure for net assets in the Central Bank was 
markedly negative, which explains the spectacular growth of "other items", regarded as one of the 
factors of absorption (see table 20). 
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Source: ECLAC, on rhe basis of official figures. 
"Preliminary figures. The growrh rares are based on real, nor rounded, figures. 
During 1983 the authorities of the Bank of Guatemala followed the main policies decided upon 
in 1982. Compulsory bank reserves remained the same (35% for monetary deposits and 10% for 
savings deposits), with the result that, as the Central Bank froze some of the deposits of the 
intermediation system, the reserve coefficient fell from 21.3% at the end of 1982 to 17.8% at the end 
of 1983. The policy adopted in November 1982 in respect of interest rates under which the maximum 
rate of interest on loans was set at 12% and that on deposits at 9%, was also kept in force. The 
provisions relating to the minimum capital requirements and the open market transactions of the 
Bank of Guatemala also remained unchanged. 
The global monetary picture described above does not reflect the high incidence of overdue debt 
—a result of the financial difficulties facing many enterprises. This meant that a large proportion of 
the credits granted were for refinancing, and the Bank of Guatemala continued to support the banks 
of the system in their efforts to adapt their portfolios to the capacity of the debtors to pay. 
Apart from the issue of stabilization bonds referred to above, the main event in the field of 
monetary policy in 1983 was that in August a new letter of intent was signed with the International 
Monetary fund with a view to obtaining a stand-by credit (approved in September) for approximately 
US$ 125 million. In that letter, the Government undertook to adopt an adjustment programme 
whereby concrete measures would be taken in the fiscal area (reduction of the non-financial public 
sector deficit to 3.5 % of the gross domestic product in 1983 and to 3 % of the product in 1984); wages 
and domestic prices would continue to reflect basically the play of market forces; the monetary policy 
would be designed to bring about price stability and prevent a continued loss of international 
monetary reserves; a realistic policy on interest rates would be adopted, and more use would be made 
of external credit for financing productive investment projects and public sector projects. The 
programme also set some targets as regards reactivating the export sector, providing new 
encouragement for economic activity, and gradually liberalizing the recently adopted exchange policy. 
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1. Recent economic trends: Introduction and summary 
The recession which had been affecting the Haitian economy in 1981 and 1982 eased slightly during 
1983. The gross domestic product, which had fallen somewhat less than 3% in each of those years,1 
made a small recovery of scarcely over 1% in 1983; nevertheless, this amounted to another 
decrease (-1.2%) in the per capita product. Over the past three years, the per capita gross domestic 
product has fallen 11%. 
Gross national income declined more steeply in 1981 and 1982 and rose less in 1983 than the 
gross product did during those years. This was primarily due to a persistent deterioration in the terms 
of trade since 1978, with the sole exception of 1980 (see table 1 and figure 1). 
All economic activities, with the exception of mining (which is not a major industry) and 
government services, increased their product in real terms during 1983. In the vast majority of cases, 
the results were substantially better than in 1981 and 1982. The recovery made by construction and by 
transport services, storage and communications was particularly notable. The upswing in agricultural 
production —despite the smallness of the increase— was even more significant, however, in view of 
the great economic importance of this sector. Export crops and poultry production were the two 
activities which led the recovery of the sector. 
The economic recession of the past three years has been very closely related to the deteriorating 
situation with respect to external variables —as reflected in the increase in the on-going deficit on the 
current account of the balance of payments— and this, in turn, was linked to the decline in the world 
economy. In this connection, it should be recalled that the industrialization process during the past 
decade (the manufacturing industry's contribution to the global product climbed from 14% to 19% 
during this period) was based on the establishment of foreign-capital export industries which 
primarily use imported parts and raw materials. 
The need to point the economy in a different direction made it necessary, first of all, to reduce 
the external sector deficit and to put public finances on a sound footing. Thus, after the fiscal deficit 
had more than doubled between 1979 and 1981 and the trade balance in that year showed a deficit 
56% greater than in 1980, the Government adopted an economic and financial stabilization policy 
and obtained a loan from the International Monetary Fund for 35 million in Special Drawing Rights, 
which were drawn between August 1982 and September 1983. Nonetheless, the restriction of public 
spending and the payment of that portion of the external debt which fell due that year took up a large 
part of the fresh financial resources that the country received. The main consequences of this were the 
drop in the gross domestic product in 1982 and its very slight increase in 1983. 
Two components of global demand, gross domestic investment and the quantum of exports of 
goods and services, represented a departure from the weak growth shown by production and imports, 
in that they rose more than 5% and nearly 9%, respectively, in 1983, to the detriment of consumer 
spending, which decreased once again. 
The increase in investment during 1983, which followed upon a large contraction in 1982 and 
insignificant increases in preceding years, came from the boost given to the construction of some 
projects, such as the Belladere hydroelectric plant and the expansion of the industrial inventory. 
Private investment, on the other hand, showed a lack of activity, as it also had during the two 
preceding years. 
The drop in economic activity during recent years raised the rate of open unemployment from 
an estimated 11.5% in 1981 to around 14% in 1983; the same thing is assumed to haveoccured with 
1 Unless otherwise indicated, the period under review is the fiscal year which runs from 1 October 1982 to 30 September 1983. The 
reference periods also correspond to fiscal years. 
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respect to underemployment, which was estimated at about 40% in 1981. This situation was 
compounded by a 15% decrease in minimum industrial wages in real terms during the past two years, 
which has further reduced the population's already low levels of consumption. Even during the years 
of sustained economic growth in the 1970s, poverty levels increased.2 Moreover, in view of the 
decrease in the domestic supply of goods and services, this situation must certainly have grown worse. 
The economy's greater openness to the exterior —the import coefficient for the gross domestic 
product has risen from 17% to 25% since 1970 and the export coefficient from 13% to 16%— and 
the greater vulnerability which this engendered to changes in the international market was reflected 
in the worsening of the trade deficit in 1980 and 1981. In 1982, however, there was less of an 
imbalance and in 1983 this level was maintained. After a considerable drop in 1981, the current value 
of exports of goods and services rose 12% and 8.5% during the last two years. Imports fell 10% in 
1982 and increased slightly more than 4% in 1983 (see table 1). 
The current deficit on the balance of payments has followed much the same course as the trade 
balance since 1980; it amounted to approximately US$ 160 million in 1983, which was greater than 
the net inflow of capital. This made it necessary to resort, for the third year running, to the use of 
compensatory credit from the International Monetary Fund, in this case, for US$ 28 million. Net 
international reserves were reduced by US$ 24 million in 1983; the sum total of this figure and the 
decreases of the three preceding years is US$ 103 million, of which US$ 76 million corresponds to the 
increase in IMF liabilities. 
During 1982 and 1983, a strict policy to hold down government spending and to raise revenue 
was followed in order to cut the fiscal deficit, which had reached a very high level in 1981. These goals 
were achieved: spending was reduced 17% in 1982 (this figure particularly reflects the drop in 
investment expenditure, inasmuch as current expenditures rose slightly) and slightly over 1% in 
1983. Current revenues rose 10% and 16% in those two years and the increase in tax receipts was 
even greater. This reduced the fiscal deficit considerably. Nonetheless, though spending was reduced, 
amortization payments on the debt increased, especially in 1983, in view of which the fiscal deficit 
rose 20% during the past year, while as a ratio of the gross domestic product (8.9%), it once again 
neared the 10.3% level of 1981. 
The contraction of private consumption and of government expenditures helped to keep 
domestic demand low, so that the increase in domestic prices remained at around 8%, which was 
similar to the rate recorded in recent years. The lack of growth in the money supply also helped to 
hold down price increases. 
2. Trends in economic activity 
a) Total supply and demand 
The shrinkage of the gross domestic product in 1981 and 1982 —following two years of rapid 
growth at a rate of 7.5% annually— and its slight recovery in 1983 were coupled with a similar trend 
in imports in constant terms; as a result, the total supply of goods and services also showed a slight 
upswing in 1983 after declining during the two preceding years (see table 2). 
The economic recession and the decrease in foreign exchange assets first resulted in a virtual 
stagnation of the quantum of imports in 1981; this was followed by a sharp drop of 14% in 1982 and 
the slight increase, already mentioned, in 1983. In contrast, the volume of exports of goods and 
services rose 8.5% and nearly 9% during the past two years, mainly because of higher sales of coffee 
and cacao. 
Given the very small expansion in total supply, the significant increase which occurred in 
exports eliminated any possibility of expanding the domestic supply of goods and services; in 1981 
this supply had already shown no growth and in 1982 it had declined. There was an appreciable 
expansion however, of gross domestic investment (5.5%) in 1983 (after it had behaved erratically 
since 1980). A particularly important factor in this expansion was the boost which the Government 
gave to the construction of the Onde Verte de Belladere hydroelectric plant, as against other public 
2It is estimated that the portion of the total population living at levels of absolute poverty rose from 48% to68% between 1976and 
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Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official data. 
"Preliminary figures. Minimum wages in industry. 'Percentages. 
works and projects, where work was slowed down or postponed. Funds were also assigned to the 
enlargement of industrial facilities in the assembly industry and in the processing of imported inputs 
for export. 
With the stabilization of domestic demand and the above-mentioned upswing in investment, 
total consumption again slackened in 1983, although this time much less than during the preceding 
year. Since the beginning of the decade, consumer spending has fallen 7% in real terms, i.e., nearly 
14% on a per capita basis. The policy to hold down government spending had a hand in this, but the 
basic cause was the reduction in economic activity and the real drop in the purchasing power of 
income. 
b) Trends in the main sectors 
With the exception of mining —which is of little relative importance— and of government 
services, all the other sectors contributed in widely varying degrees to the small but significant 
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HAITI: TOTAL SUPPLY AND DEMAND 
Total supply 
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Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures provided by the Haitian Institute of Statistics and Information Sciences. 
"Preliminary figures. ''The figures given for exports and imports of goods and services were taken from balance-of-paymentsdata and 
were converted into dollars at constant 1970 prices using unit value indexes calculated by ECLAC 
Table 3 
HAITI: GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT BY KIND OF 
ECONOMIC ACTIVITY, AT FACTOR COST 
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Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures provided by the Haitian Institute of Statistics and Information Sciences. 
"Preliminary figures. As the individual activities and the totals were calculated independently, the sum of the former does not coincide 
with the latter. 
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Apart from the increases in transport services, storage and communications and in 
construction, which were around 9% and 6%, respectively, the expansion in the other activities was 
rather limited. The increase of slightly over 3% in agricultural output hada very favourable effect on 
the entire economy, inasmuch as agriculture is still of relatively great importance, despite the fact that 
part of it was lost during the 1970s and the aforesaid increase is the first sign of reactivation in a sector 
which had been gradually declining for a number of years (see table 3). 
There was a significant recovery (2.5%) in manufacturing production which, as in the case of 
agriculture, had a positive effect. In contrast, the supply of electricity, gas and water lost dynamism 
during the year, while commercial activity and other services were sluggish. Nor was there any 
significant growth in tourism, while the authorities' stricter control of the financial market 
discouraged domestic operations and served to encourage deposits of assets abroad. 
i) Agriculture. Agricultural output, which had dropped over 5% in 1981 and 1982 through the 
effects of the Hurricane Allen and long-standing structural problems, made up for part of this loss in 
1983 with an increase of something over 3%. 
The rapid deterioration of agricultural production, especially in 1982, jeopardized a sector 
which contributed one-third of the total gross domestic product and around 37% of exports of goods, 
as well as providing employment for 68% of the active population. The food production capacity for 
supplying the domestic market has progressively diminished. Around US$ 70 million is spent 
annually on food imports in order to cover this deficit. 
The pressing need to reduce the imbalance in trade and to halt the loss of foreign exchange 
prompted the authorities to promote the production of export crops in 1983. The efforts made in this 
area had considerable success, although they were partially offset by the sharp decrease in crop-
farming output for the domestic market. This was the reason why, midway through the year, the 
authorities renewed the agreement with the United States Government3 by which US$ 11 million 
was provided for the purchase of wheat, wheat flour and other staple foods. 
Table 4 
HAITI: INDICATORS OF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION 






















































































































































Source: UCLAC, on the basis of figures supplied by the Bank of the Republic of Haiti. 
"Preliminary figures. 
'This refers to United States Law PL-480, which provides for the granting of foreign exchange to governments for the acquisition of 
foodstuffs on the condition that the product of such sales is invested ¡n domestic markets, development programmes and assistance for low-
income social sectors. 
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Among the main crop-farming export products, the coffee harvest was slightly affected by the 
drought occurring in the southern part of the country; nevertheless, it increased nearly 12% and, for 
the first time, filled the quota assigned by the International Coffee Agreement; production was 
probably stimulated by the slow recovery in coffee prices during the final quarter of 1982 (see table 4). 
Cotton production rose 11% in 1982 owing to favourable climatic conditions in the north-west 
region and to a significant increase, of the order of 16%, in cotton prices on the international market. 
The cacao crop, however, expanded only 2% during the year after production had doubled in 1982. 
The harvests of the great majority of products destined for the domestic market were smaller, 
thus repeating the results of 1981 and 1982. Rice and maize output dropped by around 2% and 3%, 
while the production of sorghum and beans fell by around 10% and 7%. Over the past three years, the 
combined output of three of the most important foods in the basic diet —rice, maize and beans— 
decreased approximately 9%. The banana harvest was an exception to this trend, in that it has 
remained at around the same volume during the last four years, and the sugar cane harvest increased 
slightly over 4% in 1983, thereby regaining its 1980 level. 
With respect to stock-raising, there was once again an exceptional increase in poultry 
production; spurred on by appropriate incentives, it has almost totally replaced the heavy 
consumption of pork in the country. Midway through the year, the campaign to eradicate African 
fever was terminated; this campaign had involved the extermination of virtually the entire pig 
population and had inflicted enormous losses on the peasants. At the same time, beef production did 
not show any major increase and goat production fell 5 % after having risen sharply in 1982 as it, too, 
provided a substitute for pork. 
The structure of agriculture, which is divided among a large number of small remote farms with 
difficult access to consumer centres, hinders the marketing of production surpluses. These same 
factors also prevent a large number of small crop-farming producers from having access to credit, 
technical assistance and other governmental support policies. The creation of agricultural co-
operatives, which would help to eliminate isolation and improve the techniques for producing and 
marketing these products, has prospered in only a few places. By virtue of the policy for promoting 
agro-industrial exports, special support was provided for the cultivation of vegetables during 1983. 
ii) Mining. The mining of bauxite, which accounted for over 30% of the value added by the 
mining sector, has been at a virtual standstill since the final quarter of 1982, when the company 
involved decided to suspend its activities owing to their low rate of return. The Government has been 
contracting foreign companies to explore mineral deposits in the northern area of the country (see 
table 5). 
iii) Manufacturing. Manufacturing output, which had fallen off considerably in 1981, only 
expanded by a little more than 1% in 1982; in 1983 it achieved a slight upturn, having coped with the 
problem of the shortage of foreign exchange and the restriction of imports. 
The relative lack of drive exhibited during the year by some of the industries which assemble 
and process imported parts and intermediate goods for export was offset by the dynamism of a 
number of other medium-sized and small industries. In the food industry, there were notable 
increases in the production of flour (34%), fats (7%) and carbonated beverages (17%). On the other 
hand the production of oil decreased 26%, and sugar output grew by only 3%- Midway through the 
year the Leogane sugar refinery was inaugurated; this project had been initiated in 1981 and became 
the largest in the country (see table 5). 
The production of some chemicals also increased considerably, such as soap (25%), detergents 
(18%) and essential oils (23%). The production of textiles dropped 9%, however, and that of 
footwear decreased almost 12%. Cement output rose 9%, only partially recovering the ground lost 
during the two preceding years. 
Some foreign-owned export industries presented a different picture. The production of 
electronic parts fell 29% and the output of sports equipment, 12%. No more direct foreign 
investment for industry was forthcoming in 1983 than in other years. The only activity in this regard 
was the establishment of a shoe factory and the renovation of some equipment in others. 
iv) Construction. The shrinkage of demand and investment in 1981 and 1982 caused 
construction to fall off during those years, especially in 1982, when the decrease was approximately 
6%. It made a good recovery in 1983; according to preliminary data, its product rose nearly 6%. This 
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upswing was primarily related to the construction of the Belladere hydroelectric plant, inasmuch as 
housing construction, at least in the metropolitan area, showed no major variation. 
v) Electricity. The generation of electricity, which had increased at a rate of 5.5% annually 
during 1980 and 1981, despite the slump in economic activity in 1981 and 1982, slowed to a 4% 
growth rate in 1983. Electricity use, meanwhile, has increased at a rate of 4.4% annually since 1980. 
The residential use of electricity has expanded very evenly during the last three years; this was 
not the case with public service, which increased substantially, or with commercial and industrial use, 
which varied widely from one year to another, especially in the cement and sugar industries. The 
sugar industry's consumption of electricity increased sharply, however, when the new Leogane sugar 
refinery began to operate in 1983 (see table 6). 
The first phase of the Carrefour thermoelectric plant near Port-au-Prince had gone into 
operation in 1982, and construction on the Belladere hydroelectric plant continued in 1983. 
3. The external sector 
a) Merchandise trade 
There was a deficit of US$ 125 million in foreign merchandise trade in 1983, which was very 
similar to the deficit recorded for the preceding year. This balance was the result of a significant 
increase in exports (9%) and a somewhat smaller one (6%) in imports (see table 7). 
Exports of goods rose 26% over the past two years. Nonetheless, the level continues to be lower 
than that of 1980, when an exceptional expansion in sales volume, combined with favourable prices 
in international markets, pushed the value of exports up from US$ 138 million to US$ 216 million. In 
1981, however, export volumes and export prices both declined considerably. The volume of exports 
rose approximately 14% in each of the two last years; on the other hand, their prices, which had risen 
slightly in 1982, dropped 4% in 1983. 
Imports of goods, which had decreased notably both in value and volume in 1982, rose nearly 
6% in the past year, despite the shortage and resulting control of foreign exchange. 
Table 5 
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Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures provided by the Bank of the Republic of Haiti. 
"Preliminary figures. Growth rates were calculated on the basis of real, no rounded figures. ' Millions of bottles. 




HAITI: ELECTRICITY GENERATION AND CONSUMPTION 
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Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official data. 
"Preliminary figures. The difference between generation and consumption is due to losses in transmission and to unrecorded 
consumption. 
Table 7 
HAITI: MAIN FOREIGN TRADE INDICATORS 
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Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official data. 
"Preliminary figures. The quantum of exports, either of goods or of goods and services, as applicable, is adjusted on the basis of the 
respective terms-of-trade index. 
The terms of trade have deteriorated 20% since 1981 and 11% during the past two years. 
However, the appreciable increase in export volumes during the past biennium has bolstered the 
purchasing power of exports of goods and services, which had been seriously impaired in 1981 (see 
table 7). 
i) Exports. Two consecutive years of a significant expansion of exports was still not enough to 
bring them back to the 1980 level, from which they dropped in 1981 as a result of plummeting sales of 
coffee and other export commodities (see table 8). 
In 1980 coffee had come to represent 42% of total exports of goods. In 1981 it accounted for 
only 22% and in 1983 the figure rose to 27%. During 1983, the value of coffee exports soared (42%), 
thanks to an extraordinary increase in the volume exported (57%), which peaked during the final 
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quarter of 1982 and the first quarter of 1983. The year 1983 was the first in which the coffee export 
quota assigned to the country by the International Coffee Organization had been filled. Coffee prices, 
however, which had remained high until late 1982, declined nearly 11% in the first three quarters of 
1983, but rose again during the fourth. 
Along with coffee exports, sales of essential oils, sisal and cocoa showed notable increases. This 
was not the case with bauxite, exports of which were halted during the course of the year because they 
had ceased to be profitable. In addition, meat exports have dropped by nearly 90% over the past two 
years. 
During 1983, net exports of manufactures in the free zone, after subtracting that portion 
represented by imported parts and raw materials used in their production, showed a significant 
increase (14%) and now occupy an important place in the country's export structure. 
ii) Imports. Despite the shortage of foreign exchange which caused the authorities to employ 
stricter measures for controlling and rationalizing its use, imports of goods showed a partial but 
significant recovery of slightly over 3% in terms of volume and nearly 6% in terms of value; this 
contributed to a slight economic recovery. It should be recalled that in 1982 imports had plummeted 
as a result of the recession (see table 7). 
The preliminary information available concerning trends in imports of goods (OF), broken 
down by main products as shown in table 9, indicates that the increase in 1983 was substantially lower 
than that shown in the balance of payments in terms of imports FOB. According to this information, 
the drop in imports of goods was less than 9% in 1982, while they only appear to have increased 3-6% 
in 1983. Moreover, it would seem that during 1983 the percentages by which imports in the various 
categories of products increased were similar to one another and to the total figure, which was 3.4% 
(see table 9). 
b) The deficit on current account and its financing 
The balance-of-payments current account showed a deficit of US$ 157 million in 1983, which 
was similar to the deficit in the preceding year and 30% below that of 1981, when imports of goods 
rose rapidly. The deficit balance for services has also not varied a great deal in recent years, and the 
deficit in factor services has changed even less, despite the fact that net remittances of profits outside 
the country fell sharply in 1983 and interest payments increased from US$ 6 million to US$ 14 
Table 8 
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HAITI: IMPORTS OF GOODS, CIF 
Total 
Foodstuffs, beverages and 
tobacco 
Hydrocarbons 
Oils and fats 
Chemicals 
Manufactured products 















































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures supplied by the General Customs Adminisrration and the Bank of the Republic of Haiti. 
"Preliminary figures. ''Including manufactures of textiles, leather, rubber, wood, paper and metallic and non-metallic 
minerals. 'Including clothing, footwear, travel goods, furniture, professional instruments and sanitary, heating and lighting 
articles. ' Including non-edible raw materials and commodities. 
million. The inflow of private transfer payments from abroad has taken on special importance in 
Haiti; in the past two years these payments have amounted to US$ 50 million, which means that they 
are now 50% higher than the inflow under this heading in the late 1970s (see table 10). 
During 1983 there was a net capital inflow of US$ 134 million, only US$ 20 million more than 
the year before, but US$ 34 million less than in 1981. According to information on 1983 which is still 
preliminary, the net inflow of long-term capital in that year was US$ 25 million higher than in the 
year before, of which US$ 6 million corresponded to direct investment, while the net inflow of short-
term loans (which was negative in 1982) may have been US$ 10 million. Official transfer payments 
rose from US$ 61 million in 1982 to US$ 76 million in 1983. 
The long-term financing received by the official sector increased very little in 1983 and was 
partially nullified by higher amortization payments. Consequently, the Government had to borrow 
US$ 11 million in short-term loans from private banks. 
Despite the fact that, based on the transactions recorded in the current account and capital 
account, the global balance-of-payments deficit dropped from US$ 45 million to US$ 23 million 
between 1982 and 1983, the loss of international reserves rose from US$ 3 million to US$ 24 million 
during the same period, primarily in the form of International Monetary Fund liabilities. Foreign 
exchange assets, which had amounted to US$ 15 million in September 1982, had fallen to US$ 10 
million one year later. 
By late September, the Government had used up the entire credit of 35 million in Special 
Drawing Rights which the International Monetary Fund had granted fifteen months earlier. Taking 
into account the financial programme prepared by the Government, the IMF authorities granted Haiti 
a new loan of 60 million SDR for the period 1983-1985-
c) External indebtedness 
The public sector's medium- and long-term external debt amounted to US$ 450 million by the 
end of September 1983, which was equivalent to 26% of the gross domestic product. Of that figure, 
70% corresponded to the Government and the remaining 30% to public companies (see table 11). 
The rate of public-sector borrowing has slowed down during the past two years. It decreased 
from an annual rate of 21 % between 1978 and 1981 to 10% in 1982 and#% in 1983. Disbursements, 
which averaged US$ 52 million during the three-year period 1978-1980 and which exceeded US$ 90 
million in 1981, thus amounted to less than US$ 50 million each year in 1982 and 1983. 
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Table 10 
HAITI: BALANCE OF PAYMENTS 
(Millions of dollars) 
Balance on current account 
Trade balance 
Exports of goods and services 
Goods FOB 
Real services 
Transport and insurance 
Travel 
Imports of goods and services 
Goods FOB 
Real services 







Unrequited private transfer payments 
Balance on capital account 


















Errors and omissions 
Global balance 
Tocal variation in reserves 
(- sign indicates an increase) 
Monetary gold 
Special Drawing Rights 
IMF reserve position 
Foreign exchange assets 
Other assets 










































































































































































































































































































































Source: I977-J982: International Monetary Fund, Balance of Payments Yearbook, magnetic tape, May 1984; 1983; ECI.AC, on the basis of 
official data. 
"Preliminary figures. Real services also include other official and private transactions, but not factor services. ' In addition to 
loans received and their amortization payments, this entry includes net loans granted and other assets and liabilities. The global 
balance is the sum of the balance on current account and the balance on capital account. The difference between the total variation in reserves 
marked with a minus sign and the global balance represents the value of counterpart items: monetizationof gold, allocation of Special Drawing 




HAITI: PUBLIC SECTOR EXTERNAL INDEBTEDNESS 
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Source: ECLAC, on the basis oí figures provided by the Bank of the Republic of Haiti and the International Monetary Fund. 
"Preliminary figures. 'Balance of disbursed debt, for terms of over one year, as of 30 September of each year. 
The debt service, however, which had held steady at between US$ 15 million and US$ 16 
million annually until 1982, shot up to US$ 24 million in 1983, owing to the fact that interest 
payments, part of which corresponded to overdue interest, had doubled. Hence the debt service, 
which in 1980 represented 5% of the exports of goods and services, had reached 8% in 1983. 
In sum, during 1983 the net flow of capital (deducting amortization and interest payments) 
amounted to US$ 23 million, which was substantially lower than in 1982 (US$ 32 million) and far 
below that of 1981 (US$ 77 million). 
4. Prices and wages 
Consumer prices rose somewhat more than 8% annually, on average, for the third year running.4 
Measured from September to September, prices climbed 9%. There were larger increases in food 
prices, which rose 13% during the fiscal year, pushed up by an insufficient supply of basic consumer 
products, since production has declined over the past three years (see table 12). 
Other factors contributing to the rise in prices during the year were the 16% increase in fuel 
prices and the general imposition of a 7% sales tax. 
In so far as wages are concerned, the minimum wage paid in industry has not risen at all since its 
last adjustment in October 1980. This means that real wages have dropped 19% in industry since 
then and 15% in the last two years (see table 13). 
The wages paid in the manufacturing and construction industries, which in some cases varied 
between the equivalent of US$ 2.64 and US$ 3.20 per day, are substantially higher than those paid in 
other production activities, and the trends in these wages in recent years have not necessarily 
followed those of wages in general. 
4 According to the new consumer price index using 1980 as the base year, the average variation in 1983 amounted to 9%. The 
geographical coverage of this index is more extensive, inasmuch as it includes price trends in the urban centres of Delmas, Carrefour and Pétion 
Ville, in addition to Port-au-Prince. The main components of the new index are weighted as follows: food, 64%; clothing, 3%; and housing, 12%. 
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5. Fiscal and monetary policy 
a) Fiscal policy 
During 1983 strict measures to hold down public spending and increase tax revenue were 
applied in order to decrease the high fiscal deficit. In 1981 this deficit had come to represent slightly 
over 10% of the gross domestic product, a proportion which had been reduced to 8% in 1982. These 
aims figured in the stringent economic adjustment programme agreed upon with the International 
Monetary Fund. 
Raising some taxes and reforming others produced good results both in 1982 and in 1983- Tax 
receipts, which had risen only slightly more than 2% in nominal terms in 1981, rose by something 
over 11% in 1982 and by 17% in 1983- The collection of both direct and indirect taxes increased 18%, 
while taxes on foreign trade, which had dropped off sharply during the two preceding years, climbed 
15% in 1983 (see table 14). 
One of the major changes made in the tax system was the replacement of some specific taxes by 
a 7% general sales tax. The increase in tax receipts from foreign trade was primarily due to the 
increase in coffee exports, whose value was set at benchmark prices. This accounted for 30% of the 
increase in these taxes. In addition, there was a rise in the percentages of taxes on imports of luxury 
items. In relation to taxes on foreign trade, efforts were also made to eliminate contraband, which 
resulted in the closure of the border and of overland trade with the Dominican Republic for three 
months. 
Table 12 
HAITI: TRENDS IN CONSUMER PRICES 
Consumer price index 
Food 
Consumer price index 
Food 
1978 1979 1980 
Variation from September to September 
2.3 18.6 9.5 
-2.0 26.4 13.9 
Variation between annual averages (fiscal yeai 
-2.9 9.7 18.1 

















Source: LCI. AC, on the basis of figures provided by the Haitian Institute of Statistics and Information Sciences and the Bank of the Republic of 
Haiti. 
Table 13 
HAITI: TRENDS IN WAGES AND SALARIES 
Wages and salaries 
Nominal 
Real' 

























Source: IÏCLAC, on the basis of figures provided by the Bank of the Republic of Haiti and the Haitian Instirute of Statistics and Information 
Sciences. 




HAITI: CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INCOME AND EXPENDITURE 




On foreign trade 
Non-tax revenue 
2. Current expenditure 
Wages and salaries 
Purchase of goods and services 
Other current expenditure 
3. Current savings ( 1 - 2 ) 
4. Capital expenditure 
Real investment' 
Debt amortization payments 
5. Total expenditure (2 + 4) 
6. Fiscal deficit (1 - 5) 

























































































































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official data. 
" Pteliminaty figutes. Including capital expenditute financed ftom domestic and external funds and not only that listed in the centtal 
government development budget. ' Including capita] ttansfers. 
Despite the stringent measures taken to reduce government spending, it expanded by 18% 
during the year, which was similar to the increases in such spending during the years prior to the 
establishment of these restrictions and was certainly quite a departure from the decrease in 
government expenditures achieved in 1982. The considerable expansion in government spending in 
1983 was, however, entirely due to a huge increase in amortization payments on the debt (140%), 
which has risen by a factor of 5.5 since 1980 and in 1983 far exceeded the level of real investment. 
If amortization payments are not taken into account, then government spending fell slightly in 
1983 (-1.4%). Both current and investment expenditures decreased by a like amount and, among 
current expenditures, only wages recorded some nominal increase (4%), which was less than that of 
1982, when wages were also the only category in which expenditure rose. The reduction in current 
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and investment expenditures obviously meant the delay and postponement of many government 
social projects and programmes in such areas as public health and educational reform (see tables 14 
and 15). 
Since total expenditures increased by two percentage points more than the rise in income, the 
fiscal deficit grew by 20%. Nonetheless, if the expenditures for amortizing the debt are excluded it 
can be seen that the measures adopted to reduce the fiscal deficit were highly successful, since the 
deficit dropped from 440 million gourdes in 1982 to 300 million gourdes in 1983 and from 5.6% to 
3.6% as a ratio of the gross domestic product. 
Table 15 
HAITI: CENTRAL GOVERNMENT CURRENT EXPENDITURE 
Total current expenditure 
. . . . . h 
Administration 
Armed forces 
Ministry of Finance 
Other'' 








Wages and salaries 
Administration 
Armed forces 
Ministry of Finance 
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Ministry of Finance 
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Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures provided by the Bureau of the Treasury. 
"Preliminary figures. ''Including operating expenses of the Central Amortization Fund. 
Central Amortization Fund, but including quotas and subsidies for ministries. 




HAITI: MONETARY BALANCE 
Money 
Currency outside banks 
Demand deposits 
Factors of expansion 





Factors of absorption 
Quasi-money (savings 
and time deposits) 
Long-term foreign loans 
Other accounts (net) 



















































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures provided by rhe Bank of the Republic of Haiti. 
"Preliminary figures. Growth rates have been calculated on the basis of exact, not rounded figures. ' Does not include interbank 
transactions. ' Including allocations of Special Drawing Rights and of the IMF trust fund. 
During 1983,46% of the financing to cover the deficit came from the national banking system, 
unlike what occurred in previous years when a large part of such financing came from abroad; one 
factor contributing to this was the revocation of Central Bank provisions which limited the amount of 
credit that could be extended to the Government. In addition, grants made up a larger part of external 
financing, while loans accounted for a smaller proportion. 
b) Monetary policy 
There were no major variations in the means of payment between September 1982 and 
September 1983. The 8% increase in currency outside banks was offset by the fact that demand 
deposits decreased by a similar amount; this gave rise to a lack of liquidity which tended to curb the 
reactivation of economic activity (see table 16). 
Net international reserves were drawn down more rapidly in 1983, thus becoming one of the 
main factors in the contraction of the money supply. A determination to maintain exchange 
parity —which has existed since 1919— led the authorities to regulate the monetary flow in 
accordance with the needs of the economy by providing duly programmed credit to the public sector 
and by maintaining stable balances of international reserves, without any major fluctuations. This 
made it possible to ward off speculation and expectations of a devaluation sparked by the shortage of 
foreign exchange. Near the end of the period in question, the exchange rate for the dollar in large-
scale financial transactions was only very slightly above the official exchange rate of 5 gourdes. 
The preference that became evident during the year for time and savings deposits, which 
expanded by 15%, contributed to the absorption of money and to the lower level of liquidity available 
for economic activity. In mid-1983, time-deposit interest rates were made more flexible; in order to 
conform to the conditions prevailing in the international financial market, these rates were increased 
from 12% to 17%. This step, which usually would have made more money available for the banking 
system, turned out to have an adverse effect because it encouraged speculation, to the detriment of 
productive activities. 
The increases in quasi-money and other factors of absorption, as well as the decrease in net 
international monetary reserves, were counteracted by an increase of somewhat less than 10% in 
credit. Credit extended to the public sector expanded by 16%, but the largest amount of credit —that 
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granted to the Government— rose 29%, whereas less credit was extended to the other public 
institutions. The efforts that were made in line with a monetary programme to limit the credit 
extended to the Government to its minimum needs do not appear to have been very successful. 
There was no major variation with respect to credit extended to the private sector. Banks 
granted less credit to companies and there was clearly less demand for such credit. Even the assistance 
granted by the Institute of Agricultural and Industrial Development (IDAI) decreased by 10% during 
the year, despite the fact that this is one of the most active and important of the institutions engaged 
in the promotion of development and that it had received an IDB loan for 75 million gourdes during 
the 1982-1983 period. 
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HONDURAS 
1. Recent economic trends: Introduction and summary 
The Honduran economy continued to suffer from pronounced financial imbalances in 1983. The 
situation with respect to external liquidity worsened; the deficit in public finances persisted; and real 
wages declined once again. In the midst of a great deal of tension, some of which was not economic in 
nature, activity as measured by the gross domestic product at market prices slowed for the second year 
running. After decreasing slightly less than 2% in 1982, it declined by less than 1% in 1983. 
The per capita product fell by 4%, thus decreasing for the fourth successive year; in the last year 
its level was the same as that at the beginning of the preceding decade. The economic slowdown 
revealed by these indicators affected the population's levels of consumption in 1983 and caused a 
major drop in gross capital formation over the last three years. There was a slight but significant 
upswing in national income during 1983; this resulted from a smaller outflow of profits and interest 
payments abroad rather than from any improvement in the terms of trade, which continued to 
deteriorate (see table 1 and figure 1). 
Honduras, which has the lowest per capita income of any country in Central America and which 
is one of the relatively least developed nations of Latin America, underwent quite rapid economic 
growth during the greater part of the 1970s. During that period, thanks to international financial 
support, a series of major policies and projects began to be implemented. These policies included 
measures which led the State to promote certain industrial and service activities as well as agrarian 
reform, which had gradually been slackening off. Two ambitious projects were also undertaken: the 
exploitation of forestry resources with a view to the future production of wood pulp and paper and the 
construction of El Cajón hydroelectric plant. The exploitation of African palm in the Valle de Aguan 
was also promoted. 
Nonetheless, the growth rate of economic activity began to slow down late in the decade as 
financial difficulties increased and external accounts began to show imbalances. The fiscal and 
balance-of-payments current account deficits required increasing external financing, which was 
extended on less and less favourable conditions with respect to interest rates and maturity periods; 
this heightened the vulnerability of a commodity-exporting economy which was heavily dependent 
on the exterior. 
The present government took office in early 1982 following the first elections in over a decade. 
Faced with the serious economic situation which already prevailed by that time, the newly-invested 
authorities turned their attention to the task of at least maintaining a satisfactory rate of economic 
activity and to the development of an adjustment programme aimed at reducing the fiscal and 
balance-of-payments deficits; this programme was later included in the Financial Stabilization 
Programme for the 1982-1983 period and served as a basis for the agreement signed with the 
International Monetary Fund in November 1982. 
In general terms, the programme provided for the following measures in order to lessen the 
government's financial deficit: a wage freeze, refraining from filling posts as they became vacant, 
reducing the purchase of non-personal goods and services to a minimum, continuing with works and 
projects which had already been begun, limiting the commencement of new projects to those which 
were of top priority and, lastly, substantially cutting back current and capital transfers to the rest of 
the public sector. The fiscal policy was to be coupled with a reform of customs duties, but towards the 
end of 1983 this had still not been approved by Congress. It was also proposed tht public companies 
should gradually become self-financing. This would be facilitated by an increase in prices and in the 
rates charged for electricity, water and sewerage and for port services. 
Foreign trade policy was oriented towards export promotion and furthering trade with other 
Central American countries on the basis of bilateral agreements; a strict control of imports was also 
maintained and only the purchase of essential goods was authorized. 
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With respect to prices and wages, in addition to the above-mentioned increase in the rates 
charged for public services and the freeze placed on the wages of State employees, an attempt was 
made to keep staple food prices low (in the case of grains, through credit for production at low 
interest rates) and to hold down the prices of some essential inputs such as gasoline. An effort was 
also made to prevent nominal minimum wages from rising. A ceiling of 5% for domestic price 
increases was set by the Stabilization Programme, but this figure was greatly exceeded. 
The above objectives could not be fully achieved owing to a variety of circumstances which were 
felt particularly strongly during the second half of the year. Three factors prevented a greater 
Table 1 
HONDURAS: MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS 
Basic economic indicators 
Gross domestic product at market 
prices (millions of 1970 dollars) 
Population (millions of inhabitants) 
Per capita gross domestic product 
(dollars at 1970 prices) 




















Short-run economic indicators 
Gross domestic product 
Per capita gross domestic product 
Gross national income 
Terms of trade (goods and services) 
Current value exports of goods 
and services 
Current value of imports of goods 
and services 
Consumer prices 
December - December 
Variation between annual averages 
Money 
Real minimum wages 
Agriculture 
Manufacturing 
Rate of unemployment1 
Current income of government 
Total expenditure of government 
Fiscal deficit/total expenditure of government 
































































































Millions of dollars 
C, External sector 
Trade balance (goods and services) 
Balance on current account 
Balance on capital account 
































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official data. 
"Preliminary figures. Gross domesric product plus terms-of-trade effect and minus net factor payments to the rest of the world and net 
private donations. ' Percentages. Total medium- and long-term external debt. 
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HONDURAS 
reduction, more in keeping with the objectives of reducing the fiscal deficit. Firstly, the ability of State 
companies to make a financial recovery had been overestimated; not only were these companies 
incapable of meeting their external obligations, but they also could not continue to operate efficiently 
without financial support from the government, and treasury outlays could therefore not be reduced 
as much as had been hoped. 
Secondly, another factor in the failure to hold down public spending was the increasingly large 
allocations of monies for military purposes, which were due to the conflicts occurring in the region, 
especially along the country's borders with El Salvador and Nicaragua. The third factor was that, 
owing to the recession, current income was substantially less than had been projected. 
Problems were also encountered in attempting to reduce the country's external imbalance. 
Despite the efforts that were made to hold down imports, they rose 6% in 1983 following a reduction 
of 27% during the two preceding years. They thus exceeded the rise in exports of goods and services 
(around 5%), thereby increasing the trade deficit. Because remittances of profits and interest 
payments abroad were lower, however, it was possible to reduce the deficit on current account from 
US$ 250 million in 1982 to slightly over US$ 200 million in 1983. At the same time, contrary to the 
expectations created by the establishment of a civilian government and the agreement signed with 
the Intenational Monetary Fund, the net inflow of capital decreased despite the deferment of the 
amortization payments on the external debt with private creditors that fell due during the year.1 As a 
result, international reserves declined once again. 
There were other goals also which were not achieved. Consumer prices rose by 8.5 %, which was 
more than had been foreseen. This increase, combined with the wage freeze, seriously reduced the 
population's buying power and consumption levels. Nonetheless, there was a sufficient amount of 
liquidity for economic activity. The 14% expansion in the means of payment was spurred on by a 
significant increase in credit, particularly that extended to the government, which rose almost 27% 
from December to December, as the amount of financing coming from abroad fell off sharply. The 
smaller increase in credit for the private sector, although significant (11%), was not in proportion to 
the weakness of production activity.2 A much more notable development during the year was the 
rapid increase in savings and time deposits (24%). 
Given the instability and severe internal and external constraints affecting economic activity in 
recent years, the gross domestic product diminished slightly in 1983; with the exception of agriculture 
(whose product rose by 2.5%) all production activities contributed to this decrease in a greater or 
lesser degree, thereby prolonging the recession which had begun in 1981. The slight decline in 
production, however, was counteracted by an increased volume of imports, which would seem to 
indicate that there was some increment in total supply, in contrast to the drop recorded in the two 
preceding years. Nonetheless, the expansion in the value of exports at constant prices ultimately 
resulted in a slight decrease in the domestic availability of goods and services during 1983, a decline 
which had a greater effect on consumer spending, primarily that of the general government, than on 
capital formation. 
The sacrifice that the country made in intensifying a financial adjustment policy which worked 
to the detriment of economic growth and caused a greater degree of social dissatisfaction, did not 
bring about a reduction in the imbalances affecting the country, as had been hoped. Indeed, a number 
of variables and indicators deteriorated further, especially during the latter part of the year. This 
increased the skepticism of the economic agents, provoking, inter alia, the outflow of capital from the 
country. 
In response to the difficult economic situation, which worsened towards the end of the year, in 
late November the "Emergency Law to reactivate the national economy" was promulgated. This Law 
authorized the government to take special measures to bring down the fiscal deficit, to settle overdue 
debts, to raise employment levels, and to promote production activities (primarily agricultural and 
industrial output for export) in order to reactivate the economy. 
'Although the government negotiated with its private external creditors in order to reschedule some of the amortization payments 
falling due in 1982 and 1983, no agreement whatsoever was signed during the year. Nonetheless, the government postponed making these 
payments with the implicit consent of its creditors since the corresponding agreements were soon to be formally concluded. 
1 The rediscount rate fell from 15% to 13% and the interest rate on credits for grain cultivation was reduced from 10% to 8% in order to 
stimulate grain production. 
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Figure 1 
HONDURAS: MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS 
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Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official data. 





HONDURAS: TOTAL SUPPLY AND DEMAND 
Millions of dollars Percentage „ . 
,„.,„ . i_ i j Growth rates 
at 1970 prices breakdown 1981 1982 1983" 1970 1980 1983" 1980 1981 1982 1983" 
Total supply 1 681 1 575 1 582 129.6 130.1 121.9 3.0 -1.8 -6.3 0.5 
Gross domestic product 
at market prices 1 331 1 307 1 298 100.0 100.0 100.0 2.7 1.2 -1.8 -0.7 
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Source: ECLAC, on the basis of data provided by the Central Bank of Honduras. 
" Preliminary figures. The figures on imports and exports of goods and services were taken from blance-of-payments data expressed in 
dollars at current prices, which were converted to dollars at constant 1970 values using price indexes calculated by ECLAC for the purpose. 
2. Trends in economic activity 
a) Total supply and demand 
After having fallen by 8% during the two preceding years, the supply of goods and services 
expanded slightly in 1983. This was the result of a slight decrease (around 1%) in the gross domestic 
product at market prices, combined with a significant increase of approximately 6% in the quantum 
of imports, which was nevertheless not enough to compensate for the 32% drop recorded during the 
previous two years (see table2). 
Despite the increase noted, imports remained at very low levels owing to the lower demand of 
depressed production and to a shortage of foreign exchange during the past three years. The 
adjustment policy which has been applied to ease the country's financial imbalances included a variety 
of measures designed to limit total demand, especially external purchases. This reduced imports of 
some products, particularly consumer durables, capital goods and some raw materials used by the 
agricultural and industrial sectors. The volume of imported goods and services in 1983 was lower than 
in 1977; in per capita terms, it was equivalent to that of 20 years earlier, when the process of Central 
American integration had barely began and the national economy's industrial structure was largely 
unintegrated. 
With respect to demand, the increase of somewhat over 5 % in the value of exports of goods and 
services at 1970 prices (which had dropped by 11% in 1982 and by 16% over the past three years) 
meant that the domestic supply of goods and services decreased for the third year running, this time 
by only 0.6%. This affected the possibilities for growth in consumption and investment. 
Gross domestic investment rose by over 6% in 1983; fixed domestic investment, however, fell 
by around 1%. This difference may be attributed to the variation in inventories. Over the last three 
years, fixed-capital formation fell by 37%. The greatest decrease was in investment in construction, 
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in contrast to what had occurred in 1981 and 1982, when investment in machinery plunged by 60%. 
Investment made by the private sector, which up to 1981 had been greater than that of the public 
sector, lost its lead in 1982, inasmuch as it decreased by 56% in 1981 and 1982; it showed no major 
change in 1983. On the other hand, after having decreased by 12% in 1981 and risen by 3.5% in 1982, 
public investment dipped slightly again in 1983, since it was confined to the execution of only the 
most essential public works (see table 2). 
Consumption was also affected by this new drop in the domestic supply of goods and services. 
General government consumption fell by slightly over 3 % in real terms for the second year running, 
which was in keeping with basic fiscal policy objectives. Private consumption appears to have 
decreased by slightly over 1% as a result of the deterioration in the overall economic situation. 
b) The growth of the main sectors 
All activities except agriculture reflected the effects of the widespread recession of the economy 
to a greater or lesser extent. The increase of slightly under 3% in agricultural output was offset by 
construction, which decreased by a similar percentage, thereby constituting the sector that was 
hardest hit by the crisis, notwithstanding the efforts made to reactivate it; it was also counteracted by 
the manufacturing industry which, like basic services, has lost all dynamism since 1981 and by the 
other services, whose products fell by 1.2% on average in 1983, having followed an erratic course 
since early in the decade (see table 3). 
In contrast, agricultural production (the largest activity) increased by slightly less than 3% in 
1983. Agriculture has shown very little dynamism since 1980. The annual rate of 1.9% for those years 
was far below the level of nearly 8% recorded for the 1975-1979period. Nonetheless, the value added 
by agriculture continues to represent nearly 30% of the gross domestic product. 
Table 3 
HONDURAS: GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT, BY KIND 
OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITY, AT FACTOR COST 
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Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures supplied by the Central Bank of Honduras. 
"Preliminary figures. As the individual activities and the total were calculated independently, the sum of the former does not coincide 
with the latter. 'These growth rates differ from those given in tables 1 and 2 because they measure different concepts of the product: in 





HONDURAS: INDICATORS OF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION 
















































































































































































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official data. 
" Preliminary figures. Growth rates have been calculated on the basis of actual, not rounded, figures. 
variation in valued-added. Thousands of tons. 'Thousands of head. Millions of litres. 
1 Estimated on the basis of the 
^Millions of dozens. 
i) Agriculture. Even though agricultural output continued to show growth during 1983, this 
rate was not as good as it might seem. Firstly, per capita production declined slightly and, secondly, 
the production of bananas, which is one of the major products, went into a steep decline (see table 4). 
There were adverse weather conditions during the year. In March, hurricane-force winds 
damaged budding citrus trees as well as banana and plantain plants, causing heavy losses. Then, the 
rains which usually begin during the first half of May were almost a month late, and as rainfall 
continued to be irregular, the production of basic grains was affected and late sowings had to be 
postponed. This made it necessary to import maize to cover the temporary deficit in order to provide 
for domestic consumption. 
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With the delay in the rains, crops were affected less by pests and disease, but the coffee rust 
disease continued to spread and to affect vast stretches of coffee plantations; the black sigatoka 
disease affected banana plantations in the same way. 
The performance of export products was varied. While cotton and banana production declined 
by 56% and 17%, respectively, coffee and sugar cane output rose; tobacco production held steady at 
the same level as in preceding years. The production of bananas decreased owing to the adverse 
weather conditions mentioned above, which damaged over 5 000 hectares of plantings. This made it 
necessary for the authorities to assist some banana companies to rehabilitate damaged plantations. 
The shortage of funds for supporting the activities of the Honduran Banana Corporation (COHBANA) 
has caused it to play a smaller role in domestic banana marketing and in the promotion of projects to 
develop other areas of production.3 
Despite the fact that coffee rust disease and the coffee berry beetle damaged around 45 000 
hectares, coffee production expanded by nearly 18% owing to the ongoing replacement of all the 
coffee plantings with new high-yield and rust-resistant varieties. A support programme financed by 
the United States Agency for International Development (AID) is currently underway which is 
designed to help small-scale producers in improving the planting or total resowing of up to two 
hectares per coffee producer and in acquiring equipment and pesticides. The effective control or 
eventual eradication of coffee rust disease has, however, been hampered by a variety of factors, 
including the drop in international coffee prices, which has decreased the interest of producers in this 
effort. 
The drop in international sugar prices also discouraged any major increase in sugar cane output, 
which only increased by slightly over 3% in 1983. Sugar cane production had shown greater 
dynamism in earlier years, especially in 1980 and 1982, and good use had been made of the installed 
industrial capacity, even though market conditions were not the best. This situation grew worse in the 
last year, and it therefore became necessary to reinforce the credit policy pertaining to this activity. 
The banking system provided similar support to cotton producers, whose international market 
had diminished. The results were negative, however, in that production fell by nearly 56% after 
having dropped by 28% during the two preceding years (see table 4). 
Production of all basic grains rose and would have risen more if the rains had not been late. 
Indeed, one of the primary objectives of the government's economic policy was to encourage and 
support production of these basic foodstuffs, particularly by means of the extension of credit, 
technical assistance and maketing facilities. In the case of maize, which was the crop that increased 
the least (1%), supply problems arose late in the third quarter owing to insufficient storage capacity. 
Towards the end of the year, however, a bidder had still not been selected to expand the network of 
grain —and especially maize— silos and depots that were to be constructed with the aid of the 
countries of the European Economic Community. 
Bean production climbed by 6%, despite the substantial decrease in the surface area under 
cultivation as a result of the drop in international bean prices and the large surpluses accumulated 
during past years; these factors did not help to stimulate the planting of beans. 
The lateness of the rains and their later intensity in the main farming areas worked to the 
benefit of rice production. The output of sorghum, however, was lower because the area along the 
border with El Salvador, which is the main sorghum-growing area, was affected by a drought. 
The production of plantains and African palm increased considerably. In the case of plantains, 
this was due to the successful control of the black sigatoka disease, while in the case of African palm, it 
was due to the fact that new areas were brought under cultivation some years ago (the Bajo Aguan and 
Guaymas Projects). 
Stock-raising increased as a result of a significant expansion in poultry and pork production. 
Poultry output made progress towards regaining the growth rae it had in 1980 and 1981, while there 
was a large increase in pig-slaughtering for the second year running. Investments made during earlier 
years in poultry-keeping also resulted in an increase of nearly 5% in egg production. Although milk 
output also increased, not enough was produced to meet domestic needs and additional imports were 
therefore necessary. 
*In February 1984 the government decided to reduce the advisory role played by COHBANA in relation to banana policy and assigned 
some of its other functions to other intitulions. Domestic marketing thus came under the responsibility of BANASUPRO, the Ministry of 
Natural Resources took charge of technical assistance, the National Agricultural Development Bank took over the area of financial assistance, 




HONDURAS: INDICATORS OF MANUFACTURING PRODUCTION 
Index of manufacturing value added 
(1976 = 100) 












Consumption of electricity by industry1 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures supplied by CONSUPLANE and the Central Bank of Honduras. 
"Preliminary figures and estimates based on an 11-month period. Calculated on the basis of an 11-month period compared with the 
same period of the preceding year. 'Thousands of 42.5-Kg sacks. Thousands of square metres. 'Millions of 
yards. 'Thousands of quintals. ^Millions of boxes. Millions of 12-ounce bottles. 'Thousands of 
litres. 'Millions of kWh. 
Finally, beef production increased by slightly more than 3%. It should be noted that low meat 
prices during the two preceding years had sparked off the smuggling of live cattle into other Central 
American countries. 
The progress made in agrarian reform continued at a slower rate than had been planned. 
During 1983, only half of the programmed allocations and awards of land were carried out. At the 
same time, the sector in which reforms had been carried out received only 7% of the credit that had 
been granted by the National Agricultural Development Bank (BANADESA). 
Furthermore, agricultural production has been increasingly affected by the problems 
encountered in acquiring more production equipment and maintaining stocks of spare parts. 
According to official data, the number of tractors in operation was cut by half owing to a lack of spare 
parts and only 86% of existing caterpillar tractors are functioning. 
¡i) Manufacturing. Preliminary information indicates that manufacturing production declined 
for the second year in a row as a result of the decrease in domestic demand. Some industries also had 
problems as a result of a temporary lack of some imported inputs and materials; this was the case in a 
number of food industries, which suffered from a temporary shortage of packaging. 
On the other hand, although intra-regional trade continued to slacken, the sale of manufactures 
on that market rose to such an extent that this line of products became one of the main factors in the 
expansion of exports; this slowed the decrease in industrial production. 
The performance of different branches of industry varied. Whereas the production of 
traditional manufactures would appear to have increased slightly during 1983, according to the 
limited information available, the output of the smaller metal-working industry appears to have 
fallen (-4%), as has the production of intermediate goods. 
In regard to the food, beverage and tobacco industries, preliminary information indicates that 
some of the largest increases were in the production of wheat flour, beer and carbonated beverages; 
sugar output hardly expanded at all, however, and the output of other alcoholic beverages and of 
cigarettes dropped (see table 5). 
1980 1981 1982 1983" 
1981 1982 1983* 
135 137 135 134 1.7 -1.3 
7 229 7 315 6 528 11422 1.2 -10.8 75.0 
2 030 1 680 1 538 1 878 -17.2 -8.5 22.1 


















































379 415 401 438 9.5 -0.7 9.2 
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Textile production showed a considerable increase as a result of the establishment of a new 
textile industry which has become the largest of its kind; it was expressly designed to provide a supply 
for regional demand. 
The production of cement and fibro-cement sheets increased considerably, especially that of 
cement, which rose by 7 5 % ; this partially made up for the drop in this item which occurred in 1982 as 
a result of the temporary shutdown of factories. 
Owing to the slump in the domestic market and in regional demand resulting from the 
recession in general, many industries were working at less than one-third of their installed capacity; 
in the manufacturing industry as a whole, this coefficient fluctuated between 40% and 60%, 
irrespective of those medium-sized and small industries, primarily engaged in the manufacture of 
wood and the production of food, which suspended operations during the past two years. During 
1983, however, the new Bonito Oriental sawmill started up operations. It is part of the Olancho 
Project, which was begun during the preceding decade and which is designed to develop the 
exploitation of forestry resources and, in the future, the manufacture of pulp and paper. Owing to 
financial problems and some limitations of a technical nature, however, the achievement of these 
objectives has been delayed. 
Several of the companies founded in previous years with the support of the Nationallndustrial 
Development Corporation (CONADI) —including those producing cement and other building 
materials— found themselves in very serious financial straits during the year. 
Some years ago the government began to implement a policy designed to attract foreign 
investment to what is called the Free Zone of Puerto Cortés. This project has not been fully put into 
effect, however, and as owners have abandoned their installations, these have been taken over by a co-
operative, the first such enterprise created in the zone. 
iii) Construction. Affected by financial problems, by the slump in housing demand (primarily 
for medium- and high-priced dwellings), and by the policy to hold down public spending, 
construction continued to decline during 1983. There has been a 14% decrease over the last three 
years, and this has had serious repercussions on other associated production sectors and on 
employment. Nonetheless, the production of cement and of fibro-cement sheets soared during the 
year and largely made up for the decreases in these products in 1982 as a result of the partial 
suspension of operations of the country's two cement factories in response to the serious financial 
problems stemming from these companies' high rate of external indebtedness (see table 6). 
The statistics on construction permits went down considerably during the period from October 
1982 to September 1983 compared with the same period the year before, in contrast to the hitherto 
rapid increase in such permits despite the serious deterioration in the main economic variables. In 
late 1981 and early 1982, in view of the upcoming elections and subsequent change of administration, 
there was a period in which optimism once again reigned among economic agents, despite the 
Table 6 
HONDURAS: CONSTRUCTION INDICATORS 
Constructed area' (thousands of m2) 
Total 
Dwellings 
Production of some 
construction materials 
Cement (thousands of sacks) 
Fibro-cement sheets 
(thousands of m2) 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures provided by the Central Bank of Honduras. 
"Preliminary figures. Calculated on the basis of actual, not rounded, figures. ' Refers to private urban construction in the Centra I 
District, San Pedro Sula and La Ceiba. 
1975 1980 1981 
225 322 261 
130 238 199 
7 229 7 315 





6 528 11 422 11.5 
1 538 1 878 21.7 
Growth rates' 
1981 1982 1983° 
-19.0 27.3 -42.9 
-16.2 34.6 -45.7 
1.2 -10.8 75.0 

























































































Source: JiCLAC, on the basis of figures supplied by the Central Bank of Honduras. 
"Preliminary figures. The growth rates correspond to real, not rounded, figures. 
economic crisis, and a recovery was expected to begin in October 1982; this gave rise to a brief speed-
up in construction. These expectations diminished as the economic situation gradually grew worse. 
iv) Basic services. While the product of transport, storage and communications services went 
down by nearly 2% in 1983, as a result of the recession of the last three years and the decrease in 
foreign trade volumes, there was no major variation in electricity, gas and water services after the 
decrease recorded in 1982. However, the available information indicates that there was a significant 
increase of 8% in the use of electricity, and, in the case of industrial use of electricity, the figure 
inexplicably exceeds 9%. Residential consumption of electricity rose by 7%, while the increase in 
business consumption was slightly less than 4%. It is equally difficult to account for the increase in 
street lighting and the huge variation which occurred between 1982 and 1983 in government 
electricity use (see table 7). 
Electricity was imported during the year from Costa Rica (141 million kWh) by way of 
Nicaragua using the Central American system of electrical interconnection. Construction on the El 
Cajón dam, where a hydroelectric plant will be built, also continued. 
c) Employment 
The country suffers from a large and long-standing imbalance between the economically active 
population and the supply of jobs; the problems of unemployment and underemployment are 
therefore quite serious. Available indicators provide some information with respect to the high levels 
of unemployment brought about by the economic crisis. Nationally, the level of unemployment was 
over 21%, and almost 37 % in the agricultural sector. The decline in construction (-14%) for the third 
year running and its multiplier effect on other industries was the most important factor in raising 
unemployment (see table 8). 
The masses layoffs carried out by some companies, including some banana companies, in 
addition to the existing high level of unemployment and the deterioration in real wages, have caused 
many labour conflicts. 
3. The external sector 
a) Merchandise trade 
The external situation continued to be critical in 1983; despite the fact that the deficit on current 
account was lower, the smaller net inflow of capital resulted in another drop in international reserves. 
An increase of slightly over 7% in imports of goods exceeded the increase of only 4% in exports of 
merchandise, thereby raising the negative balance in this type of trade from only US$ 4 million in 
1982 to US$ 27 million in 1983. 
The efforts made to expand sales to other countries were not successful in producing any major 
increase because of the decrease in the unit values of exports and adverse weather conditions which 
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reduced the banana crop, the main export product. Despite this, however, the volume of exports rose 
by 6%, which made up for only a part of the decreases registered in 1980 and 1982 (see table 9). 
Although efforts wereniade to hold down imports in order to diminish the external imbalance, 
imports increased by over 7% and the volume of imported goods rose even more (8.5%). 
Import prices fell slighly in 1983 (-1%) and export prices showed a larger decrease (-2%); 
there was thus a further deterioration in the terms of trade (this time the decrease was only 1%), 
making it the third successive decrease in the terms of trade, which, since 1980, have dropped by 18%. 
The purchasing power of exports of goods, which had decreased by 29% during the three-year period 
from 1980 to 1982, improved by 5% in the last year asa result of an increase in the volume exported. 
i) Exports. Although the value of slightly over US$ 700 million in exports of goods in 1983 was 
4% higher than in the preceding year, it was still substantially lower than the peak level of US$ 850 
million reached in 1980. 
Exports of the main traditional products, which together account for over 75% of the total, 
grew less than 2%. Two different factors influenced this increase: on the one hand, there was a 
Table 8 
























Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official data. 
"Preliminary figures. 
Table 9 
HONDURAS: MAIN FOREIGN TRADE INDICATORS 








Terms of trade (goods) 
Terms of trade (goods) 
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HONDURAS: EXPORTS OF GOODS, FOB 
Total 
Central America 
Rest of world 






































































































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of data supplied by the Central Bank of Honduras. 
''Preliminary figures. The percentage breakdown and growth rates correspond to real, not rounded, figures. 
moderate improvement in the prices of most such products and, on the other hand, the volume of the 
main goods exported, particularly bananas and wood, fell through decreases in the output of both 
products (see table 10). 
International coffee prices continued dropping. The value of sales threfore decreased for the 
third year in a row, even though a larger amount was exported because of increased production and 
the large surpluses accumulated the preceding year as a result of the restrictions placed on the export 
quota by the International Coffee Organization for the past cycle. 
In 1983 there were significant increases in the sales of three lines of products which hold out the 
possibility of rapid development: sales of silver and zinc rose by 166% and 95%, respectively, while 
those of shrimp and lobster were 22% higher; in total, this amounted to about US$ 82 million. 
Non-traditional exports expanded by more than 10%, reaching US$ 176 million; this was 23% 
less than only two years before. Efforts were made during the year to export new types of products, 
open up new markets and improve the co-ordination of the action taken by the State and by exporters. 
With respect to sugar exports, these efforts made it possible to take better advantage of the rise in 
prices on the free market and the 10% increase in the quota assigned by the United States. 
According to information for the first half of the year, it appears that exports to Central 
America increased more than exports to the rest of the world. For several years now, certain problems 
relating to payments among the Central American countries have hindered intra-regional trade. 
These difficulties were compounded in December by the temporary closure of the border with 
Guatemala. 
Lastly, it should be noted that new bilateral agreements were negotiated during the year with 
Costa Rica and Nicaragua. Although trade relations with El Salvador had been re-established in late 
1982, only a minimum amount of trade has been resumed. 
ii) Imports. There was a 6% increase in imports of goods CIF in 1983, following two years in 
which such imports dropped by 30% as a result of the widespread economic depression, the shortage 
of foreign exchange and the restrictive policy adopted several years earlier by the authorities. Such a 
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sharp reduction in imports as occurred during those two years made it unlikely that imports would 
continue to fall in 1983, inasmuch as this would have entailed an extremely high economic and social 
cost. 
The expansion in imports during 1983 primarily stemmed from increases of 23% in the 
purchase of non-durable consumer goods and of about 14% in imports of raw materials and 
intermediate goods for use in industry and construction. The importation of consumer durables, 
however, declined substantially (-18%) and the decrease in the purchase of transport materials 
(-30%) was even greater (see table 11). 
b) The current account balance and its financing 
In addition to the growth in the deficit in merchandise trade, the trade balance deficit also rose 
in 1983, although to a lesser extent. This deficit increased from US$ -56 million in 1982 to US$ -68 
million in the last year, which is only one-third of what it was in 1980. Expenditures on transport and 
insurance did not go up, despite the increase in imports, nor was there any variation in expenditures 
on travel or the income from tourism (see table 12). 
Remittances of profits abroad fell to one-third of their former level and net interest payments 
dropped by US$ 27 million. The current account position improved with the decrease in the negative 
balance for factor services. The deficit dropped from nearly US$ 250 million in 1982 to slightly over 
US$ 200 million in 1983. This last figure is equivalent to the 1979 level and is substantially lower than 
the 1980 level, when the deficit on current account peaked at US$ 330 million. 
As the deficit on current account has been decreasing since the beginning of the decade, the net 
inflow of capital has also declined; since that time, it has been lower than the current deficit, and this 
has resulted in a loss of international reserves. During those four years, international reserves were 
drawn down by US$ 212 million, but the rate of decrease has slowed since then and in the last year it 
was only US$ 17 million, which was one-fourth the size of the decrease in reserves during 1980. 
Table 11 
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Source: ECLAC, on the basis of data from the Central Bank of Honduras and CONSUPLANE. 
"Preliminary figures. The percentage breakdown and growth rates correspond to real, not rounded, figures. 
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Table 12 
HONDURAS: BALANCE OF PAYMENTS 
HONDURAS 
(Millions of dollars) 
Balance on current account 
Trade balance 
Exports of goods and services 
Goods FOB 
Real services 
Transport and insurance 
Travel 
Imports of goods and services 
Goods FOB 
Real services 







Unrequited private transfer payments 
Balance on capital account 
Unrequited official transfer payments 
Long-term capital 
Direct investment (net) 
Portfolio investment (net) 














Errors and omissions 
Global balance 
Total variation in reserves 
(- sign indicates an increase) 
Monetary gold 
Special Drawing Rights 
IMF reserve position 
Foreign exchange assets 
Other assets 








































































































































































































































































































































Source: 1977-1982: International Monetary Fund, Balance of Payments Yearbook, magnetic tape, May 1984; 1983: ECLAC, on the basis of 
official data. 
"Preliminary figures. Real services also include other official and private transactions, but not factor services. 'In addition to 
loans received and amortization payments made, this entry includes net loans granted and other assets and liabilities. The global 
balance is the sum of the balance on current account and the balance on capital account. The difference between the total variation in reserves 
(minus sign) and the global balance represents the value of counterpart items: monetary gold, allocation of Special Drawing Rights and 
variations due to revaluation. 
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c) The external debt 
The public external debt totalled nearly US$ 1.9 billion by the end of 1983. Of that amount, 
more than US$ 1.66 billion corresponded to medium- and long-term loans. Only about 15% of the 
debt was contracted with private institutions; the rest came from international agencies and 
governments. The medium- and long-term public debt represents 56% of the gross domestic 
product, a figure which rises to 62 % if the global debt is considered, and to 70% if the short-term debt 
is also taken into account (see table 13). 
The servicing of the external debt (the medium- and long-term debt only) reached a relatively 
high point in 1982, when it was equivalent to over one-third of the exports of goods and services and 
over 9% of the gross domestic product. In 1983 it increased very little, and these ratios fell to 21 % and 
5.7%, respectively. 
The shortage of foreign exchange made it more and more difficult to meet all the payments due 
on the debt, especially that contracted in recent years with private financial sources. As a result, talks 
had already been begun in 1982 with private banks in order to restructure some of the amortization 
payments falling due during the 1982-1983 biennium.4 
Table 13 
HONDURAS: EXTERNAL INDEBTEDNESS 
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983" 
Millions of dollars 
External public debt 
Year-end balance 
Medium and long term 
Short term 
Disbursements 
Global external debt 
Year-end balance' 











Service/exports of goods 
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Services/disbursements 







































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of data supplied by the Central Bank of Honduras. 
"Preliminary figures. Medium and long term. 'Including total external public debt and medium- and long-term private 
debt. ''Corresponds to the servicing of the medium- and long-term public debt only. ' Excluding amortization payments on the 
short-term private debt, Excluding all amortization payments on the private debt and amortization payments on the short-term public 
debt. ''Total interest paid. 'Calculated on the basis of the external debt and medium- and long-term disbursements. The service 
includes total interest payments and the total amortization payments on medium- and long-term debt, except in 198.V where amortization 
payments on the private debt are not included. 
'The financial commitments contracted with private foreign banks by the Central Bank of Honduras, the National Electrification 




HONDURAS: DOMESTIC PRICE TRENDS 
Consumer price index 
Food 
Consumer price index 
Food 
1978 1979 1980 
Variations December to December 
5.3 22.5 11.5 
5.5 20.3 12.3 
Variation between annual averages 
5.7 12.1 18.1 
















Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures provided by the Central Bank of Honduras. 
"Variation from October to October. Variation from January to October 1983 in comparison with the corresponding period of the 
preceding year. 
These negotiations continued in 1983 and were extended to include the debts payable in 1984. 
The total amount of loan payments due during those three years amounts to approximately US$ 125 
million. In mid-1983 an agreement was reached, in principle, whereby Honduras was to be given a 
grace period of three years and would make subsequent amortization payments, in equal proportions, 
over a term of four years. The interest rate and surcharges to be paid were also the subject of 
negotiations, but the agreement was still awaiting formalization owing to differences with respect to 
the amount of additional financing to be covered by the agreement. However, during 1983 the 
government acted with the implicit consent of the creditors as if the renegotiations had been 
formalized. Consequently, although the public sector had paid all the interest on its external debt as 
well as making the amortization payments due on the debt with public creditors by the end of 1983, it 
failed to pay part of the amortization payments due on the debt with private international banks. 
4. Prices and wages 
Domestic prices rose somewhat more than 8% in 1983. This was less than the variation recorded 
during the four preceding years, which had reached nearly 23% in 1979 (measured from December to 
December). Nonetheless, it exceeded the goals that had been set as part of the economic stabilization 
programme (see table 14). 
The stabilization seen in the prices of imported products in general, including petroleum, 
contributed to the slackening of the rate of inflation, as did the satisfactory supply of foodstuffs and 
other commodities which was available during the year, except in September and October. During 
that period there was a temporary scarcity of basic grains for domestic consumption, and the supply 
had to be immediately supplemented with imports in order to prevent a shortage on the market; this 
helped to speed up the rise in prices. Until September, the general consumer price index climbed at a 
rate of 1% per month, on average; this rose to 1.4% or 1.5% ¡n February, June and September, and 
dropped to between 0.3 % and 0.4% in March and May. The price index fell slightly during the fourth 
quarter. 
The rates charged for public services, electricity, water and sewerage, as well as for port services, 
communications and others rose during the year. These rate increases were intended to reduce the 
financial deficits of public enterprises and to make them self-supporting. 
The increase in food prices was less than the increase in the overall index, as had frequently 
occurred during preceding years. Over the past five years, food prices rose at an annual rate of 9.5%, 
whereas prices in general increased at a rate of 11.4%. In 1980, when the inflation rate peaked at 18% 
(as an annual average), food prices climbed 17%. Agricultural promotion and credit policies, 
particularly those relating to grain production, have certainly helped to hold down the increase in 
food prices. 
429 
Although inflation slowed in 1983, real minimum wages fell by nearly 8%, since there were no 
wage adjustments during the year. Minimum wages paid in the various activities have lost about 10%, 
on average, of their purchasing power over the past four years, except in agriculture, where they 
increased by nearly 12% in real terms during that period. Minimum wages in the manufacturing 
industry and in construction were the hardest hit (see table 15). 
The wages of public employees have been frozen since 1980; only isolated wage hikes were 
granted —which had been established under collective agreements signed prior to that time— to 
workers in decentralized institutions, but in no case did such increases exceed 15%. The decline in real 
wages and the high levels of unemployment occasioned by the recession led to serious labour conflicts 
in various sectors from the beginning of the year, and these conflicts threatened to spread to almost 
the entire country. Two such situations were the strike by municipal employees of San Pedro Sula in 
which several thousand workers participated, and the work stoppage by employees of public health 
institutions. In addition, the reduction of the budget for education and health which was made in 
September gave rise to protest demonstrations by workers in these sectors. These demonstrations 
were not successful in reducing the number of layoffs or in raising wages. 
Table 15 
HONDURAS: TRENDS IN MINIMUM WAGES 
1980 1981 1982 1983 
Indexes (1976= 100) 
Minimum wages" 
Nominal 
Agriculture and stock raising 
Manufacturing and mining 
Artisanal activities 
Construction 
Commerce and services 
Real 
Agriculture and stock raising 
Manufacturing and mining 
Artisanal activities 
Construction 
Commerce and services 
Minimum wages" 
Nominal 
Agriculture and stock-raising 
Manufacturing and mining 
Artisanal activities 
Construction 
Commerce and services 
Real 
Agriculture and stock-raising 
Manufacturing and mining 
Artisanal activities 
Construction 

















































































Source: LCLAC, on the basis of official data. 
"Minimum wages correspond to annual averages in the Central District and San Pedro Sula. Since 1974, they have been adjusted in December 
1978, May 1980, June 1981 and during 1982. 
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HONDURAS 
5. Fiscal and monetary policy 
a) Fiscal policy 
One of the main imbalances in the Honduran economy is in central government finance. It has 
become more severe with the rapid growth of expenses and the slower increase of income, giving rise 
to an increasing deficit. In 1982, the fiscal deficit peaked when total expenditure rose by 24% while 
current income climbed by only 4%, reaching the point where it represented 14% of the gross 
domestic product (see table 16). 
In 1982, the serious situation led the authorities to conclude the above-mentioned agreement 
with the International Monetary Fund under very strict guidelines for an adjustment policy; although, 
in general, a number of goals were met, this policy was not successful in putting government finances 
on a completely sound footing. In the last year, some factors of distortion were reduced, but the 
negative effects of others continued to be felt and were compounded by additional pressure on 
expenditures which, during the preceding fiscal year, had gone largely unnoticed. 
As a first step, an attempt was made to reduce expenditure on the purchase of non-personal 
goods and services, to abstain from filling vacancies as they came up and to abstain from granting 
wage increases. In addition, it was decided to reduce real investment by concentrating on those 
projects already underway and initiating only the most essential works. 
Secondly, in view of the fact that central government finances had been subject to pressure in 
preceding years from the subsidies given to decentralized enterprises, the prices and tariffs of public 
services were increased in order to avoid the need to provide additional financing. 
Two phenomena contributed to the fact that the proposed goals were not met. The first factor 
was the decentralized institutions' need for transfers or direct payments combined with a relative lack 
of consistency in the setting of priorities and in the initiatives taken by various agencies. The second 
factor was that the conflicts affecting the country and the rest of Central America encouraged 
increased defence spending. 
The government had to continue to meet the commitments of various public companies, 
including some branches of CONADI. Most of these commitments involved the servicing of external 
credit, which gave rise to the need to transfer a larger amount than had been expected. 
Another cause of the failure to meet the goals of the economic adjustment was a decrease of, 
approximately 200 million lempiras in the current income budgeted by the government. There was 
virtually no variation in tax receipts; direct taxes fell by slightly more than 3% and indirect taxes rose 
by less than 1%. Revenue from income tax was less than had been planned, despited the fact that a 
surtax was applied to the existing rates. There was apparently a measure of over-optimism in 
drawing up the budget, and the effects of the 1982 depression and of the economic situation in 1983 
were underestimated. There were also unforeseeable factors, however, which influenced the poor 
results of the tax revenue. One of these, for example, was that a large foreign banana company was 
given permission to postpone the payment of its taxes until it recovered its production levels, which 
had been seriously afected by hurricane winds. In addition, the revenue from import duties was 100 
million lempiras lower than had been expected. Although the agreement signed in 1982 with the 
International Monetary Fund had provided for an increase in tariffs, this measure was not 
implemented. 
With the near stagnation of tax revenue in 1981 and 1983 and the small increase recorded in 
1982, the tax burden gradually fell from 14% in 1980 to 12% in 1983. In addition to the worsening 
economic situation in general and other factors which may have influenced the erratic trends seen in 
tax collection, it is possible that a certain degree of tax evasion may have played some part. 
Current expenditure increased by 10% during 1983, more rapidly than in the two preceding 
years. Since 1980, the amount of interest payments has risen from 54 million lempiras to 115 million, 
and this figure increased by 42% in the last year alone. The purchase of goods and services also rose 
substantially in 1983; wages, on the other hand, increased by little more than 5% and transfers 
decreased. 
Capital expenditure fell by nearly 18%. Nonetheless, real investment in current terms rose by 
11% and amortization payments on the debt by 40%, making this the first time that they had 
exceeded investment (by 39 million lempiras). The decrease in capital expenditure corresponded 
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entirely to the "other capital expenditure" entry, which dropped by 48% as a result of the decrease in 
financial investment and, primarily, of the drop in capital transfer to the rest of the public sector. 
Finally, even though the deficit on the central government balance was slightly lower in 1983, a 
marked imbalance that exceeded the planned goals persisted; it represented slightly less than 50% of 
total expenditure and nearly 13% of the gross domestic product. 
b) Monetary policy 
Between the end of 1982 and the end of 1983, money and quasi-money expanded by much larger 
percentages than the gross domestic product at current prices (around 6%), and the coefficient of 
liquidity rose as a result. Money outside banks and demand deposits rose by a similar amount, which 
Table 16 
HONDURAS: CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INCOME AND EXPENDITURE 




On foreign trade 
Non-tax revenue 
2. Current expenditure 
Wages and salaries 
Purchases of goods and services 
Interest payments 
Transfer payments 
3. Current savings (1-2) 
4. Capital expenditure 
Real investment 
Debt amortization payments 
External 
Domestic 
Other capital expenditure 
5. Total expenditure 
6. Fiscal deficit (1-5) 






Current savings/capital expenditure 




































































































































































































































HONDURAS: MONETARY BALANCE 
Money 
Currency outside banks 
Demand deposits 
Factors of expansion 





Factors of absorption 
Quasi-money (savings and time deposits) 
Bonds 
Long-term foreign borrowing 
Other items (net) 
Year-end balance i in 






















































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of data supplied by the Central Bank of Honduras. 
"Preliminary figures. 
was a departure from what had occurred in previous years. Savings and time deposits continued to 
grow rapidly (24%), as they had in the two preceding years. In the midst of the serious external 
financial situation of recent years, depositors, attracted by positive interest rates in real terms, placed 
their trust in the banking system within the country (see table 17). 
The expansion in the money supply was bolstered by an increase in domestic credit (17.6%), 
which was twice as high as the rate of inflation. Although the monetary authorities tried to stay in line 
with the goals set forth in the agreement with the International Monetary Fund, it was not always 
possible to achieve them. Thus, the net amount of credit extended to the government, which had 
grown much more slowly in 1982, rose substantially in 1983 (27%). Since 1980, credit received by the 
private sector has expanded at the much lower rate of approximately 10% annually. To a slight 
extent, the increase in domestic credit was offset by a further reduction in net international reserves. 
During the last two months of the year, rapid increases occurred in some monetary variables. In 
the midst of a situation marked by a sharp imbalance in the balance of payments and in fiscal accounts, 




1. Recent economic trends: Introduction and summary 
Throughout 1983 the Mexican economy was subject to strong recessive pressures, as a consequence of 
a large number of internal and external factors, significant among which were the aftermath of 
unprecedented disequilibria existing during 19821 and the subsequent implementation of a 
stabilization programme launched by the authorities in order to cope with them. To that end, 
adjustment policies were focused, in the short run, on the reduction of the fiscal deficit and the 
correction of external accounts with the purpose of rapidly coping with foreign exchange shortage 
and inflation, and thus creating a minimum platform on which to base economic reactivation. 
The effects of the shift suffered by the economy in 1982, after four consecutive years of rapid 
growth, were only partial in that year, in view of the dynamism of former periods. But during 1983 
the crisis was fully felt, not now as an acute problem of foreign exchange shortage, but as an overall 
process of recession with high inflation, a drop in consumption levels and the uncertainty of private 
economic agents as to the general trend of the economy. 
The gross domestic product declined for the second consecutive year, this time by 4.7%, a drop 
only exceeded by that recorded half a century ago, during the depression of the 1930s. This implied a 
contraction in the per capita income of 7%, which virtually annulled the advances recorded by this 
indicator in the years of greatest economic boom (see table 1). Although these recessive phenomena 
were not experienced with the same harshness in all sectors of the economy, nor in all geographic 
regions, they produced as a whole serious disturbances in the economic and social structure of the 
country. 
In 1982 the crisis had been characterized by a large public sector deficit which reached the 
equivalent of 18% of the gross domestic product,2 and an increasing external public debt mainly 
contracted during that year and the preceding ones, in order to finance such deficit, as well as by an 
inordinate rate of inflation of nearly 100% and by severe external disequilibria which were reflected, 
among other things, in a massive capital flight, an acute foreign exchange shortage and a rapid and 
progressive monetary devaluation. The situation of widespread uncertainty in 1982 was also due to 
the adoption of policy instruments of opposite sign, not always consistent with one another.5 
The new administration decided to face the crisis by means of the Immediate Economic 
Reorganization Programme (PIRE), announced on 1 December 1982. Significant among its objectives 
were the management of inflationary pressures, a decrease in the growth of public expenditure, the 
selective protection of the productive system and employment, a discipline in programming and 
implementing public expenditure, and the recovery of the control of the exchange market by the 
State. 
In principle, PIRE was consistent with the extended facility agreement subscribed with the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) by the former government, and ratified by the present 
administration, which will be in force during the period 1983-1985. This programme is part of the 
National Development Plan (1983-1988) published in May which includes the policy guidelines and 
objectives for the sexennium. Significant among the latter is that which aims at achieving structural 
changes in the productive system (in order to maintain a steady growth of the economy by means of 
expanding the domestic market), a more efficient insertion in the international economy and the 
generation of permanent labour sources. Likewise, the need to build up conditions for a more 
egalitarian society is stressed, an increasing challenge in the short run in the light of the adjustment 
programme effects on the distributive structure. 
•See the chapter on Mexico in ECLAC, Economic Survey of Latin America and the Caribbean, 1982. Santiago, 1984. 
2 The extraordinary magnitude of this amount is ex plained in part by the large disbursements made for external interest payments which 
multiplied with devaluation. 
'See the chapter on Mexico, Economic Survey of Latin America and the Caribbean, 1982, op.cit. 
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Given the serious disequilibria both in the real and financial spheres, the administration was 
forced to centre its first efforts on coping with monetary and financial problems, particularly those 
related with foreign exchange shortage, reorganization of the exchange market, debt renegotiation 
and inflation. With the short-term measures which were applied it was possible to diminish the 
public deficit in the envisaged proportion, although at the expense of investment, given the 
enormous weight of the debt service on public finances. The surplus on the balance of payments 
greatly exceeded expectations —especially owing to a drastic fall in imports— allowing a notable 
restoration of the international monetary reserves, despite the fact that the external economic 
situation remained adverse to Mexico. Finally, it was possible to reduce inflation and to dispel the 
danger of plunging into chronic hyper-inflation. 
Table 1 
MEXICO: MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS 
Basic economic indicators 
Gross domestic product at market 
prices (millions of 1970 dollars) 
Population (millions of inhabitants) 
Per capita gross domestic product 
(1970 dollars) 
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983° 
80091 87 460 94 803 102 338 101784 97 000 
65.7 67.5 69.4 71.2 73.1 75.1 
1 220 1 295 1 366 1 436 1 391 1 291 
Growth rates 
B. Short-term economic indicators 
Gross domestic product 
Per capita gross domestic product 
Gross national income 
Terms of trade (goods and services) 
Current value of exports of goods 
and services 
Current value of imports of goods 
and services 
Consumer prices 
December to December 
Variation between annual averages 
Moneyr 
Wages and salaries 
Unemployment rate 
Current income of government 
Total expenditure of government 
Fiscal deficit/total government expenditure 
Financial deficit of the public sector/GDP^ 
Millions 
C. External sector 
Trade balance (goods and services) 
Balance on current account 
Balance on capital account 



























































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official data. 
"Provisional figures. ftGross domestic product plus terms-of-trade effect, less net factor payments to the rest of the world and net private 
grants. 'Money in circulation: notes and checking accounts. Refers to minimum wages and annual averages. e Weighted 
average for the metropolitan areas of Mexico City, Guadalajara and Monterrey. Percentages. g End-of-year figures for total 
outstanding external debt. 
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The multiple economic restrictions affected a large number of productive sectors. In contrast, in 
spite of the uncertainty predominating in the international economy, the new deterioration of the 
terms of trade, and the high interest rates which prevailed throughout the year, it was possible to 
increase the volume of exports by nearly 13%. Exchange undervaluation and the existence of 
exportable surpluses had an influence on this increase, factors which allowed the support of activities 
such as petrochemicals, assembly industries —particularly motor-vehicle industries— and certain 
mining industries. On the other hand, industrial branches oriented to the domestic market underwent 
severe contractions, owing to a drop in consumption (-5%) and a steep fall in investment (-25%). 
Even the petroleum industry, which had recorded a dramatic growth in recent years, diminished by 
0.6% owing to a sharp decline in domestic demand, and despite a rise in the volume of crude exports. 
For its part, manufacturing, which had fostered development during decades, suffered a decline of 
7%; among the most affected branches were those producing capital goods (-26%) and durable 
consumer goods (-18%), but even non-durable manufacturing diminished by 5%. Construction was 
hit the hardest by the decline in investment: only housing construction retained some dynamism. 
Mining, transport, commerce and other services also declined. In contrast, owing in part to favourable 
climatic factors, agriculture grew by 3%, a rate that slightly exceeded population growth. Finally, the 
electrical sector expanded by slightly over 1%. 
The considerable downturn in economic activity aggravated unemployment, particularly 
affecting occasional workers in industrial centres. On the other hand, in the northern frontier strip, in 
tourist centres and in some agricultural areas there was a greater absorption of manpower. In any 
event, the contraction in the number of wage earners and employment were crucial factors in the 
decline in private consumption of nearly 5% and in the worsening of income distribution. These 
phenomena were the most overt manifestations of the social and economic cost of the crisis and of the 
adjustment policies applied to combat it. 
Within the framework of such policies, the authorities established a dual exchange system and 
effected a severe devaluation at the end of December 1982. In view of instability expectations, on 20 
December, a new exchange rate was set at an extremely high level, which was modified during 1983 
by means of a daily variation scale.4 This measure was supplemented by the maintenance of many of 
the controls associated with foreign exchange sales established previously. The combination of these 
measures —an extremely high free exchange rate and the active management of a dual exchange 
system which became more efficient over time, owing in part to an improved control exerted by 
means of a nationalized banking system— reduced to a great extent —although it did not eliminate 
completely- the capital flow to the exterior, particularly that stemming from speculative operations. 
Although the monetary authorities succeeded in recovering the control of the exchange markets, 
apparently certain irregularities in external transactions arose, such as undervaluation of exports and 
overinvoicing of imports, encouraged by the existence of a dual exchange rate system. Thus, in some 
cases the liquidation of external sales at the least favourable exchange rate discouraged export efforts, 
regardless of a considerable exchange difference. 
As regards the restructuring of the external debt, negotiations conducted with the IMF and the 
international financial community allowed a gradual reversal of the climate of uncertainty which had 
emerged in the exterior and the renegotiation of around US$ 22.5 billion of the public external debt, 
whose amortization payments fell due between August 1982 and December 1984. These were 
rescheduled with refinancing for an eight-year term, including four years of grace, but with relatively 
high interest and commission surcharges. Thus, amortization payments were postponed until the 
1987-1990 period, which gave a temporary financial relief. 
Likewise, through the Trust Fund for the Coverage of Exchange Risks (FICORCA), established in 
the Banco de México to facilitate external debt payments of private enterprises and to protect the 
productive system from bankruptcy owing to devaluation, it was possible to renegotiate US$ 11.6 
billion of the approximately US$ 20 billion of the private debt. 
The debt management was internationally praised. However, the country's indebtedness is still 
high —US$ 82 billion— a factor which will remain a limitation to its future development. 
4 On the basis of an exchange rate of 70 pesos per dollar applicable to the majority of external transactions, in December 1982 a "free" 
exchange rate of 150 pesos per dollar was established which remained fixed until September 1983, when daily variations began to be applied 
which raised it at the end of the year to 163 pesos per dollar. A "controlled" exchange rate, applicable to the majority of external transactions, was 
established in December 1982 at 95 pesos per dollar and, after a continuous variation it came to 144 pesos one year later. 
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Figure 1 
MEXICO: MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS 
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Meanwhile, although in 1983 it was possible to defer amortization payments, interest payments 
alone —amounting to nearly US$ 10 billion— accounted for more than 60% of foreign exchange 
earnings from hydrocarbon exports and to nearly 20% of public sector expenditure. 
Other top priority objectives of economic policy were the reduction of the public deficit and of 
the rate of inflation. In the case of the latter, it has been considered that one of the fundamental causes 
for price increases in the recent past was excess demand caused by the great expansion of public 
expenditure and its financing pattern. With the aim of reducing the share of the public deficit with 
respect to the product —in the conditions described of a high public debt servicing— a strict austerity 
programme was applied, involving a considerable sacrifice in investment programmes, as well as 
important restrictions on current expenditure.5 As regards income, taxes were raised —especially 
those on consumption— but these did not supply the originally estimated resources, owing mainly to 
a real contraction in the taxable base because of a lower economic activity. The review of the major 
part of prices and tariffs of public goods and services had a greater influence, since it was estimated 
that their increase would provide an amount equivalent to 2.5% of the product. 
The combination of these measures resulted in reducing the public sector deficit to 8.7 % of the 
product in 1983, thus nearly fulfilling the goal established by the authorities in PIRE and also included 
in the Letter of Intent addressed to the IMF. Although the goals of putting public finances on a sound 
footing were fulfilled, inflation could not be controlled as much as expected, since between December 
1982 and December 1983 consumer prices recorded a variation of 80%, instead of an estimated 60%. 
However, this implied a slowdown compared with the figures of 1982 and the rate of 117% reached 
in April 1983, with respect to the same month of the preceding year. Moreover, an important 
achievement of the stabilization programme was the oppportune avoidance of hyper-inflation. The 
steep rise in the price of foreign exchange, the substantial revision of most of the prices and tariffs of 
public goods and services, higher indirect taxes and high active interest rates in nominal terms, were 
factors which, although in the long term they will diminish the rate of inflation, had immediate 
effects on costs. In contrast, other elements which have traditionally caused inflationary pressures, 
such as the increase in money supply and bank credit, remained in 1983 within conservative bounds. 
The fact that the public deficit had been reduced and had been financed with resources from domestic 
savings reduced the need to increase the primary issue of money. 
At the same time, the existence of an exchange control system contributed to unpeg, at least in 
part, domestic from external interest rates and to preserve the passive rates at positive levels 
nominally, though negative in real terms in most months of the year. Owing to a wide differential 
between the cost of passive operations and the active rates, and to different commissions and outlays 
for credit openings, the effective active rates ramained high and discouraged credit contracts. The 
banking system procured resources from individuals for 1 500 billion pesos, but could not place them 
entirely. Thus there remained a surplus of nearly 400 billion pesos, which was absorbed by the Banco 
de México through bidding, or was placed in securities issued by the government. 
Also within the framework of an anti-inflationary policy, in order to inhibit effective demand 
and to lessen the effects on costs, it was decided to pursue a restrictive wage policy. In the light of a 
critical economic situation and a contraction in productivity, strict limitations were imposed on wage 
adjustments, which were far below price increases. The minimum wage, the only indicator available, 
suffered a real drop estimated at 23% compared with the average of 1982 and of 33% with respect to 
that of 1976, when it historically reached its peak. Although it is hard to assess the behaviour of 
government allowances and subsidies, which may constitute an important component in the income 
of wage earners, as well as the income evolution of workers not subject to the minimum wage, it is 
estimated that the share of wages in the gross domestic product declined as a whole from 40% to 
approximately 30% in the course of the last year. Increasing unemployment, as well as a commitment 
to restraint accepted by unions enrolled in the official party, contributed to that reduction. Thus the 
wage policy became another element of contraction in effective demand. 
Another priority objective of the economic policy was to reverse external account imbalances 
and to rebuild international monetary reserves. Results exceeded expectations, mainly because of a 
46% decline in the value of imports of goods, since the current value of external sales of goods and 
5 It is estimated that real contraction was 36% in investment expenditure and 11% in current expenditure. 
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services declined slightly. Thus, a trade surplus of over US$ 14 billion was obtained, which was nearly 
double that of 1982. This sum exceeded by a wide margin the amount of factor payments to the 
exterior and therefore the current account closed with a surplus of US$ 5.3 billion (see figure 1). As a 
result of the exchange policy, the evolution of foreign trade and the debt renegotiation, international 
monetary reserves increased by US$ 3.1 billion. However, there were no signs of a return of the large 
capital amounts which had previously abandoned the country, nor of a significant reactivation of 
foreign investment. 
In brief, 1983 was a year of important changes in economic policy, which had to face a complex 
situation of marked financial imbalances that had been encouraging pressures towards economic 
recession. Finally, the package of economic policies applied in the short run reversed the trend of 
those imbalances, especially those affecting the external sector. However, despite the fact that the 
authorities intended to apply these policies in a selective manner and to insert the stabilization 
programme within the framework of a wider economic reactivation project reflected in the National 
Development Plan for 1983-1988, their application had necessarily a high social cost in terms of a 
drop in the levels of production, productivity, employment and real income. 
2. Trends in economic activity 
a) Global supply and demand trends 
In 1983 the depressive situation of the economy worsened. All macroeconomic variables 
suffered severe contractions, with the sole exception of the volume of exports of goods and services, 
which, thanks to an increase in sales of petroleum and petrochemical products, as well as a favourable 
response from some manufactures and the reactivation of tourism, increased by 13 %. Nevertheless, 
their value diminished slightly in view, among other things, of a sharp decline in the prices of 
exported products. 
In addition to the drop of nearly 5 % in total supply in 1982 —after four years of unprecedented 
expansion—, it suffered another decline of over 7% in 1983, so that it fell to a level barely higher than 
that already reached in 1979- This completely annulled the progress achieved in terms of per capita 
income in the 1980-1981 biennium (see table 2). 
The gross domestic product, which had been expected to remain stationary, suffered the above-
mentioned decline of 4.7%. In this respect the restrictions imposed on economic development by the 
stabilization and adjustment programme adopted to contain inflation and to mitigate external and 
fiscal imbalances, had a major influence. The shortage of foreign exchange for importing inputs, the 
sharp contraction in public expenditure, the financial difficulties of enterprises, a more expensive 
credit and a drastic reduction in the demand for consumer goods, were the main factors responsible 
for the unfavourable performance of the various sectors of the economy. 
Imports of goods and services were also constrained because of a rise in the exchange rate and a 
shortage of foreign exchange, thus declining again sharply, this time by 40%. Hence the trend 
towards an increasing opening up to the exterior which had occurred in recent years was reversed, and 
the import coefficient, which had accounted for nearly 11 % of the product in 1980, diminished to less 
than 5% in 1983. 
In contrast with the dynamism in external demand, all components of domestic demand 
experienced significant reductions. As envisaged, investment expenditure suffered a greater 
contraction than consumption expenditure. Thus, gross fixed investment declined by 25 % and public 
investment fell by nearly 29%. Private investment, in turn, dropped by 23 % because of the climate of 
uncertainty prevailing among entrepreneurs, the drop in domestic demand and the financial 
difficulties of corporations. For example, investment in construction fell by 16%, because no large-
scale projects were undertaken, and the decline in the purchase of machinery —which was over 
37 %— even impaired in some cases the replenishment of capital assets. However, most enterprises 
operated at such a low capacity that the purchase of new equipment was unnecessary. 
Unlike 1982, when consumption still experienced a moderate increase, in 1983 it declined by 
nearly 5%, owing to both a contraction of 5.5% in government consumption and a drop of nearly 5% 
in private consumption. The latter reflected the effects of a decline in the purchasing power of the 
population caused by an increase in unemployment and an unprecedented contraction in real wages, 




MEXICO: TOTAL SUPPLY AND DEMAND 
Total supply 
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Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures supplied by the Ministry of Programming and the Budget. 
" Provisional figures. The figures for imports and exports of goods and services were taken from balance-of-payments data in dollars at 
current prices, which were converted to constant 1970 values by using price indexes calculated by ECLAC for that purpose. 
b) Evolution of the main sectors 
As noted earlier, there was a widespread recession in the economy as a whole. Agriculture was 
an exception, which, thanks to a favourable agricultural cycle, grew by 3%. Electricity also showed a 
slight increase (1.3%), confirming the persistent slowdown in its growth rate in recent years. Some 
services, such as real estate, also recorded a scant expansion (see table 3). 
There was a remarkable stagnation in the petroleum industry, which in previous years had 
constituted the main driving force of the economy. Crude and gas exports recorded contractions 
owing to a drop in their prices; these were not offset by the dynamism shown in the production of 
some refined and petrochemical products. Domestic sales, in turn, diminished by 6% in real terms, as 
a result of the lower economic activity and price adjustments of fuels, which exceeded the inflationary 
rate. 
Manufacturing, which given its weight still plays an important role in the economy, suffered a 
drop for the second consecutive year, this time of 7%. With the exception of the petrochemical 
industry, the remainder of the sector contracted; the production of capital goods declined considerably 
and that of motor-vehicles, even more. The shortage of foreign exchange for purchasing inputs, the 
credit restrictions, and particularly, the weakening of the domestic market, explain this behaviour, 
which was not helped by a dynamic external demand. Only some branches showed positive responses 
and these were, as a rule, those controlled by transnational corporations. 
Construction was the activity which recorded the greatest decline (-14%) because no new public 
works had been initiated and private investment was sluggish. Only housing construction showed a 
certain dynamism. Significant, among services, was the depression in commercial activity (-9%) 
because of its high share in total added value. This was associated with a decrease in the real income of 
the population, restrictions imposed on consumption credits and the drop in imports. 
As a whole, the added value of the production of goods declined more than that of services 
(-5.4% and -3.5% respectively). 
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i) Agriculture. Within a scenario of widespread recession, one of the few exceptions was the 
evolution of agriculture. In fact, after a decline recorded in the preceding year, its product increased by 
3.4%, owing to the important role played by crop-farming, whose performance exceeded that of 
livestock and that of the other two relatively less important subsectors.6 
Despite the relatively satisfactory growth attained in 1983, production barely recovered in some 
cases the volumes of 1981. However, it is of interest to stress the efforts made within the framework 
of agricultural policy to expand production, with the triple objective of substantially increasing 
agricultural exports and improving the trade balance of the sector; of promoting the production of 
basic grains intended for domestic consumption, especially maize; and of increasing the demand for 
labour in the sector in order to reduce migration to the cities, thus mitigating, to some extent, the 
decline in employment levels in urban areas caused mainly by the recession in manufacturing and 
construction. 
During 1983 there was an increase in production of nearly all the main crops, except coffee, 
among export items, and wheat, among the products of domestic consumption (see table 4). 
Among the export crops, cotton production rose sharply (18%). However, since in 1982 this 
had declined considerably, particularly owing to the sharp drop in its international price, it barely 
represented in 1983 two-thirds of the volume obtained in 1981. 
Table 3 
MEXICO: GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT BY KIND OF ECONOMIC 
ACTIVITY, AT FACTOR COST 
Gross domestic product 
Goods 






Electricity, gas and water 
Transport, storage and 
communications 
Millions of dollars 



















































































































Wholesale and retail commerce, 
restaurants and hotels 
Financial institutions, 
insurance, real estate and 
business services 
Ownership of dwellings 
Community, social and 
personal services 
Government services 
Less: commission on bank 
services 
47 792 48 441 46 581 51.6 49.6 50.4 7.3 7.0 1.4 -3.8 
24 144 23 888 21 834 25.9 24.9 23.6 8.3 7.6 -1.1 -8.6 
9 249 9 518 9 727 11.3 9.8 10.5 4.6 4.8 2.9 2.2 
7 243 7 456 7 620 9.4 7.8 8.3 3.5 3.3 2.9 2.2 
14 399 15 035 15 020 14.4 14.9 16.3 7.5 7.7 4.4 -0.1 
3 404 3 553 ... 3.0 3.5 ... 10.3 9.1 4.4 
1 376 1 411 1 409 1.5 1.4 1.5 11.9 11.2 2.5 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures supplied by the Ministry of Programming and the Budget. 
"Provisional figures. As the general method applied in the calculation was to extrapolate independently individual activities and the 
total, the sum of the former does not correspond exactly with the latter. 




Coffee was one of the few items which suffered a drastic decline in output (-31%) in 1983, 
mainly because of the pernicious effects of rust. For some years now efforts have been made to control 
this disease, and plantation afforestation programmes have been carried out, in an attempt to 
introduce varieties more resistant to the blight. Despite this, rust has continued to spread, since 
eradication campaigns will only give full results when control measures are taken at the regional 
level, including Central America. 
Tomato production showed the most dynamic growth in agriculture ( 121 %) , but starting from 
extremely low levels. This item had declined in the preceding biennium because of the high cost of 
inputs and restrictions imposed on imports in the United States. The upturn of 1983 was due, among 
other factors, to the slackening of these restrictive measures, owing to a drop in harvests in that 
country. 
With respect to products intended for the domestic market, signs of recovery were observed 
after an exceptionally unfavourable crop-year, attributable in part to adverse natural factors. 
However, as noted earlier, the production levels of 1981, the highest in the last 15 years, were not 
reached. The lower harvests of 1982 forced the import in 1983 of very large amounts of some basic 
goods, which exerted a pressure on the balance of payments. In any case, there were evident successes 
in respect of maize and beans,essential items in the people's diet, whose production grew by 32% and 
38%, respectively. The increase of 7% in sorghum production was, however, meagre in view of the 
decline of 25% in the preceding year. For its part, the wheat harvest dropped by 20%, owing to a 
policy designed to avoid the overproduction of the preceding year. Finally, there was a remarkable 
success in sugar cane, the only one among the ten major crops which attained the greatest production 
in history in 1983, thanks to the incentives that this activity has received in order to diminish the 
dependence of external supply, as well as to meet the raw material needs of sugar mills which came 
into operation in recent years. 
Although no quantitative information on livestock was available, it may be stated that in 1983 
this activity was subject to strong pressures which in some way affected its structure. Persistent cost 
increases, stemming in part from a rise in input prices —some coming from abroad— triggered a 
debate between producers and authorities, since the former wanted to transfer the said increases to 
the price of products such as milk. Although price rises did take place, they were not enough, 
according to producers, to reflect the higher costs. In any event, price increases in dairy products 
contributed to reduce sales, which were also affected by the substantial loss in the purchasing power of 
the majority of the population. Thus, a large numbr of cattle breeders preferred to sacrifice their dairy 
stock through considering their profits insufficient. Part of this slaughtering was destined to meet an 
increased external demand, and these sales were augmented by exports of cattle on the hoof. Given 
the importance of bovine cattle in livestock activity as a whole, this increased slaughtering and the 
reduction of the herd —whose reconstitution will demand great efforts over a long period— were 
reflected, paradoxically, in a slight expansion in the activity rate during the year. 
ii) Fishing. Fishing production dropped by somewhat over 5%, in contrast with its expansion 
in 1982 and its dramatic dynamism during the 1977-1981 quinquennium. Such decline arose from the 
situation prevailing in the economy as a whole. Hence, in addition to public expenditure adjustments 
which led to lower income and investments in the sector, there were increases in the prices of basic 
inputs, thus raising costs. The scheduled catch goals were therefore not fulfilled. 
The production for industrial use plummeted (-68%), owing to serious difficulties in importing 
tin-plate. This led to a drop in exports, which sank from 18 000 tons in 1982 to 8 000 in 1983, being 
also affected by the prohibition imposed by the United States on fish meal imports. 
Shrimps still remained the major fishing product as a source of foreign exchange. This 
shellfish, together with carp, in the category of whole fresh fish, and seaweed for industrial use, were 
the only species whose catch increased: shrimps by nearly 26%, carp by 25% and seaweed by 23%. 
The catch of other species on the other hand, declined appreciably: tuna fish by 24%, sardines by 26% 
and anchovies by nearly 58%. 
The evolution by regions was heterogeneous. Whereas along the Pacific coast fishing declined 
by nearly 36%, in the Gulf and the Caribbean it rose by approximately 2%. Lake areas recorded the 
greatest contraction (-60%). 
iii) Mining. The fall of nearly 4% in mining production exceeded that of the preceding year 
(see table 5). The upturn in the exports of some products could not offset the weakness in the 
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external demand for others. For example, gold and silver extraction, which had declined in 1982, 
increased sharply. This momentum stemmed from an increased external demand for precious metals, 
and in the case of silver —of which Mexico still remains the major world producer— it was facilitated 
by the discovery of new deposits and by improvements in the methods of ore processing. 
On the other hand, there was a sharp decrease in copper production (-13%), which had 
increased remarkably in the 1980-1981 biennium. The slump in production of this metal is likely to 
have reflected more than any other the impact of a drop in the domestic demand of various productive 
branches, particularly the motor-vehicle industry, durable consumption goods, the iron and steel 
industry and construction. 
Significant among the non-ferrous metals was the growth in production of lead and zinc, 
attributable to a recovery of external demand. Exports of the former rose by 30% and those of the 
latter increased by 40% thanks to the entry into operation of a modern refinery in 1982. As regards 
ores for the iron and steel industry, production dropped again owing to a lower industrial demand, as 
in the case of iron (-3.5%) and manganese (-27%). Finally, the production of most non-metallic 
minerals also diminished. 
Table 4 
MEXICO: INDICATORS OF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION 
1975 1980 1981 1982" 1983° 
Growth rates 
1980 1981 1982" 1983" 
Indicators of agricultural 
production (base 1970 = 100) 115.9 139.9 148.4 140.8 149.6 7.1 6.1 -5.1 6.3 
Agriculture 113.2 138.4 149.6 130.0 144.4 10.0 8.1 -13.1 11.1 
Livestock production 119.4 138.2 142.5 146.3 149.7 3.0 3.1 2.7 2.3 
Forestry 109.6 135.5 136.0 136.1 136.8 2.2 0.4 0.1 0.5 
Fishing and hunting 153.1 245.6 274.1 290.8 275.7 10.5 11.6 6.1 -5.2 
Production of main crops1 
For export 
Unginned cotton 206 329 335 196 232 -4.8 1.9 -41.3 18.1 
Coffee 228 193 244 313 217 -13.7 26.4 28.4 -30.6 
Tomatoes 1 056 1 458 1 074 645 1 422 -4.9 -26.3 -40.0 120.7 
For domestic consumption 
Maize 8 449 12 383 14 766 10 129 13 423 46.6 19.2 -31.4 32.5 
Beans 1 027 971 1 469 943 1 302 51.5 51.2 -35.8 38.0 
Wheat 2 798 2 785 3 189 4 462 3 491 22.0 14.5 39.9 -21.8 
Sorghum 4 126 4 812 6 296 4 717 5 068 20.5 30.8 -25.1 7.4 
Sugar cane 35 841 36 480 34 905 34 066 37 732 5.5 -4.3 -2.4 10.8 
Soya 599 312 712 648 683 -55.6 128.4 -9.0 5.5 
Lucerne 14260 18 360 15 999 15 039 17 867 14.1 -12.9 -6.0 18.8 
Indicators of livestock 
production 
Slaughter' 
Beef cattle 763 1 016 1 126 1 201 ... 6.7 10.8 6.6 
Swine 810 1 250 1 307 1 365 ... 7.2 4.5 4.4 
Sheep 21 22 23 24 ... 3.8 2.8 2.7 
Poultry 296 399 426 450 ... 8.9 6.8 5.5 
Milk' 5 809 6 742 6 856 6 924 ... 1.5 1.7 1.0 
Eggs' 6 790 9 666 9 956 10 355 ... 7.3 3.0 4.0 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official data. 
"Preliminary figures. ''The structure of the product in terms of 1980 current values was as follows: crop farming, 60.8%; livestock 




MEXICO: INDICATORS OF MINING PRODUCTION 
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Source: ECLAC, on the basis of data supplied by the Ministry of Programming and the Budget. 
" Provisional figures. Calculated on the basis of total, not rounded, figures. c Kilograms. Tons. ' Thousands of tons. 
iv) Petroleum. Various factors determined a loss of dynamism in the petroleum sector, whose 
added value and extraction index shrank nearly 1% and 2%, respectively (see table 6). In the first 
place, trends in the international petroleum market experienced a sudden change as from mid-1981: 
international prices declined and world consumption dropped. To the persistence of a depressed 
external market was added the deep recession of the national economy, which curbed the expansion 
plans of the petroleum industry, owing to a substantial contraction in investment and financing 
—through budgetary restrictions imposed by the adjustment and stabilization policies— and to a 
decrease in domestic demand because of the rise in petroleum derivatives and the contraction of the 
economic activity as a whole. These latter factors led to a fall of 6% in the domestic consumption of 
petroleum. Thus the extraction of crude and condensed petroleum decreased by nearly 2 % and that of 
natural gas by over 4%. 
In spite of the foregoing, Mexico was able to increase by 3 % the volume of crude exports. These 
amounted to 560 million barrels, that is, to a daily rate of 1 536 000 barrels, thus slightly exceeding 
the established export goal. Of this volume, 44% corresponded to the Isthmus type (light) and 56% 
to the Maya type (heavy). However, foreign exchange earnings (US$ 14.8 billion) dropped by 5%, 
owing to an average decrease of 8% in prices. As from February the quotations for the Isthmus type 
dropped from US$ 33 to US$ 29 and those of the Maya type from US$ 25 to US$ 23. Nevertheless, 
the price of the latter rose by one dollar in August and by another in October, reaching again by the 
end of 1983 the price of US$ 25 per barrel. 
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For its part, the volume of gas exports decreased from 2.9 billion cubic metres to 2.1 billion as 
United States purchases declined, which, added to a decline in prices, also of 8%, implied a reduction 
of nearly 27% in earnings. However, there was an exportable surplus of 80 000 barrels per day in 
derivatives —gasoline, turbo fuel, diesel and fuel oil—, besides an additional volume of various 
petrochemicals which compensated the decrease in external sales of gas. The country earned a total of 
US$ 16.5 billion from exports of petroleum products, that is, nearly the same amount as in 1982. 
Domestic petroleum consumption shrank owing to a downturn in industrial activity and also to 
a lower demand from individuals. Even so, the production of refined products was slightly ( 1 % ) over 
that of the preceding year. Gasoline price adjustments decreed in December 1982 and on two 
occasions during 1983 contributed to a reduction in their domestic consumption by 12%, allowing a 
supply of exportable surpluses. On the other hand, diesel production dropped by 13% and domestic 
consumption, by a similar percentage. Fuel oil production, in contrast, nearly equalled that of 1982 
and was enough to meet demand, which rose by 9%. The production of other refined products rose by 
7%, mainly because of a greater external demand for gas oil. 
In brief, the petroleum industry suffered a virtual stagnation, in contrast with its remarkable 
dynamism in preceding years. Significant progress was made in the field of distribution and the 
reactivation of the Tula and Salina Cruz refineries, and the petrochemical plants of La Cangrejera, 
Pajaritos and Morelos. Likewise, progress was made in developing facilities for using marine gas 
—especially the platforms of the Abkatún Complex— which improved the utilization of gas in Sonda 
de Campeche from 42% to 69% during the last biennium. Finally, there were the notable exploration 
works which gave positive results both in the mesozoic area of Chiapas-Tabasco and in Sonda de 
Campeche, which increased the country's proven reserves to 72.5 billion barrels. 
v) Manufacturing. Given the important share of manufacturing in the gross domestic product 
(23%) and its role as a source of employment, its fall of 7% in production was highly significant. This 
contraction was in addition to that of 3% experienced in 1982, and contrasted sharply with its 
development in preceding years (see table 7). 
Table 6 
MEXICO: INDICATORS OF PETROLEUM ACTIVITY 
Growth rates 
1980 1981* 1982 1983" 
1980 1981 1982 1983" 
Index of extraction of crude oil 
and natural gas (1970 = 100) 
Production of main items 
Petrolemc 






























































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures supplied by Petróleos Mexicanos (PEMEX). 




MEXICO: INDICATORS OF MANUFACTURING PRODUCTION 
Index of manufacturing 
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Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures 
"Preliminary figures. 'Billions of IcWh. 
The year 1983 was a particularly difficult year for manufacturing. Some of the essential 
elements on which its development was based were suddenly altered: the range of subsidies was 
reduced, mainly by revising prices and tariffs of public services and goods, and the traditional facility 
for importing equipment and inputs declined severely, owing to the shortage and increasing cost of 
foreign exchange and to exchange controls. To this were added a reduction in domestic demand and a 
strong credit contraction. 
These phenomena forced many enterprises to reorient their strategies in a climate of great 
uncertainty as to the trend of the economy. Some of them attempted to advance in the field of import 
substitution, and others, in face of the prospects of a permanent undervaluation of the peso, preferred 
to turn towards the external market with very mixed results, given the prevailing protectionist 
conditions. In this latter field, the enterprises which showed their traditional exporting ability were 
the affiliates of transnational corporations. Such was the case, for example, of factories producing 
motors and spare parts for automobiles which, within the framework of the industrial redeployment 
process followed by their parent companies, took advantage of cheap manpower and of domestic 
subsidies and exemptions.7 
'The climate of uncertainty mentioned above discouraged an increase in foreign investment during 1983. However, at the beginning of 
1984, with the relaxation of the law on foreign investment, the installation, in the frontier State of Sonora, of a large-scale assembly plant owned 
100% by foreign capital was announced, whose production is intended for the United States and Canadian markets. In various cities of the 
frontier States there are already in operation some factories manufacturing motors and spare-parts for automobiles. 
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In the almost total deterioration of the manufacturing sector, the production of non-durable 
consumer goods declined by 5%, that of durable consumer goods by 18%, that of raw materials by 
8%, and that of production goods by 26%. In the first group, food, beverages and tobacco, as well as 
textiles, decreased by 1 % and clothing by 2%. The demand for basic goods was, as a rule, affected by a 
rise in the price of products such as meat, milk and clothing and, above all, by a real reduction in 
wages. 
In the second group there was a remarkable drop in production of automobiles (-29% ) ,8 electric 
home-appliances (-17%), and radio and television sets (-13%). These drops were mainly a result of 
an increase in prices, a rise in interest rates, and the shortage of credit. 
The production of intermediate goods declined by 8% as a result of a lower industrial demand 
which affected the iron and steel industry and the branch of basic chemical products. On the other 
hand, the drop in construction affected the cement industry, whose surpluses were exported, as well 
as other inputs. Conversely, the basic petrochemical industry showed an extraordinary dynamism 
(27%) thanks to the entry into operation of five plants in the La Cangrejera complex. 
Finally, the manufacturing of capital goods was the most affected one owing to a fall in 
investment and to the few possibilities of exporting them on account of their low competitiveness. 
The drops in production of trucks (-60%) and agricultual machinery (-40%), were especially acute. 
vi) Construction. Being a very sensitive sector to fluctuations in economic activity, 
construction declined by 14% in 1983. This decrease, substantially higher than that of the economy as 
a whole, was directly associated with a contraction in public and private investment, and affected the 
industries manufacturing its inputs. It also had an adverse influence on the employment level, since 
around 330 000 workers were laid off, that is, nearly 18% of the personnel working in that sector 
during 1982 (see table 8). 
Given the policy of restriction on public expenditure, no new major projects were undertaken 
and only those already initiated were carried on. For this reason, public works contracted by nearly 
40%. This considerable drop resulted mainly from the suspension of new drilling works and of the 
construction of various refining and petrochemical plants by Petróleos Mexicanos (PEMEX), the 
notable decrease in investment by the Federal Commission on Electricity, the virtual stagnation in the 
construction of roads, hospitals and schools, as well as the almost complete paralyzation of the 
scheduled extensions of the underground railway network in Mexico City, since only those initiated by 
the former administration were concluded. 
Table 8 
MEXICO: INDICATORS OF CONSTRUCTION ACTIVITY 
Growth rates 
1975 1980 1981 1982 1983" ; 
1980 1981 1982 1983 
Index of volume of production 
(1970 = 100) 
Production of some of the most 
important building materials 
(thousands of tons) 
Reinforcing rod 
Seamless steel tubes 
































































-15.5 Employment (thousands of persons) 1 151 2 016 2 248 2 154 1 821 l; 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
"Preliminary figures. 
8This fall, Together with that of trucks (59%), led to a decline in motor-vehicle production of 41%. 
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MEXICO 
Private construction declined less (around 7%), owing in part to the fact that housing 
construction retained some growth (nearly 4%). This was due to the building of some low-cost 
housing estates, —which received credit support—, the incentives granted to self-help construction 
programmes, and the investment in luxury residences, which was used as a means of protection 
against inflation. Non-residential private building (industrial, commercial, offices) contracted, in 
contrast, more than public construction (nearly 40%). 
vii) Basic services. The aggregate product of basic services declined by 3 %. Electricity, gas and 
water, after maintaining high growth rates in previous years entered, as from 1982, upon a definite 
slowdown stage. The huge dependence of the electricity sector's growth on imported equipment and 
foreign credit placed it in a very vulnerable situation vis-a-vis global financial problems. 
Consequently various projects for expanding the power generation capacity were suspended or 
postponed.9 
In addition to the above problems there was the lower dynamism in domestic demand for 
energy, particularly by the industrial sector. But in 1983 this demand could still be met with the 
installed capacity existing in 1982 by means of an increase of 2.4% in power generation, which 
implied nearly 75 billion kWh. 
At the same time, transport declined by a percentage similar to that of the preceding year 
(-4%), mainly owing to a lower domestic production and a drastic decline in imports, as well as to a 
rise in fuel prices, in toll rates on certain highways and in tariffs. 
This fall was particularly evident in road transport. Although railway tariffs were also revised, 
the number of passengers and the volume of cargo carried grew by 5% and 8%, respectively. In 
relation to the latter, there was a considerable increase of over 30% in the transport of agricultural 
products, as a result of a rise in grain imports by CONASUPO. In contrast, the cargo carried by sea 
declined by approximately 3%. Finally.air transport grew by4%,owing toalarger inflow of tourists, 
and to an increased use of local airlines by nationals who in previous years spent their holidays abroad. 
viii) Other services. These declined by nearly 4%, but the performance of their main 
components varied. Whereas the commerce, restaurants and hotels sector was one of the most 
affected by recession (-9%), community, social and personal services remained practically stationary. 
On the other hand, the financial and real estate sectors went up by a little over 2%. The former 
reflected a certain recovery of intermediation volumes after a substantial drop in 1982; the latter 
maintained a relatively normal growth rate, but somewhat lower than that of the trend in preceding 
years. 
Finally, commercial intermediation suffered a remarkable deterioration associated with the 
impact of various factors. Firstly, there was a lack of domestic demand resulting from an increase in 
unemployment, a decrease in income and a marked decline in investment. Secondly, the shortage of 
credit which became more expensive negatively affected the sales of durable consumer goods, which 
were those which dropped the most. Another adverse factor, although limited in scope, was the 
shortage of imported inputs. 
As regards medium-scale trade, some unofficial estimates indicate that real sales shrank by 
20%.10 The worst affected were articles for the home —furniture and electric appliances— and 
automobiles. In contrast, the fall in sales of essential products such as food and clothing was 
somewhat lower. 
It should be noted that CONASUPO sales amounted to 113 billion pesos, that is, they suffered a 
real reduction of 7%. Of that amount, 75% was placed in urban zones and the remainder in the 
countryside. Thus the volume sold in the former declined by 13%, while that in the latter increased by 
12%. This resulted from a contraction in predominantly urban activities —in contrast with a 
favourable crop-year— and the policy followed by CONASUPO designed to strengthen its rural 
programme. 
9lt should be pointed uur that as the Federal Commission on Electricity had contracted a major external debt it had to refinance its 
maturities, particularly those which fell due in the short run. 
l0These estimates come from surveys undertaken by the Banco Nacional de México; and they should only be taken as orders of 
magnitude. 
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3. The external sector 
a) Main features 
The circumstances which intervened in the evolution of international economic relations 
during 1983 continued to be adverse for Mexico, as was the case for the majority of the economies in 
the region. In trade, the protectionism of industrialized countries prevailed; the terms of trade 
continued to deteriorate and the recovery of the American economy did not have the expected 
favourable effect on exports. In financing, despite a relative reduction in interest rates, these 
remained high, aggravating the enormous debt burden and compounding the increasing difficulties 
in obtaining access to capital markets. 
The external economic policy was focused primarily on settling, at least in the short run, 
financial problems. Thus, negotiations were held with the international financial community in order 
to reschedule the debt and reorganize and stabilize the exchange market. Success was relative in both 
cases. It was possible to defer for four years the payment of maturities in the amount of nearly 
US$ 23 billion of the public debt and over US$ 11 billion of the private debt. The latter was achieved 
thanks to State support through the Trust Fund for the Coverage of Exchange Risks (FICORCA). The 
exchange market was able to recover a certain normality, despite the precarious availability of foreign 
exchange at the beginning of the year, thanks to a policy of undervaluation of the currency. On the 
other side, the stabilization programme caused a greater contraction than expected, leading to a 
slump in imports, against stable levels in external sales. This resulted in a trade surplus of over 
US$ 14 billion and a current account surplus of over US$ 5.3 billion. This latter outcome was in 
contrast with an anticipated deficit of US$ 3 billion. 
Thus, international monetary reserves rose by over US$ 3 billion; secondary credit lines were 
restored, and only 4.4 from the US$ 5 billion of additional loans negotiated by the public sector were 
drawn. 
b) Merchandise trade 
Within a framework of a widespread drop in trade flows with the exterior, the prices of most 
goods maintained a declining trend. Quotations for the package of export products diminished by 
over 10%, mainly because of a reduction of 8% in petroleum prices. Import prices also dropped, but 
by a considerably lower amount (-7%). Thus the terms of trade declined by nearly 4%, in addition to 
a fall of 18% suffered in 1982 (see table 9). The successful control of inflation by the United States 
Table 9 
MEXICO: MAIN FOREIGN TRADE INDICATORS 
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Source: IiCI.AC, on the basis of figures supplied by the Banco de México. 
"Including assembly industries. Provisional figures. 'Including uncoined gold and silver. 
and other industrialized countries, the revaluation of the dollar vis-a-vis other strong currencies, and 
the low commercial activity in the international setting were the main causes of the decline in import 
prices. 
In this way the progress made in the field of exports was almost completely neutralized, since 
the growth of nearly 12% in their volume led to an increase in their value of less than 1% (see 
table 10). This phenomenon was particularly evident in the exports of petroleum products, which 
represented 74% of total external sales. In fact, while their volume grew by 3%, their value declined 
by 2%. n To this should be added the losses due to a contraction of 27% in external sales of natural gas 
stemming from a lower American demand. In contrast, the value of exports of non-petroleum 
products increased by 10%, in spite of lower unit prices and protectionism in purchasing countries. 
Among the few traditional products whose exports increased, those of coffee expanded by 40% 
with the favourable harvests in 1982 and those of sulphur increased by 45 %. The other fresh products 
experienced sharp drops owing to border restrictions in some cases and to poor harvests, in others. 
Among manufactured goods, motors and parts for motor-vehicles were the most dynamic branches 
(49%), given the advantages offered by Mexico, especially in the field of cheap manpower, fiscal 
"The value of crude petroleum sales dropped by 5%, whereas those of petroleum derivatives responded favourably with an increase of 
140%, partially offsetting the drop in petroleum exports. This was partly made possible by gasoline and gas oil sur pluses resulting from a decline 
in domestic consumption. 
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subsidies and incentives, and the proximity of assembly units and consumption centres. Among 
mining products, zinc, lead and above all silver exports made good progress. Finally, exports of 
petrochemical products also increased. 
On the other hand, nearly all imports suffered sharp drops: their value declined to almost half 
of that reached in 1982 and to less than a third of that in 1981. However, as unit prices also 
diminished, the contraction in the volume of imports was somewhat less than that in their value. The 
shortage of foreign exchange, the rise of the dollar, the lower public and private demand, the decline 
in consumption and investment and some efforts made in the field of import substitution were the 
main elements accounting for such an evolution. The private sector reduced its purchases above the 
average (-62%), while the public sector had to import considerable amounts of grains as a result of 
poor harvests in 1982, so that its purchases from abroad declined by only 21%. 
Thus, purchases of basic food products —such as maize, sorghum and sugar—, whose domestic 
supply became insufficient, rose until they became one of the major import items. In contrast, the 
remaining products suffered substantial reductions. External purchases of consumer and capital 
goods dropped the most (by 63% and 60%, respectively), while those for intermediate use declined 
by 37%, a percentage in which the depression of the motor-vehicle industry weighed considerably 
(see table 11). 
Table 11 
MEXICO: IMPORTS OF GOODS, FOB 












Iron and steel sheets 
Spare parts for automobiles 
and trucks 
Sorghum 
Parts for electrical 
installations 
Chemical products for 
industry 






Aircraft and aircraft part 
Agricultural tractors 
Unclassified goods 






























































































































































































































































In short, the slowdown in the economy reduced imports in general, with the exception of 
essential goods, to extremely low levels. This decline, as against a stable export value, led to a surplus 
on the trade account of US$ 13.6 billion, essentially stemming from PEMEX operations. PEMEX 
external sales amounted to over US$ 16 billion and its imports to 600 million, leaving a trade surplus 
of over US$ 15.4 billion. 
c) Services trade and factor payments 
The effects of a rise in the exchange rate in 1982 and its gradual and continuous increment 
during 1983 had perhaps a more noticeable influence on the services trade than on that of goods. In 
effect, tourism and border transactions, as well as the services at assembly industries, are usually more 
sensitive to the evolution of comparative prices. 
The large initial undervaluation of the peso and domestic recession were decisive for the 
development of non-factor services, by promoting exports and discouraging external purchases. 
Thus, income on account of transport and insurance grew by 12%, especially on account of a greater 
use of national airlines by foreign tourists. The inflow of 4.7 million tourists (26% more than in the 
preceding year) supplied US$ 1 625 million, that is, 16% more than in 1982, and helped to sustain 
the employment level. In the border zone services sales experienced an upturn, but, because of 
devaluation, foreign exchange earnings diminished. The transformation services of assembly 
enterprises, encouraged by the exceptionally low cost of Mexican manpower, employed 15% more 
people than in 1982 and earned resources in the amount of US$ 830 million. In brief, exports of real 
services rose to over US$ 5.4 billion, an amount which, for the reasons noted, was nearly 10% lower 
than that obtained in 1982 (see table 12). 
As regards imports, transport and insurance declined markedly (-30%) owing to a lower 
purchase volume and less use of foreign airlines by Mexicans. In tourism, there was a reduction of 
26% in the number of travellers (nearly 2 million) and of 44% in expenditures. This drop was the 
main cause of tourism's positive balance of around US$ 1.2 billion nearly double that of 1982. The 
purchases of nationals in the south of the United States contracted 40%, resulting in a surplus of 
US$ 170 million, against a deficit of US$ 140 million in the preceding year. Imports of real services 
totalled close on US$ 5 billion, 33% less than in 1982. 
The trade surplus —which exceeded US$ 14 billion— more than doubled that of the preceding 
year, allowing, furthermore, the comfortable financing of factor services, which amounted to nearly 
US$ 9 billion, that is, 17% less than in 1982. The decline in profits remitted by foreign corporations 
to their parent companies, and a drop in interest rates in the international financial markets in 1983, 
were the cause of this reduction. 
d) Capital account 
The current account as a whole exhibited an unprecedented surplus of over US$ 5.3 billion. '2 
Unlike what had happened in previous years, these resources served to finance a capital account 
deficit of over US$ 2 billion (the first since 1949) and to restore the international monetary reserves 
by over US$ 3.1 billion (see table 12). 
Owing to restrictions on additional indebtedness, the public sector procured a considerably 
lower amount of credit than in previous years. For its part, foreign investment did not react in the 
degree expected to the incentives of a flexible legislation; the inflow of funds was only slightly over 
US$ 370 million, and of that amount two-thirds corresponded to financing granted to affiliated 
corporations and only one-third to new investments. These resources, plus portfolio investments, 
gave a positive balance on the long-term capital account of nearly US$ 4.2 billion. 
In contrast, the short-term capital account exhibited a deficit of US$ 5 billion despite the 
procurement of resources by the public sector in the amount of US$ 770 million. The rescheduling of 
the short-term private debt and variations in the financial assets abroad of the banking system and of 
the private and public agencies and corporations may explain some of these movements. The 
remainder, which is hard to quantify, may correspond to capital flights. The entry errors and 
omissions, which exceeded US$ 1.4 billion, includes perhaps payments made by corporations to their 
suppliers or creditors in the free exchange market. 
l2In the past, a current account surplus had been the exception; the last one was recorded in 1955 and amounted to USS 35 million. 
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Table 12 
MEXICO: BALANCE OF PAYMENTS 
(Millions of dollars) 
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 
Balance on current account 
Trade balance 
Exports of goods and services 
Goods, FOB 
Real services 
Transport and insurance 
Travel 
Imports of goods and services 
Goods, FOB 
Real services 







Unrequited private transfer payments 
Balance on capital account 
Unrequited official transfer payments 
Long-term capital 
Direct investment (net) 
Portfolio investment (net) 














Net errors and omissions 
Global balance 
Total variation in reserves 
(- sign indicates an increase) 
Monetary gold 
Special Drawing Rights 
IMF reserve position 
Foreign exchange assets 
Other assets 

































































































































































































































































Source: 1978-1981: International Monetary Fund, Balance of Payments Yearbook; magnetic tape, J une 1984; 1982-1983, ECLAC, on the basis of 
official data. 
"Provisional figures. Real services also include other official and private transactions, but exclude factor services. ' In addition to 
loans received and amortization payments on these, this entry includes net loans granted and other assets and liabilities. ' The global 
balance is the sum of the balances on the capital and current accounts. The difference between the total variation in reserves with opposite sign 
and the global balance represents the value of counterpart ¡terns: monetization of gold, allocation of Special Drawing Rights and variation 
owing to revaluation. 
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MEXICO 
In brief, the balance of transactions with the exterior allowed the rebuilding of international 
monetary reserves, which exceeded US$ 4.9 billion, a very similar amount to that at the end of 1981. 
In addition, the so-called secondary reserve, that is, credit lines to support the peso agreed with the 
IMF and with central banks of various countries, amounted to US$ 4.75 billion, after the payment of 
US$ 700 million to the Federal Reserve System of the United States and US$ 1.85 billion to the Bank 
for International Settlements for loans contracted previously. 
e) The external debt 
The ratification of the Letter of Intent addressed to the IMF by the former government and the 
commitment to adopt a stabilization plan for three years facilitated the restructuring of maturities of 
the external, public and private debt. The negotiations were conducted in three stages and included an 
amount of US$ 22 655 million, that is, 98% of the short- and medium-term commitments of the 
public sector which fell due between 23 August 1983 and 31 December 1984. 
The first stage concluded in August with the renegotiation of a debt of US$ 11.4 billion 
contracted by the Federal Government, PEMEX and Nacional Financiera with 530 international banks. 
The second stage comprised US$ 8 432 million of debts contracted by the Banco Nacional de 
Comercio Exterior, Comisión Federal de Electricidad and CONASUPO, among other institutions. The 
third one, completed in October, included US$ 2 823 million of debts contracted by the rest of the 
public entities. The refinancing terms included an 8-year term and 4 years of grace, an interest rate of 
1 7/8 over LIBOR or 1 3/4 over prime rate in the United States. This implies that until March 1987 
interest alone will be paid, while amortization payments on the capital will be made in the period 
1987-1990. 
At the same time, with the intervention of FICORCA, the private sector renegotiated 
US$ 11.6 billion of a total debt of approximately US$ 20 billion. Participants in the negotiations 
were, on the one hand, more than 1 200 corporations and, on the other hand, around 200 suppliers 
and 300 financial institutions. This trust fund of the Central Bank, established in March 1983, has 
played a crucial role in the payment of debts to suppliers, thus avoiding the bankruptcy of many 
enterprises owing to fluctuations in the exchange rate of their debt service. 
The success achieved in rearranging the external debt allowed the deferment of amortization 
payments until 1987. However, the liquidation of interest alone forced the diversion of foreign 
exchange or the recourse to new loans, as occurred in the additional financing of the public sector in 
the amount of close on US$ 4.4 billion.15 
Thus, the external public debt rose to US$ 62.5 billion and the total debt is estimated at 
US$ 82 billion, an amount which represents a high proportion of the product (36%). Likewise, its 
service absorbed 56% of export earnings (see table 13). 
4. Prices, wages and employment 
a) Prices 
The lowering of inflation constituted one of the priority objectives of the economic policy. 
Although this warded off hyperinflation, the real results fell short of those envisaged. In fact, after an 
inflation of nearly 100% in 1982, the government intended to reduce it to 60% by means of a 
restrictive policy on demand. However, the consumer price index closed in December with an 
increase of 81% over the same month in the preceding year (see table 14). 
The causes of the persistence of inflationary pressures differed from those mainly associated 
with supply rigidities against the dynamism of demand in the petroleum boom period. In 1983, 
tensions were more related to cost factors and to adjustments in the structure of relative prices than to 
excess demand. 
The effects on prices of the sudden variation in the exchange rate in December 1982 were felt 
from the beginning of the year. The rise in interest rates was definitely a contributing factor. 
"Of this amount, around US$ 3.6 billion correspond to an increase in the external public debt and the remainder covers short-term 
liabilities. 
455 
The active revision of prices and tariffs of the major part of goods and services supplied by the 
public sector —which was one of the crucial aspects of the programme for putting public finances on a 
sound basis— had short-term inflationary effects, despite that in the longer run, it will have 
repercussions of opposite sign. The gasoline price was increased on two occasions (high-octane 37%, 
normal 50% and diesel 90%), after a rise which had doubled its price in December 1982. Airline 
tariffs increased by 120% in the course of the year, those for road transport were altered on two 
occasions and those for railways once; highway tolls, postage costs, telephone, electricity and water 
rates also recorded substantial increases. 
In addition to tariff revision, subsidies were modified; guarantee prices for peasants went up 
—although below the average inflation in most cases— having an immediate effect on the prices of 
basic products: that of bread increased by 100% and that of "tortilla" by 50%; milk, eggs, meat and oil 
prices were also frequently reviewed. The acceptance of the thesis of avoiding lags in the adjustment 
of relative prices led to a more liberal policy in the field of price control, which even affected basic 
products. In this climate of adjustment, changes in prices of many products were often made on 
account of inflationary expectations and not so much because of real cost pressures, except when the 
elasticity of demand set narrow limits. 
The increase in the value added tax (IVA) from 10% to 50%, and B to 20% for luxury 
items —included in the policy of fiscal adjustment— was the main reason for the fact that the January 
inflation rate was the highest in the year (10.9%). The review of nominal wages effected 
simultaneously was also a contributing factor. As from that month the rate of inflation began to slow 
down until its renewed upturn in November. In fact, the inflationary rate exhibited an upward trend 
Table 13 
MEXICO: INDICATORS OF EXTERNAL INDEBTEDNESS 
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Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures supplied by the Banco de México and the Ministry of Finance and Public Credit. 








MEXICO: EVOLUTION OF DOMESTIC PRICES 
1978 1979 1980 1981 
Consumer price index" 
Food 
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Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures supplied by the Banco de México. 
"National. In México City. 
until April 1983, when it reached 117%, only to slacken again and close the year at 81% (see figure 2). 
Throughout 1983 the average growth in consumer prices was 102%,afigure higher than that of 59% 
recorded in 1982. 
In the evolution of the consumer price index the price rise in fuels, transport, durable consumer 
goods and clothing had a marked effect. In contrast, price increases in food and housing were 
relatively lower. Probably because of moderate wage increases, price increases in services were 
considerably lower than those in merchandise (87% against 109%). 
The rise in the wholesale price index was greater than that in consumer prices (88% from 
December to December and 107% when the annual average is considered). This was due, among 
other factors, to the greater influence of fuel prices. 
b) Wages 
The wage policy of 1983 was kept in line with the general adjustment strategy of the Immediate 
Economic Reorganization Programme and the Letter of Intent addressed to the International 
Monetary Fund. Therefore, the authorities adopted a restrictive wage policy so as to avoid an 
inflationary spiral. 
In January there was an average increase of 25% in the general minimum wage and the rural 
wage. This increment, besides not replenishing the purchasing power lost in previous months, was 
absorbed by higher price increases than expected. 
Thus, by mid-June the authorities granted an average readjustment of 15.6% for the four wage 
groups.u Even so, these rises were insufficient to offset the changes in consumer prices, with the 
consequent erosion of the purchasing power of workers. Although it is hard to assess the loss, since 
only data on minimum wage adjustments were available and none on the evolution of allowances 
—which account for a considerable part of the total income of wage earners— or on government 
support in the field of education, health and housing, on the basis of the partial information available 
it may be stated that the average annual deterioration in real wages was around 23% (see table 15). 
14 The trend to establish a uniform wage in the country persisted. On the one hand, the general minimum wage and the rural wage were 
unified. On the other hand, the number of wage groups has gradually fallen from 54 in 1979 to 18 in 1980, to 8 in 1981, to 5 in 1982 and to 4 in 
1983. 
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In former periods, the deterioration in the monetary wage was usually compensated with 
increases in allowances and with an ascending mobility of manpower. In addition, overall wages also 
grew as a result of greater employment. This did not happen in 1983, since the protection of real 
wages was centered on the Programme for the Production, Supply and Control of the Basic Package of 
Popular Consumption, comparatively limited in scope. 
In brief, a considerable share of the burden of economic adjustment fell on wage earners. Owing 
to unemployment and the erosion of wage purchasing capacity, the latter appear to have lost around 
25%- of their share in the product,15 with regressive effects on income distribution and on the living 
standards of the population. 
Figure 2 
MEXICO: EVOLUTION OF PRICE INDEXES 
(Percentages) 
Variation over twelve months 
120 
1982 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures provided by the Banco de México. 
1<*83 
'* According to estimates based on the evolution of employment and wages, the share of the latter in rhe product diminished from 40 % in 





MEXICO: EVOLUTION OF WAGES AND SALARIES 
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982° 1983 
Index (1976= 100) 
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Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official data. 
"In calculating the annual average it was assumed that the recommendation of the 30Ç? increase in minimum wages as from 18 February was 
initially complied with by 409Í of enterprises and that the adjustment was gradually generalized until it became mandatory on 1 November. 
c) Employment 
The levels of open unemployment and underemployment appear to have increased in 1983, 
thus continuing the trend initiated halfway through the preceding year. However, this phenomenon 
affected with different intensity the various economic branches and geographic regions of the 
country. 
Serious limitations exist for measuring unemployment and underemployment in Mexico and 
the official statistics often show certain inconsistencies. 
Thus, estimates at the national level indicate a virtual stagnation in open unemployment 
between the end of 1982 and that of 1983. According to these estimates, the unemployment rate 
would not have exceeded 8.5%, thanks to the emergency programmes of employment protection 
implemented by the government.1 6 
On the contrary, employment surveys undertaken quarterly in the three large metropolitan 
areas show an increase in unemployment with respect to 1982. According to these surveys, the real 
average open unemployment rate would have risen from 4 % to 6% in Mexico City between 1982 and 
1983, from 5 % to 7.4% in Guadalajara, and from 5.4% to 10.7% in Monterrey (see table 16). In any 
event, part of this decline in urban employment appears to have been compensated by a rise in rural 
employment, given the relatively favourable performance of agriculture. 
Likewise, the statistics of the Instituto Mexicano del Seguro Social (IMSS) —more limited in 
scope—17 also record a decrease of 2 % in the average number of participants throughout 1983, 
stemming from a virtual standstill in the number of permanent participants and a drop of around 
11 % in that of eventual participants, whose proportion among its contributors is small. This drop is 
in contrast with the annual growth of the labour force, which amounts to 3.8%. 
16 According to data supplied by the Ministry of Programming and the Budget 356 000 temporary jobs were created—157 000 in 
rural areas and 149000 in urban zones—, in addition to 144 000 resulting from the channelling of public in vestment to labour-intensive sectors. 
17 This information does not include the informal sector, both urban and rural. See, Ministry of Programming and the Budget General 
Statistical Office, Bo/etiti mensual de información económica. 
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Bearing in mind the combination of an important fall in economic activity with a decline in 
average productivity (caused, in part, by the shift of those formerly employed in the modern sector to 
the informal sector), ECLAC estimates that the open unemployment rate may have risen to 
approximately 11 % in 1983.18 Had open unemployment not really increased by that proportion, the 
fall of the product by 4.7 % would certainly imply a considerable decline in the average productivity of 
the economy. This would be consistent with the increase in the informal sector, which has a lower 
productivity than the average of employed persons. 
From a geographic point of view, the data of contributors to the IMSS show a greater absorption 
of manpower in the northern border strip, owing to a reactivation of the assembly industry, especially 
in Chihuahua (16%) and Baja California (13%), as well as in the States where tourism has a great 
influence on their economy; Quintana Roo (7%) , Colima (6%), and Guerrero, where this activity had 
already experienced in 1982 a substantial upswing. Moreover, the results of the survey on assembly 
industries confirm these trends by exhibiting an increase of 17% in the annual average absorption of 
manpower. 
5. Monetary and fiscal policies 
a) Monetary policy 
One of the immediate objectives which the monetary authorities intended to fulfill in 1983 was 
the recovery and rearrangement of the exchange market, taking advantage of a control system already 
in operation, of an expropriated banking system, and of the use of more traditional policy 
instruments. 
The first step consisted in abandoning the dual system of fixed exchange rate set at 70 pesos and 
50 pesos per dollar in the "ordinary" and "preferential" markets, because it had led to a massive 
outflow of pesos arising from speculative operations. 
Hence a new dual exchange system was established which operated, on the one hand, with a 
"controlled" rate, with a relatively wide margin of undervaluation (which was set at the end of 1982 at 
95 pesos per dollar), with a daily rise of 13 cents (a rate equivalent to the differential calculated 
between external and internal inflation) and, on the other hand, with a "free" exchange type, which 
was even higher than that quoted by foreign money-changing agencies. This rate, set at 150 pesos per 
dollar, assumed an extremely wide margin of peso undervaluation, which permitted the gradual 
recovery of the control of the exchange market and the encouragement of exports, although it led to a 
sudden rise in external purchases which fostered inflation. The controlled exchange rate was applied 
to transactions linked with debt payments, to basic imports and to exports (that is, around 80% of 
current account transactions), while the free exchange rate was applied to the remaining imports, 
tourism and other transactions in the free market.19 
Table 16 
MEXICO: OPEN UNEMPLOYMENT RATES IN THE 
MAIN METROPOLITAN AREAS 
(Percentages) 
1981 1982 1983 
1979 1980 
I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV 
México City 5.7 4.3 4.2 3.8 4.1 3.6 3.6 3.9 4.4 4.1 7.0 5.6 6.2 5.4 
Guadalajara 5.7 5.0 6.2 5.8 5.8 6.5 4.4 5.2 5.3 5.1 6.4 8.6 9.5 7.0 
Monterrey 5.9 5.2 4.5 4.8 4.2 3.4 4.3 4.7 6.2 6.5 9.0 10.2 12.5 11.1 
Source: Ministry of Programming and the Budget and the General Statistical Office. 
'"The main causes for this rise appear to have been the decline in employment in contruction, manufacturing and commerce (330 000, 
220 000 and 100 000 people, respectively), whereas the increase in agriculture appears to have involved somewhat fewer than 200 000 people. 
|,JIn fact, until March a third "special" exchange rate persisted, at which "mexdollars" (dollar deposits in Mexican banks) were converted 
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Source: BCI.AC, on the basis of figures provided by the Banco de Mexico. 
"Average in the period. 'As from August 1982 a dual exchange type was adopted, first known as "preferential'" and then as 
"controlled". ' Provisional figures. 
The tempo of the sliding scale of the "controlled" exchange rate was constant throughout the 
year and amounted to a devaluation of 49% —lower, in fact, than the inflation differential— while 
the "free" rate remained constant until the end of September, when it began to depreciate daily by the 
same amount as the "controlled" rate. Hence the "free" rate closed the year with a devaluation of 
nearly 9%, reaching a quotation of 163 pesos per dollar. Thus the gap between the two rates was 
reduced from 55% at the end of 1982 to 12% one year later. 
Although domestic inflation was considerably higher than the shifting of the two exchange 
rates, the initial level of undervaluation was such that at the end of 1983 there was still no need to 
accelerate the daily tempo of the sliding scale, which would only have increased uncertainty about the 
exchange trend and inflationary expectations (see table 17).20 
This policy led to an improvement in the control of the exchange market, the virtual 
disappearance of the domestic parallel market, the minimization of the presence of foreign money-
changing agencies and a rebuilding of reserves. Foreign exchange availability in the banking system 
gradually strengthened and their supply to corporations and individuals began to return to normal. 
Thus, it was possible to isolate, to a certain extent and temporarily, the domestic interest rate 
from those prevailing in the exterior. In order to promote savings —and thereby financial 
intermediation, which had declined in 1982—, as well as to avoid luxury consumption, passive rates 
were set at nominally high levels. However, as high inflation persisted, real rates remained positive 
only in certain months. 
The average procurement cost, whose annual average was 55%, was therefore lower than 
inflation. Even so, active rates ranged between 76% and 100%, that is, at high levels, even in real 
terms.21 Thus, the rise in credit cost constituted a restrictive instrument in addition to the effects of 
general economic stagnation. 
20These undervaluation margins refer in table [7 to a parity rate of purchasing power that, given its limitations, should only be taken as 
an indication. 
11 This refers to "effective" active rates, that is, those including expenditures and various commissions related to credit openings. 
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Besides the restoration of control over the exchange market, the monetary policy was subject to 
minor pressures as the public sector deficit was reduced, the international monetary reserves were 
rebuilt and the demand for credit diminished. 
Currency outside banks recorded an extremely limited nominal growth (42%), implying a real 
contraction of 25%. This behaviour resulted from a real reduction in the monetary base because the 
financing needs of the public sector decreased. The multiplier also diminished. Furthermore, with 
respect to demand deposits, the persistence of strong inflationary pressures led the public to maintain 
reduced balances or to transfer them to longer-term instruments. Thus, the real contraction in these 
balances amounted to 20% with respect to those of December 1982 (see table 18). 
The banking system as a whole procured resources in the amount of 3 700 billion pesos, thus 
reaching a balance of 9 700 billion pesos, 60% more than in 1982, which in real terms amounted to a 
fall of 15%. In fact, the 1982 devaluations distorted financial statistics by inflating foreign currency 
balances, thereby concealing the reduced intermediation operations of the banking system, which was 
not corrected in the last year. 
During 1983 the commercial banks procured resources for nearly 1 600 billion pesos, as a 
consequence of the aforesaid interest rates, the impossibility for individuals to place deposits in 
foreign currency in Mexican banks, and the ban on capital expatriation, although this did not imply 
that there existed a greater savings capacity in the country. Rather, the lack of investment or 
expansion projects among enterprises in the face of depressed markets gave rise to large surplus 
resources which were placed in time instruments, in CETES and in variable income securities. 
Among the factors of expansion, international monetary reserves trebled in terms of pesos 
after having reached extremely low levels in the former period. In contrast, the credit granted by the 
banking system suffered a real decline of 20% because: i) the government credit demand was more 
Money 
Currency outside banks 
Demand deposits 
Factors of expansion 












































































































































































Source: IÍCLAC, on rhe basis of figures provided by the Banco de México, 
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Source: HCLAC, on the basis of figures supplied by rhe Banco de Mexico. 
"Including public and private enterprises. Excluding Central Bank financing. Provisional figures. 
moderate than in 1982, owing to a reduction in the fiscal deficit and an increase in financing through 
treasury certificates (CETES); ii) the revision of prices and tariffs of goods and services supplied by 
State corporations allowed them a greater amount of their own resources to meet their operating 
costs, and iii) investments were restricted. 
The credit demand of the private sector also shrank by 20%. This drop was not due to an 
intrinsic resource shortage —since in fact there was a surplus in loanable funds in commercial banks 
estimated at nearly 400 billion pesos— but to a sharp fall in demand owing to high interest rates, 
difficult financial conditions in several enterprises and lower investment. 
Within the real contraction suffered by credit oriented through commercial and development 
banks, the activities which endured most constraints were agriculture, construction, commerce and 
manufactures, whereas the electrical industry as services were less affected. In contrast, low-cost 
housing was definitively favoured, in spite of absorbing a modest share of resources (see table 19). 
Despite the difficulties experienced by the banking system for placing its procured resources, 
which greatly exceeded those granted, it obtained significant profits in its first year of operation. This 
was partly due to the fact that it placed its surpluses in CETES or in the Banco de México, obtaining 
acceptable returns. 
Mention must be made of the activity of the Bolsa Mexicana de Valores (Mexican Stock 
Exchange), which, as in 1978, showed an unusual growth by effecting operations in the amount of 
6 200 billion pesos, 166% over those of 1982. Fixed income securities accounted for 98 % of the total, 
of which 87% were CETES and 13% trade stocks, liabilities and petrobonds. CETES transactions 
amount to 5 300 billion pesos, 204% more than in the preceding year, a dynamism resulting from 
their advantages as regards liquidity and return. In contrast, the issuance of petrobonds was less 
successful. The fact that the stock exchange agencies are the only intermediaries for issuing to the 
public several of these instruments —mainly CETES— has granted them a higher degree of 
competitiveness than the banking system in the procurement of resources. 
In addition to trade stocks and bank acceptances which allowed corporations to mobilize fresh 
resources, the stock exchange had at its disposal a new procurement instrument in the form of bank 
compensation bonds, which were issued in order to reimburse stockholders of nationalized banks the 
value of their shares by means of nominative securities at 100 pesos each, over a ten-year term, with 
three years of grace for the principal and seven equal amortization payments, on annuities due. The 
interest rate, payable quarterly, is equivalent to the maximum for quarterly time deposits. The first 
banks compensated in September recorded shares in the amount of 72 billion pesos, a fourth of which 
were transacted in the stock exchange in the remaining months. 
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As regards variable income securities —which represented barely 2% of the total transacted in 
the stock exchange—, their accrued amount rose by 206%, owing to the dramatic increase in prices of 
most shares, which had remained extremely depressed since 1980, when they suffered a sharp drop. 
Thus, the quotation index moved from an average of 670 points in December 1982 to 2 200 a year 
later. 
In view of its influence on the economy, reference must be made to the financing granted 
through development trust funds, which provided a selective support in the amount of 468 billion 
pesos —54% more, in nominal terms, than in 1982— implying a real contraction of 18%. Significant 
among them were Trust Funds Instituted in Relation to Agriculture (FIRA), the Fund for Export 
Promotion (FOMEX), the Fund for Industrial Equipment (FONEI) and others. The Fund for Bank 
Transactions and Discounts for Housing (FOVI) had a leading role in the growth of credit granted, 
since it provided financing for 32 billion pesos (106% more than in 1982) for the construction of 
around 32 000 dwellings. 
Finally, among the significant legal changes which atrected the banking system as a wnoie tne 
law regulating the public service of banking and credit was outstanding. This law, which came into 
force in January 1983, establishes that banking services are to be provided by national credit 
associations and by national credit institutions constituted by the government, given the 
expropriation of banks. Likewise, it provides that the subscription of 66% of shares (Series A) 
belongs solely to the government and the remaining 34 % (Series B) may be subscribed by any public 
sector body or any natural or legal person of Mexican nationality, and for no more than 1% of the 
capital of each society. 
This law was the basis for restructuring the banking system and paying compensations to the 
previous bankers. With respect to the former, in transforming private and mixed institutions into 
national credit associations, their number was reduced from 60 to 29. As regards the latter, bank 
compensation bonds were issued, which, as noted earlier, are negotiable in the stock exchange under 
the terms described. Finally, the Banco de México established a trust fund for bank compensation 
payments. 
b) Fiscal policy 
In 1983, the rehabilitation of public finance was a priority objective of economic policy within 
the framework of the Immediate Economic Reorganization Programme launched in December 1982. 
The financial deficit of the public sector in the preceding year accounted for nearly 18% of the gross 
domestic product, and the purpose was to reduce it to 8.5%. This goal, which was almost achieved, 
since the year closed with 8.7%, is also included in the Extended Facility Agreement for three years 
subscribed with the IMF, in which the said percentage is to be reduced to 5.5 % in 1984, and to 3.5 % in 
1985 (see table 20). 
Despite the enormous burden of the internal and external debt service, the goals of 1983 were 
able to be fulfilled as a result of two facts: a reduction in current public expenditure and, especially, in 
investment, and an increase in fiscal income, not so much because of higher taxes, but because of an 
active review of prices and tariffs of goods and services provided by the public sector. To this was 
added the relief implied by the deferment of amortization payments on the renegotiated external debt 
and the reduction of exchange losses, absorbed by the federal government, which had greatly affected 
public expenditure in 1982. 
Total public expenditure amounted to 7 300 billion pesos, representing a real contraction of 
13% against that of 1982. In fact, this was the main policy instrument, not only for anti-inflationary 
purposes, but as a means of alleviating pressures exerted by external purchases on the balance of 
payments. Its amount was subject to non-inflationary domestic financing possibilities and to a 
maximum external indebtedness of US$ 5 billion which, as noted, was not fully utilized. As regards 
the budget, amortization and interest payments on the external and domestic public debt constituted 
a major entry —2 800 billion pesos, that is, nearly 40% of total expenditure— and diverted funds 
which might have been used in investment expenditure in order to maintain productive plant and 
employment. 
During the year the guidelines of the new administration were followed. These aimed at 
strengthening the public sector and not necessarily expanding it, but attempting to improve its 
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Source: FXLAC, on the basis of figures provided by the Ministry of Finance and Public Credit. 
"Provisional figures. Includes: Federal District Department, Altos Hornos de Mexico, Teléfonos de Mexico and the Metro. 
agencies and corporations were avoided —the State even made some transfers— and an austere 
remuneration policy was introduced which affected all public services. 
Total current expenditure of the public sector —nearly 6 000 billion pesos— suffered a real 
reduction of 11 %, caused mainly by a decrease of 2 8 % in remunerations, since both interest payments 
and current transfer increased by 30% and 15%, respectively. Capital expenditure —1 300 billion 
pesos— contracted even more (-36%), mainly due to a fall of 50% in public works and to lower 
investments by PEMEX and the Federal District Department. 
The promotion of projects with low import content was attempted, since they generate 
employment, increase the supply of goods and services in the short run and support rural 
development. In the budget, priority was granted to social welfare and communications at the 
expense of industry and fuels, as well as to fishing and administrative expenditure, including defence. 
PEMEX, whose investment was over one-fourth of the total, diminished its capital expenditure 
by 40%, limiting itself to exploration activities and the reactivation of certain important projects. 
Federal government expenditure amounted to 4 600 billion pesos, that is, 6 3 % of total 
expenditure, implying a real reduction of 16% with respect to that of 1982. This was also due to a 
greater contraction in capital expenditure (-27%) than in current expenditure (-13%). As shown in 
table 21, the major real drops were in remunerations and other capital expenditure. 
The public sector procured resources totalling 5 900 billion pesos, a slight increase of 1% 
against those obtained in the preceding year, but an appreciable increase in the income coefficient, 
which rose from 30% to 34%. PEMEX absorbed the greatest growth ( 2 1 % , in real terms) by its 
domestic sales (because price increases were higher than the drop in volume), as well as by an increase 
in exports as measured in pesos. The resources of the national railways rose by 6% owing to a tariff 
review. The other agencies and corporations, in contrast, recorded lower incomes owing to a sharp 
drop in their sales —as was the case with FERT1MEX and, to a lesser extent, with CONASUPO— or to 
tariff reviews which were deferred as for example, in the electric sector. Generally speaking, the scant 
465 
Table 21 
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Total income ( 1 + 2 ) 
Current expenditure 
Wages and salaries 
Other current expenditure 
Current savings ( 1 - 4 ) 
Capital expenditure 
Real investment 
Other capital expenditure 
Total expenditure (4 + 
Budgetary deficit or 
surplus (3 - 7) 
Account not under 
budgetary control 
Total deficit or surplus 
6) 
(8 + 9) 
1980 1981 1982 



































































































































11. Financing of the deficit 
Net increase of debt 
Domestic 
Banco de México 
Others 
External 

































Current savings/capital expenditure 40.3 26.2 -136.6 -93.5 
Fiscal deficit/total expenditure 16.4 30.3 44.1 30.9 
Tax revenue/GDP 15.2 15.2 15.1 17.1 
Total expenditure/GDP 18.8 22.4 28.2 26.3 
Fiscal deficit/GDP 3.1 6.8 12.4 8.1 
Domestic financing/deficit 84.8 94.2 83.7 64.7 
External financing/deficit 15.2 5.8 16.3 35.3 




economic activity largely neutralized the anticipated increment in income stemming from rises in 
prices and tariffs. 
Without the fiscal resources that the federal government obtains from PEMEX (1 200 billion 
pesos), the total amount would have shrunk by over 20%, in spite of fiscal modifications made at the 
beginning of the year. Its total income amounted to 3 200 billion pesos, which is equivalent to a real 
increase of 2% with respect to 1982. 
Significant among the fiscal modifications were the rise in the rate of the value added tax (IVA), 
from 10% to 15 %, and the reduction to 6% of the 10% tax which formerly applied to processed foods 
and medicines. In addition, a rate of 20% on luxury items was established. An overall emphasis was 
laid on curving tax evasion. Anonymity in respect of stocks representing corporate capital was 
abolished and the rate of income tax was reformed by reducing the tax on lower-income strata, though 
also establishing a 10% surcharge on income tax for 1983. 
However, owing to the fall in economic activity and, therefore, in the taxable base, tax revenue 
grew at a lower rate than expected. Furthermore, direct taxes experienced a sharp contraction, which 
in real terms reached 24%, as a result of the reduction in real wages, and the losses or lower profits of 
many enterprises. In contrast, indirect taxes showed a real expansion of 16%, introducing new 
regressive elements into the tax system. The growth of tax revenue on foreign trade reached 13%, 
thanks to petroleum exports, although it was artificially increased by exchange effects. The strong 
decline in imports had the opposite effect. 
In short, the consolidated financial deficit of the public sector rose to 1 500 billion pesos, that is, 
it experienced a real contraction of 55% against the deficit of 1982 (1 700 billion). It was partly 
financed with additional external indebtedness amounting to US$ 4.4 billion (510 billion pesos) and 
the remainder with domestic financing. Within the latter, credit granted by the Banco de México 
amounted to 900 billion and that obtained by means of CETES and petrobonds, to a little over 100 
billion. These certificates constituted an extremely dynamic instrument for the procurement of non-
inflationary resources. 
As regards the federal government, its deficit amounted to 1 400 billion pesos, that is, 40% less 
than in 1982, in real terms. This sum was covered with funds from the Banco de México for 
782 billion and from other domestic resources for 135 billion pesos. Besides, external loans were 
obtained for 500 billion pesos (see table21). 
Given the large amounts of tranfers and shares granted by the federal government to the semi-
State sector, this became the chief generator of over 90% of the total deficit.22 In any event, in 1983 
the efforts made to correct disequilibria in many agencies and corporations produced results. 
Particularly outstanding was the case of PEMEX which, for the first time in ten years, obtained a 
positive balance of 800 billion pesos, although with a reduced investment programme. 
22 It is important to point out in this connection that the federal government assumed the huge financial disequilibrium which the 




1. General economic trends: Introduction and summary 
The evolution of the Nicaraguan economy in 1983 was dominated by problems of security and 
defence. It is difficult, therefore, to evaluate it adequately with the usual methodology of economic 
analysis. In fact, the particularly adverse effect on Nicaragua of the conditions created by the 
international economy was aggravated by a permanent harassment and state of siege which forced 
the authorities to divert their attention increasingly from other problems and to allocate greater 
resources to defence. These circumstances explain the opposing trends of the economy in 1983: a 
major expansion of production and employment, profound financial imbalances (both internal and 
external), and a fall in private per capita consumption. 
Thus, the gross domestic product grew by more than 5 % in 1983 (see table 1), mainly as a result 
of three factors: the growth of agriculture, the reactivation of construction and the inflow of external 
resources. 
In the agricultural sector the main feature was the increase of 28% in the area sown with cotton, 
which accounts for a third of the expansion in agricultural production. The reactivation of 
construction, for its part —because of its impact on employment and especially its effects on the 
industrial branches which supply it— helped to generate at least one-third of the growth in 
manufacturing output. Finally, the inflow of external resources also influenced the growth of the 
product, despite the fact that in 1983 the country had no access to medium- and long-term credits 
from the leading multilateral financial agencies —the World Bank and the Fund for Special 
Operations of the Inter-American Development Bank— nor from the United States bilateral official 
organizations. Thus, the net capital inflows exceeded US$ 500 million, which was more than seven 
times the amount of the net payments of profits and interest, thus placing Nicaragua in a different 
position from that of the rest of the Latin American economies. 
Close on 45 % of the positive balance on the capital account originated in the net loans received, 
although these totalled 12 % less than the average for the period 1980-1982. The renegotiation of the 
maturities of the external debt for 1983 —including the capitalization of part of the interest payable 
during the year— provided another 45 % and reduced the payments of interest and amortization on 
the global external debt to 35% of the value of the exports of goods and services, as against 46% in 
1982. Finally, grants of foodstuffs and especially of intermediate goods for manufacturing, coupled 
with the creation of new lines of credit for acquiring raw materials, also contributed to the expansion 
of production. 
The economic reactivation was influenced, on the demand side, by the expansion of public 
consumption and the increment in the physical volume of exports, achieved as a result of the excellent 
coffee crop and the increases in cotton production which occurred during the 1982/1983 cycle. In 
contrast, the terms of trade suffered a further drastic fall for the sixth year running. Thus, as may be 
seen from figure 1, the gross income once again grew less than the product and there was a marked 
contraction of domestic saving, which was already very low. 
The relative economic dynamism of 1983 and the recruitment for defence led to an 
improvement in the employment situation. The sectors which absorbed most labour were agriculture 
—as a result of an increase of 9% in the area sown— and government, where the value added also 
rose by 9%. 
The advances mentioned were overshadowed in more than one sense by the imbalance created 
by the demands of security, especially in view of certain significant lags in production. Thus, there has 
not been the time or the resources to correct the disequilibria associated with the events of 1979 and 
the basic structural faults of the economy, which have heightened the effects of the international crisis 
and the abnormal situation of the country. Indeed, in some cases these maladjustments have become 
even more acute. 
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In this connection, there was a continuance of the acute scarcity of foreign exchange, which 
ultimately reflected the high and persistent trade imbalance. For example, in the last four years the 
trade deficit averaged 47% of imports of goods and services and the terms of trade fell by 28%, or 
48% if 1977 is taken as the base year. This deterioration was mainly reflected in what might be called 
a structural trade deficit, so that it was necessary to continue assigning high priority to exports. This 
had already been manifest in 1983, a year in which the physical volume of exports of goods rose by 
around 1 %. Nevertheless, this increase was offset by the fall in the international prices of coffee and 
sugar, to such an extent that the current value of external sales was one of the lowest of the last decade. 
As regards domestic financial imbalances, the fiscal deficit increased considerably. This 
occurred despite the notable increment in tax revenue achieved through the raising of the rates of 
indirect taxes —especially on gasoline— owing to the greater flexibility of these to price rises and the 
increased fiscal control and better organization of income-tax collection. Consequently, the sole cause 
of the considerable rise in the deficit was the very marked growth of public expenditure. More than 
Table 1 
NICARAGUA: MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS 
\. Basic economic indicators 
Gross domestic product at market prices 
(millions of 1970 dollars) 
Population (millions of inhabitants) 







3. Short-run economic indicators 
Gross domestic product 
Per capita gross domestic product 
Real gross national income 
Terms of trade (goods and services) 
Current value of exports of goods 
and services 




Variation between annual averages 
Money 
Wages and salaries6 
Unemployment rate 
Current income of government 
Total expenditure of government 
Fiscal deficit/total expenditure of government 
Deficit/gross domestic product 
Millions 
Z. External sector 
Trade balance (goods and services) 
Balance on current account 
Balance on capital account 













































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
"Preliminary figures. Gross national product plus terms-of-trade effect. cNovember 1982 to November 1983. January-
November 1982 to January-November 1983- 'Nominal wages and salaries of members of the Nicaraguan Social Security Institute. 
Percentages. 'Disbursed medium and long-term external public debt. 
470 
NICARAGUA 
half of this expansion originated in the increase in current expenditure, especially through the 
growth in defence requirements and the extension of social expenditure. There was likewise a 
substantial increase in capital expenditure. Apart from the sharp rise in real investment, there was a 
marked expansion in indirect investment, in the form of capital subsidies disbursed by the central 
government to finance the investments of the State enterprises. Thus the central government 
assumed the functions of financial intermediary, which notably increased its imbalances and 
heightened the need to apply new adjustments. In an attempt to solve this problem and to centralize 
the process of capital accumulation the Fondo Nicaragüense de Inversiones (Nicaraguan Investment 
Fund) was created in December 1983. 
Thus, in 1983 the fiscal deficit represented close on 20% of the gross domestic product: almost 
twice the 1982 percentage.1 Half this deficit was financed by money issues from the Central Bank. 
This caused a disproportionate expansion of the means of payment, which in its turn gave impetus to 
inflation. 
Perhaps the most acute problem in 1983, together with the tasks of defence, was the periodic 
shortage of basic consumer goods, in consequence of the low agricultural output of 1982 and the lack 
of foreign exchange to remedy this shortage with imports. This gave rise to a new phenomenon, 
especially in the city of Managua: the existence of two different prices for the same goods, which 
reflected a process of speculation facilitated by the increase in the money supply. The scarcity of food 
and the high financial liquidity were decisive factors in the upsurge of inflation which occurred in 
1983. This was particularly intense in the second half of the year, reaching 37% as between 
November 1982 and the same month in 1983.2 
The aforesaid rise in prices particularly affected wage-earners, since a very restrictive wage 
policy continued to be applied. Thus, real average wages went down by 18% in rural areas and 25% in 
the towns. However, the loss of purchasing power varied between the different strata of the 
population because of the subsidies and price controls applied by the Government —including the use 
of ration cards— for a minimum basket of consumer goods, with a view to safeguarding the 
purchasing power of the lower-income groups. 
In keeping with the foregoing, private consumption once again diminished, but at a much lower 
rate than in 1982 and 1981, although per capita consumption of the goods considered basic increased.3 
The fall in overall private consumption reflected not only the decline in average real wages but also 
the meagre agricultural output in 1982, the restrictions on imports of goods, associated with the 
scarcity of foreign exchange, and the structure of the increase in production in 1983, since more than 
half of this growth was concentrated in export lines and intermediate goods and, in the case of the 
manufacturing sector, only a third of the expansion occurred in consumer goods. 
The intensification of the external harassment, manifested inter alia by various armed frontier 
skirmishes, acts of sabotage against the economic infrastructure and, in general, tensions which had 
repercussions in the diplomatic and economic fields,4 forced the authorities to assign high priority to 
defence and security. This circumstance, linked with the lines of action required for the fulfilment of 
the basic postulates of the revolutionary process, contributed to the application of an economic policy 
distinct from the adjustment policies applied in other Latin American countries. This in its turn 
accounts for some of the phenomena —economic dynamism with financial imbalances— which 
characterized the Nicaraguan economy in 1983-
Economic policy was basically directed towards the achievement of three objectives: to 
reactivate production and accumulation; to improve the distribution of income; and to reduce 
inflation and the external and internal financial imbalances. The simultaneous achievement of these 
objectives obviously raised some problems, and in the course of the year there was a subtle change of 
emphasis. Thus, after having assigned priority to activities concerned with the reactivation of 
production, towards the end of the year the Government paid more attention to the disequilibria 
mentioned above.5 
'It should be noted that the gross domestic product, at current prices, is probably undervalued, owing to the fact that the implicit deflator 
of the product rose in recent years at much lower rates than those of the consumer price index. By way of example, whereas in 1983 the deflator 
rose by 14%, the annual variation of consumer prices reached M (7r. If the implicit prices of the product were in effect underestimated, this would 
explain the high ratio of the fiscal deficit to the product, along with the high tax burden. 
JIt may also have been indirectly influenced by the price of the dollar in the parallel (illegal) market, which rose significantly. 
*It is estimated that the consumption of basic goods increased by 5%, while that of goods considered "non-basic" fell by 279?. 
4An example of this was the reduction of the sugar quota in the United States market. 
'See, for example. Gobierno de Reconstrucción Nacional de Nicaragua, Ltneumientos de potíticueconómica 1983-1988. September 1983. 
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Figure 1 
NICARAGUA: MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS 
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Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official information. 
aAnnual growth rate. ^Annual average rate for the whole country. 







As regards the first aspect, public sector investment —both of the central government and the 
State enterprises— in machinery and equipment was increased and there was a special reactivation of 
construction. Production was fomented by giving priority to the agricultural sector through the fixing 
of a policy of guaranteed prices and greater attention to its credit needs, and through investments in 
the sector. The policy of guaranteed prices, combined with multiple exchange rate mechanisms to 
ensure reasonable profitability for the producers of the main export items, together with the credit 
policy (which in the case of cotton and coffee took care of 100% of the needs), facilitated the increase 
in the physical volume of exports. The policy of expansion of public expenditure and that of external 
financing were also important factors in the growth of investment and production. 
To improve the distribution of income, various instruments were used. The main ones were the 
fixing and control of prices of the basic consumer items; the granting of subsidies in respect of the 
consumption of basic goods and services; the expansion of social expenditure; the rise in the levels of 
employment through the growth of production; the fixing of interest rates subsidized for the priority 
sectors, and the restructuring of the internal debt of small producers. The effects of all these measures 
were weakened by the wage policy, which drastically reduced real wages. 
Finally, the anti-inflationary measures were less successful than previously, which perhaps 
explains the growing anxiety of the authorities over this phenomenon as the year advanced. Measures 
such as the controls on prices and subsidies of basic goods and services and the increase in tax 
revenues with a view to diminishing the fiscal deficit had some success. But the shortage of basic 
consumer goods during some periods of the year on the one hand —owing to the lack of foreign 
exchange and the climatic conditions which affected the 1982/1983 productive cycle— and on the 
other the expansion of public expenditure which raised the fiscal deficit and led to a marked 
expansion of the means of payment, generated an inflationary process which intensified in the second 
half of the year. Moreover, as already indicated, it was not possible to reduce the deficit on the balance-
of-payments current account, nor to moderate the domestic financial imbalances in relation to the 
preceding year. 
With regard to the action of the State, it should be noted that there was apparently an 
improvement in its capacity and experience in formulating and applying economic policies and in 
running the State enterprises. Examples of this were the renegotiation of the external debt, the 
greater control over the use of foreign exchange, and the flexibility achieved within a group of 
enterprises in the Area de Propiedad del Pueblo (the nationalized sector) for the solution of 
production problems deriving from the shortage of foreign exchange. 
To sum up, the Nicaraguan economy in 1983 showed contradictory results. Economic activity 
developed at a much more dynamic rate than that of most of the countries of the region, but there was 
nevertheless a persistence, and even an aggravation, of the profound imbalances and lags of previous 
years. All in all, despite the number of adverse factors —of economic and other origin— which the 
country had to face, perhaps the most striking feature is that some advances have been made, and that 
the obstacles encountered have not been greater. 
2. Trends in economic activity 
a) Total supply and demand 
Despite the international recession and the other difficulties of economic and other origin 
mentioned above, the gross domestic product grew by more than 5 % in 1983. This increase gave rise 
to a somewhat smaller expansion (4.8%) in total supply, since the volume of imports rose by only 3% 
because of the shortage of foreign exchange and the need to rationalize its use (see table 2). 
On the demand side, although the volume of exports of goods and services grew faster than that 
of domestic demand as a whole, the most dynamic elements were government consumption and gross 
fixed investment in construction. Thus, domestic demand increased by 4% and external sales by 8%, 
mainly owing to the increments in the production of coffee and cotton during the 1982/1983 cycle. 
For its part, public sector consumption rose by more than 15%, basically because of the priority given 
by the authorities to national defence and to the solution of critical social deficits. There was also a 
marked increase in gross fixed investment in the construction sector (16%). The effort in capital 
formation came mainly from the public sector, both from the central government and the enterprises 
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Table 2 
NICARAGUA: TOTAL SUPPLY AND DEMAND 
Millions of _ 
dollars at Percentage 
1970 prices breakdown 
Growth rates 
1981 1982 1983" 1970 1980 1983" 1980 1981 1982 1983" 
Total supply 1 312 1 223 1 281 126.6 132.2 125.1 16.7 6.2 -6.8 4.8 
Gross domestic product 
at market prices 984 973 1 024 100.0 100.0 100.0 10.0 5.3 -1.2 5.3 
Imports of goods and 
services6 328 250 257 26.6 32.2 25.1 43.9 8.9 -23.8 2.9 
Total demand 1 312 1 223 1 281 126.6 132.2 125.1 16.7 6.2 -6.8 4.8 
Domestic demand 1067 1013 1055 101.8 110.4 103.0 39.8 3.4 -5.1 4.2 
Gross domestic investment 242 200 203 18.5 16.7 19.8 ... 54.6 -17.3 1.4 
Gross fixed investment 221 179 181 16.3 14.5 17.6 139.8 62.8 -19.0 0.9 
Construction 
Machinery 








































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures from the Nicaraguan Ministry of Planning. 
"Preliminary figures. *The figures for imports and exports of goods and services were obtained from balance-of-payments data in 
current dollars, converted to constant 1970 values using price indexes calculated by ECLAC for the purpose. 
Table 3 
NICARAGUA: FINANCING OF GROSS DOMESTIC INVESTMENT 
Afrgt) 1981 1982 1 9 8 3 ° 
Percentages of gross domestic investment6 
1. Gross domestic investment 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
2. Gross national saving (a + b + c) 
a) Gross domestic saving 
b) Net factor payments abroadc 
c) Terms-of-trade effect 
3. External saving 36.1 77.8 86.4 84.8 
Percentages of gross domestic product 
1. Gross domestic investment 13.9 23-1 18.1 17.4 
2. Gross national saving (a + b + c) 8.8 5.1 2.5 2.6 
a) Gross domestic saving 12.4 10.8 10.3 9.2 
b) Net factor payments abroad17 3.3 2.5 4.0 1.7 
c) Terms-of-trade effect 0.3 3.2 3.8 4.9 
,3-External saving 5.1 18.0 15.6 14.8 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official statistics. 
Preliminary figures. The original information in expressed in constant values, coinciding with those given in table 2. 




















NICARAGUA: GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT, BY KIND OF 
ECONOMIC ACTIVITY, AT FACTOR COST 
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Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures from the Ministry of Planning of Nicaragua. 
"Preliminary figures. As the individual activities and the total were calculated independently, the sum of the former does not 
correspond with the latter. cIncludes restaurants, hotels and business services. 
of the Area de Propiedad del Pueblo, since the private sector continued to show some reluctance to 
invest, which meant that gross fixed investment in machinery declined by almost 4%. Consequently, 
the total gross fixed investment rose by barely 1%. 
External resources continued to account for the greater part (75%) of investment finance (see 
table 3). Domestic saving, for its part, increased both as a source of this financing and in relation to 
the gross domestic product. At the same time, the positive effect which might have been produced on 
internal financing by the reduction in the net payments of services to the exterior —which between 
1982 and 1983 fell from 4% to less than 3% of the product— was almost entirely offset by a new 
deterioration in the terms of trade. Even so, gross national savings financed 25% of the gross 
domestic investment. 
Private consumption fell for the third year running, the drop being particularly marked in the 
case of goods and services considered non-basic Three factors contributed to this: first, the drastic 
contraction of real wages; second, the lack of foreign exchange which limited imports of consumer 
goods, especially durables; and, finally, the meagre domestic supply of basic foodstuffs recorded 
during certain periods of the year owing to the fall in agricultural production caused by the adverse 
climatic conditions of the previous year (see table 2). 
b) Evolution of the main sectors 
i) The general picture. Almost all the economic sectors except mining and electricity recorded 
positive growth rates in 1983. The goods-producing industries showed the greatest dynamism, with 
outstanding increases in the agricultural sector (10%), construction (8%) and manufacturing (5%) 
(see table 4). In contrast, production in basic services virtually stagnated, with growth of only 1%. 
Finally, the notable expansion of government services (10%) gave rise to an increase of almost 5 % 
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under the heading of "other services". All this contributed to a growth of over 5% in the gross 
domestic product, which more than made up for the slight decline of 1 % suffered in 1982. 
ii) The agricultural sector. The growth in the agricultural sector was mainly due to crop-
farming, since stock-raising stagnated, forestry recovered only slightly and fishing fell abruptly6 (see 
table 5). 
In agriculture, both export products and those destined for domestic consumption displayed 
great dynamism. This was mainly due to three elements. First, there was an expansion of 19% in the 
area sown, especially that devoted to cotton, sesame, beans and sorghum. Second, the yields in crops 
such as maize, sorghum and sugar cane increased considerably owing to the better climatic conditions 
and to the progress made through the irrigation policy. Finally, various economic policy measures 
also encouraged production. The credit policy gave priority to the agricultural sector, to which greater 
resources were allocated and lower rates of interest granted than to the rest of the economic activities. 
Table 5 
NICARAGUA: INDICATORS OF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION 
Index of agricultural 
production 
(1970 = 100) 
Agriculture 
Stock-raising 


























Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures from the Ministry of Planning. 
"Preliminary figures. 'The growth rates correspond to real, not rounded, figures. 'Metric tons. ''Thousands of metric 
tons. "Thousands of head. ^Millions of litres. 'Millions of dozens. 















































































































































































Thus, in the cases of cotton and coffee 100% of their credit needs were catered for, compared with 
80% in the preceding year. Moreover, the adverse trend of the international prices of export lines was 
offset by the application of a system of multiple exchange rates and the fixing of guaranteed prices.7 
In the lines destined for domestic consumption producer prices were likewise increased. The negative 
effect of this measure on the lower-income population was offset by the policy of subsidizing the 
consumption of basic goods. 
Among export products, the most outstanding increase was in cotton production, whose rise of 
22% contributed a third of the growth of the crop farming subsector. Even so, however, the level 
reached represented only two-thirds of the production levels of the period 1975-1978. In contrast, 
although the rate of growth of the coffee crop was more moderate (5%), a record volume was 
achieved owing mainly to the better climatic conditions. 
The crops of products for domestic consumption also increased substantially. Those of sorghum 
and tobacco more than doubled, thus making up for the losses suffered in the two preceding years and 
reaching levels never before recorded. The bean crop, too, achieved a record level, while that of maize, 
with a growth rate of 33%, greatly exceeded the average volume registered in the period 1974-1978. 
In fulfilment of the agrarian reform programme, 1983 saw the inclusion of a further 254 000 
manzanas* which brought the total accumulated from the beginning of this programme to 518 000 
manzanas. Moreover, in 1983 titles of ownership were granted in respect of 339 000 manzanas, 
which benefited 13 918 families, the majority grouped in various forms of co-operatives. 
The stock-raising subsector practically stagnated. Although there was some growth in cattle-
raising, this was offset by the falls in the production of pigs, poultry and dairy produce. This last was 
particularly affected by climatic problems, and declined by more than4%. Moreover, a large part of it 
was devoted to cheese production, which diminished the supply of meat for public consumption. 
Production of pigs and poultry was affected, for its part, by the scarcity of foreign exchange 
—which limited the importation of inputs, with the ensuing fall in yields— and by the shortage of 
basic grains. Thus, pig-slaughtering went down by close on 3%, while poultry production declined 
by 5%. 
Despite the skirmishes taking place in the production zones, the extraction of timber rose 
slightly, mainly owing to the administrative reorganization of the sector. On the other hand, the 
fishing industry diminished by 7%. This was largely on account of the reduced catch of shrimps, due 
in its turn to the poor condition of the fishing fleet, the lack of inputs and the occurrence of hostilities 
in the Atlantic and especially in the Pacific. 
iii) Mining. Mining production contracted for the second year running in 1983, suffering a fall 
of 9% (see table 6). The greatest decline occurred in silver production, which went down by 32%, 
reaching barely a third of the volume recorded in 1980. At the same time, the output of gold fell by 
13 %. The decline in both cases was due to the gradual depletion of the mines, the obsolescence of the 
machinery and the lack of equipment and spares to attend simultaneously to the tasks of production 
and prospection, so that ore of a lower metal content had to be used. Notwithstanding the decline in 
production, however, employment rose in the sector as a result of the increase in geological 
prospections. 
iv) Manufacturing. The manufacturing sector expanded by almost 5%, more than making up 
for its decline of almost 2% in 1982. As a result, the value of manufacturing output was the highest 
recorded since 1975 (see table 7). 
If production is analysed by end-use, intermediate goods grew by 18% and represented two-
thirds of the increase in the branches which expanded. There were high growth rates in intermediate 
goods destined for agriculture (17%), construction (23%) and manufacturing itself (14%). The rate 
was also high in the case of intermediate goods for transport, although these are of lesser importance. 
Production of manufactures for consumption, for its part, rose by 3 % and represented a third of 
the growth of the branches which increased. The production of beverages and tobacco grew most (9% 
and 7%, respectively). In contrast, production of clothing and footwear stagnated, while that of 
foodstuffs fell by almost 2%. 
'For each export product, different combinations of exchange rates of 10 and of 28 córdobas per dollar were fixed, according to the 
international price trends and internal costs. This mechanism has been in force since the beginning of 1982. 
"A manzana equals 0.7 hectares. 
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Table 6 
NICARAGUA: INDICATORS OF MINING PRODUCTION 
1970 1975 1980 1982 1983° 
Growth rates 
1980 1981 1982 1983° 
Index of mining production 
(1970 = 100) 100.0 63.3 56.4 53.2 48.3 2.4 1.6 -7.1 -9.3 
Production of some 
important minerais 





















Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures from the Ministry of Planning. 
"Preliminary figures. The growth rates correspond to real, not rounded, figures. 
Table 7 
NICARAGUA: INDICATORS OF MANUFACTURING PRODUCTION 
Value of manufacturing 
production 





Footwear and clothing 
Wood and cork 
Furniture and fittings 
Paper and paper products 
Printing, publishing and 
related industries 
Leather and leather products 
Rubber products 


































































































































































































Other indicators of 
manufacturing production 
Industrial consumption of 
electricity 179 258 236 275 307 3.1 20.9 -3.8 11.6 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures from the Ministry of Planning. 






































NICARAGUA: INDICATORS OF CONSTRUCTION ACTIVITY 
Area constructed 
(thousands of m2) 
Total 
Dwellings 
Production of selected 
building materials 
Structural steel (tons) 
Cement (thousands of tons) 
Paving stones for highways 
(thousands of units) ... 4 021 5 649 9 864 -11.5 58.7 74.6 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures from the Ministry of Planning. 
"Preliminary figures. 
The output of petroleum products contracted even more sharply (-10%), owing in part to the 
reduction of supplies coming from Venezuela under the San José Agreement (see table 7). 
Manufacturing output expanded basically owing to the impulse of the demand of other 
activities, such as construction and agriculture. It was an inward-looking expansion, since exports of 
non-traditional manufactures fell in relation to those of 1982. 
A further factor contributing to this dynamism in the manufacturing sector was the improved 
organization of the enterprises of the Area de Propiedad del Pueblo and the favourable response of 
the private sector to the economic policy incentives. There were even some investments by foreign 
enterprises in certain industrial branches, although these represented only a small proportion of the 
total capital formation in the sector. Finally, the growth of the manufacturing sector was helped by 
donations of intermediate products and the opening of credit lines to import inputs, which offset the 
restrictive effect of the scarcity of foreign exchange. 
v) Construction. The construction sector recovered in 1983 to such an extent that it registered 
8% growth. This had a positive effect on global demand, both because of the capacity of this sector to 
generate employment and through its purchases of inputs from the manufacturing sector. 
In contrast to what had happened in previous years, the construction industry engaged to a 
greater extent in infrastructure works, while housing construction suffered a considerable decline 
(-72%) (see table 8). The most important increases occurred in works linked with the poultry 
industry, and in particular in the programme of agrarian reform. The network of access roads was 
likewise increased and other works were carried out, especially for defence. 
vi) The other sectors. Energy production fell by almost 11% in 1983, largely owing to the 
marked fall (-43%) in hydroelectric generation (see table 9). This fall was due to climatic problems. 
Although the geothermal power station began to operate during the second half of the year, its 
production was insufficient to cover the deficit. Hence it was necessary to import energy from Costa 
Rica, under the Central American electrical interconnection programme.9 
c) Employment and unemployment 
The growth of the gross domestic product helped to improve the employment situation to some 
extent, and there was a slight fall in open unemployment (see table 10). According to preliminary 
estimates, this reflected an increase of close on 5% in employment. The crop-farming subsector and 
the central government came to account for more than half of total employment in 1983. 
Notwithstanding this improvement, the unemployment rate remained very high (17.5%) and 
the structure of employment continued to suffer, with some variants, from a serious maladjustment: 
'Under the same system, Nicaragua acted as intermediary in the purchases by Honduras from Costa Rica. 
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on the one hand, because of the shortage of labour during the harvesting of the main export products, 
and, on the other, owing to the accumulation of labour surpluses in other periods of the year and the 
growth in the number of urban underemployed poorly fitted for crop-farming work. Although 
policies were applied with the aim of achieving more stable levels of employment throughout the 
year, the heavy military recruitment in 1983 caused distortions in employment. At the same time, the 
growth of informal trade, above all in the city of Managua, was a factor in a new rise in employment in 
the urban informal sector. 
3. The external sector 
In 1983 there was a further substantial deterioration in foreign trade. The terms of trade fell by 13%, 
causing an increase of the same proportion in the merchandise trade deficit. This made necessary a 
new process of renegotiation of the external debt, which, together with the former agreements, made 
Table 9 
NICARAGUA: ELECTRICITY INDICATORS 
Total consumption 










of power by type 
of station 
(millions of kWh) 
Hydroelectric 
Thermal 




































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures from the Ministry of Planning and the Instituto Nicaragüense de Energía (Nicaraguan Energy 
Institute — INE). 
"Preliminary figures. ' in January 1980 the INE began to takeover wholesale distribution, ending with its total absorption in August 
of that year. 
Table 10 
NICARAGUA: EVOLUTION OF EMPLOYMENT AND UNEMPLOYMENT 
1980 1981 1982 1983" 

















NICARAGUA: MAIN FOREIGN TRADE INDICATORS 








Terms of trade (goods) FOB/CIF 
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Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
"Preliminary figures. 
possible a marked reduction (-42%) in interest payments. At the same time the high net inflows of 
capital, whether as loans or donations, gave rise to an increase of US$ 70 million in the net 
international reserves, despite the persistence, for the fourth year running, of a deficit on current 
account of over US$ 500 million. 
a) Excbange-rate policy 
In 1983 some changes were introduced in the exchange-rate policy, with a view to improving 
the entry of foreign exchange. With regard to foreign trade, the multiple exchange rates applied to 
certain export products were corrected. In particular, the exchange rates for external sales of cotton, 
sesame and sugar were increased. 
On the other hand, expenditure on travel, remittances, commissions and repatriation of capital 
had to be made at the exchange rate of 28 córdobas per dollar. At the same time, it was decreed that 
any natural or legal person could have in his possession only the equivalent of US$ 500, and any 
amount in excess of that sum must be deposited or changed in the national financial system. 
b) Merchandise trade 
The merchandise trade deficit, which had fallen substantially in 1982, increased again in 1983. 
Thus, at the end of the year there was a negative balance of US$ 350 million, mainly as a result of the 
fall for the sixth year running in the terms of trade, which went down on this occasion by close on 
13%, since the average price of exports fell by 10%, while that of imports rose by 3%. Consequently, 
the purchasing power of exports in 1983 amounted to barely a third of that recorded in 1977 (see 
table 11). 
The volume of external sales rose by close on 12%, partly owing to various incentives granted 
to producers.10 Their value, however, was not much higher than in 1982, owing to the sharp fall in the 
prices of the main export products. 
In fact, in 1983 there was an increase in the value of external sales in the case of only three 
products: bananas, cotton and coffee. Banana exports grew the most, with an expansion of almost 
l0As mentioned above, in 1983 several exchange rate incentives were granted and guaranteed prices were fixed in order to shield 
producers from the effects of the fall in international prices. 
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78% over the previous year. Nonetheless, as a result of the sharp fall (-53%) suffered in 1982, their 
value was still 20% lower than that achieved in 1981 (see table 12). In the case of coffee and cotton, 
the increases in external sales, although lower in relative terms (19% and 25% respectively), were 
more significant, since the two products represent more than half of the traditional exports. 
With regard to coffee, the volume sold rose by 35%, thanks to the increased production 
achieved in the 1982/1983 cycle and the use of stocks available at the beginning of the year. At the 
same time, however, prices fell by 12% compared with those of the preceding year. 
Similarly, the internationl price of cotton fell slightly, despite the increase in the volume 
exported. 
With regard to sugar exports, the greater volume did not manage to offset the decline of 25 % in 
the average price. The fall in sales of sugar was also influenced by the reduction of Nicaragua's quota 
in the United States market, where a higher price was paid than that prevailing in the international 
market. Hence the value of sugar exports, which had already contracted by 25% in 1982, fell once 
again, this time by 13.5%. As a result, the amount of sugar exported was barely two-thirds of that 
recorded in 1981. 
Exports of beef went down by 7%, as a result of falls in the international price as well as in the 
volumes sold abroad. This latter fact was due to greater domestic consumption, which reduced the 
exportable surpluses. On the other hand, the reduction in the values of shrimp, lobster and molasses 
exports was the result of falls in the levels of production. 
Finally, the external sales of industrial products fell by over 40%, as a result of falls both in their 
prices and in the volumes sold abroad. This development was due in part to the difficult economic 
situation of the countries of the Central American Common Market, which are the main purchasers 
of these products. ' ' A further factor was the lack of imported inputs, which had a restrictive effect on 
the level of industrial production. 
Table 12 
NICARAGUA: EXPORTS OF GOODS, FOB 
Millions of dollars , . , g 6 Growth rjttesb 
breakdown r 
1981 1982 1983° 1970 1980 1983° 1980 1981 1982 1983° 
Total 
To Central America 






































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures 1 





























































Tom the Ministry of Planning. 
























































































































"In addition to the restricted global demand owing to the current recession, it should be noted that these countries were very short of 




NICARAGUA: IMPORTS OF GOODS, CIF 
Total 
From Central America 











Raw materials and 
intermediate goods 





































































































































































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures from the Ministry of Planning. 
"Preliminary figures. The percentage breakdown and growth rates correspond to real, not rounded, figures. 
The fall in external sales of manufactured products caused a decline in the relative share of the 
Central American countries and Mexico in total exports. Moreover, the part corresponding to the 
United States fell to only 16% of the external sales: barely half the figure recorded in 1980. On the 
other hand, there was a rise in the shares of other purchasers, such as the European Economic 
Community (28%), Japan (18%) and the CMEA (Council for Mutual Economic Assistance) countries 
(10%) (see table 12). 
The value of imports of goods grew by 5%, owing to a rise of 3% in prices and 2% in volume 
(see table 11). 
The greatest increase (23 %) corresponded to imports of capital goods, which came to represent 
more than a quarter of the total external purchases. Imports of machinery for the manufacturing 
sector went up by 37% and those of transport equipment by 27%. In contrast, external purchases of 
agricultural capital goods fell by 44% (see table 13). 
Imports of non-durable consumer goods, for their part, went up by 16% owing to the increased 
external purchases of food, particularly basic grains. This rise more than offset the fall of 11% in 
imports of durable consumer goods, so that total external purchases of consumer goods went up by 
close on 9%. 
On the other hand, total imports of raw materials and intermediate goods fell by slightly over 
2%. External purchases of inputs for construction dropped to less than half (-53%), while those of 
fuels and lubricants declined by 12%,owing to falls both in volume and prices.Fortheir part, imports 
of inputs for agriculture increased by 71 %, which reflected the greater activity of this sector in 1983. 
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The OECD countries again reduced their relative share in Nicaraguan imports, which fell from 
35% in 1982 to barely 31% in 1983. The proportion of purchases made in Venezuela underwent an 
even greater fall and failed to reach even 1 % of the total in 1983, owing to the reduction in petroleum 
imports (see table 13). 
In contrast, the CMEA countries —whose share in imports was practically negligible even in 
1981— supplied almost 17% of total imports in 1983. Mexico and the Central Americaa countries, 
for their part, maintained figures similar to those of the preceding year (21% and 16% respectively). 
The share of the latter, however, was much lower than the figure of almost 34% recorded in 1980. 
c) Services trade and factor payments 
The deficit on the real services balance rose substantially from US$ 65 million in 1982 to 
US$ 112 million in 1983. Nonetheless, this deterioration was more than offset by the sharp fall in 
interest payments during the same period. These went down from US$ 150 million in 1982 to 
US$ 86 million in 1983, thanks to the capitalization of the interest corresponding to the period from 
March to December 1983. Thus, the deficit on the overall services balance declined by more than a 
fifth, falling from US$ 205 million in 1982 to US$ 170 million in 1983 (see table 14). 
d) The current account position and its financing 
The reduction in interest payments offset the rise in the trade deficit. Thus, the balance-of-
payments current account showed a deficit of US$ 520 million, which was similar to that of the 
preceding year. As in 1982, the main source of financing for this deficit consisted of long-term loans 
received by the official sector. The corresponding amortization payments increased considerably, 
however, rising from US$ 40 million in 1982 to over US$ 100 million in 1983, and the net 
contribution of capital to the official sector consequently fell for the second year running, barely 
reaching US$ 265 million. 
Among the creditors, the socialist countries supplied the greater part (35%) of the medium-
and long-term loans (not necessarily corresponding to those disbursed during the year). The 
countries of Western Europe, for their part, provided 21% of such credit, while another 20% came 
from Latin American countries, mainly Mexico, which financed Nicaragua's petroleum purchases. 
Finally, the multilateral agencies provided 16% and the countries of Africa and Asia, 8%. 
Owing to the diminution of external credit, to which was added the deterioration of the trade 
balance, as from March 1983 Nicaragua was unable to carry out the servicing of its external debt. 
Hence a new round of negotiations began with the creditor banks in order to reschedule the payments 
falling due between March 1983 and June 1984. The advances achieved in this process made available 
US$ 265 million, corresponding to the amount of the short-term debt, which was converted into 
medium-term commitments. At the same time, the donations received increased by 60% and 
contributed US$ 70 million to the financing of the current account. Thus the net inflows of capital 
exceeded US$ 590 million, i.e., practically seven times the net interest payments, which placed 
Nicaragua in a different situation from that confronting the majority of the Latin American countries 
in 1983. As a result, it was possible to increase the net international reserves by US$ 70 million (see 
table 14). 
e) The external debt 
The external public debt having a term of more than one year increased by close on US$ 590 
million, as a result of the new disbursements made and of the rescheduling of part of the previously 
accumulated debt. Hence the total disbursed debt came to represent around 135% of the gross 
domestic product, the highest proportion of all the Latin American countries (see table 15). 
Despite the substantial increase in the disbursed debt, the progress made in the renegotiation 
(and especially the conversion of part of the short-term debt) into long or medium-term debt 
considerably reduced the payments in respect of services. A particularly favourable aspect was the 
reduction of interest payments by more than 40%. This diminished the burden of the servicing of the 
global external debt as a proportion of exports of goods and services, which in 1982 had risen to the 
record level of 46%. Even so, the proportion of 35 % recorded in 1983 was similar to that for 1981 and 




NICARAGUA: BALANCE OF PAYMENTS 
(Millions of dollars) 
Balance on current account 
Trade balance 
Exports of goods and services 
Goods FOB 
Real services 
Transport and insurance 
Travel 
Imports of goods and services 
Goods FOB 
Real services 







Unrequited private transfer payments 
Balance on capital account 
Unrequited official transfer payments 
Long-term capital 
Direct investment (net) 
Portfolio investment (net) 
Other long-term capital 













Errors and omissions 
Global balance' 
Total variation in reserves 
(- sign indicates an increase) 
Monetary gold 
Special Drawing Rights 
IMF reserve position 
Foreign exchange assets 
Other assets 









































































































































































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official data. 
'Preliminary figures. 'Real services also include other official and private transactions, but not factor services. cIn addition to 
loans received and amortization payments made, this entry includes net loans granted and other assets and liabilities. Includes long 
and short-term capital movements. 'Correspond to the renegotiation of the short-term external debt to long-term. 'The 
global balance is the sum of the current account balance plus the balance on capital account. The difference between total variation in reserves 
of opposite sign and the global balance represents counterpart items: monetization of gold, allocation of Special Drawing Rights, and 
variations due to revaluation. 'Estimates. 
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4. Prices and wages 
In 1983 there was an upsurge of inflation. Although the variation between annual averages came to 
31 %, which was not much higher than the price increments of around 24% recorded in the last two 
years, a process of speculation broke out in the second half of the year, with the result that the rise in 
consumer prices was 37% between November 1982 and November 1983 (see table 16 and figure 2). 
The price increases were particularly notable in the case of food, beverages and tobacco, which 
rose by close on 53%. Green vegetables and pulses, fruit and fish registered even higher price 
increases (95%, 78% and 56% respectively). 
These increases were decisively influenced by the scarcity of some food products, as a result of 
the fall in the production of basic grains in the 1982/1983 cycle and the lack of foreign exchange. This 
scarcity also led, at least in the city of Managua, to the existence of two food markets: on the one hand, 
the official market, with prices fixed by the Ministry of Internal Trade, and with some products 
controlled by ration cards; on the other, the traditional markets of Managua, where the same articles, 
such as rice, beans, edible oil, salt, sugar, soap, eggs, cheese, meat, etc., were sold at prices which were 
uncontrolled and much higher than the official ones.12 
Moreover, the economy was affected by the excess of means of payment, basically attributable to 
the large fiscal deficit. 
Nevertheless, the price variation of the basket of basic products was only 12%, and that of the 
so-called "subsistence products" was even lower (6%).13 The other subindexes (housing, clothing and 
miscellaneous) also showed increases lower than the general index (16% for the first and 18% for the 
other two). 
Table 15 
NICARAGUA: INDICATORS OF EXTERNAL INDEBTEDNESS 











Gross disbursed global external debt/ 
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Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures from the Ministry of Planning. 
"At 31 December 1978 the short-term debt amounted to US$ 131 million; commitments in respect of guaranteed debt, to US$ 36 million; 
private debt not guaranteed by the State, to US$ 264 million; and State-guaranteed private debt, to US$ 6 million. Preliminary 
figures. f End-year balance of debts having a term of over one year. Includes renegotiation of US$ 264 million of the debt from 
short to long term. 'Estimates, according to balance-of-payments data. 
"The statistics on consumer prices weigh the prices prevailing in the two markets of Managua. 
•*ln order to safeguard the incomes of the poorest groups, some foodstuffs —rice, beans, sugar, coffee and processed maize— are 
provided in pre-established amounts through a system of quotas, with prices fixed by the government. 
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Table 16 
NICARAGUA: EVOLUTION OF DOMESTIC PRICES" 
NICARAGUA 
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983° 
Variation from December to December 
Consumer price index 


































Variation between annual averages 
Consumer price index 
Food, beverages and tobacco 































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures from the Ministry of Planning. 
"Consumer price index for the metropolitan area of Managua. * Preliminary figures for the period January-November. In the first case, 
the growth rate corresponds to the variation between November 1983 and November 1982; in the second, to the variation between the period 
January-November 1983 and January-November 1982. 'Including rice, beans, sugar, coffee, processed maize, beef, eggs and dairy 
products. 
The rise in domestic prices and the very restrictive wage policy considerably reduced real 
remunerations. In the case of rural workers, the purchasing power of the legal minimum wage was 
reduced by almost 19%, while that of industrial wages went down by almost 26% (see table 17). Since 
in real terms these remunerations had already suffered substantial successive reductions during the 
five preceding years, they reached their lowest level for the whole period and were barely equivalent 
to half the figure recorded in 1980. 
To offset part of this striking deterioration in real wages, various industrial enterprises 
provided daily meals for their workers at subsidized prices. Some institutions of the central 
government also made available the same type of service. 
5. Fiscal and monetary policy 
a) Fiscal policy 
In 1983 the fiscal deficit rose again and reached 20% of the gross domestic product,14 owing 
mainly to the big increase in public spending. 
Current expenditure grew by 36%, the most notable increases being in defence expenditure, 
social services,15 and current transfers (see table 18). 
Capital expenditure, which rose by 131% at current prices, accounts for the remaining 45% of 
the increase in total expenditure. To the marked growth in real investment and debt amortization 
was added the unprecedented rise (260%) under the heading of "other capital expenditure". This 
comprises capital transfers to finance the investments of State enterprises, which as in the previous 
year absorbed a very high proportion of the fiscal outlays.16 
l4See footnote 1. 
"Social expenditure —which includes disbursements for health, education, housing, social security and welfare— increased its share in 
the product from 11 % in 1982 to 13 % in 1983. Particular attention was given in 1983 to medical programmes, which brought down the rates of 
incidence of some tropical or infant diseases (malaria, whooping cough, amebiasis and measles). 
"In December 1983 the Fondo Nicaragüense de Inversiones (Nicaraguan Investment Fund) was created to cope with the situation. 
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Current income, on the other hand, showed a moderate increase (39% at current prices). Direct 
taxes rose slightly (5%) in real terms, owing partly to the expansion of the tax base and to the 
regularization of the arrears of some of the enterprises of the Area de Propiedad del Pueblo. Another 
contributing factor was the imposition of a special surtax on revenue. 
Revenues derived from the tax on foreign trade, for their part, fell by practically a fifth, 
reflecting the stagnation of the external sector of the economy. On the other hand, indirect taxation 
grew by 55%, partly owing to the rise in the rates of duty on petroleum products. Other elements in 
this increase were the higher revenues obtained from the tax on the sale of goods and services and 
from the tax applied to the purchase of foreign exchange. Thus, indirect taxes came to represent 69% 
Figure 2 
NICARAGUA: EVOLUTION OF DOMESTIC PRICES8 
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Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures from the Ministry of Planning of Nicaragua. 




NICARAGUA: EVOLUTION OF WAGES AND SALARIES 
Members of the 
Nicaraguan Social 
Security Institute 






































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures from the Ministry of Planning. 
° Preliminary figures. * With the expansion of the coverage of the Nicaraguan Social Security Institute, the evolution of the nominal and 
real wage calculated on the basis of its registers does not faithfully reflect the sequence for average wages at the national level, since the 
membership structure changed rapidly according to levels of income. 'Corresponds to annual average. North and Central 
Atlantic areas. 'National District. 
Table 18 
NICARAGUA: CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INCOME AND EXPENDITURE 




On foreign trade 
Non-tax revenues 
2. Current expenditure 
Wages and salaries 
Other current expenditure 
3. Saving on current 
account ( 1 - 2 ) 
4. Capital expenditure 
Real investment 
Debt amortization payments 
Other capital expenditure 
5. Total expenditure (2 + 4) 
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Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures 
"Preliminary figures. Including 
domestic income. 
from the Ministries of Finance and Planning. 
income of the Junta de Reconstrucción de Managua (Managua Reconstruaion Board) and special 
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Table 19 
NICARAGUA: MONETARY BALANCE 
(Millions of córdobas) 
Money 
Currency outside banks 
Demand deposits 
Factors of expansion 





Area Propiedad del Pueblo 
Factors of absorption 
Quasi-money (savings and 
time deposits) and bonds 
Long-term external loans 















































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures from the Ministry of Planning. 
"Preliminary figures. 
of the total tax revenues, as against only 46% in 1980. At the same time, the tax burden rose from 
22% in 1982 to 26% in 1983,17 which shows the degree of efficacy of the collection. 
External resources financed 41 % of the fiscal deficit, while 90% of the domestic financing used 
(representing 11% of the gross domestic product) consisted of credit from the Central Bank. 
b) Monetary policy 
Owing mainly to the heavy fiscal deficit, the supply of money increased by 58%: the highest rate 
in the last six years. This generated surplus liquidity and facilitated speculative and inflationary 
processes (see table 19). 
As in 1982, the most outstanding factor of expansion was clearly domestic credit to the central 
government, which increased by close on 83%, thus limiting the possibilities of increasing the credit 
granted to some productive sectors. Indeed, credit to the private sector increased by only 11% and 
that destined for the Area de Propiedad del Pueblo by 25%. 
The loans by the national financial system to the different economic sectors highlighted the 
predominance of credit to the agricultural sector, which rose by 25% while total loans grew by 15 %. 
Deposits, both in current accounts and as time deposits, showed a notable increase, reflecting in 
their turn the monetization of the economy and the increase of confidence in the domestic economic 
and financial system. There was also a notable increase in savings deposits even though the interest 
rates on deposits were negative in real terms. As a result, quasi-money grew by 39%, thus showing a 
certain recovery compared with the rate of only 10% registered during the previous year. 
The policy as regards interest rates on loans tended to favour the agricultural sector and within 
this the agricultural production co-operatives. Moreover, during 1983 there was a restructuring of the 
debts of small and medium-sized producers and of some State enterprises, which enabled them to 
remedy their financial situation. The debts of State enterprises (especially those dependent on the 
Ministries of Agriculture and Internal Trade) were condoned and taken over by the central 
government. 
Finally, 1983 witnessed the introduction of a policy of bank specialization, beginning with a 
pilot project of a regional nature. 
17See footnote 1. 
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PANAMA 
1. Recent economic trends: Introduction and summary 
The gross domestic product, which had maintained a quite acceptable growth rate in 1981 and 1982 
despite the rapid worsening of the external situation, finally succumbed in 1983, coming to a virtual 
standstill which resulted in a reduction of 2% in the per capita product. The gross national income 
was also practically stationary during 1983, owing to the scant variation in the terms of trade (see 
table 1 and figure 1). 
In 1982, the gross domestic product had increased by 5.5%, a growth which although it did not 
differ much from those recorded in preceding years, had the merit of having been the highest among 
those observed in the Latin American countries, nearly all of them seriously affected by economic 
recession. This result stemmed mainly from construction, fostered by public investment, and from 
basic services. However, other services and financial activity lost their dynamism, and to the 
intensification of the current account deficit of the balance of payments was added another more 
considerable increment in the fiscal deficit, which came to represent 18% of the gross domestic 
product. 
In order to contain the increasing imbalances developing in different sectors and activities, 
various measures were adopted during 1983 to adjust economic variables to the limited prevailing 
conditions; one of them was a restriction on public expenditure. The drastic contraction in 
construction (-28%) was associated with a significant reduction in commercial activity (-6%) and 
with a decrease of around 2% in manufacturing, falls that were barely offset by increases in other 
activities, significant among which were basic services and other services —except trade— and a 
slight upturn in agriculture. Likewise, the conclusion of the construction of the trans-Isthmian oil 
pipeline1 and its entry into operation at the end of 1982 also helped to maintain the global activity 
level of the economy. 
The incorporation of the pipeline into the economic activity, besides having increased the 
country's status as exporter of services, resulted in the virtual disappearance of oil tankers going 
through the Canal. The transit of this kind of vessel had already dropped considerably since large-
sized ships, which had difficulties in going through the Canal began to be used. The pipeline 
operation —with State participation— produces more income for the country than that earned from 
oil transport through the Canal. 
The rapid worsening of the external situation in 1981 and 1982, with a marked increase in the 
balance-of-payments current account deficit and a loss in international reserves, changed in 1983 with 
the striking drop in imports of goods and services (-12%), despite the fact that exports also 
diminished, though by a slight proportion and for the second consecutive year. This slight fall was 
solely due to a decrease in the sales of goods, particularly of petroleum products. 
Import reduction produced a major fall in the trade deficit, which, despite having been partially 
neutralized by lower interest earnings, led finally to a significant drop in the current account deficit 
and to an increase in international reserves (see table 1 and figure 1). 
In 1981 and 1982, the country had an annual inflow of around US$ 2.8 billion on account of 
interest and an outflow of nearly US$ 3 billion. These amounts dropped in 1983: interest received fell 
to US$ 2.2 billion and interest paid to a little less than US$ 2.5 billion. The international economic 
recession, and particularly the crisis confronting the Latin American countries, depressed the 
important international financial transactions conducted in Panama. 
'The pipeline, 130 kilomerres long, connects the oil terminals of the Atlantic and the Pacific. 
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Halfway through 1983 an agreement was signed with the International Monetary Fund for a 
stand-by loan of 289 million in Special Drawing Rights (SDR). Under this agreement the economic 
authorities committed themselves, on the one hand, to drastically reducing the public sector deficit to 
a figure amounting to 6% of the gross domestic product in 1983,2 and, on the other hand, to 
improving the profile of external indebtedness by reducing the share corresponding to trade 
financing. To this end, in addition to renegotiating the debt which fell due during the year, new long-
term credits were contracted. Some of the latter, in the amount of US$ 278 million were contracted 
with private banks, in addition to those agreed with international organizations, particularly the 
World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank, with a view to various development 
projects. 
Table 1 
PANAMA: MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS 
A. Basic economic indicators 
Gross domestic product at market 
prices (millions of 1970 dollars) 
Population (millions of inhabitants) 
Per capita gross domestic product 
(1970 dollars) 
B. Short-run economic indicators 
Gross domestic product 
Per capita gross domestic product 
Gross national income 
Terms of trade (goods and services) 
Current value of exports of goods 
and services 
Current value of imports of goods 
and services 
Consumer prices 
December - December 
Variation between annual averages 
Real wages 
Unemployment ratec 
Current income of government 


















Fiscal deficit/total expenditure of governmentc 38.7 
Fiscal deficit/gross domestic product* 
C External sector 
Trade balance (goods and services) 
Balance on current account 
Balance on capital account 
Variation in net international reserves 


























































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official data. 
" Provisional figures. *Gross national product, plus terms-of-trade effect and less the net payment of factors to the rest of the world and 
of private grants. 'Percentages. Variation in the first half of 1983 with respect to the first half of 1982. 'Estimate on 
the basis of data for the first half year. 'Year-end balances of the debt contracted for a term of more than one year by the central 
government and decentralized agencies. 'Balances at the end of October. 
2It is estimated that the ratio fiscal deficit/gross domestic product, which in 1982 reached an extremely high percentage (18.3%), 
considering amortization payments on the debt in capital expenditure, might have diminished to around 10% in 1983. 
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PANAMA 
The lack of dynamism in global production, as well as the sharp downturn in the quantum of 
imports of goods and services during 1983, resulted in reductions in domestic demand, mainly in 
gross fixed investment (-16%). Meanwhile, the consumption expenditure of the general government 
decreased slightly and private consumption increased by only 2%. 
In a situation of economic depression such as that of the last year, domestic prices did not show 
much variation (2 % ) and already in the two preceding years they had increased only slightly, around 5 
and 4% respectively. Food prices, at the consumer level, increased even less, 1.3% from December to 
December, owing to an increased supply of basic agricultural products, which was promoted by a price 
and financing policy favouring farmers and by the existence of greater facilities in storage and 
distribution. 
The economic policy measures implemented during 1983 became more effective in the second 
half of the year, after the agreement with the International Monetary Fund was signed. However, 
their impact will only be fully felt in the medium term, when measures tending to reactivate the 
economy, included in the so-called "Caribbean initiative" (a project sponsored by the United States 
Government) are implemented, and investments by foreign enterprises in the Colón Free Zone show 
some results. 
Minimum wages had been increased at the end of 1982 and the remunerations of civil servants 
were raised in 1983 by percentages exceeding inflation. 
2. Trends in economic activity 
a) Total supply and demand 
Total supply, which had increassed by close on 16% in 1980, grew at an annual rate of 3.7% in 
the two following years and diminished by 2.6% in 1983. The absence of dynamism in the gross 
domestic product in the last year was accompanied by a drastic contraction in the volume of imports, 
which already in the two preceding years had remained stagnated (see table 2). 
Meanwhile, the quantum of expors of goods and services, which had shown marked fluctuations 
in recent years, dropped 3% in 1983: however, the domestic supply of goods and services diminished 
2.4%, mainly affecting investment levels. 
Gross domestic investment dropped 12% and fixed investment 16%. The conclusion of the 
construction of the trans-Isthmian pipeline, towards the end of 1982, was one of the reasons for the 
decline in investment; the other was the restrictive policy on public expenditure, which deferred the 
initiation of new projects and delayed some in process of execution. Thus public investment declined 
by nearly 18% and was limited to the construction of a hydroelectric power plant, a highway adjacent 
to the pipeline and other infrastructure works. 
Moreover, private investment declined by 15%, affected by the worsening of the economic 
situation, the lack of reactivation expectations and the uncertainty brought about by the change of 
government and the election scheduled for May 1984. 
Investment in construction diminished by 15% and in machinery and equipment by nearly 
19%. The value of imports of capital goods fell 32% in the first half of the year. By and large, no new 
industries were installed except in the Colón Free Zone, where some clothing factories entered into 
operation. 
As regards consumption expenditure, while that of the general government dropped slightly 
over 1% in real terms, owing to the adoption of strict austerity measures, private consumption 
increased by approximately 2%, indicating a very slight decline in per capita consumption. 
b) Evolution of the main sectors 
The fall in the growth rate of global production from 5.5 % in 1982 to practically zero was due, 
in the first place, to an extraordinary drop in construction (-28%), and, secondly, to decreases of 
around 6% in commercial activity and 2% in manufacturing (see table 3). 
Other activities increased their output levels to a greater or lesser extent, especially basic 
services and particularly electricity, gas and water, whose rate doubled that of the previous two years. 
The other services, except commerce, did not increase at a notably high rate (3.3%), but it was 
important for the weight which these activities have in the total product. For other reasons, there was 
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Figure 1 
PANAMA: MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS 
Gross domestic product3 
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• ^ ^ ^ 

































Net capital movement0 
Trade balance0 
Balance on current account0 
Net factor payments0 
1970 1975 1980 1983 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official data. 
aAnnual growth rate. ^December - December percentage variation. 
cMillions of dollars. 
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Table 2 
PANAMA: TOTAL SUPPLY AND DEMAND 
Total supply 
Gross domestic product 
at market prices 




Gross domestic investment 










Exports of goods and 
services 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures provided by the Statistics and Census Office. 
particular significance in the upturn of 3 % attained by agricultural and fishing production —despite 
the severe drought which affected crops between November 1982 and July 1983—, which led to 
striking increases in the exports of agricultural products and a satisfactory supply of basic foods. 
i) Agriculture. The credit and price support policies, and the construction of infrastructure and 
storage capacity for grains and fodder, promoted during 1982, as well as the favourable situation of 
the markets of some export products, produced an increase in agricultural output of slightly over 4 % 
in 1983, despite the severe drought which affected grain until July and livestock production, which 
increased by less than 1% (see table 4). 
As regards crops intended for export, the production of bananas increased slightly and that of 
coffee considerably, fostered by the favourable conditions prevailing in the external markets for these 
products. In particular, banana exports to the United States were favoured by higher prices and by the 
possibility of expanding the exported volume, owing to a fall in banana production in Ecuador and 
Honduras. 
Coffee production increased by 37%, thanks to very timely rains which raised the yields, as well 
as to an increase in the surface area harvested; the sugar cane harvest, in contrast, dropped by 12%. 
Low sugar prices in the free market made the operation of some sugar mills unprofitable; hence they 
slowed down and part of the surface planted with sugar cane remained uncut. Halfway through the 
1970s —when the international price of sugar remained high— Panama, with State support, made 
vigorous efforts to expand this activity and its industrialization, allocating major investments to this 
end. 
With respect to crops for domestic consumption, maize and beans were affected by a drought 
between November 1982 and July 1983; only the maize harvest, however, diminished (-25%), 
whereas that of beans rose slightly. Rice production, on the other hand, supported by a price policy 
which encouraged its expansion increased by 36%, exceeding domestic consumption levels and 
considerably increasing stocks in the State marketing corporations for agricultural products. 
Millions of dollars Percentage ~ , 
,„.,_ L i j Growth rates 
at 1970 prices breakdown 
1981 1982 1983" 1970 1980 1983" 1980 1981 1982 1983" 
3 059 3 191 3 109 131.4 129.1 122.9 15.7 3-2 4.3 -2.6 
2 393 2 525 2 530 100.0 100.0 100.0 15.1 4.2 5.5 0.2 





















































































































741 796 771 28.9 33.3 30.5 43.8 -3-1 7.5 -3.1 
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Livestock production did not vary significantly during the year, and no data were available on 
fishing. Beef cattle also suffered the effects of drought, leading to exports of live cattle. Beef cattle 
stocks remained virtually stationary and milk production diminished. At the same time, pig 
slaughtering declined by nearly 8%, whereas poultry production appears to have recovered from its 
sharp contraction in 1982. 
ii) Manufacturing. Manufacturing output declined by 2.5% in 1983, affected by a weakening of 
the external market, by the fall in sugar production, by the domestic economic recession which 
depressed demand and, associated with the latter, by the drastic contraction suffered by construction, 
to the detriment of the production of building materials. 
The decrease in sales to markets such as Venezuela and the Central American countries, which 
for different reasons and in different ways limited their imports, helped to depress the production of 
footwear, clothing and food. To this was added the fall in sugar-cane production. Thus, whereas the 
production of food, beverages and tobacco remained virtually stationary, that of footwear and 
clothing dropped by 17% (see table 5). 
Similarly, petroleum-refining diminished by nearly 8%, mainly owing to a lower demand for 
heavy fuels resulting from the reduced shipping activity observed during the year, which was 
especially evident in the Canal. 
Other branches which showed a substantial decline in production were those of basic metal 
products (-33%), non-metallic minerals (-13%) and wood, furniture and fittings (-12%), all related 
in greater or lesser degree to the sharp fall in construction. 
Table 3 
PANAMA: GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT, BY KIND OF 
ECONOMIC ACTIVITY, AT FACTOR COST 







Electricity, gas and water 





insurance, real estate 
and business services 
Ownership of dwellings 
Community, social and 
personal services 
Government services 
Less: Imputed commissions 
banking services 
Millions of dollars 
















































































































































































Source: EC LAC, on the basis of figures provided by the Statistics and Census Office. 
"Provisional figures. As the individual activities and the total were calculated independently, the sum of the former does not 




PANAMA: INDICATORS OF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION 
Index of agricultural production 
(1970 = 100) 
Crop farming 
Livestock 


































































































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
"Provisional figures. Growth rates correspond to real, not rounded, figures. 
''Thousands of head. 'Millions of litres. ^Millions of units. 'Tons. 
'Thousands of tons. 
During the year various measures were adopted to encourage industrial production. These 
included the tariff protection established for a series of domestic consumer products (such as soaps 
and cosmetics). Likewise, small-scale industry was granted credit facilities, as well as support and 
technical assistance through institutions such as the National Council for Small-State Enterprises. 
iii) Construction. The value added by construction suffered an extraordinary fall of around 28% 
in 1983, contributing to the further depression of productive activity and employment. 
The fall in construction is explained, in the first place, by a sharp contraction in demand for 
housing and new building, stemming from domestic economic recession and the lack of recovery 
expectations, which inhibited new investments. In these conditions it is estimated that housing and 
commercial construction shrank by a third. This situation was further aggravated by the excessive 
construction of relatively high-cost dwellings in recent years, which remained unsaleable owing to 
economic recession (see table 6). Other contributing factors were the drop in construction, the 
conclusion of the trans-Isthmian pipeline, as well as the restrictive policy on public expenditure 
which was strictly limited to the continuation of works already in progress, such as the construction of 
a highway running parallel to the pipeline, the La Fortuna hydroelectric power plant installations for 
agriculture (silos, warehouses, etc.) and works designed for housing, health and education. 
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iv) Basic services. Basic services activities were the most dynamic, especially those of electricity, 
gas and water, which in 1983 nearly doubled the growth rate recorded in 1981 and 1982. Transport, 
storage and communication services increased by 7%, considerably less than in the preceding year 
(see table 3). 
The entry into operation of the above-mentioned pipeline contributed notably to a boom in 
these services; it brought about major changes in the transport system and allied services which 
Panama provides for the rest of the world. The pipeline crosses the Isthmus and connects two 
terminal points; it has a transport capacity of 300 million barrels per year, exceeding that which could 
be carried previously by ship through the Canal. Thus, the problem which the Canal posed for the 
passage of deep draught vessels was eliminated. The income earned by using the pipeline, and the 
greater fiscal revenue derived from it, more than offset the lower receipts stemming from a drop in 
the activity of the Canal. 
Table 5 
PANAMA: INDICATORS OF MANUFACTURING PRODUCTION 
Index of manufacturing 
production (1971 = 100) 
Food, beverages and tobacco 
Footwear, clothing and 
leather goods 
Wood, furniture and fittings 
Paper, printing and publishing 
Chemicals and petroleum products 
Non-metallic minerals 
Basic metal products 
Metal products 
Other manufactures 
Index of employment 
(1970 = 100) 
Employees and technicians 
Manual workers 
Source: ECLAC, on the bases of figures provided by the Statistics'and Census Office. 
"Corresponds to theJanuary-September period. 'Corresponds to the January-September variation with respect to the same period of the 
preceding year. 'The petroleum refineries included in this entry decreased their activities by 7.8%. Personnel employed in the 
cities of Panama and Colón; averages for the period indicated. 
Table 6 
PANAMA: INDICATORS OF CONSTRUCTION ACTIVITY 
Growth rates 
1980 1981 1982 1983" 
1980 1981 1982 1983" 
Area constructed 
(thousands of m2) 
Total 401 397 574 371 -2.5 -1.1 44.9 -35.4 
Dwellings 208 260 304 212 2.5 24.7 17.0 -30.3 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of data from the Statistics and Census Office. 






























105.7 146.0 142.8 138.0 113.2 2.3 -2.2 -3.4 -17.3 
69.1 85.8 82.8 84.4 72.3 0.6 -3.5 2.4 -11.9 






































































PANAMA: PRODUCTION OF ELECTRICITY 
Growth rates 
1975 1980 1981 1982 1983" 
1980 1981 1982 1983e 
Production of electricity 
(millions of kWh) l 305 1 812 l 897 2 088 1 076 2.8 4.7 10.1 6.1 
Hydroelectric 98 964 1 334 1 074 414 19.9 38.5 -19.5 -22.5 
Thermal 1207 848 563 1014 662 -11.6 -33.6 80.1 37.9 
Source: ECLAC, on che basis uf figures frum the Statistics and Census Office. 
"Corresponds to the first half year. Growth rates correspond to real, not rounded, figures. 'January-June variation with respect to 
the same period of 1982. 
On account of toll payments for crossing the Canal, US$ 72 million were obtained in 1983, that 
is (-11%) less than in 1982, despite the fact that in March 1983 the tariff had been increased by 10%. 
This was the first year in which receipts decreased since the Torrijos-Carter Treaty came into effect in 
1978. 
In 1983 the number of vessels going through the Canal fell by 15% and the tonnage of freight 
by 17%. This fall was due mainly to theentry into operation of the new pipeline, and also to a drop in 
the Canal water level owing to drought, which prevented the passage of deep draught ships. Finally, 
the contraction in international trade also affected the volume of cargo passing through the Canal. 
However, it should be pointed out that in 1983, with the conclusion of some improvement works, it 
was possible to reduce considerably (from 35 to 22 hours) the average time for crossing the Canal. 
On the other hand, in the first half of the year, the generation of thermoelectricity had to be 
increased by 38% in order to offset the fall (-23%) in the generation of hydroelectricity, affected by 
drought. Hence, electricity production increased by 6% in the first half of the year (see table 7). 
The construction work on the La Fortuna hydroelectric power plant, with a capacity of 840 MW, 
was continued during the year, and its completion is expected in 1984. 
v) Other services. In 1983, the marked contraction in commercial activity (around 6%), was in 
contrast with an increment in financing, insurance, real estate and business services, which, although 
not high (3.7%), slightly exceeded that recorded in the preceding year. This increment is significant, 
since it occurred in a year in which international financial transactions showed little dynamism, and 
when some foreign banks established in Panama transferred most of their operations to their parent 
institution. It should be mentioned that during the year six new branches of international banks 
opened in the country. 
c) Evolution of unemployment 
The sudden and considerable fall in construction, in the first place, and the subsequent 
reduction in manufacturing output, commercial activity and some agricultural productions, explain 
the increase in the unemployment rate from 8.4% in 1982 to 9.5% in 1983- Unemployment in urban 
centres still remains higher than in the countryside, though the latter increased more rapidly in 1983. 
Whereas urban unemployment increased from 10.3% to 11.2% between 1982 and 1983, rural 
unemployment went up from 5.9% to 7.2% in the same period (see table 8). 
Urban unemployment is especially high in Panama City and the Colón Free Zone,3 where 
industrial activity and residential and commercial construction are concentrated. It is estimated that 
these two cities account for 70% of urban unemployment. 
The government adopted various measures for reactivating production and thereby 
diminishing unemployment. For example, the National Council for Small-Scale Enterprises and the 
banks launched a campaign and supplied financial resources for promoting labour-intensive 
*The population in the capital city and Colón comprised somewhat over 409? of the total population in 1981. 
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productive activities. In addition, credits were granted to small-scale entrepreneurs to enable them to 
develop their activities and foster handicraft, with the aim of absorbing unemployment. 
In the countryside, the drought which affected grain production and the preparation of soil and 
crops contributed to the increase of rural unemployment. Employment was also affected by the fall in 
the sugar-cane harvest and the shutdown of some sugar mills. 
Finally, it should be noted that open unemployment figures are relative in scope, since Panama 
is one of the countries in the region where underemployment has greatest signficance. The patterns 
and peculiarities of a wide-open economy linked to the exterior, with an international financial and 
commercial centre, create the contradiction between a low demand for high- and medium-skilled 
human resources and an abundant supply of low-skilled labour, working in commercial 
intermediation activities, which are marginal and with scant productivity. 
3. The external sector 
a) The external imbalance 
During 1983 there was a significant improvement in the external situation, reflected in 
appreciable falls in the trade and current account deficits and in an increase in international reserves 
(see table 9). 
The trade imbalance had amounted to US$ 250 million in 1982 and the current account deficit 
to US$ 540 million, 48% more than that which existed at the beginning of the decade.4 Meanwhile, 
on account of net interest payments US$ 110 million more were disbursed in 1982 than in 1980. This 
situation improved during 1983; on the one hand, the trade deficit shrank to one-fifth, thanks to a 
sharp decline in imports of goods and services, and the current account imbalance fell from US$ 540 
million to US$ 410 million, in spite of an increase in net interest payments —as the amount of 
interest received had fallen more than that of interest paid. 
Along with a decrease in the current account deficit in 1983, the net capital inflow diminished 
from US$ 524 million to US$ 440 million; nevertheless, this was sufficiently high to raise the 
country's international reserves by around US$ 30 million, which had not happened since 1980, since 
which time US$ 75 million had been lost. 
The appreciable drop in total imports in 1983 (-12 %) stemmed rather from a fall in imports of 
goods (-13.5%) than of services, which decreased by 8%. On the other hand, the slight decline in 
exports resulted solely from a drop of 8% recorded for goods; income received for the provision of 
real services —which are four times as high as those obtained for the sale of goods— did not vary 
significantly. 
Table 8 






































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. For 1979,1982 and 1983 corresponds to data obtained from housing surveys made in August of 
each year. For 1980 corresponds to data from the general population census undertaken in February. 
"Provisional figures. 
4 However, the increases in these deficit were much larger in 1978 and 1979.Between 1977 and 1979 the trade imbalance went up from 
USS -93 to USS -236 million and the current account deficit from 183 to 363 million. 
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Table 9 
PANAMA: BALANCE OF PAYMENTS 
PANAMA 
(Millions of dollars) 
Balance on current account 
Trade balance 
Exports of goods and services 
Goods FOB 
Real services 
Transport and insurance 
Travel 
Imports of goods and services 
Goods FOB 
Real services 







Unrequited private transfer payments 
Balance on capital account 


















Errors and omissions 
Global balance 
Total variation in reserves 
(- sign indicates an increase) 
Monetary gold 
Special Drawing Rights 
IMF reserve position 
Foreign exchange assets 
Other assets 






















































































































































































































































































































Source: 1977-1982, International Monetary Fund, Balance of Payments Yearbook, magnetic tape. May 1984; 1985, ECLAC, on the basis of 
official data. 
"Provisional figures. 'Real services also include other official and private transactions, but not factor services. 'In addition to loans 
received and amortization payments made, this entry includes net loans granted and other assets and liabilities. The global balance is 
the sum of the current account balance plus the balance on capital account. The difference between total variation in reserves of opposite sign 
and the global balance represents counterpart items: munetization of gold, allocation of Special Drawing Rights, and variations due to 
revaluation. 
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b) Merchandise trade 
The provision of services constitutes around 80% of the country's total income on account of 
exports of goods and services. For this reason, the balance of goods shows a huge deficit, which in 
1981 and 1982 amounted to approximately US$ 1.1 billion, falling to 930 million in 1983. 
The exports of goods have shown a very uneven trend since the beginning of the decade. In 
1983 they recorded a drop of 8%, which was preceded by another of the same magnitude in 1981 anda 
virtual stagnation in 1982. The fall in the last year was due exclusively to a reduction of around 9% in 
the volume exported, which contrasts with its striking increase in 1982. Prices, on the other hand, 
which had suffered a sharp fall in that year, barely increased in 1983 (see table 10). 
At the same time, imports of goods, which in the period 1978-1981 grew at an annual rate of 
16%, suddenly stagnated in 1982, and in 1983 recorded a significant contraction (-14%), which was 
even more intense in the case of the volume imported (-15%), in addition to a decline of 5% in 1982. 
Prices, meanwhile, showed a moderate increase. 
The slightly higher increase in the unit value of imports against that of exports resulted in a 
new and slight deterioration in the terms of trade, on top of the many depreciations that had occurred 
in previous years. In the 1970s the terms of trade index diminished by 28% and the purchasing power 
of exports of goods, by 23%. However, in three years alone (1981-1983), the deterioration in the 
terms of trade reached 20% and in the purchasing power, 23%. 
The evolution of the terms of trade index of goods and services was different from that of goods. 
It fell by 38% in the 1971-1980 decade, but its deterioration was minimal in the following three years. 
However, the purchasing power of exports of goods and services, which is really the major factor in 
the case of Panama, increased by 14% in the first period, continued to rise in 1981 and only in 1982-
1983 decreased by 7%, an evolution which reflects the favourable course followed by the sale of 
services valued at constant prices (see table 10). 
i) Exports of goods. The drop in exports in the first ten months of 1983 was due mainly to a 
sharp fall in sales of petroleum products (-42%), which could not be offset by the increases achieved 
in exports of agricultural products, mainly bananas, sugar, coffee and others, which, taken together, 
represent around 60% of total exports (see table 11). 
Table 10 
PANAMA: MAIN FOREIGN TRADE INDICATORS 








Terms of trade 




Purchasing power of exports 





































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 





PANAMA: EXPORTS OF GOODS, FOB 
Total 
Petroleum products 







Other exports and 
re-exports to the Canal 
Others 






















































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures from the Statistics and Census Office. 
"Corresponds to the January-October period. ''Calculated on the basis of real, not rounded, figures. 'January-October with respect 
to the same period of 1982. 
The slump in exports of petroleum products was closely related to a decrease in the passage of 
vessels through the Canal. Indeed, a high percentage of these exports correspond to bunker and other 
heavy fuels sold to ships crossing the Canal. 
Banana exports, which represent about 23% of total exports, increased by approximately 15% 
in 1983, taking advantage of a fall in production in other important Latin American producer 
countries. Moreover, sugar exports increased by 49%, thanks to the excellent results of the sugar-cane 
harvest in 1982-1983. In addition, the sugar export quota to the United States rose from 73 600 to 85 
500 tons for the 1983-1984 period, making it possible to place a larger share of sales in that market at 
higher prices and to decrease sales to the free market, where prices are 40% lower than in the 
American market. 
Coffee exports also had an extraordinary increase (64% in the January-October period as 
compared with the same period in 1982), and those of fish meal, considerably less important, more 
than doubled. In contrast, shrimp sales retained the levels of the preceding year. 
ii) Imports. Imports of goods diminished by slightly over 13% in the first half of 1983 with 
respect to the same period of the preceding year. Economic recession, the fall in construction, 
manufacturing and investment, as well as the scant dynamism shown by other activities, resulted in 
this drop in external purchases. 
Capital goods, crude petroleum, raw materials and intermediate goods are among the items 
which dropped the most. In contrast, imports of food and chemical products recorded slight 
increments (see table 12). 
During 1983 some import restrictions were applied. Taxes were raised on the importing of 
some goods, among these automobiles. 
c) Services trade 
The balance of real services was favourable to Panama in the amount of US$ 880 million, a 
figure exceeding by US$ 37 million that of 1982. This positive balance resulted from a stagnation in 
services sold and a decline of approximately 3% in services paid. 
Income from tourism fell slightly (-3%), owing to a lower inflow of tourists. However, the 
operation of the new pipeline produced far more income than that which was lost through reduced 
activity in the Canal. 
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As regards outlays, transport expenditure diminished owing to the fall in imports and 
expenditure on travelling abroad also decreased. 
Nonetheless, the favourable and significant reduction in the trade deficit in 1983 was eclipsed 
by increased outlays on factor services. In fact, during the year both interest paid and interest received 
diminished, but the decline in the latter was greater. Receipts and interest payments attain high 
magnitudes in Panama, owing to the importance of international financial transactions conducted in 
the country. In 1983 interest received amounted to US$ 2.2 billion and interest paid to US$ 2.47 
billion, resulting in a negative balance of US$ 270 million, 66 million more than that of 1982 (see 
table 9). 
d) External public indebtedness 
In addition to an intensification in the trade and current account deficits in 1982, the external 
debt grew considerably. Disbursements on loans to the public sector alone rose from approximately 
US$330 million in 1981 to US$730 million in 1982 (119%), resulting in an external public 
indebtedness at the end of that year of US$ 2.82 billion, an amount which represents 66% of the gross 
domestic product. The debt service grew in the meantime by 25 %, accounting for 38% of exports of 
goods and services and 15% of the gross domestic product (see table 13). 
Table 12 
PANAMA: IMPORTS OF GOODS, FOB 
Total 








According to tariff 
sections 
Food products 
Beverages and tobacco 
Non-edible crude materials, 
except fuels 
Fuels and lubricants, 
minerals and related 
products 
Animal and vegetable oils 
and fats, except edible 
margarines and fats 
Chemical products 
Miscellaneous manufactures 
Machinery and transport 
material 
Others 




















































































































































Source: ÜCLAC, on the basis of figures from the Statistics and Census Office. 
"Provisional figures from January to June. Calculated on the basis of real, not rounded, figures. 
respect to the same period of the preceding year. Variation corresponds to the entire year. 
'January-June variation with 
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Table 13 
PANAMA: INDICATORS OF EXTERNAL INDEBTEDNESS 
PANAMA 
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983" 
External public debt 
Balances 
Disbursements 
Servicing of the debt 
Amortization payments 
Interest payments 

































External public debt/gross 
domestic product 
Servicing/exports of goods 
and services 
Servicing/disbursements 
Servicing/gross domestic product 


















Source: For the 1978-1982 period: World Bank, All debt table, éd., 1983-1984. 1983: ECLAC, on the basis of provisional daca. 
"Outstanding debt at the end of October and disbursements and services made in theJanuary-October period. Medium- and long-term 
end-of-year debt of the general government and decentralized agencies. 
This situation changed in 1983; in the first ten months, credits for US$ 640 million had been 
disbursed and the debt service decreased to a little over US$ 400 million. At the end of October, the 
external debt of the public sector amounted to US$ 3.27 billion. 
The rapid worsening of the external situation led the government, halfway through the year, to 
sign an agreement with the International Monetary Fund for a stand-by loan of 289 million in SDRs, 
subject to the application of an adjustment programme, which among its purposes stressed the need 
of limiting the public sector deficit to a maximum percentage of 6% with respect to the gross 
domestic product, and of considerably reducing the external indebtedness with commercial banks and 
the proportion of the short-term debt. 
Likewise, during the year credits for US$ 280 million were obtained from private banks; the 
Inter-American Development Bank granted credits mainly for infrastructure works and an 
agreement was signed with the World Bank for US$ 60 million. 
4. Prices and wages 
a) Evolution of domestic prices 
The fact that Panama is a wide-open economy has contributed to a great stability in domestic 
prices. The two-digit increases in the consumer price index in 1979 and 1980 were exceptional and 
were linked to the steep rise in petroleum prices. Since then, there has been a remarkable slowdown 
in the rate of inflation, which, as measured both from December to December and in its variation 
between annual averages, has diminished from around 14% in 1980 to only 2% in 1983- The more 
gradual increment in import prices had a definite influence on this decline (see table 14). 
The work done by the Institute for Agricultural Marketing (IMA) in regulating the supply and 
prices of grains and other basic foods was a major factor in containing domestic prices. The drop in 
petroleum prices —an important item in Panamanian imports— also contributed to this outcome. 
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The food component index, which usually grew more than the general index, increased by 
barely over 1 % from December to December, owing to a generally satisfactory supply of agricultural 
products during the year. The low increment in wholesale prices also helped to hold down consumer 
prices. 
b) Wages 
In the 1980-1982 triennium nominal wages increased at an annual rate of 13% and real wages 
by 4.7%. In 1983 these increments only amounted to 5.5% and 3.3%, respectively. Minimum wages, 
which had not been raised since the beginning of 1981, were adjusted by 18% in December 1982. This 
increment broadly favoured all workers (see table 15). 
The wages for civil servants were also adjusted by percentages inversely proportional to the 
amount of their salaries, particularly those for officials in the educational sector, whose union has a 
strong influence. 
Table 14 
PANAMA: EVOLUTION OF DOMESTIC PRICES 
Consumer price index 
Food 





Consumer price index 
Food 





Source: ECLAC, on the basis 










































































































































Current savings (1-2) 
Capital expenditure 
Real and financial 
investment and other 
capital expenditure 
Amortization payments 
Total expenditure (2+4) 













































































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis uf official figures. 
"With the exception of current income, the remainder has been estimated on the the basis of data for the first half year compared with the same 
period of 1982. ''Except in the case of current income, variations correspond to January-June with respect to the same period of 
1982. 'Includes wages and salaries and purchases of non-personal goods and services. Includes current and capital transfer 
payments. 
5. Fiscal and financial policies 
a) Central government income and expenditure 
During 1983 various measures were adopted to diminish the fiscal deficit, which had increased 
inordinately in 1982, representing 18% of the gross domestic product. The commitment assumed 
with the International Monetary Fund halfway through 1983 stipulated that the ratio fiscal 
deficit/gross domestic product should not exceed 6% in 1983 and 5.5% in 1984. With this in mind, 
efforts were made during the year to increase government income and to reduce expenditure as much 
as possible. 
According to estimates based on expenditure data for the first half year, a considerable 
reduction in the deficit (-47%) appears to have been attained during the year, thanks to a drastic 
reduction of 19% in expenditure and a fall in the ratio fiscal deficit/gross domestic product from 18% 
in 1982 to slightly under 10% (see table 16). 
The contribution of income to the deficit reduction was not too clear. In fact, its increase was 
slightly under 7%, that is, lower than that recorded in preceding years, despite the various measures 
adopted during the year to expand it. Thus, import tariffs were raised for a series of goods, including 
automobiles, which were subjected to a 25 % tax. In addition, the toll for using the Canal was increased 
by 10%. 
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The highest increases in tax revenue were recorded by duties on foreign trade (8%) and by 
direct taxes (7%); in contrast, indirect taxes proper did not show much variation. Among the latter, 
however, taxes on production, sales and selective consumption were increased by 12% (see table 17). 
Non-tax receipts increased by 10% in 1983, a rate slightly lower than that of recent years. The 
drop in receipts deriving from a reduced activity in the Canal was offset by the operation of the new 
pipeline. 
The sharp fall in expenditure (-19%) waslargelydeterminedbyadrasticcontraction(-60%)in 
capital expenditure, excluding amortization payments. Current expenditure declined less, i.e., by only 
4%, and exclusively on account of lower interest payments on the external debt. Consumption 
expenditure did not record significant variation, owing to the different performances of its 
components (see table 16). 
Various measures —such as that of not filling vacancies in the civil service— were taken during 
the year to diminish expenditure. However, consumption expenditure in the administrative sector 
went up by nearly 13%, boosted by wage increases. On the other hand, the decision to limit activity 
and to economize in public enterprises and institutions causing losses to the State led to a marked 
reduction in consumption expenditure in the production field. 
The drastic contraction observed in capital expenditure was due to the conclusion of the 
pipeline towards the end of 1982 (a work which had considerably increased capital expenditure in 
that year), and to the deferment of any new project. In contrast, works in progress were carried on; for 
example, the construction of dwellings for low-income strata in Panama City and in various towns on 
the Atlantic coast, and the countrywide extension of health services. 
Likewise, major works were built for grain storage and the marketing of agricultural products; 
work on the La Fortuna hydroelectric power plant was continued and, for the installation of 
distribution networks, progress was made with the construction of a highway running parallel to the 
trans-Isthmian oil pipeline. 
b) Evolution of financial transactions 
The activities of the international financial centre operating in Panama remained sluggish 
during 1983, in contrast with the dynamism shown in previous years, particularly in 1981. This 
recession was mainly evident in international transactions (see table 18). 
Table 17 
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Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures from the Statistics and Census Office. 








Other domestic liquid assets 
Other external liquid assets 
Demand deposits in banks 
Time deposits in banks 




















































































































































































































Source: ECLAC, un the basis of figures from the Statistics and Census Office. 
'Balances at the end of September. 'Growth rates were calculated with respect tu September 1982. 
local banks. 
' Excluding transactions among 
The end-of-September balances showed a considerable increment in liquid assets (17%) and a 
fall in the external credit portfolio, which was offset in part by a greater investment in securities 
(9.5%). 
On the other hand, time deposits (83% of liabilities) did not show, as a rule, much variation, 
because deposit withdrawals by foreign banks were offset by a considerable increase in personal 
deposits made by nationals and, to a lesser extent, by foreigners. 
The withdrawal of deposits by foreign banks is due to the fact that the parent houses of 
institutions established in Panama have given some preference to transactions made by branches set 
up in other countries, mainly in the United States, where they have increased their activities. As 
regards the increase in deposits by foreign individuals, this was related to the economic difficulties 
existing in some parts of the region, which discouraged investment in those countries. 
Finally, it should be noted that banks which mainly operate with the exterior increased their 
reserves by 13% during the first half of the year, as a precaution against possible losses in operations 
connected with financial events in debtor countries. For the same reasons, the patrimony of the centre 





1. Recent economic trends: Introduction and summary 
The recession affecting the Paraguayan economy since the end of 1981 was accentuated in 1983. 
At the same time unemployment again increased disproportionately while inflation became more 
intense. Most results in the external sector were also once again unsatisfactory in 1983 (see table 1 
and figure 1). 
As in the preceding year, external conditions proved decidedly unfavourable to the economy of 
Paraguay. Although some international variables snowed improved results, the successive economic 
crises in neighbouring countries continued seriously to impair its evolution. 
Furthermore, the most damaging floods in the history of the country occurred in 1983, causing a 
high cost in human suffering, destruction of wealth and loss of production. 
In the sphere of domestic economic policies, numerous exchange rate adjustments were 
introduced in the course of the year (though in appreciably smaller proportions than the rising rates 
in the parallel exchange market); expansive fiscal and monetary policies were applied; there was a 
marked increase in external public indebtedness, and a comparatively small readjustment was 
granted in private sector wages. 
In 1983 the recession deteriorated further in almost all sectors of the economy with the 
exception of certain non-basic services. As in 1982, the activity most affected was building, in which 
added value diminished by 5.4% compared with 1982. Nevertheless, the agriculture and livestock, 
commercial and manufacturing sectors also contracted severely. Community, social, personal and 
government services continued to expand at moderate rates. 
On the other hand unemployment at the national level increased from 9.4% in 1982 to 15% in 
1983, while the unemployment rate in Asunción rose from 5.6% in 1982 to 8.4% at the end of 1983. 
Whereas the recession in 1982 had been accompanied by a decline of inflation, the wholesale 
price index in 1983 rose by 33% after a contraction of almost 7% in 1982. Consumer prices 
meanwhile rose by 14% in comparison with the increase of 9% recorded in the preceding year. 
As regards real wages, a contraction of more than 7% occurred in the Asunción labour market 
after a decline of around 3% the year before. In contrast with this situation, agricultural wages 
remained unaffected and, according to available information, even rose in real terms. 
In the external sector the purchasing power of registered exports of goods and services fell by 
24.5% mainly owing to a severe contraction in the volume of foreign sales. The decline in total 
importing capacity was slightly less (almost 20%) as a result of an increase in net capital inflows. 
At the same time, registered imports of goods and services diminished in volume by almost 
22%. The current account deficit consequently fell despite the unfavourable evolution of foreign 
sales. This trend, together with a greater surplus on capital account, halted the depletion of 
international reserves. External indebtedness, however, increased considerably again and delays 
occurred in payments to foreign suppliers. 
The international and regional situation remained highly unfavourable despite the appearance 
of some encouraging signs. Although the United States economy began to make a good recovery in 
1983, that of most European countries remained recessive and stagnant. International interest rates, 
for their part, continued in real terms (expost) at the historically unaccustomed levels of between 4% 
and 6%. 
At the same time international capital supplies again contracted severely. For example, net 
flows in 1983 measured according to the Latin American balance of payments, showed a decrease of 
almost 81% after a decline of 56% in the preceding year. 
Although this radical reduction in capital flows to Latin America did not directly affect 
Paraguay, it certainly harmed the country indirectly through its sharp impact on the economies of 
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Brazil and Argentina, countries with which Paraguay carries on 50% or more of its foreign trade. The 
indirect negative effect of high interest rates was also more significant than their direct effect. 
Thus the process of adjustment in the Brazilian economy went on apace in 1983. The national 
product contracted by more than 3% while inflation accelerated to a level of close on 180%. The 
volume of its imports decreased by almost 19% while exports rose by over 15%. Although the crisis 
in Argentina became less acute, it continued to be a depressive factor in the level of activity in 
Paraguay. 
Table 1 
PARAGUAY: MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS 
A. Basic economic indicators 
Gross domestic product at factor cost 
(millions of 1970 dollars) 
Population (millions of inhabitants) 
Per capita gross domestic product 
(1970 dollars) 
B. Short-run economic indicators 
Gross domestic product 
Per capita gross domestic product 
Gross national income 
Terms of trade (goods and services) 
Current value of exports of goods 
and services 




Variation between annual averages 
Money (M,) 
Wages and salaries'7 
Rate of unemployment 
Current central government income 
Total central government expenditure 
Savings/current central 
government income 
Global balance/total central 
government expenditure^ 
Central government global 
balance/GDP' 
Public sector global balance/GDP' 
C. External sector 
Trade balance (goods and services) 
Balance on current account 
Variation in international reserves 
Disbursed gross external debr 

























































































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official data. 
'Preliminary figures. 'Gross national product plus terms-of-trade effect, less net factor payments to the rest of the world and net private 
donations. 'Workers' wages in real terms in Greater Asunción. Average annual rate in Greater Asunción. 
'Percentage. ^Public, and private with State guarantee; medium and long term. * Disbursed gross external debt less holdings of net 
foreign assets in the economy. 
512 
PARAGUAY 
An indication of the very unsettling effects of these recessions and adjustments on the 
Paraguayan economy was to be seen in tourism. The number of visitors to Paraguay again fell by 17% 
after having decreased by 33% in 1982 and 12% in 1981. The number of foreign visitors in the year 
was thus 50% lower than in 1980. Slightly more than 53% of the decrease between 1980 and 1983 
was due to a contraction of over 64% in the number of visitors from Argentina and more than 22% 
was attributable to a decline of 33% in Brazilian tourism. 
These adverse developments were aggravated in 1983 by the worst rainstorms and floods ever 
experienced in Paraguay. Some 600 rivers and streams were calculated to have broken their banks, 
flooding vast areas in eleven of the country's 19 departments. 
At least 125 000 persons were affected by this disaster, which caused considerable losses in he 
country's wealth (including more than 10% of the livestock population), depressed production levels, 
gave rise to inflationary pressures, reduced exports, and affected financial administration in the 
public sector. A conservative estimate suggests that the combined production losses were equivalent 
to 3 % of the gross domestic product in 1982 and to 7 % of the value of registered exports in that year. 
The climatic phenomenon alone would suffice to explain almost the whole drop in the level of activity 
in 1983. 
With regard to domestic economic policy, the average official exchange rate for exports in 1983 
was increased by 12%. The parallel rate, however, rose by 36%. As a result, the official rate fell to 
50% of the value of the parallel rate, whereas in 1982 it had amounted to 70% of the latter. Apart 
from this greater disparity between the official and parallel rates caused by the adjustments 
introduced during the year, the exchange rates applicable to different products were also dissimilar. 
Thus, at the end of 1983 there were four different official parities for exports and three for imports. In 
addition, progressive restrictions in access to the importation of goods at the official exchange rate 
were introduced during the year, with the result that the latter remained in practice much closer to the 
parallel rate for the purpose of foreign purchases. 
In spite of the devaluations adopted, the official real effective average rate of exchange for 
exports contracted by almost 12% in 1983 after having risen slightly in 1982 and having deteriorated 
to a marked degree in 1981. On the other hand, the rate applicable to imports probably increased 
considerably in 1983; however, as explained in the corresponding section, there is no way of 
calculating this accurately. 
With respect to wage policy, a first readjustment of the minimum legal wage since May 1981 
was introduced in July 1983. During this period inflation was approximately 20% whereas the 
minimum wage was raised by 10%. The public sector received no increase whatsoever in 1983. 
The average nominal increase in wages received in 1983 by workers in Asunción was slightly 
over 5%, this being almost the same as the average increase in the minimum legal wage. On the other 
hand, the nominal increases applicable to daily farm wages were much greater than the legal 
readjustment. 
With reference to financial policy in the public sector, the central government budget for 1983 
showed a deficit equivalent to 1% of the forecast gross domestic product and 39% greater than the 
deficit recorded in 1982. It was expected that less than 55% of the deficit would be financed from 
external sources and the remainder by a reduction in government-owned deposits in the Central 
Bank. 
Most of the results in the 1983 fiscal year, however, were not only different from those foreseen 
in the budget, but showed a notable deterioration in comparison with the equivalent results in 1982. 
In fact, the deficit rose fourfold and was equivalent to 3.3% of the gross domestic product. 
Financial results in the rest of the public sector also deteriorated. The consolidated global deficit 
in the non-financial public sector amounted to 5.4% of the gross domestic product. Its pressure on the 
external sector, however, was appreciably less than its monetary effect, since 60% of the difference 
between income and expenditure was covered by external credits. 
With regard to monetary policy, this continued to follow the passive approach applied since the 
onset of recession in the second half of 1981. In contrast with events in the two preceding years, 
however, this policy led to a considerable growth in means of payment in 1983. In effect, the 
monetary authority adapted expansion to the growing demands of the State without limiting credit to 
the commercial banks. Thus, the total net domestic credit issued by the Central Bank rose by 109% in 
1983. At the same time its net external asset holdings hardly varied. These circumstances caused an 
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Figure 1 
PARAGUAY: MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS 
Gross national incomea 
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Unemployment" 
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Urban unemployment0 . - d 
J I l_ 
Net capital movements^ 
Balance on current account 
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Trade balance*. 





Exports of goods 
and services 
Total foreign debt' 
1970 1975 1980 1983 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official data. 
aAnnual growth rate. ''Total average annual growth rate country-wide. ^Fourth 




expansion of 30% in the monetary base. Approximately 73% of its growth may be attributed to an 
increase in the amount of credit absorbed by the central government. Expansion of the monetary base 
was accompanied by an increase of more than 26% in means of payment (M,), while the growth of 
quasi-money was restricted to 13%. As measured by the M2, liquidity expanded by 18%. 
To sum up, domestic economic policy contributed to the unfavourable evolution again shown by 
the economy in 1983- The exchange policy inhibited exports and encouraged further devaluation 
expectations. Fiscal policy, for its part, kept domestic expenditure at a higher level than would 
otherwise have been the case. However, since the increase in public sector investment was not 
covered by a growth of savings in the sector, the consequent creation of means of payment exerted 
pressure on the external sector and on price levels. In contrast, wage policy attenuated cost-induced 
inflationary pressures. On the other hand, the higher level of public expenditure was also 
accompanied by an appreciable restriction of growth in the allocation of credit to the private sector; 
its net impact on activity levels and employment was therefore a matter of doubt. 
While the growth of means of payment arising from the monetary policy did not occasion a loss 
of international reserves, inflation was intensified, especially at the wholesale price level. This result 
would appear to be attributable to growing restrictions on access to the external assets of the Central 
Bank, namely, to import limitations. At the same time, the considerable expansion of the money 
supply failed to relieve the economic recession. This juxtaposition of results would also appear to 
have been due fundamentally to the effect of reduction in the volume of imports added to an 
insufficient allocation of credit to the private sector and an uneven distribution of money growth in 
the course of the year. 
2. Trends in economic activity 
a) The product and income1 
The recession affecting the Paraguayan economy since the end of 1981 increased in intensity in 
1983; the gross domestic product declining by 3.7% after a drop of 2% the year before. The gross 
national product contracted by 4.6% and gross national income by nearly 5.7% compared with 
decreases of 1.7% in both indicators in 1982 (see table 2). 
1983 was in fact the worst year for the Paraguayan economy since 1947 when the country 
suffered a civil war. As a result of the prolongation and deepening of recession, the product and per 
capita income fell back to levels lower than those achieved in 1980. This recessive interval contrasted 
significantly with the evolution of the economy in the preceding decade, when it was one of the most 
dynamic in the world, showing an average rate of expansion of 8.2%.2 
b) Supply and demand 
In contrast with events in the preceding year, when imports continued to expand strongly 
despite the recession in levels of activity, the volume of imports of goods and non-factor services in 
1983 dropped by almost 22%, according to figures supplied by the Central Bank of Paraguay. 
However, the volume of registered exports of goods and services not attributable to factors also 
showed a radical change in 1983, decreasing by close on 20% compared with an expansion of 16% in 
the preceding year. As a result of the foregoing, the decrease in domestic expenditure was not much 
greater than the drop in the gross domestic product despite a very considerable reduction in imports. 
While in 1982 the contraction of domestic demand more than reflected the depression of gross 
domestic investment, in 1983 it was mainly attributable to a decline in consumption. More 
'As readers will be aware, the national accounts drawn up in connection with the Paraguayan economy suffer from lack of precision, 
especially in regard to the external sector (in which foreign trade and net capital inflows have been underestimated in recent years by as much as 
50% or more in relation to domestic expenditure, and, to a certain extent, to the product). The official statistics do not, therefore, necessarily 
reflect the magnitude or significance of variations in external sector aggregates other than in the case of the product. In these circumstances, an 
analysis of the evolution of these variables is subject to severe limitations. Nonetheless, it would appear that, at least in 1983, the trends indicated 
by the official figures were consistent with actual results. For a study of the problem and of alternative calculations of the main macroeconomic 
aggregates for the period 1972-1981, see Richard Lynn Ground, "Las cuentas nacionales del Paraguay", Revista paraguaya de sociología, year 19, 
No. 5, September-December 1982. 
2See: ECLAC: Economic Survey of Latin America and the Caribbean, 1981, a United Nations publication, sales No. S.83.I1.G.2, Santiago, 
Chile, 1983. 
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specifically, it reflected the decline in private consumption since general government consumption 
remained unchanged. Gross domestic investment, for its part, decreased by slightly less than 2% in 
1983 compared with a contraction of nearly 12% in the previous year (see tables 3 and 4). 
The persistence of the drop in domestic demand was in part due to factors such as the rains and 
floods, which reduced main farm crops, and the increase in competitive pressures from neighbouring 
economies which depressed activity and income levels and thereby private consumption. The rise in 
the effective average exchange rate in real terms and the continuing deceleration in the construction 
of the Itaipú hydroelectric power project also restrained domestic demand. 
Countering these recessive features, and thus reducing the magnitude of the restraint on 
domestic demand, the country's fiscal and monetary policies, as against those of the preceding year, 
were frankly expansionary. 
c) Investment and savings 
Private sector expenditure devoted to capital formation again contracted in 1983, declining by 
nearly 9% after having fallen by over 17% in 1982. The depression in private investment was mainly 
due to a lower utilization of installed productive capacity in sectors of the economy other than 
construction, and also to the renewed slow-down in execution of the hydroelectric power projects. 
Despite this, private investment continued at a very high level compared with the general level of 
activity (it still represented 24% of the gross domestic product in 1983), mainly owing to the work in 
progress at Itaipú.3 
The public sector, for its part, intensified its efforts to alleviate the effects of recession on 
activity and employment by increasing its investment expenditure to 29% after the previous year's 
increase of 17.5%. In this manner, public investment (excluding Itaipú and Yacyretá), expressed as a 
proportion of the product, rose to 8.6% in 1983 and represented more than 26% of total gross 
domestic investment compared with 6.1% and 17% respectively two years earlier (see table 5). 
There can be no doubt that this growth of expenditure enabled employment to continue at a 
higher level than would otherwise have been the case. Its impact on the level of activity was probably 
also positive. Nonetheless, as it was not financed by an increase in savings, it exerted increasing 
Table 2 
PARAGUAY: SOME FIGURES ON THE PRODUCT, INCOME AND EXPENDITURE 
(Millions of dollars at constant 1970 prices)" 
Gross domestic product 
at market prices 
Indirect taxes, less 
subsidies 
Gross domestic product at 
factor cost 
Net imports of goods 
and services 
Net factor payments to 
the rest of the world* 
Terms-of-trade effect 
Gross domestic expenditure 
Gross national product 



























































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official data. 
"At parity exchange rate. "Preliminary figures. 'Including private unrequited transfer payments. The minus sign (-) indicates net 
income. 





PARAGUAY: TOTAL SUPPLY AND DEMAND 
Tota supply 
Gross domestic product 
at market prices 




Gross domestic investment 
























































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of data from the Central Bank of Paraguay. 
'Preliminary figures. kThe figures for exports and imports of goods and services were obtained from balance-of-payments data in current 
dollars converted at constant 1970 values using price indexes calculated for that purpose by ECLAC. 
Table 4 
PARAGUAY: STRUCTURE OF TOTAL SUPPLY AND DEMAND 
(As a percentage of the gross domestic product)" 
Total supply 
Gross domestic product 
at market prices 
Imports of goods and 
services' 
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 
111.6 111.7 114.2 115.1 116.2 114.3 114.7 116.2 113.1 
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
11.6 11.7 14.2 15.1 16.2 14.3 14.7 16.2 13.1 
Total demand 111.6 111.7 114.2 115.1 116.2 114.3 114.7 116.2 116.2 
Domestic demand 






































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of Central Bank of Paraguay figures. 
'At market prices in constant 1970 dollars at the parity exchange rate. 'Preliminary figures. 'The figures for exports and imports 
of goods and services were obtained from balance-of-payments data in current dollars converted at constant 1970 values through deflation with 
price indexes calculated for that purpose by ECLAC 
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pressure on the balance of payments and on price levels. The higher expenditure was in fact 
accompanied by a further significant deterioration in the situation of the public sector current 
account, in which the overall deficit rose from a sum equivalent to 3.9% of the gross domestic product 
in 1982 to 7.6% of the corresponding product in 1983. The counterpoise was an acceleration of 
inflation, a turn-around in the balance of the private sector (which, from a deficit equivalent to 2 . 1 % 
of the gross domestic product in 1982, showed a surplus of 1.8% of the equivalent product in 1983) 
and an appreciable expansion in governmental external indebtedness. In these circumstances the 
balance-of-payments current account deficit showed a slight reduction (see table 5). 
d) Sectoral trends in the product 
i) Introduction. In 1983 the recessive situation increased in severity in almost all sectors of the 
economy, some non-basic sectors excepted. Construction was again the activity most affected. Similar 
declines occurred in the agricultural, commercial and manufacturing sectors. Basic services, which 
continued to grow in 1982, were also considerably affected by the recession in 1983. On the other 
hand, community, social and personal services, and government services again increased in 1983 (see 
table 6). 
As in the preceding year, economic activity was affected by an unfavourable evolution in relative 
external prices owing to the difficult situation facing the countries whose economies have an 
important influence on that of Paraguay, and by a lower level of activity on the part of the binational 
entities. To these negative influences were added the exceptionally adverse climatic conditions 
experienced in 1983. As a result of the abnormally intense and frequent rainstorms, principally in the 
headwater areas of the rivers Paraguay and Paraná in Brazil, but also around the sources of the rivers 
Pilcomayo (in the Bandes region) and Iguazu (in Brazil) and over large expanses of Paraguayan 
territory, the year 1983 witnessed the most severe floods experienced in the country in the present 
Table 5 
PARAGUAY: COMPOSITION, ORIGIN AND FINANCING 
OF GROSS DOMESTIC INVESTMENT 
(As a percentage of the gross domestic product)" 
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 












25.4 27.8 30.5 
Demand 
16.3 18.9 22.5 
9.1 8.9 8.0 
Composition 
11.0 12.8 15.1 
12.3 14.1 13.7 

































22.4 23.3 25.7 27.0 29.2 28.3 24.9 27.0 Gross domestic savings 
Net factor payments to 
the rest of the world' 
Terms-of-trade effect 




Source: ECLAC, on [he basis of data supplied by the Central Bank of Paraguay and the Technical Planning Secretariat. 
"At market prices in constant 1970 dollars at parity exchange rate. Preliminary figures. 'Including government enterprises, with 
the exception of the Itaipú and Yacyretá Binational projects. Livestock sector only. 'Including private unrequited transfers. The 


























































PARAGUAY: GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT BY KIND OF 
ECONOMIC ACTIVITY, AT FACTOR COST 
Gross domestic product 
Goods 
Agriculture, hunting, 
forestry and fishing 




Electricity, gas and water 




Ownership of dwellings 
Community, social and 
personal services 
Government services 
Millions of dollars 











































































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of Central Bank of Paraguay figures. 
"Preliminary figures. *As the individual activities and totals have been calculated independently, the sum of the former does not tally 
exactly with the latter. 'Including financial institutions, insurance and real estate except ownership of dwellings. ' Including 
restaurants, hotels and business services. 
century and perhaps throughout its history. It may without doubt be affirmed that the negative effects 
of these floods were far greater than those caused by other extensive inundations in the past, such as 
those of 1825 and 1904 when the population and economic activity were considerably smaller. 
In its normal periods of spate the river Paraguay, which traverses the centre of the country from 
north to south, rarely exceeds a height of six metres, whereas at the end of May it rose to nine metres 
opposite Asunción —its highest level since 1904— and reached the unprecedented level of ten metres 
near the city of Pilar, to the south of the capital city. At the same time the river flow, normally less 
than 11 500 cubic metres per second, reached almost 18 000 cubic metres per second to the south of 
Pilar, near its junction with the river Parana. It broke its banks and provoked overflows of its 
tributaries throughout its course across Paraguayan territory. The river Paraná, which defines the 
eastern and part of the southern borders of the country, reached its highest volume in more than 60 
years, rising to a height of close on 45 metres injune with a flow of more than 40 000 cubic metres per 
second —the highest figure recorded in the last 200 years. At the same time the flows of the rivers 
Pilcomayo and Iguazú also swelled abnormally, the former inundating almost the whole of the 
department of Presidente Hayes in the west-central part of the country while the latter aggravated 
the overflows of the river Paraná and its affluents. 
All in all, it is calculated that some 600 watercourses broke their banks, flooding extensive areas 
in 11 of the country's 19 departments, the departments of Mumbucu and Presidente Hayes being 
those particularly affected. The former, which lies between the rivers Paraguay and Paraná in the 
southwest corner of the country's eastern region, overflowed along almost 40% of its length while 
the latter was similarly affected to the extent of 10%. This natural disaster caused loss to at least 
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125 000 persons —slightly more than 4% of the total population,4 considerably diminishing the 
country's accumulated wealth, in particular that consisting of dwellings and livestock. It also 
depressed production, particularly in the agricultural sector; gave rise to inflationary pressures, and 
increased the deficits in the public and external sectors.. With regard to activity levels it may be 
estimated, in a preliminary and conservative manner, that the rains and floods reduced gross 
domestic production to an extent equivalent to 3% of the gross domestic product of 1982. Even on 
this basis of calculation, which probably substantially underestimates their real impact, it would be 
reasonable to attribute more than 80% of the contraction in the country's level of activity in 1983 to 
these climatic disasters.5 
ii) Agriculture. In 1983 production in this sector declined by almost 5%, mainly reflecting a 
contraction of 6% in agricultural activity in general. Production in the stock-raising and forestry 
subsectors also decreased (see table 7). 
The harvests of the two main crops —soya and cotton— again diminished considerably in 1983. 
In contrast with events in the preceding year, however, when the marked deterioration of real prices 
Table 7 
























































































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of data supplied by the Central Bank of Paraguay. 
'Preliminary figures. 'including hunting and fishing. 'Thousands of head. 
4 This figure includes only those persons counted in a census of the emergency camps at the mid-year. Many others —it is not known how 
many— were directly taken care of by relatives and friends. According to some preliminary calculations, 50 000 dwellings were affected by the 
floods and it may therefore be estimated that some 250 000 persons — 8 % of the population— were involved by the end of the first half-year. 
'This calculation only takes account of four sectors —agriculture, quarrying, commerce and transport— in the absence of information 
concerning the extent of losses in other activities or of criteria enabling them to be estimated At the same time it is probable that the magnitude 
of production in the agricultural sector under normal weather conditions may also have been underestimated in 1983 considering other 
conditions prevailing at the time In this event the losses in commerce and transport would similarly have been underestimated. 
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paid to producers appears to have been the main factor influencing that year's negative results (see 
table 8), in 1983 the exceptionally adverse climatic conditions were those responsible for reducing 
these and other crops. 
The soya harvest in 1983 fell short of that of 1981 by 26%, while the cotton harvest was reduced 
by 29%. The lower output of these two products alone would explain 47% of the drop in the level of 
activity between 1981 and 1983, apart from further indirect effects to the extent of at least 11%. No 
recession would have occurred in the year under review if the output of these products had maintained 
the same growth rates as in the years prior to 1982.6 
Approximately 60% of the crops were damaged by the excessive or untimely rains and floods. 
Apart from soya and cotton, the harvests of other main products which were severely affected 
included rice, maize and manioc, which contracted by over 46%, 13% and 5% respectively. On the 
other hand, slight increases were recorded in the sweet potato harvest and in the production of meat, 
while that of wheat rose by 14%. Even so, the wheat harvest was also affected by the bad weather, 
since, according to the annual target of the wheat-growing campaign and the availability of 
intermediate goods and inputs, a production level of 100 000 tons had been expected. 
All in all, the primary activity most affected by the floods and their consequences was livestock-
raising. According to preliminary estimates drawn up in mid-1983, between 500 000 and 600 000 
head of cattle were lost owing directly or indirectly to the climatic conditions and it was feared that 
this figure would rise to one million by the end of the year. Assuming the latter figure, it is probable 
that 18% of the country's total cattle stock will have been lost in 1983. A further consideration is the 
anticipated lower fertility rate in 1984 and lower level of reproduction which, continued over many 
years, would entail the eventual extermination of the national herd. At the historic rate of growth, the 
size of the herd as it was in 1982 could be regained by 1990. 
In the period 1981-1982 prices paid to producers of most of the main agricultural products 
deteriorated in real terms to a more or less pronounced extent (see table 8). In the case of cotton the 
real price received by the producer fell by 19% in this period and that of soya by 16%. These decreases 
were, moreover, additional to those of previous years, with the result that in 1982 the real price, both 
of cotton and of soya, was not only decidedly lower than it had been before the period of recovery 
which began early in the preceding decade, but was also lower than the average production costs. This 
adverse trend reflected both the deterioration of prices in the international market and that of the real 
exchange rate. 
The average official rate of exchange in 1982 had risen by 14%, but this increase was barely 
sufficient to halt its deterioration in real terms, while the international prices of cotton and soya both 
declined by 15%. 
A first important step taken by the authorities early in 1983 to overcome the unfavourable 
cost/price situation in agricultural production was to increase the exchange rate and thus raise the 
real price of cotton. An increase of 20% was introduced in the exchange rate effectively obtained for 
exports of cotton fibre by those ginning companies which undertook to pay a minimum price of 60 
guaraníes per kilo of raw cotton delivered at their factories. This price reresented a nominal increase 
of 28% in relation to the average price paid the year before, and a rise of 17% in real terms.7 
An improvement of 15% in the exchange rate for exports of soya and its byproducts, and of 
11 % in the case of meat, was also introduced in mid-March. The exchange rate for cotton fibre was 
again raised in May by 7% and for soya and its byproducts by 8%.8 In June the exchange rate for 
cotton fibre was extended to apply also to exports of cotton wastes, and the rate for exports of tung oil 
and silk-worm cocoons was raised by 22%. Finally, in September the exchange rate for exports of 
peroba wood was also increased by 22%. 
While the official exchange rate for these products was thus being raised, the normal applicale 
exchange rate had risen considerably and the prices of the country's main export products in the 
international market were also beginning to improve. In the second quarter of the year, during the 
harvest season, domestic prices paid to the producers of cotton and soya were clearly recovering — 
'Between 1972 and 1981 the soya and cotton harvests multiplied 8.8 and 7.8 times respectively. If these rates of expansion had been 
maintained, it may be calculated that the gross domestic product would have been at least 10% greater than in 1982 and 4% greater than in 1981. 
'This decision increased the exchange rate received thanks to a rebate in the official reference price, a reduction from 100% to 75% in 
the proportion of earned foreign exchange that the exporting companies were compelled to deliver to the Central Bank at the official exchange 
rate, and the application of a lower exchange rate for the calculation of the export tax. 
8The official reference prices for cotton and soya were, however, increased at the same time. 
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Table 8 
PARAGUAY: NOMINAL AND REAL PRODUCER PRICES 
OF MAIN AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS 
(1970 = 100) 
Rice Cotton Maize Manioc Soya ° Cocoa .,* Wheat 














































































































































































































































































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of data from the Ministry of Agriculture (Department of Agricultural Marketing and Economics) and the Central 
Bank of Paraguay. 
"In general a blank space means that there were no prices for the quarter, or that there were prices for one month only. 
''The quarterly averages may not coincide with annual averages owing to frequency of observation or error in rounding-off. 
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Source: ECLAC, on the basis of data from the Ministry of Agriculture and Stock-raising, Department of Agricultural Marketing and Economies; 
and the Central Bank of Paraguay. 
"Calculated by deflating the nominal prices using the consumer price index. 
especially in the case of the former. Between that period and its equivalent in the preceding year the 
price of cotton rose by 90%, while that of soya increased by 29%. In real terms the domestic price paid 
to cotton producers rose in the period mentioned by 74% and that of soya by 18% (see table 8). The 
average price of cotton in the second quarter of 1983 wa 45% higher than that agreed in January 
between the government and the cotton ginning companies; and in the third quarter it exceeded it by 
65%. 
Owing to the rains and floods, neither the producers nor the country were able to take full 
advantage of the improvements in domestic and external prices in the 1982/1983 farming year. The 
domestic price increases of the products mentioned and of others such as maize were also partly 
induced by the effects of the bad weather on harvests. It is in any event foreseeable that production in 
the 1983/1984 season will rise appreciably thanks to the stimulus to sowing provided by these higher 
prices. 
Prices in the rural land market, for their part, showed variable fluctuations in 1983. In the first 
half year, when the floods occurred, they showed signs of decline. During the second half year, 
however, a considerable improvement took place in the prices of farming and forestry land, althoug 
land devoted to stock-raising continued to fall in value. In real terms the prices for each of these 
classes of land declined, especially for arable land (in 1983), as a result of which the reversal of the 
trend noted in the preceding decade (when spectacular increases in crop- and stock-raising property 
were recorded), continued for the second successive year (see table 9). 
As regards agrarian reform, in 1983 the Institute for Rural Welfare (1BR) awarded more than 
2 600 properties comprising a total area of more than 300 000 hectares, as against over 3 030 lots and 
close on 600 000 hectares awarded the year before and with a historic rate of 3 480 lots and 306 000 
hectares per year (see table 10). 
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Of the awards assigned in 1983, 2 500 lots were arable and covered an overall area of 28 000 
hectares (an average of 11 hectares per lot). The 100 or so stock-raising lots awarded amounted to a 
total of 270 000 hectares and had an average area of 2 750 hectares. 
In the course of the year almost 4 100 final title deeds were granted, comprising a total area of 
approximately 410 000 hectares, both figures being similar to those of the preceding year and 
appreciably larger than the historic figures. Furthermore, two new community settlements were 
established comprising an area of 340 hectares. 
Finally, four properties measuring 25 790 hectares in all (an area similar to that awarded in the 
case of crop-farming properties) were taken over under occupation or expropriation decrees in 1983 
(see table 10).9 
iii) Manufacturing. In 1983, added value in the manufacturing sector decreased by slightly over 
4%. This decline was exclusively due to a very substantial contraction in textile, clothing and leather 
production, which exceeded by over 30% the overall drop in the manufacturing sector. Other 
subsectors showing declines in levels of activity included those producing metal products, machinery 
and equipment (-13.6%), basic metals (slightly over -8%), handicrafts (-4.5%) and wood and 
Table 10 
PARAGUAY: AGRARIAN REFORM INDICATORS 
Total awards 
Number of lots 
Surface area (in thousands of hectares) 
Average hectares per lot 
Crop-raising awards 
Number of lots 
Surface area (in thousands of hectares) 
Average hectares per lot 
Stock-raising awards 
Number of lots 
Surface area (in thousands of hectares) 
Average hectares per lot 
Final title deeds 
Numbers 
Surface area (in thousands of hectares) 
Average hectares per lot 
Communal settlements 
Numbers 
Surface area (in thousands of hectares) 
Nationalized and expropriated 



















































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of data from the Institute for Rural Welfare, Memoria (several years' issues) and Juan Manuel Frutos, Con el 
hombre y la tierra hacia el bienestar rural, Cuadernos Republicanos, Asunción, 1982; and information provided by the Institute for Rural 
Welfare and the Departamento de Tierras y Colonias (Department of Rural Land and Settlements). 
°339 hectares. 
9 For a retrospective analysis of the effects of agrarian reform on the distribution and ownership of land in Paraguay, see ECLAC, 





PARAGUAY: INDICATORS OF MANUFACTURING PRODUCTION 
Gross manufacturing 






Textiles, clothing and leather 
Wood and furniture 





machinery and equipment 
Other manufacturing 
Artisanal production 
Output of some of the 
main manufactures 
































































































































































































































Source: ECLAC, un che basis of data supplied by che Central Bank of Paraguay. 
"Preliminary figures. 'Thousands of metres. 'Thousands of packets. Thousands oí litres. 
furniture (-3.3%). In contrast, activity in the paper and printing sector —which is quite small in 
Paraguay despite the country's large forestry production— showed a marked increase after two years 
of depression. The ceramics and chemical products industries also showed some signs of recovery, 
while the foodstuffs, beverages and tobacco subsectors continued to expand at moderate rates despite 
the prevailing recession (see table 11). 
The manufacturing sector was faced by four main difficulties in 1983- In the first place bad 
weather must again be mentioned, since the floods affected the operations and installations of many 
firms operating in the sector including the largest, Manufactura de Pilar, S.A. The installations of this 
firm, consisting of an integrated textile complex employing 2 000 persons, were completely 
inundated, bringing its operations to a halt and severely damaging machinery and equipment. 
At the same time, and as in the previous year, deceleration of the construction work in progress 
at Itaipú and Yacyretá had an adverse effect on manufacturing activity, which also suffered from an 
intensification of competitive pressures, contraction of demand in neighbouring countries and high 
financing costs. 
With regard to the effects of the economic crisis in regional terms, mention should be made of 
the depressive impact on the sector of the continuous increases in exchange rates in Brazil and 
Argentina, since these provided firms in those countries with major advantages over Paraguayan 
firms in the Paraguayan market and reversed the flow of tourism. 
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In the financing sphere, the main difficulty stemmed from a long-standing contradiction 
between the trend of the exchange rate and interest rates, on the one hand, and the sales situation on 
the other. Since mid-1981 two adverse circumstances had been developing simultaneously; namely, a 
weakening of demand and a more or less continuous rise in the parallel exchange rate, both of which 
raised the financing costs of companies with unregistered external debts (or debts in dollars). Since 
mid-1982 firms owing registered external debts were also faced with a higher official rate of 
exchange. At about the same time real interest rates rose spectacularly, reaching levels totally 
incompatible with economic activity and hence with the very survival of the financing sector itself. 
While it is true that the rising trend in interest rates was reversed in 1983 despite the 
acceleration of inflation, their real levels (ex-post) still remained high and reached an average of 
around 14% annually for commercial operations in the second half-year. The parallel rate, moreover, 
continued to rise throughout much of the year, and at the year's end reached a level 43% higher than 
at the same period in 1982. 
In respect of requests made by entrepreneurs that their debts be rephased and dollar 
commitments converted, the authorities decided not to finance a general renegotiation, leaving 
creditors and debtors to resolve their problems directly.10 Declining interest rates as from the end of 
July were, however, the result of a Central Bank policy. At the same time, a large increase in the public 
sector deficit, partly financed by the creation of means of payment, was attenuated by lack of liquidity, 
partially offseting the decline in sales. Nevertheless, if the results of the transactions of the financial 
institutions in 1982 and 1983 are compared, a further new and important increase in their overdue 
portfolios is observed. 
The intensification of recession again depressed financial allocations for capital expenditure. 
This may have been due to a notable fall in the amount of investments benefiting from investment-
promotion Law No. 550. The value of investments approved in 1983 for the purpose of obtaining tax 
incentives under the terms of this law declined by 32% in comparison with 1982 and was 59% less 
than in 1981. These results, however, also reflected a decision to limit the application of Law 550, 
since it was considered that installed capacity was already sufficient in many of the country's 
manufacturing activities. 
Furthermore, the programme to reduce the country's dependence on external sources of energy 
continued to be applied. Deserving mention in this respect was an increase from 10% to 15% in the 
proportion of dehydrated alcohol in admixture with gasoline and the doubling for the second 
consecutive year of the number of motor vehicles consuming alcohol fuel. Both of these alcohol 
products are locally manufactured from sugar cane and their combined production volume rose in 
1983 by 32%. 
A number of measures were adopted during the year to accelerate the development of this 
initiative. These included an increase in the price paid to products f alcohol fuel; a reduction of the 
import tax on alcohol-fuelled vehicles to 30% of their value (compared with a rate of up to 100% in 
the case of conventional vehicles); liberalization of the sale of ethanol fuel, and a 28% increase 
towards the end of the year in the established proportion of alcohol for admixture with gasoline. 
iv) Construction. The level of activity in this sector decreased in 1983 by 5.4% after the 
previous year's contraction of 6%. Once again, though to a lesser degree than in 1982, the reduction in 
building activity at Itaipú and Yacyretá affected the development of the construction industry. 
Purchases of goods and services by the binational entities declined at current prices by 6% in 1983, 
compared with a drop of 25% in 1982. As against what happened in 1982, when the purchases of 
Yacyretá Binacional contracted radically, they showed a slight increase in 1983 despite a further 
significant cut in their budget. In part, the local purchases of ItaipuBinacional fell by 7% in 1983 after 
a reduction of 3% in 1982. Employment at Itaipú also decreased by 35% in the year compared with a 
drop of 31% in 1982. 
The marked expansion of investment expenditure in the rest of the public sector in 1983 more 
than offset the effects of the lower construction outlays of the binational entities, but was not 
sufficient to counteract completely the notable reduction of investment in private-sector construction 
which was again adversely affected by high interest rates and a decrease in personal incomes. 




Although this productive activity appears not to have been so badly affected by the widespread 
floods as the manufacturing sector, it should be borne in mind that, according to preliminary 
estimates, by the middle of the year some 50 000 homes had been damaged —a number equivalent to 
9% of the dwellings recorded in the 1982 census. 
As regards the development of hydroelectric projects in 1983, the spillway at Itaipú was 
brought into regular operation; work continued on the installation of the main engine room, 
associated structures and the first four power generators; various aerial interconnections were 
erected, including two power transmission lines to the Acaray hydroelectric station in Paraguay, and 
the first of the 18 turbines to be installed at Itaipú successfully underwent its initial mechanical 
rotation test at the end of the year. 
A number of civil works had either been finished or were nearing completion by the end of the 
year. These included the main reservoir, the earth and rock dam, the right-hand lateral dam, and the 
principal cofferdams and spillway, while the main engine room and substation were 75% to 80% 
completed. With respect to the manufacture and installation of equipment and machinery for Itaipú, 
4.3% of the forecast total had been completed by the end of the year. From a financial point of view, 
67% of the total cost of the project had been carried out by the end of 1983. According to the latest 
estimate (December 1982), the total cost of the project when finished will have amounted to some 
US$ 15.3 billion. 
The working test of the'first generating unit had originally been planned to take place in the 
first quarter of 1983. Together with this change in schedule, the date fixed for the entry of the 
complex into commercial operation was postponed from March 1986 to March 1988 owing to the 
financial restrictions and recession prevailing in Brazil. 
In the case of Yacyretá the most significant events of the year were the agreement reached in 
September between Paraguay and Argentina to continue with this project, and the commencement of 
civil construction in December. One thousand three hundred persons were engaged in activities 
associated with the civil works at the year's end. For 1984 an increase of 30% was budgeted in the 
financial outlays of Yacyretá Binacional and it was hoped to increase the number of persons employed 
in the main construction works to 2 000 by the end of the year. In comparison it should be mentioned 
that the budget for 1983 amounted to only 37% of that of 1982.11 
v) Basic services. The global basic services product decreased by over 2% in 1983 compared 
with an expansion of 9.6% in 1982. Added value in transport, storage and communications declined 
by almost 3% while that of electricity, gas and water contracted by slightly over 1%. 
The fluctuation in electricity demand was especially noticeable in that, after expanding 
continuously for more than two decades and even growing by around 27% the year before, when the 
rest of the economy was in a state of recession, it contracted by approximately 13% in 1983 despite a 
further increase in domestic consumption of electricity. Owing to opposing results in the generation 
and consumption of electricity, the country had to import 202 million kW, with which it covered 24% 
of domestic consumption. The increase of 3% in domestic consumption was mainly due to an increase 
in residential demand, although industrial consumption also rose after having contracted in 1982 (see 
table 12). 
vi) Trends in employment and unemployment. As in the preceding year, the lower level of 
activity in 1983 was accompanied by a more than proportional increase in unemployment. The 
unemployment rate at the national level rose from 9.4% in 1982 to 15% in 1983 after amounting to 
4.6% in 1981 and 2.1% in 1980. The open unemployment rate in Asunción also increased noticeably, 
rising from 5.6% in 1982 to 8.4% at the end of 1983. It nevertheless remained much lower than the 
overall national rate12 (see table 13). 
Generally speaking, evolution in the supply of labour showed no significant change either in the 
short term or from one year to the next. Since the growth rate of the labour force had accelerated 
considerably in the boom period, having risen from an annual average of 2.4% in the ten years ending 
in 1972 to 4% between 1972 and 1981, the abrupt fall in demand for labour from mid-1981 onwards 
led to a sharp increase in unemployment. The lower demand for labour was moreover greater than 
11 For additional details concerning these hydroelectric projects and their effects on the future of the Paraguayan economy, see ECLAC, 
Economic Survey of Latin America, 1980, United Nations, Santiago, Chile, 1981, pp. 620 and 621. 
12 It should be noted that the data for Asunción —but not those of the Central Bank for the country as a whole—are based on household 
surveys. 
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the contraction in levels of activity. For example, the labour force at Itaipú decreased by more than 
55% between 1981 and 1983, while expenditure disbursed by the binational entity contracted much 
less in real terms. 
To these factors were added the effects of the floods on the unemployment rate in 1983. Suffice 
it to recall that at least 4% of the population were displaced from their homes. 
3. The external sector 
a) Introduction 
In the past four years the country's total importing capacity has contracted by 32.5%. Both 
registered imports of non-factor goods and services and gross international reserves have remained 
at relatively high levels; but the disbursed gross external debt has risen (at constant prices) by almost 
46%, and the net foreign debt has increased three-fold (see table 14). 
The deterioration experienced in the external sector was particularly acute in most aspects in 
1983. The purchasing power of external sales fell by 24.5% owing mainly to a considerable 
contraction in the volume of exports of non-factor goods and services registered by the Central Bank. 
The decline in total import capacity was limited to slightly less than 20% as a result of a reversal of 
the declining trend in net capital inflows. 
At the same time the volume of registered imports of goods and services decreased by almost 
22% in 1983. Owing to this and to the expansion of the surplus on capital account, a reduction in the 
current account deficit was attained. The shrinkage of international reserves was also halted despite 
Table 12 
PARAGUAY: INDICATORS OF THE CAPACITY, GENERATION 
































































































































































Percentage of population 
receiving electric 
energy services 10.9 14.8 19-0 21.2 24.2 26.6 29-0 31.5 37.7 39.5 
Source: National Electricity Administration (ANDE), Compilación Estadística I960-1981, Asunción, 1982, and other statistics also supplied by 
ANDE. 














































Source: Based un data supplied by the Central Bank of Paraguay and the Ministry of Finance, Department of Statistics and Censuses. Encuesta de 
bfif>ares (several issues). 
"Apart from Asunción proper, these figures include Fernando de la Mora, Lambaré and the urban distrias of Luque and San Lorenzo. 
the reduced volume of external sales. Offsetting these developments was an intensification of 
inflationary pressures and a considerable renewed increase in foreign indebtedness of almost 23 % in 
gross terms and 74% in net terms. In addition, a notable expansion occurred in short-term external 
indebtedness, and payments to foreign suppliers were delayed. 
One of the most significant factors in the weakening of the external sector as well as in the 
generation of recession has been the pressure exerted on the Paraguayan economy by the financial 
crisis in Argentina (especially in 1981 and 1982) and in Brazil (in particular in 1983). At the same 
time, the international recession has also directly affected the Paraguayan economy through its 
depressive effects on the prices of its main export products and the increase in the value of the dollar 
in relation to the European and Japanese currencies. 
On the other hand, the level of expenditure of the binational entities declined substantially 
from 1982 owing in part to the financial difficulties in Argentina and Brazil but also to the 
postponement of the construction schedule at Itaipu. The other most noteworthy factor, however, 
was perhaps the unwillingness of the Paraguayan authorities to adjust the official export exchange 
rate to an extent comparable with the rise in the parallel exchange market. Further problems in 1983 
were the climatic phenomena already mentioned and the deteriorating financial position of the 
government. Moreover, whereas the world's more developed countries began to recover, the crisis in 
Brazil grew worse. 
Although a more or less progressive moving parity scale was established for the parallel 
exchange rate in the light of the anomalies affecting the country since 1981 —consisting primarily of 
constant and drastic increases in the exchange rates in Argentina and Brazil (these being countries 
with which Paraguay conducts about 50% of its foreign trade at the official exchange rate)—, the 
competitive position of the Paraguayan economy continued to deteriorate appreciably. Thus, while 
the parallel market exchange rate rose by 11% between 1980 and 1981, by almost 38% between 1981 
and 1982 and by more than 56% between 1982 and 1983, the official rate (at its average level for 
exports) remained unchanged in 1981, increased by slightly less than 14% on average in 1982 and 
rose by 12% in 198.3." After having been very similar in value to the parallel rate for almost a full 
^These figures, however, underestimate the changes introduced in the official exchange rate for some export products, since their 
official reference prices were also reduced in comparison with the corresponding international prices. 
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decade, the official exchange rate declined to 8 5 % of the parallel in 1981, to 7 0 % in 1982 and to 50% 
in 1983. The real effective official exchange rate, in its turn, fell by almost 17% in 1981 and, after a 
small recovery in 1982, again deteriorated by 12% in 1983 (see tables 15 and 16). 
The unwillingness of the authorities to reduce the gap between the official and parallel 
exchange rates appears to have been due to concern over the rate of inflation that it would involve as 
well as its effects on the magnitude in dollars of the purchases of the binational entities in Paraguay.14 
Nevertheless, a large proportion of the country's foreign trade —at least 50% and perhaps 6 0 % — 
was transacted in this period at the parallel exchange rate without causing an upswing of inflation 
until 1983, when the restrictive monetary policy came to an end. A key ingredient in this case was 
undoubtedly the reduction of monetary stocks between the end of 1980 and the end of 1982. It should 
Table 14 
PARAGUAY: MAIN EXTERNAL SECTOR INDICATORS 
1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983° 
Volume of exports of goods 
and servicesc 
Purchasing power of exports 
of goods and services 
Net factor payments to rest 
of world 
Purchasing power of net 
capital imports 
Total import capacity 
Volume of imports of goods 
and servicesc 
Gross international reserves 
Index 
In months of imports 
Gross disbursed external debt 
1970 = 100" 
127.9 159.6 188.0 201.5 204.6 187.2 217.2 174.6 
140.3 210.5 226.9 229.2 216.3 207.8 223.7 168.9 
99.0 80.4 113.7 ' 25.7 
224.1 310.1 521.3 562.5 560.2 519.4 328.9 443.5 
165.4 248.1 311.1 338.0 321.1 316.7 288.5 231.8 
154.9 211.7 250.1 296.1 292.1 325.6 349.7 273.7 
465.6 736.8 1 194.6 1 385.6 1 484.6 1 506.3 1 261.7 1 264.0 
6.4 7.4 10.2 10.0 10.9 9.9 7.7 9.8 
154.8 163.9 204.7 191.6 192.9 203.9 255.6 313.8 
Gross domestic product = 100* 
Volume of exports of goods and 
servicesc 
Terms-of-trade effect 
Net factor payments to rest of 
world 
Purchasing power of net capital 
imports 
Total import capacity 
Volume of imports of goods 
and services' 
Trade balance 
Current account balance 
Global balance of payments 
Gross international reserves 

























































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official data. 
"Preliminary figures. h1970 prices. 'Non-factor. Including private unrequited transfer payments. 'Credit 
balances. Gross international reserves and imports of goods and services for each year. * At market prices in 1970 dollars, at 
the parity exchange rate. Excluding terms-of-trade effect. 
14 According to the consumer price index, inflation in 1981 and 1982 was even less than in preceding years. Between 1982 and 1983 it 
increased from 9% to 14% according to the same index. For its part, the wholesale price index recorded a decrease of 2% in 1980, rose by 




PARAGUAY: OFFICIAL EXCHANGE RATES 
(Guaraníes per dollar at the end of each period) 







Oil seed (soya)' 
Fruits and vegetables 
Others 







Petroleum and derivatives 























































































































































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official data. 
" Peroba wood only ( 143.0 for other species). Tung oil only, also valid for silk-worm cocoons. 'Excluding certain exports for which 
the applicable rate was 126.0. Also valid for cotton wastes (including strands) uncorded and uncombed. 'Includes soya 
derivatives and by-products. 'includes only interest payments on external debt used for the production of goods with the authorization of 
the Centra) Bank, and dividend and profit remittances. 8 Includes only capital imports and amortization payments on external debt used 
for the production of goods with the authorization of the Central Bank. 
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however also be borne in mind that, with some minor exceptions, the country's export goods do not 
—other than marginally— form part of the consumption basket. In this respect, the fact that in 
practice the authorities raised the exchange rate for imports more than that for exports is especially 
noteworthy. I n fact, successive restrictions had been gradually placed on the access of import goods to 
the "official dollar", as a result of which the official exchange rate for imports came increasingly closer 
in practice to the parallel rate. Imports were in fact made even more costly through administrative 
measures such as the institution of prior import deposits. 
It is true on the other hand that the binational entities' foreign-currency receipts fluctuated —at 
least in the short term— more or less in the same proportion as the exchange rate adjustments. In the 
longer term, however, the development and stability of the economy will not depend on the 
magnitude of the binational entities' purchases within the country, but on the growth of the 
exporting sector and, to a lesser extent, on import substitution, both of these sectors being especially 
affected when the exchange rate is below its level of equilibrium. 
Table 16 
PARAGUAY: EVOLUTION OF INDEXES OF THE EFFECTIVE REAL 
EXCHANGE RATE FOR EXPORTS AND IMPORTS 




















































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of information supplied by the Central Bank of Paraguay and the International Monetary Fund. 
"Corresponding to the average of the real exchange-rate indexes of the guarant in respect of the currencies of the principal countries with which 
Paraguay conducts trade, weighted in accordance with the relative importance of registered commercial flows to and from those countries. In 
the calculation of these indexes use was made throughout of the official exchange rate. For 1982 and 1983 the average exchange rate was 
used. r For 1982 and 1983 the average exchange rate was used. However, the figures refer solely to imports handled by the Central Bank, 
and hence do not represent the true average official rate. These indexes correspond to a weighted average of the exchange rate indexes 
of Paraguay vis-à-vis the Federal Republic of Germany, Argentina, Brazil, the United States, Japan, Italy and France, according to the relative 
participation of the non- registered trade flows between Paraguay and the countries mentioned. Use was made of the free fluctuating exchange 




PARAGUAY: EXPORTS OF GOODS, FOB" 
Millions of dollars Percentage 
breakdown 
Growth rates 
1980 1981 1982 1983 1973 1983 1980 1981 1982 1983 
Total 310 296 330 252 100.0 100.0 1.7 -4.7 11.6 -23.7 










Oil seeds (soya beans) 
Feed-cake and expellers 

























































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of data supplied by the Central Bank of Paraguay. 
"Includes only exports appearing in the exchange register. 
In addition to postponing the adaptation of the exchange rate to prevailing market conditions, 
the adjustments that were introduced differed as between different classes of goods. Thus, from a 
single official exchange rate in 1981, six different official rates were later introduced for exports and 
four for imports. Four different rates for exports and three for imports were in force at the end of 
1983- By applying these procedures the production and export of certain goods were adversely 
affected to an exceptional degree without in any way benefiting existing or potential exporting 
capacity (see table 15). 
The rains and floods also severely affected the exporting sector and the balance of payments in 
1983- At the reference prices officially established for exports, the cotton and soya harvest losses in 
1983 came to around US$ 45 million compared with 1982 —an amount equivalent to slightly more 
than 11 % of the current value of exports of goods registered at the Central Bank in 1982, and 6 9 % of 
the contraction between 1982 and 1983. Although these figures tend to exaggerate the impact on 
registered trade (only a fraction of the loss would presumably have been registered through official 
channels) they might well underestimate the true dimension of the loss, since the 1982 harvests were 
in their turn substantially inferior to those of 1981. At the same time the official reference prices of 
these products were reduced in 1983, when international prices were on the increase. 
On the other hand, despite the renewed considerable increase in its absorption of external 
credit, financial management in the public sector created pressures on the balance of payments for the 
first time in many years. These pressures, however, and those generated by the undervalued exchange 
rate were diverted towards price levels, or were compensated by growing restrictions on access to the 
official exchange rate, the application of prior import deposits, severe controls and follow-up 
procedures in connection with import applications, and the requirement that external financing be 
obtained for purchases abroad. Finally, amortization disbursements in foreign currency in respect of 
external credits for import purposes began to be delayed. 
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b) Trade 
i) Exports of goods, FOB. The current value of so-called regular (i.e., registered) exports 
declined by nearly 24% in 1983 (see table 17)." 
Of the main traditional export products, timber suffered the greatest fall with a decrease in the 
year of around 56%, so that its value was barely 29% of that recorded only three years earlier. On the 
other hand, exports of livestock products and tobacco rose substantially. 
With regard to the main registered non-traditional exports, cotton fibre and soya beans both 
declined appreciably, the current value of cotton fibre decreasing by around 36% and that of soya 
beans by 15.5%. There was also a drastic fall in the current values of fruits and vegetables. 
In contrast with events in recent years the international prices of the country's main export 
products improved in 1983. Thus, the nominal price of soya beans rose by 15% and that of cotton by 
16%. In real terms these increases amounted to 22% and 23% respectively. Despite these 
improvements, the relative prices of these two products were still considerably depressed in 
comparison with those of the early years of the preceding decade (see table 18). 
Table 18 
PARAGUAY: EVOLUTION OF EXTERNAL PRICES 
OF MAIN EXPORT PRODUCTS 
(7970 = 100) 

































































































































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of UNCTAD, Monthly Com modify Price Bulletin {various issues) and I nternational Monetary Fund, international 
Financial Yearbook (various issues). 
" United States, No. 2 yellow, CIF Rotterdam. The nominal prices were deflated by world export prices. ' All origins, raw oil, FOB, 
ex-factory, Netherlands. Mexican, middle grade, CIF, Northern Europe. 'Tropical, wholesale price, United Kingdom. 
15This statistical figure does not include unregistered exports of goods or adjustments in respect of exports to the binational entities. 
























Source: ECLAC, on the basis of data supplied by the Central Bank of Paraguay. 
"Only includes imports appearing in the exchange register, plus imports subject to deferred payment and those carried out using long-term 
external loans. ''Including final paper and paperboard products, pharmaceutical and chemical products and textiles and textile 
manufactures. 'Includes jeeps and rural vans. Includes iron and iron manufactures (except hardware); ordinary metals and their 
manufactures; stones and earth and their manufactures; cement, asphalt and timber and their manufactures. ' Excluding automobiles, 
jeeps and rural vans. ^Includes agricultural implements and accessories, hardware, and live cattle. 
ii) Imports of goods, FOB.16 The current value of registered imports of goods FOB fell by close on 
18% in 1983 (see table 19). This result reflected a decrease of more than 24% in external purchases 
of consumer goods, more than 18% in the case of intermediate goods and around 9% in that of capital 
goods. Imports of consumer goods —durable and non-durable— decreased substantially, the most 
pronounced contractions being those of automobiles, beverages and tobacco. Imports of fuels and 
lubricants fell by 22%, while among capital goods the greatest decline occurred in transport 
equipment and accessories. 
iii) Services. Tourism. The number of visiting tourists declined in 1983 for the third consecutive 
year. The total number of tourists failed to reach the 150 000 mark compared with 178 000 in 1982, 
267 000 in 1981 and more than 300 000 in 1980. The decrease of more than 55% between 1980 and 
1983 was due to a fall in tourism from Argentina which dropped from almost 133 000 visitors in 1980 
to 47 000 in 1983. 77% of the contraction between 1982 and 1983, however, was due to a lower flow 
of tourists from Brazil. 
There was also a decline in the average amount of money spent by incoming tourists, with the 
result that earnings from tourism declined by almost 24% in the year, amounting to barely half of the 
sum obtained in 1980. But in spite of the severety of the recession in this sector, the supply of rooms 
and beds for tourists continued to expand in 1983. In these circumstances the average occupancy rate 
fell to 42% in the case of rooms and to less than 19% for beds, these proportions in 1980 having been 
99% and 43% respectively (see table 20). 
l6These statistics do not include unregistered imports of goods FOB, imports of goods FOB made by the binational enterprises of I taipú 
and Yacyretá, imports in connection with external loans and unilateral official transfer payments, and imports connected with direct foreign 
investment. The last-named item, however, is included in the balance-of-payments data given in table 21. 
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169 175 157 144 46.0 30.1 13.8 3-3 -9.7 -8.7 































About 40% of the decrease in the current value of exports of non-factor goods and services in 
the three preceding years was caused by lower levels of tourism. Moreover, since the expenditure of 
Paraguayans travelling abroad remained approximately the same or even rose, the considerable 
surplus obtained from this trade at the end of the 1970s and in the early 1980s has practically 
disappeared (see table 21). 
Other services. Income from other non-factor services declined by close on 46% in 1983, while 
expenditure under this heading fell by 43%. 
iv) Terms of trade. In calculating terms of trade on the basis of the official reference prices 
recorded in the Central Bank's foreign exchange register, a deterioration is observed. However, as 
already mentioned, the prices of the country's main export products rose substantially on the 
international market in 1983, while the reference prices of the same products were reduced as a 
matter of economic policy. It is very probable, therefore, that the country's terms of trade actually 
improved in 1983. In any case it may be stated that import prices declined slightly in the year (see 
table 22). 
c) The current account position 
The current account deficit dropped from US$ 391 million in 1982 to US$ 364 million in 1983. 
According to the evolution of the trade balance, the magnitude of the adjustment was considerably 
greater, since the gap between gross domestic investment and gross domestic savings decreased from 
US$ 446 million to US$ 364 million. The difference between these results mainly reflected a marked 
decrease in interest income, although at the same time payments under this heading rose, thereby 
producing a radical change in the balance of this account (see table 21). 
The current account and trade account deficits were equivalent to 5.5 % of the gross domestic 
product in 1983. 
Table 20 
PARAGUAY: INDICATORS OF TOURISM 




From the United States 
From Japan 
From Uruguay 
From other countries 
Average stay (days) 
Average expenditure (dollars) 
Total expenditure (millions 
of dollars) 
Supply of rooms (number)' 
Supply of beds (number)' 
Average occupancy rate 
Of rooms (percentage) 


















































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of data supplied by the Department of Tourism, Ministry of Public Works and Communications. 
"The total number of tourists is calculated on the basis of tourist cards and includes only persons over 12 years of age. The distribution 
of tourists by country of origin is calculated on the basis of hotel registers. For 1970 and 1972 the distribution refers to the nationality of the 
tourists. Subsequent figures refer to their point of departure. rIn hotels, motels, hostels and boarding houses considered by the 
Department of Tourism to be of "tourist level". 
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Table 21 
PARAGUAY: BALANCE OF PAYMENTS 
PARAGUAY 
(Millions of dollars) 
Balance on current account 
Trade balance 
Exports of goods and services 
Goods, FOB 
Real services 
Transport and insurance 
Travel 
Imports of goods and services 
Goods, FOB 
Real services 







Unrequited private transfer payments 
Balance on capital account 
Unrequited official transfer payments 
Long-term capital 
Direct investment (net) 
Portfolio investment (net) 














Errors and ommisions 
Global balance'' 
Total variation in reserves 
(- sign indicates an increase) 
Monetary gold 
Special Drawing Rights 
IMF reserve position 
Foreign exchange assets 
Other assets 





































































































































































































































































































































































Source: 1972-1981: International Monetary Fund, Balance of Payments Yearbook. For 1982: ECLAC, on the basis of official data. 
"Preliminary figures. 'Real services also include other official and private transations, but not factor services. In addition to 
loans received and amortization payments made, this item includes net loans granted and other assets and liabilities. The global 
balance is the sum of the current account balance and the balance on capital account. The difference between the total variation of reserves (of 
opposite sign) and the global balance represents counterpart entries: monetization of gold, allocations of Special Drawing Rights and 
variations through revaluation. 
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In contrast with events in the preceding year, when it suffered a drastic fall, the current account 
surplus attributable to the transactions of the binational entities increased slightly in 1983 according 
to the accounting records of the Central Bank. However, the current deficit, excluding Itaipú and 
Yacyretá transactions, decreased for the second successive year, falling from US$ 541 million to 
US$ 523 million (see table 23). 
d) The capital account and the global balance of payments 
As measured by the variation in reserves, the global balance of payments remained 
approximately in equilibrium at the end of 1983 after recording in 1982 its first deficit for 13 years. 
The improvement reflected both the adjustment process and a larger capital inflow. The expansion of 
the surplus on capital account was due to a greater absorption of external credits by the public sector, 
which very substantially increased its investment expenditure. For their part, capital receipts 
generated by the binational entities again decreased appreciably. 
Excluding the Itaipú and Yacyretá operations, the global balance-of-payments deficit amounted 
to US$ 321 million, a considerably smaller amount than in the preceding year but still equivalent to 
5% of the gross domestic product. 
Table 22 
PARAGUAY: VALUE AND VOLUME OF EXPORTS AND 
IMPORTS OF GOODS AND SERVICES" 
(Growth rates) 






























































































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official data. 
"Non-factor. "Preliminary figures. 


























Terms of trade 
Terms of trade (goods and 
services) 
Purchasing power of exports 




PARAGUAY: EFFECTS OF THE B1NATIONAL ENTITIES 
—ITAIPU AND YACYRETA— ON THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS" 

































































































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of data supplied by the Central Bank of Paraguay. 
"Excluding imports of goods and services by the binational entities, which are imputable to the balance of payments, with the exception of 
profits deriving from investments by the binational entity Itaipú in Paraguay. Also excluded are the capital flows which finance those imports 
(and which are also imputable to the balance of payments). The accounting method used for this table is therefore the same as that on which 
table 21 (balance of payments) is based, the original source of which is che Cencral Bank of Paraguay. Preliminary 
figures. f Gross, minus gold. Shows the accumulated effects on the global balance of payments. 'Includes the counter-
entries relative to the monetization and demonetization of gold, the allocation/repayment of SDRs, and variations arising from the revaluation 
of other reserves. 
e) The external debt 
The gross contracted external debt increased substantially for the third year running. At the end 
of the year it approached a level of US$ 2 300 million, having amounted to US$ 1 939 million in 1982 
and US$ 1 323 million in 1980. The gross disbursed external debt again increased at an even more 
rapid rate owing to the marked expansion of the absorption of external credits by the non-financial 
public sector, but it had still not reached two-thirds of the amount contracted. For its part, the external 
debt of the private sector decreased slightly between the end of 1982 and the end of 1983 (see 
table 24). " 
The net external debt grew by almost 56% in 1983, reaching US$ 825 million. In 1980 it had 
barely amounted to US$ 97 million. In that year the public sector was even a net creditor to the 
outside world. 
The rapid rise of the disbursed debt in recent years has not been accompanied by a similar 
growth in its servicing costs. In fact, these rose by only 16% between 1980 and 1983, the increase for 
17 These figures exclude the external commitments of the binational entities. In this res pea see, for example: ECLAC, Economic Survey 
of Latin America and the Caribbean, 1981, op. cit., pp. 632-634. 
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the year 1983 being 8%. This result not only reflects an improvement in the profile of the debt but 
also a decrease in the average rate of interest due. Net debt-servicing costs nevertheless more than 
doubled in 1983 owing to an appreciable reduction in interest earnings from the outside world. 
Since international prices remained stable in real terms in 1983, the increase in the debt was 
similar to that at current prices. On the other hand, it again rose appreciably in relation to the gross 
domestic product, especially when converted at the market exchange rate. In fact, at the parallel rate, 
the gross disbursed external debt rose from 335% of the gross domestic product in 1982 to 56% of 
that in 1983 after having been less than 23% in 1981. The net external debt rose from less than 7% of 
the gross domestic product in 1981 to almost 15% of that in 1982 and 31.5% of that in 1983 at the 
market exchange rate (see table 25). 
In relation to registered exports of non-factor goods and services, the gross service of the debt 
went up to 39% (compared with 28% the year before), owing to the decline in value of external sales 
and higher interest payments. In net terms, the service of the debt increased threefold in relation to 
exports, rising from 8% to 24.5%. 
With regard to the sectoral allocation of the new external credits, a significant change occurred 
in 1983 with the notable increase of the flow to the social sectors. This was largely due to the high 
value of a loan obtained to finance the construction and equipping of a new 500-bed hospital near the 
capital. The counter-effect of this increase was a sharp drop in the channelling of new credits to 
sectors producing basic services. Allocations to producers of goods continued to represent 60% of the 
total. There was a marked reduction, however, in the proportion directed to the farming sector, while 
that assigned to the manufacturing industry rose steeply, for the purpose of completing the 
Table 24 
PARAGUAY: INDICATORS OF EXTERNAL INDEBTEDNESS 
(Millions of dollars) 
1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 











Net foreign assets 
Public sector 
Private sectorc 
Net external debt 
Public sector 
Private sector 



































































































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of data supplied by the Central Bank of Paraguay and the International Monetary Fund. 
"Public and State-guaranteed private indebtedness, medium and long-term; end-year balances. Foreign assets of Central Bank less 
short-term foreign liabilities of the Central Bank. 'Foreign assets less short-term foreign liabilities of private commercial 




PARAGUAY: INDEXES AND RATIOS OF THE EXTERNAL DEBT 
1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 
Disbursed gross external debt" 
At current prices 
Deflated by export prices 
Deflated by import prices 
Disbursed net external debt 
At current prices 
Deflated by export prices 
Deflated by import prices 
1970 Index = 100 
143.7 178.3 217.8 298.9 340.0 438.8 480.7 564.9 
89-0 86.0 103.1 141.0 124.2 169.6 168.4 182.4 
115.9 100.0 109.0 154.8 163.9 204.7 191.6 192.9 
124.6 136.1 156.3 195.0 178.2 172.9 129.9 117.5 
77.2 65.6 74.0 98.0 65.1 66.8 45.5 38.0 
100.5 76.4 78.2 101.0 85.9 80.7 51.8 40.1 
622.4 790.0 963.9 
180.8 248.3 324.1 
203.9 255.8 313.8 
145.0 346.6 5396 
42.1 108.9 181.6 
47.5 112.2 175.6 
As a percentage of GDP 
Disbursed gross external debt 
At official exchange rate 
At parallel exchange rate17 
At parity exchange rate 
Disbursed net external debt 
At official exchange rate 
At parallel exchange rate17 



































































Gross external debt service 
Amortization payments 
Interest 
Net external debt service 
As a percentage of exports' 
14.0 15.9 18.9 19.4 15.4 18.2 22.0 28.3 
7.4 8.2 10.8 9.9 8.7 9.7 11.3 14.0 
6.7 7.7 8.1 9.5 6.7 8.5 10.7 14.3 
31.2 27.9 39.2 
15.4 13.0 15.0 
15.9 14.9 24.3 
12.7 13.5 16.2 15.7 12.3 14.0 16.2 14.7 13.2 8.1 24.5 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of data supplied by the Central Bank of Paraguay and the Internationa) Monetary Fund. 
"Public and State-guaranteed private debt, medium and long-term; end-year balances. By the Central Bank, at current prices. For 1982 
and exchange rate of HO guaraníes per dollar was used, and for 1983,153 guaraníes per dollar. 'On the "parallel" exchange market. The 
free exchange market formally established in 1973 was abolished injuly 1982. From July 1982 onwards, therefore, the black market exchange 
rate has been used. Calculated by ECLAC at constant prices. In order to deflate the external debt use has been made of the import price 
index. 'Exports of goods and services, excluding income in respect of interest from abroad. 'interest and amortizations paid, 
less interest received. 
construction of a steel plant. The proportion finding its way to non-residential construction 
—namely to road works— also expanded substantially (see table 26). 
With the considerable increase in net external indebtedness, the severety of the process of 
adjustment has been noticeably alleviated. Although this has meant a notable reduction in interest 
earnings, this higher indebtedness has hitherto been attained without appreciably increasing debt-
service payments —a quite exceptional achievement considering the high interest rates and 
indebtedness prevailing in the international capital market in recent years. Nevertheless, the growth 
rate of indebtedness since 1980 cannot be maintained without causing a dramatic curtailment of the 
country's room for manoeuvre in the near future. Moreover, in 1983 the problem arose of delays in 
payments to foreign suppliers. Finally, doubts have also been arising concerning the profitability of 
new projects financed by external credits, since the exchange rate used for servicing the external 
public debt has remained at 126 guaraníes to the dollar while all other rates of exchange have 
increased. 
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4. Prices and wages 
a) Prices 
Between the end of 1981 and the end of 1982 the wholesale price index decreased by 7% despite 
the adjustment of relative prices. In 1983, however, wholesale prices went up very appreciably, rising 
by an average of 33% between December 1982 and December 1983. Inflation, for its part, measured 
in terms of the consumer price index, rose from 9% in 1982 to 14% in 1983 (see table 27).18 
The wholesale price index also recorded an upward annual variation of 33% compared with 
3.5% the year before, while the consumer price variation was 13.5% compared with around 7% in 
1982. The index of implicit prices of the gross domestic product averaged a variation of 15.3% in 
1983 as against 6% the previous year. 
Inflation in the first nine months of the year accelerated more or less continuously. In the final 
quarter, however, this trend was reversed. In effect, according to the wholesale price index, it fell from 
over 45% in October to 33% in December, while according to the consumer price index it showed a 
decrease from close on 19% in September to 14% in December. Both indexes showed a decrease in 
price levels in the final month of the year. 
Table 26 
PARAGUAY: SECTORAL DISTRIBUTION OF THE EXTERNAL 












Sectors producing basic 
services 
Electricity 
Gas and water 
Transport 1 
Communications / 







































































































































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of data from the Central Bank of Paraguay. 
"The wholesale price index is based on 1972, whereas the base year for the new consumer price index is 1980. Applying the former 
consumer price index based on 1964, inflation in 1982 amounted to 4%. 
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Table 27 
PARAGUAY: EVOLUTION OF DOMESTIC PRICES 
PARAGUAY 
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 





Wholesale price index 
Agricultural 
Price index implicit in the gross 
domestic product0 

























































6.7 5.0 9.2 10.4 20.6 16.8 16.6 6.1 15.3 
Variation from December to December 








































Source: Central Bank of Paraguay. 
"Base year; 1980. 'Base year: 1972. rAt market prices. Base year: 1977. 
The higher level of consumer prices in 1983 reflected similar increases in the case of clothing 
(21%), food (19.4%) and miscellaneous expenses (17%). On the other hand, the average price of 
housing rose by less than 3%. The increase in wholesale prices was particularly marked in the 
imported consumer goods group, which rose by nearly 85 %. In the case of locally-produced goods, the 
price increases were in general lower than that of the global index. 
A factor influencing the inflation of price levels in 1983 was the rising exchange rate and 
consequent adjustment of domestic relative prices. This process, which, according to the wholesale 
price index, was accompanied by deflation in 1982 and inflation in 1983, may be partly explained by 
the generalization and intensification of exchange rate adjustments. In the case of many products, 
including some, such as petroleum and wheat, which have considerable weight in the cost of the 
market basket, the exchange rate did not vary in 1982. But in 1983 no products remained at the old 
rate of exchange of 126 guaraníes to the dollar, while the average increase in the exchange rate was 
approximately double that of 1982. At the same time it is probable that the persistence of rising 
exchange rates may have exerted increasing pressure on the prices of goods not directly affected by 
the rate of exchange, because of its effects on expectations. 
Similarly, in contrast with events in 1982, pressure was exerted on prices in 1983 by the lower 
domestic output of food products and the evolution of means of payment and wage levels. 
The prices of most foodstuffs dropped in 1982; but in 1983 the exceptional rains and floods 
substantially reduced the harvests of a number of food products with consequent effects on their 
selling prices. The price of rice, for example, rose by around 140% between the end of 1982 and the 
end of 1983, and that of maize rose by more than 500%. 
The monetary stock barely expanded in 1981 and contracted by 4% in 1982. In these 
circumstances the process of adjustment of relative prices had little effect on price levels. In 1983, 
however, means of payment increased by more than 26%. Furthermore —and again contrasting with 
the preceding year— money demand was declining in 1983. The sharp expansion of the monetary 
stock in 1983 was mainly due to the very considerable growth of credit to the public sector, which 
showed a deficit equivalent to 5.1% of the gross domestic product in 1983 compared with 0.9% in 
1982. 
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Finally, nominal wages received by the labour force in 1983 also rose more than in the preceding 
year without however giving rise to any significant improvement in labour productivity. The general 
wage index for workers in Asunción rose by slightly over 5% in 1983 compared with 3.8% in 1982, 
while the index for agricultural day labourers went up by over 23% in 1983 as against 4.6% in 1982. 
Minimum legal wage levels, for their part, rose by 5% between december 1982 and December 1983 
after remaining unchanged in the equivalent preceding period. 
As in the previous year, factors having a moderating influence on inflation included the stability 
of international prices, the increase in gross labour productivity —employment having again declined 
more than the product— and the contraction of national income. Finally, price controls were 
appreciably stepped up during the course of the year. 
b) Wages 
Despite the greater nominal increases received in 1983, workers' wages in most sectors 
deteriorated substantially in real terms. They contracted by 11.5% in the building industry, close on 
8% in manufacturing, 6.4% in commerce and transport, and 5.3% in the non-basic services sector. 
On the other hand, they declined by less than 1% in the basic services sector, while rising in the 
agricultural sector (see table 28). 
In the case of activities surveyed in Asunción, real wages dropped for the second year running; 
they were approximately 10% lower in 1983 than in 1981 and more than 20% below the levels 
prevailing at the beginning of the preceding decade.19 A feature of interest in this connection is that 
agricultural day wages have not deteriorated in real terms during the recession and consequently, 
according to available information, continued to evolve in an anti-cyclical fashion. 
Until recently, the government's wage policy consisted in readjusting the minimum legal wage 
for the private sector in accordance with past inflation and whenever the accumulated increase in 
price levels exceeded 15% after the previous adjustment.20 In the case of the public sector, wage 
adjustments were in general less frequent and lower than past inflation. 
After the May 1981 minimum legal wage readjustment, however, the government waited until 
the end of July 1983 before granting a new readjustment, whereas accumulated inflation since May 
1981 had exceeded 10% by October 1982 according to the new consumer price index.21 Moreover, the 
increase of 10% granted on this occasion was equivalent to approximately half the increase in price 
levels between May 1981 and June 1983- Public employees, for their part, received no wage 
readjustments in 1983. 
Wage policy cannot of course be disassociated from the evolution of activity levels and real 
income without sooner or later provoking inflation and pressures on the exchange rate. Since the 
product and incomes have been declining since the end of 1981, it is probable that remunerations in 
the private sector would have deteriorated in real terms regardless of the official wage policy, unless a 
more liberal policy had been accompanied by a successful global incomes programme. 
5. Fiscal and monetary policy 
a) Fiscal policy 
The central government budget for 1983 assumed a deficit of 6 600 million guaraníes, 
equivalent to 1% of the year's projected gross domestic product and 39% greater than that of the 
previous year, which was under 0.8% of the product. It was foreseen that slightly less than 55% of the 
deficit would be financed from external sources. The remaining fraction would be covered by freeing 
resources withdrawn from circulation during the period of bonanza, when the government 
accumulated a considerable surplus. The monetary effect of the deficit would be small and its pressure 
on the balance of payments still less (see table 29). 
19 The apparent deterioration of workers' wages in Asunción in the recent boom years was examined in ECLAC, Economic Survey of 
latin America, 1981, op. cit. 
20The readjustment also applied to other wages but in an amount equal to the increment of the minimum wage —and consequently in 
smaller and decreasing proportions. 
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Source: ECLAC, on the basis of data supplied by the Central Bank of Paraguay. Department of Economic Studies: Ministry of Agriculture and 
Livestock, Department of Agricultural Marketing and Economics; and Ministry of Justice and Labour, Department of Human 
Resources. 
"Average for the months of June and December. The nominal values were deflated by the consumer price index. 
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Table 29 
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Source: Ministry of Finance of Paraguay, Technical Secretariat and Budget Department; and Public Sector Planning Division of the Technical 
Planning Secretariat. 
"Budgeted amounts. 'Quantities recorded. Preliminary figures. "These amounts are less than 50 million guaraníes. 
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An increase of more than 14% of total expenditure was budgeted with a 35.4% higher 
allocation for capital expenditure and one of 9.4% for current outgoings. At the ruling rate of 
inflation these increases assumed real variations of 5%, 24% and 0.5% respectively. 
With reference to current income, a growth of slightly more than 23% was forecast. An 
increase of 31.3% in tax revenue was expected, together with a decrease of almost 30% in non-tax 
income. With regard to tax collection, the planned reduction of direct taxes was to be more than 
compensated by an expected increase in revenues from indirect taxation. Of the latter, a growth of 
92% was forecast in those deriving from levies on domestic trade and others, and a contraction of 
9.5% in the case of taxes on foreign trade. 
The forecast current income of the central government was based on a number of adjustments 
in indirect taxes —including Law 967, which modified the specific levies on the consumption of 
cigarettes and whisky; Law 975, which readjusted the sealed-paper and stamp tax; Law 977, which 
increased the taxes on alcoholic and carbonated beverages and converted them into advalorem rates; 
and Decree 35984, which stipulated lower real estate reference prices for tax purposes— and on the 
depressive effects of lower imports and the expiry of Law 920 relating to the legalization of irregular 
situations in respect of assets and values. 
The restriction of current expenditure in real terms was to be achieved mainly through the 
freezing of wages paid to public employees. It was also intended not to increase expenditure on the 
consumption of goods and of non-personal services. 
The forecast of current income and budgeted current expenditure would produce a saving of 
14 238 guaraníes, which would more than treble the saving obtained in the preceding year. In relation 
to the forecast gross domestic product, this would represent slightly more than 2% compared with 
0.7% in 1982. Since an important increase in capital expenditure was envisaged in order to attenuate 
the effects of recession, the attainment of this improvement in the current account would be an 
essential element in avoiding the generation of pressures on price levels and on the balance of 
payments. 
Nonetheless, most actual results in the 1983 fiscal year were not only much higher than those 
envisaged in the budget but showed a marked deterioration in comparison with the previous year's 
financial figures. According to preliminary data, the 1983 fiscal deficit amounted to 25 543 million 
guaraníes. This sum was almost four times that of the budget and was equivalent to 3.3% of the gross 
domestic product. It reflected much lower revenues than those foreseen and required the creation of 
means of payment to defray the shortfall (see tables 30 and 29). 
All in all, current income decreased by upwards of 8% in nominal terms and nearly 20% in real 
terms. The drop in tax revenues —which amounted to barely 66% of the receipts foreseen and almost 
13% less than in 1982— was mainly due to the drop in direct taxation, which declined by 26% 
compared with 1982 and amounted to only 79% of the forecast amount. Indirect tax revenues also 
contracted by nearly 6% compared with the previous year and were barely 62% of the budget 
estimate. Non-tax revenues, however, rose by over 21%. 
Compared with 1982, the main decreases in income were recorded in revenues from the tax on 
net worth, which contracted by 44%, and those deriving from import dues, which declined by 30.5 %. 
Revenues from the tax on corporate earnings also decreased, as did those from export levies and other 
indirect taxes. On the other hand, revenues from sales taxes rose by 18%. 
The most significant factors in the reduction of current income compared with receipts in 1982 
were the contraction of domestic expenditure, the expiration of Law 920, and the exceptional rains 
and floods. On the other hand, it seems clear that the estimation of current income as contained in the 
1983 budget was excessively optimistic. 
As for current expenditure, the recorded expansion was not much greater in nominal terms 
than that foreseen in the budget and contracted slightly in real terms despite the exceptional demands 
arising from the climatic phenomena experienced in the year. While expenditure on goods and 
services was rigorously restricted and an explosive expansion in transfers and wage costs was 
successfully avoided, other consumption expenses and interest payments rose appreciably. 
However, as current income proved to be much less than the level envisaged, a significant 
deficit occurred on current account —the first for many years. The negative result totalled more than 
9 million guaraníes and was equivalent to 1.2% of the gross domestic product. The growth of capital 
expenditure was limited to less than 7% of that incurred in 1982, and to less than 80% of the amount 
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budgeted. Capital formation also expanded by slightly less than 7% and showed a reduction of close 
on 7% in real terms. Approximately 87% of the global deficit was financed from domestic sources — 
primarily the Central Bank. 
Although recessional factors contributed to the marked retrogression of approximately one-
third in the financial situation of the central government, it should be borne in mind that this has 
been deteriorating more or less continuously since the end of the previous decade owing to the 
increased rigidity of the tax system and to the accelerated expansion of current expenditure. Between 
1979 and 1982 tax revenues fell from 11 % to 9-6% of the gross domestic product, or to 8.9% if the 
extraordinary revenues stemming from Law 920 are excluded. At the same time, current expenditure 
increased from 7.7% to 10.4% of the gross domestic product (see table 30). Since all the necessary tax 
reforms have not yet been instituted, it would appear appropriate to attribute a considerable 
part —approximately one-third— of the deterioration in the finances of the central government in 
1983 to structural problems hampering the tax system. 
Table 30 
PARAGUAY: CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INCOME AND EXPENDITURE 
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Source: ECLAC, on the basis of information from the Technical Planning Secretariat, Paraguay. 
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Source: ECLAC, on the basis of información from the Technical Planning Secretariat. 
"Preliminary figures. Including suppliers. cThese amounts are less than 50 millions guaraníes. 
Financial results in the rest of the public sector also deteriorated in 1983, though to a smaller 
extent than those of the central government. In this respect, the consolidated deficit of the non-
financial public sector grew to 41 700 million guaraníes, a sum six times the amount of the small 
deficit of the preceding year and equal to 5.4% of the domestic product. Its pressure on the external 
position of the economy, however, was appreciably less than its monetary effect, since 60% of the 
deficit was financed by external credits (see tables 31 and 32). 
Despite the contraction of general government income as a whole, that of the non-financial 
public sector increased slightly thanks to a doubling of the profits of public enterprises. Current 
income in real terms fell by approximately 10%. Expenditure, on the other hand, increased by almost 
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13% and consequently hardly varied in real terms. Most of this increase was attributable to higher 
salary and wage costs. Public sector savings amounted to only about 50% of the previous year's 
equivalent result; even so, it was a result which compares favourably with that obtained by the central 
government. 
Capital expenditure rose by 45%, and capital formation by over 51%. In real terms, the 
formation of capital in the public sector was therefore approximately 30% greater in 1983 than in 
1982. This counter-cyclical expansion of investment —mainly made by the public enterprises and 
decentralized entities— was supported by a greater absorption of previously contracted external 
credits and an increase in domestic savings; hence it did not have the effect of increasing the current 
account deficit on the balance of payments but rather tended to accelerate inflation. 
Table 32 
PARAGUAY: OPERATIONS OF THE CONSOLIDATED 
NON-FINANCIAL PUBLIC SECTOR 
(As a percentage of the gross domestic product)" 
Current income 
General government 
Profits of public enterprises 
Current expenditure 
Consumption 
Salaries and wages 
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Source: ECLAC, on the basis of information (rom the Technical Planning Secretariat. 
"At factor cost at current prices. 
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The improved results of the non-financial public sector as a whole were basically due to an 
increase in the profits of the oil company PETROPAR (Petróleos del Paraguay), the mixed or semi-
State enterprise responsible for refining and marketing petroleum products. This in turn reflected 
the effects of higher taxes on petroleum products on the one hand and, on the other, the application of 
a much lower exchange rate for oil imports than that ruling on the exchange market. If the rate of 
exchange applied to petroleum were raised without increasing the corresponding tax, a considerable 
proportion of the profits mentioned —which account for a large part of public-sector income in 
1983— would disappear. 
It should be added that the financial operations of the public enterprises have also been 
deteriorating since 1979. Their profits in real terms decreased by almost 50% between that year and 
1982. This development, and the inelasticity of central government tax revenues, were determining 
factors in the lower current income of the non-financial public sector in general, which dropped from 
17.1% to 14.9% of the gross domestic product in the period mentioned. It declined further to 12.2% 
of the gross domestic product in 1983 (see table 32). 
b) Monetary policy 
As has been the case since the present recession began in the second half of 1981, a passive 
monetary policy was applied in 1983. However, in contrast with the results of this policy in the two 
preceding years, it led in 1983 to a considerable expansion of means of payment. While the monetary 
stock contracted by 3-5% between December 1980 and December 1982, it expanded by more than 
26% between the latter date and the end of 1983 (see table 33). 
During the 1972-1981 boom period, an active monetary policy had been applied which, by 
means of a marked increase in legal bank reserves, counteracted to a considerable degree the 
monetary effects of the accumulation of external assets. This anti-inflationary policy was at the same 
time supported by an anti-cyclical fiscal policy. Almost the entire growth of the monetary stock in that 
period was provided by the balance of payments. As from 1976, the expansion of the net external 
assets of the monetary authority was consistently and appreciably greater than the growth of the 
means of payment, its holdings of net domestic assets becoming increasingly negative. At the end of 
1980 the deposits of the central government held by the monetary authority were equivalent to 22% 
of its accumulated net external assets. 
As from mid-1981, however, when the external position and financial operations of the 
government began to differ from those of the boom period, monetary policy became more passive, 
either deliberately —following an asymmetrical or one-way neutralization approach— or by 
omission. 
Although the accumulation of international reserves ceased in mid-1981 and began to contract 
some months later, the monetary base continued to grow, albeit at a lower rate, during the second half 
of that year, since the government resorted to its assets over the monetary authority to finance the 
unforeseen expansion of its deficit.22 The monetary stock, on the other hand, which had increased by 
almost 20% annually between 1972 and 1980, contracted during the second half of 1981 and ended 
that year àt a level barely greater than at the end of 1980. Quasi-money, for its part, continued to 
expand at a high rate, similar to that recorded between 1972 and 1980. 
The first balance-of-payments deficit for many years occurred in 1982, when the central 
government almost eliminated its global deficit. With a passive monetary policy, these results led to a 
contraction of slightly less than 1% in the money base. The monetary stock, for its part, declined by 
4% while quasi-money rose by 10%. 
In 1983, on the other hand, the loss of reserves was halted, but the central government deficit 
increased substantially. The monetary authority adjusted to the resulting growth of government 
credit requirements and, mainly as a result of that deficit, the monetary base expanded by 30%. In this 
respect, approximately 73% of the growth of the monetary base may be attributed to a greater 
absorption of credit on the part of the central government. At the same time the monetary authority 
saw to the provision of the appreciably higher credit demands of the rest of the non-financial public 
sector and those of the commercial banks. Net domestic credit granted in 1983 by the Central Bank 
increased in all by 109%, mainly because of the radical change in the position of the central 
12 Between 1972 and 1980 the monetary base expanded annually by approximately 28%. In the second half of 1981 it increased by 10%. 
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government, which, from having been a creditor to the Bank to the amount of nearly 3 000 million 
guaraníes, became a debtor to the extent of almost 16 000 million guaraníes (see table 33). 
For its part, the expansion of means of payment (Mj) was somewhat less than that of the 
monetary base, while the growth of quasi-money was limited to 13%. Measured in M2 terms liquidity 
expanded by 18%. 
As the rate of inflation, deflated on the basis of the gross domestic product, amounted to about 
15%, and since the level of activity contracted by slightly less than 4%, the income-velocity of M! 
decreased substantially. From 12.2 in 1982 it fell to 10.8 in 1983 with the result that its marginal 
variation barely amounted to 0.4. This contraction, after two successive years in which the monetary 
stock decreased appreciably in relation to the nominal gross domestic product, might appear 
surprising in the light of the recession, inflationary pressures, and growing restrictions on the 
importation of goods and services and on capital movements. It would have been more reasonable in 
the circumstances to expect a contraction of demand, although interest rates admittedly slackened 
during the year. 
Table 33 
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Source: ECLAC, on the basis of Central Bank of Paraguay, Boletín Estadístico, January 1984, No. 308. 




PARAGUAY: MONETARY BALANCE 
Money 
Currency outside banks 
Current account deposits 
Factors of expansion 
Net external assets 
Net domestic assets 
Domestic credit 
Public sector 
Central government (net) 
Credit 
Deposits 
Other public bodies 
Private sector 
Other net domestic assets 
Factors of contraction 






Capital and reserves 
Other liabilities (net) 
























































































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of the Central Bank of Paraguay, Boletín Estadístico. 
All in all, the growth of means of payment nevertheless accelerated noticeably during the last 
two months of the year. Up to October inflation exceeded the rate of monetary expansion, and 
surpassed it by a substantial margin during the greater part of the year. In this respect, the abnormally 
large drop in the income-velocity of money at the end of 1983 would betoken an intensification of 
inflation, a further loss of reserves and greater increases in the exchange rate if the accelerated growth 
of means of payment were to continue. However, since a considerable growth of means of payment is 
not uncommon at the end of the year, it appears that the exceptionally sharp expansion of the M, in 
December —almost 11%— was an anomalous event; in January 1984 the monetary stock contracted 
by more than 6%. It will nonetheless be remembered that the increase in the wholesale price index in 
the year was three times as high as that of consumer prices. 
In spite of the enormous expansion of net domestic credit provided by the Central Bank, the 
increase in the domestic creation of means of payment was only slightly greater than that recorded in 
the preceding year. In fact, the net domestic asset holdings of the banking system rose by 22.5% —a 
figure somewhat higher than in 1982 and appreciably lower than that recorded in previous years. The 
growth of net domestic credit amounted to 21%. Although credit to the public sector increased 
substantially —it more than trebled— credit to the private sector rose by less than 5% despite the 
considerable expansion of Central Bank credit to the commercial banks (see table 34). 
With reference to the allocation of credit to the non-financial private sector by type of economic 
activity, agriculture was the only sector to receive a higher increase than inflation.23 That granted to 
"I t should be noted that this statistical figure includes both credit granted by the commercial banks and that supplied by the National 
Development Bank (Banco Nacional de Fomento), but excludes that issued by the Central Bank. 
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the manufacturing industry was similar to the rise in price levels, while that allocated to other 
activities was less. Credit allocations for the marketing of goods and services abroad also expanded 
appreciably more than inflation, after two years of considerable contractions (see table 35). 
In relation to the gross domestic product, credit allocations again declined and were appreciably 
lower than in some former years. 
With regard to monetary policy measures, at the beginning of the year —in January— the 
Central Bank repealed the application of indexation to the operations of savings and loan associations 
for housing. At the same time, it increased the applicable rates of interest for these operations, the 
passive rate rising from 11% to 14% and the active rate from 14% to 18%. The Central Bank also 
decided in January to raise from 60% to 85 % the percentage of rediscounts granted to the commercial 
banks within the framework of the Programas de Garantías para Créditos Productivos y de Empresas 
Rurales (Guaranteed Productive Credit and Rural Enterprises Programmes). At the same time, it 
instructed the banks to attend to loan applications under these programmes up to an amount 
equivalent to at least 10% of their portfolio rediscounted by the Central Bank. In June the latter 
proceeded to limit commercial bank loans to public enterprises and decentralized entities by requiring 
the banks to obtain prior authorization before granting credit to these organizations. In July the 
Central Bank decided to establish maximum annual active rates for the commercial portfolios of 
financial entities and for the commercial banks. For the latter the maximum active rate was fixed at 
24% (12% maximum interest rate and 12% maximum rate of commission) and for the financial 
entities at 33% (12% as the maximum interest rate and 21% as the maximum chargeable 
commission). The highest rate allowed for savings and loan associations for housing remained 
unchanged at 18%. At the same time, the Bank decided that the commercial banks could not collect 
interest and commission up front on loans made under the Régimen de Cartera Mínima (Minimum 
Portfolio Régime). The rate of interest, including commission, for this portfolio remained unchanged 
at 14.5%.24 On the other hand, the rediscount rate for the same portfolio was raised from 30% to 
50%. 
Table 35 
PARAGUAY: DESTINATION OF CREDIT GRANTED TO THE PRIVATE 
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Source: ECLAC, on the basis of the Central Bank of Paraguay, Boletín Estadístico {various issues). 
"Credits granted by the National Development Bank, the Livestock-raising Fund and commercial banks. 
At market prices. 'Estimates. Including financing. 
u The Minimum Portfolio Régime (Régimen de Cartera Mínima) was set up in 1972 and establishes a requirement that the commercial 
banks shall allocate at least 50% of their credit portfolio to finance industry, agriculture and exports. 
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Until these provisions came into force the maximum rates officially allowed for commercial 
operations carried out by the banks —namely, operations outside their minimum portfolio— varied 
between 19% and 28%. In practice, however, the rates actually charged usually exceeded the 
maximum official levels by a wide margin. The new interest rates, therefore, if they were made 
effective, would represent substantial reductions in the cost of money, especially in real terms. 
Although there was a small increase in the expansion of net domestic credit during the second half of 
the year, it was not at all clear at the year's end that the measures referred to had achieved the desired 
results. Furthermore, in view of the progressive expansion of the central government deficit, the 
monetary authority raised the rediscountable proportion of the portfolios of the commercial banks 
from 40% to 50%. 
In summary, therefore, the monetary authority provided the credit requirements of the non-
financial public sector; but, in spite of the lowering of interest rates decreed in July, the reserves of the 
commercial banks remained very high in relation to their deposits, and credit to the private sector 
grew hardly at all in nominal terms and contracted appreciably in real terms. Although the 
accelerated expansion of the means of payment did not occasion a loss of reserves in 1983, owing 
partly to the considerable increase in the exchange rate and growing administrative restrictions, 
inflation intensified, especially at the wholesale price level. Furthermore, the sharp growth of the 
monetary stock did not free the economy from recession. This might be due to the limitation of 
imports, i.e., to the level of international reserves, although the allocation of credit to the private 
sector also appears to have been insufficient. The climatic phenomenon alone, however, would suffice 
to explain the recession in 1983. 

PERU 
1. Recent economic trends: Introduction and summary 
The unprecedented drop in the gross domestic product in 1983 (-12%) marked the deepest economic 
crisis recorded in Peru (see table 1 and figure 1). As in the previous six-year period its annual average 
growth rate was under 2%, the per capita gross domestic product in 1983 thus stood at the level 
already reached in 1.962. Simultaneously, the inflationary process suffered a marked upturn, since the 
consumer price index increased by 125%, thereby intensifying the trend of the previous five-year 
period, in which the annual average rate of inflation was nearly 70%. At the same time, real wages 
diminished 17%, receding to two-thirds of their 1976 value. Besides causing a sharp decline in the 
living standards of the population, the drop in wages helped to aggravate the problems faced by the 
productive sectors, since it depressed domestic demand. The economic crisis was reflected, likewise, 
in an increment in unemployment, which amounted to over 13% in non-agricultural activities. As 
underemployment rose at the same time, the population adequately employed was equivalent to only 
40% of the labour force engaged in such activities, compared with percentages of 49% only two years 
earlier and 59% in 1976. 
The problems of the productive sectors were also aggravated due to a real contraction of 15 % in 
total liquidity and of 11% in credit granted to the private sector. At the same time, the process of 
"dollarization" of the monetary aggregates continued at a very rapid pace. In fact, deposits in foreign 
currency represented more than two-fifths of total liquidity. Only six years before, that share had 
barely exceeded 1%. 
To the problems of private economic activity were added the difficulties derived from the 
efforts made by the authorities to control the imbalance in the fiscal accounts. To this end, the central 
government diminished its capital expenditure for the third year running, so that it amounted to only 
three-fifths of the 1980 level, thus constituting another factor in the negative evolution of the 
economy. However, as the tax burden declined to only 14% —after having been 18% in the two 
preceding years—, there was no way of avoiding a continuous growth in the public deficit as measured 
in relation to the gross domestic product. Thus, this coefficient rose to 12%, after having been 1% 
only four years before. 
On the other hand, however, there was a substantial upturn in the trade in goods and services 
with the exterior. Thus, after two years in which trade deficits of nearly US$ 800 million were 
recorded, in 1983 a surplus of US$ 51 million was obtained. This allowed a reduction in the current 
account deficit from US$ 1.8 billion in 1981 and 1982 to US$ 1.1 billion in 1983. Such an 
evolution —achieved largely on account of the economic depression— was supplemented by a high 
positive balance on the capital account obtained through refinancing operations of the external debt; 
thus, while the international reserves recorded only a scant decline, the country's external 
indebtedness grew by 12%. 
The country's critical economic situation was due to various factors. On the one hand, there 
were some which were exogenous in nature, such as an unfavourable external background (tightening 
of the terms of access to financial markets, reappearance of protectionism) and natural disasters 
described as the most destructive in recent years. 
On the other, the recent evolution of the economy has also been closely linked to developments 
in domestic economic policy. In order to review them it is necessary to go back to 1980 to analyse the 
progression of events since the civil government took office. 
This government received from the former administration an economy that was relatively 
stabilized on the external front and was growing at a modest pace, with a notable surplus of domestic 
savings over investments. In contrast with this phenomenon, however, no reduction in the rate of 
inflation had been achieved. Hence, the main economic policy objectives of the new government were 
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to control price increases and to promote faster economic growth. The former was sought through 
two mechanisms. On the one hand, the real exchange rate was brought down by devaluating the 
currency at a lower rate than inflation, a measure which was feasible due to the favourable external 
situation: in 1980 the net international reserves recorded an unusually high level (nearly US$ 1.3 
billion against an average of US$ -160 million in the six preceding years). This use of the reserves was 
justifiable in that their effect on the money supply needed to be sterilized in order to avert inflationary 
pressures. Furthermore, the procurement of a large amount of external resources was expected, thus 
avoiding an excessive gradual reduction in the reserves. In addition, substantial delays in adjustments 
of controlled prices were also resorted to. 
Table 1 
PERU: MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS 
1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 
A. Basic economic indicators 
Gross domestic product at market 
prices (millions of 1970 dollars) 
Population (millions of inhabitants) 
Pet capita gross domestic product 
(1970 dollars) 
B. Short-run economic indicators 
Gross domestic product 
Per capita gross domestic product 
Real gross national income 
Terms of trade (goods and services) 
Current value of exports of goods 
and services 




Variation between annual averages 
Money (M[) 
Money plus quasi-money(M2) 






Rate of unemploymentc 
Current income of central 
government 
Central government expenditure 
Fiscal deficit/total central 
government expenditure0 
Public sector deficit/gross 
domestic productc 
C. External sector 
Trade balance (goods and services) 
Balance on current account 
Balance on capital account 
Variation in net international 
reserves 
External debt ./ 


























































































































































































-314 60 6 1 066 607 -512 -57 -50 
7 384 8 567 9 324 9 334 9 594 9 638 11 097 12 418 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
"Preliminary figures. Gross national product plus terms-of-trade effect. c Percentages. Refers only to the non-agricultural 
sector. 'According to data from table 17 (balance of payments), these figures differ from the official Peruvian figures (see table 
18). Total public and private external debt, both short and long term. 
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The rise in economic dynamism, for its part, would also be obtained through two instruments: 
in the first place, by means of a sharp increase in public investment, which was favoured by a situatien 
of high domestic savings, and secondly, by incrementing the efficiency of the national productive 
system through a process of opening-up trade similar to that carried out some years before, under 
other circumstances, in the Southern Cone countries.1 The authorities assumed that the costs of this 
opening-up would be easily absorbed by using the high international reserve level and the expected 
greater inflow of external resources. 
The global economic policy implemented from the middle of 1980 to the end of 1981 failed to 
yield the expected results. On the one hand, the deterioration in the external variables was excessive 
and led to a much greater decrease in international reserves than that envisaged; inflation not only did 
not decrease but actually speeded up again, and finally, domestic activity did not show significant 
dynamism. 
Domestic output did not expand at a greater pace largely because the process of opening-up of 
trade was carried out indiscriminately. More appropriate treatment of the special situation of some 
productive sectors, as well as greater graduality in the opening-up process to allow the economic 
agents to adapt themselves to the new rules of the game would have been in order. To this was added 
the lesser dynamism in the export sector, partly due to a decrease in the relevant tax incentives. The 
use of a considerable share of available resources for financing large increments in the State's current 
expenditure, instead of allocating them to public or private productive activity, also helped to 
aggravate the situation. 
Several factors were responsible for the acceleration of inflation. The devaluation process, 
restricted though it was, resulted in strong cost pressures. Likewise, the management of controlled 
prices was not appropriate, both because of their delayed adjustment —which accounted for a 
substantial share of the public deficit— and the isolated and sudden nature of the adjustments made2 
—which increased the uncertainty and inflationary expectations. Another factor which contributed to 
price increases was the sharp decline in food production. 
In these circumstances, at the beginning of 1982 the authorities changed the priorities relating 
to the main objectives of economic policy. Thus, the improvement of the country's external position 
gained priority over the goals of reducing inflation and accelerating the rate of economic growth. 
Given that since 1980 the surplus of domestic savings over investment had disappeared, it was 
necessary to introduce such a change in order not to lose access to international capital flows: an 
essential condition for being able to keep on financing the big public investment programme. 
Integral parts of the new economic programme were a more accelerated devaluation process 
and a severely restrictive monetary programme. The former was expected to increase exports and to 
contain imports. The latter, for its part, besides offsetting the inflationary effects of devaluation, 
would help to contain demand pressures from the public and private sectors, by limiting their access 
to credit; this would also result in an improved balance-of-payments position. In addition, certain 
ceilings were established for the contracting of new medium and long-term external loans by the 
public sector, which were to cover the entire financing of the public deficit. Finally, the authorities 
decided not to refinance the external debt payment in 1982, attempting to attack its service problem 
by contracting new loans, subject to the above restrictions, and by reducing the sharp deficit on the 
current account of the balance of payments. The three-year agreement signed by Peru and the 
International Monetary Fund in the second quarter of 1982 clearly reflected these economic policy 
guidelines. 
Despite these drastic changes, the economic situation in 1982 was worse than in the preceding 
year. In the second quarter economic growth came to a stop, but neither inflation nor the current 
account deficit went down. The public sector deficit, measured as a percentage of the gross domestic 
product, did not decline either. Likewise, the trend towards a decline in the dollarization of the 
economy was reversed, implying both an increase in the financial system's ability to pass on the 
inflationary effects of devaluation, and a growth in the share of foreign currency transactions in 
domestic credit activity, resulting in greater financial costs for enterprises. Finally, external financing 
•This process actually started in 1979, but later it was considerably intensified. 
2Such was the case of the so-called "unfreezing" of prices of January 1981, which raised the price index in that month by 12%, against 
typical monthly inflation of 3% or 4% in previous months. 
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was widely resorted to, largely through the procurement of short-term loans. Along with a 
suspension of certain amortization pre-payments on the debt, this caused it to grow by one-fith in 
1982, after having remained practically unchanged in the three preceding years. 
A series of factors had an influence on this situation. The high import level of the public sector 
persisted, since its investment programme was still very large, and the purchase of defence material 
continued. The same was true of public enterprises, for which the procurement of short-term loans in 
the exterior was relatively easy (since they were excluded from the limitations imposed by the 
agreement with the International Monetary Fund). This meant that the adjustment of the balance of 
payments fell disproportionately upon the private productive sector. Despite the trade liberalization, 
this sector was forced to reduce its demand for imports owing to the strong devaluation process and 
the lack of financial resources —especially in soles— in the domestic market. In spite of the 
foregoing, total imports did not decline by the necessary amount. The poor export performance, due 
to a considerable decline in unit values and the problems faced by export enterprises, made the 
situation even more complex. 
On the other hand, the problems of the private sector and the stagnation in public investment 
—whose increase had been one of the main factors in the modest economic dynamism attained in 
1980 and 1981— combined to stop the growth in national output. This, in turn, prevented a reduction 
in the size of the public deficit as a percentage of the gross domestic product, with the consequent 
persistence of its inflationary effects and the limitation of financial resources for the private sector. 
Thus, in 1983 the situation which had resulted in a change in the orientation of economic policy 
in the past year not only persisted but in many cases had got worse. As a result of the foregoing, rapid 
devaluations, adjustments of controlled prices, the reduction in real terms in the money supply and 
domestic credit, the decline in public investment expenditure, the rise in interest rates, the lag of real 
wages and the insistence in not renegotiating the external debt were all essential components of the 
economic programme for 1983- The difference with the previous year was that general economic 
policy went deeper owing to the worsening of the situation. 
However, new factors rapidly began to emerge. The first months of the year were marked by 
natural disasters whose magnitude and effects were without precedent in the country's recent history. 
The far north and the central coastal region were affected by heavy rains and floods, sudden rises in 
temperature and destructive landslides, while the southern highlands were hit by an extremely 
serious drought. These disasters, which caused huge losses in production and infrastructure, 
prevented since early in the year the fulfilment of the scheduled programmes: the fiscal accounts were 
affected by the contraction in tax payments and the necessary increases in expenditure, while the 
external accounts were considerably prejudiced by a reduction in exports and an increase in imports 
for purposes of supply and reconstruction. 
However, the general policy lines remained unchanged. In fact, in order to control the trade 
deficit, the rate of devaluation was intensified, with the resulting inflationary pressures. In this way, it 
was also sought to maintain the access to foreign capital markets for financing the public deficit, given 
the limitations for using domestic resources. On the other hand, the negative effects of the national 
disasters on production and tax revenue were compounded by those caused by a contraction in the real 
money supply greater than expected —due to higher inflation— and by the deterioration in the 
purchasing power of the population. 
This difficult situation helped to limit the access to external capital markets, already restricted 
in 1982 due to exogenous factors mainly connected with the repercussions of the Mexican payments 
crisis and the Falklands conflict in international financial circles. 
Thus, in March the authorities were compelled to formally request external creditors to 
renegotiate the external debt. An essential part of this process was to keep in force the agreement 
with the International Monetary Fund, which meant a tightening of control policies over external 
accounts (devaluation greater than inflation, deflation of the economy in order to correct an assumed 
excess demand) and a reduction in the public deficit (decrease in expenditure, increases in controlled 
prices and in tariffs of public enterprises). 
As pointed out below, a process was thus started in which inflation and devaluation 
strengthened each other. As a result, there was a strong intensification of inflationary expectations, 
which quickly incorporated anticipated devaluations. For that reason, and due to the reduction which 
had already taken place in non-essential imports and to the problems which non-traditional export 
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enterprises faced domestically, devaluations lost a good deal of their ability to influence the trade in 
goods without affecting the pace of economic activity. In other words, the recovery in the external 
accounts was due rather to the recession than to economic policy. The national output, for its part, 
slumped on account of both supply factors (the natural disasters mentioned earlier and an increase in 
costs) and the reduced demand (deterioration in the purchasing power of the population, contraction 
in public investment, etc.). 
In August, the situation became particularly difficult. This circumstance, added to the improved 
international position arising from the renegotiation of the external debt, led the authorities to 
change the orientation of the monetary and exchange policy. Thus, emphasis was again laid —as in 
1980 and 1981— on the control of inflation. On the one hand, the pace of devaluation and of 
adjustments in controlled prices, including that of gasoline, was drastically reduced. On the other, the 
reactivation of the national productive system was attempted. Thus, the official credit available for 
the private sector was considerably increased and an extraordinary rise in domestic financing of the 
public deficit was allowed. In addition, it was endeavoured to make deposits in soles more attractive 
—in order to increase their procurement and availability—, through a rise in interest rates. 
The most striking results of this change in the main lines of economic policy were a 
considerable decline in the rate of inflation and a slight recovery in productive activity. Thus, the 
monthly rate of consumer price increases in the last four months of the year amounted to only two-
fifths of that recorded in the eight preceding months, while the gross domestic product recorded a 
small rise (0.7%) in the last quarter of the year, after six quarters of successive declines. However, 
another consequence of this change in economic policy was the cancellation of the agreement with the 
International Monetary Fund, due to the lack of coincidence with the guidelines proposed by that 
institution. This finally led to the suspension of the debt refinancing efforts. Towards the end of the 
year, the national authorities were attempting to replace the previous agreement with the IMF with a 
one-year stand-by agreement which would allow this situation to be solved. 
2. Trends in economic activity 
a) Total supply and demand 
After the interruption in 1982 of the dynamic growth of supply recorded in the 1979-1981 
triennium —in which it expanded at an annual average of 6%— during 1983 it contracted sharply by 
nearly 14% (see table 2). In order to appreciate the exceptional magnitude of this decline, it need only 
be compared with the 5% drop experienced by total supply in the former recessive period (1977-
1978). As a result, in 1983 the total supply level was identical to that obtained in 1974. 
The reduction in supply was due both to a contraction in the gross domestic product (-12%), 
and to an even greater reduction in the volume of purchases from abroad (-26%). Unlike the 1977-
1978 period, in which 90% of the adjustment was made in external purchases, in 1983 80% of the 
adjustment stemmed from a reduction in domestic production levels. 
As regards total demand, all its components shrank drastically, and in this case too there were 
great differences between what happened in 1983 and the 1977-1978 period. Thus, whereas in 1977 
and 1978 exports grew rapidly (19% per year), thus counterbalancing by 40% the drop in domestic 
demand, in 1983 the volume of sales to the exterior diminished, strengthening the negative evolution 
of domestic demand. On the other hand, whereas in the 1977-1978 period 56% of the reduction in 
domestic demand was due to sharp contraction in gross fixed investment, in 1983 it was the decline in 
domestic consumption —and especially in private consumption— which accounted for 80% of the 
fall in demand, thus critically impairing the living standards of the population. 
b) Evolution of the main sectors 
During 1983, the gross domestic product registered a decline without precedent in the country's 
history (-12%), as a result, also for the first time, of contractions in the levels of activity of all 
productive sectors (see table 3). This caused the per capita product to sink to a level already attained 




PERU: TOTAL SUPPLY AND DEMAND 
Millions of dollars 




1981 1982 1983" 1970 1980 1983" 1980 1981 1982 1983" 
Total supply 14 110 14 102 12 197 111.2 112.5 111.2 6.8 5.1 -0.1 -13.5 
Gross domestic product 
at market prices 12 396 12 440 10 972 100.0 100.0 100.0 3.8 3.9 0.4 -11.8 
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1 714 1 662 1 225 11.2 12.5 11.2 38.6 15.3 -33.0 -26.3 
14 110 14 102 12 197 111.2 112.5 111.2 6.8 5.1 -0.1 -13.5 







































































1 384 1 509 1 366 14.1 12.4 12.4 -7.0 -6.7 9.1 -9.5 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures supplied by the National Institute of Statistics (1NE). 
"Preliminary figures. The figures for exports and imports of goods and services were taken from balance-of-payments data expressed in 
dollars at current prices, which were converted to constant 1970 values, using price indexes calculated by ECLAC for that 
purpose. cVariation in stocks included in total consumptioa 
i) Agriculture. In 1983, agricultural production recorded the greatest contraction since regular 
statistics are available (-10%).3 This fall was due entirely to a sharp drop in crop farming production 
(-17%), since livestock production expanded by nearly 3 % (see table 4). 
The main reasons for this negative sectoral behaviour were the destructive natural disasters 
which affected the country in 1983. As mentioned earlier, Peru was affected by the worst rains and 
floods and the worst drought in living memory, the former affected the northern and central part of 
the coastal region (from the Ecuadorian border all the way to Lima), while the latter affected the 
southern highlands (the departments of Puno, Cuzco, Apurímac, Ayacucho.Huancavelica, Arequipa, 
Moquegua and Tacna: i.e., one-fith of the national territory). The heavy rains caused dramatic 
increases in river flows: for example, in the first half of 1983 the river Piura had a discharge thirty 
times greater than a year before, the river Tumbes had a discharge eight times greater, etc. Likewise, 
while in the first quarter of the year precipitation in the city of Tumbes grew from a normal average 
of 120 millimetres to 1 100 millimetres and that in Piura from 31 millimetres to 810, in Cuzco it fell 
by 67%, injuliaca (Puno) by 52%, and in Arequipa there was no rainfall at all (see table 5). 
The rains and floods —together with an unusual increase in temperature— affected an area 
mainly producing crops which are internationally traded, either for replacing imports (rice, soya) or 
for export (cotton, sugar cane). In the drought area for its part, there was a marked decrease in the 
production of some goods which are not usually traded internationally (potatoes, quinua) and of 
others which are imported (wheat and maize, for example). 
The damage caused by these natural disasters was both widespread and intense. In the first 
place, there were great losses in production (due both to destruction of harvests and to a fall in 
'Only two years earlier the greatest growth ever recorded had been attained. 
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productivity) and in inputs such as seed potatoes, which were eaten by peasants due to the food 
shortage. Secondly, there was great destruction of the infrastructure due to erosion and sedimentation 
of agricultural lands and of irrigation systems. The road network also suffered heavy damage, 
hindering the transport of inputs and the supply of consumer markets.4 In the drought area, for its 
part, large stretches of pastures were lost, as some of them dried up and also, because of the shortage 
of grass the animals ate it down to the roots, thus impairing future reproduction of pastureland. 
Finally, the cattle stock in the southern region was severely affected by the forced slaughtering of 
animals because they were likely to perish from hunger. 
The Government adopted various measures to cope with the situation. The Agrarian Bank 
granted loans intended for the rehabilitation of areas affected by floods and drought, and it refinanced 
existing credits once five and ten-year terms. On the fiscal side, a large number of measures were 
taken regarding extensions, temporary exemptions and rebates on various taxes. Furthermore, the 
share to be received by agriculture from the funds collected through Reconstruction Bonds was set at 
21 %.5 On the other hand, due to a shortage of many crop farming products, emergency imports were 
authorized (especially potatoes, rice and sugar). In May, under the Agricultural Promotion Law, 
exemption from sales tax and from all duties on imports of intermediate and capital goods for 
agriculture was established. 
Table 3 
PERU: GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT, BY KIND OF 
ECONOMIC ACTIVITY, AT FACTOR COST 
Millions of dollars 
at 1970 prices 
1980 1981 1982 1983" 
Percentage „ , 
, , , Growth rates 
breakdown 
1970 1980 1983" 1980 1981 1982 1983" 
Gross domestic produa 
Goods 
Agriculture, hunting, 
forestry and fishing 












insurance, real estate 
and business services 
Ownership of dwellings 
Community, social and 
personal services . 
Government services 
Less: imputed commission 
for banking services 
10 947 11 373 11 413 10 066 
5 007 5 164 5 205 4 478 
1 359 1 504 1 536 1 361 
904 876 933 871 
2 336 2 331 2 273 1 882 
408 453 463 364 
100.0 100.0 100.0 
49.2 44.9 43.4 
3.8 3.9 0.4 -11.8 
























































1 021 1 084 1 092 
164 180 190 179 
857 904 902 
5 354 5 580 5 600 
1 639 1 732 1 675 1404 13.7 14.7 13.6 5.9 5.7 -3.3 -16.2 
1 432 1 489 1 529 





2 283 2 359 2 396 ^4 263 
1 276 1 327 1 362 
241 255 238. 
19.9 20.5 >41.3 
10.4 11.5 
1.8 2.2 
4.2 4.0 2.7 
1.3 1.4 1.1 
3.5 3.3 1.6 
4.6 3.4 2.6 
13.9 5.7 -6.7 
>7.1 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures provided by the National Institute of Statistics (INE). 
"Preliminary figures. 'As the individual activities and the total were calculated separately, the sum of the former does not correspond 
exactly with the latter. 'Transport, storage and communications included in services. 
4 As indicated in the relevant section, this generated heavy pressure on prices. 




PERU: INDICATORS OF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION 
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Source: Ministry of Agriculture. 
"Preliminary figures. Calculated on the basis of values at 1973 prices. 'Thousands of tons. Thousands of hectares. 
'Includes total area planted with fruit trees. ' •'Land cultivated with credit support of the Agrarian Bank. 
Losses in crop farming production due to the natural disasters were estimated at US$ 300 
million, as total production came to only four-fifths of that initially expected. Cotton production only 
amounted to 46% of that envisaged and potato and wheat production to 61% of their respective 
goals. By and large, the production of all crops was below the established goals. 
The value of livestock production, however, slightly exceeded expectations ( 1 %). The fact that 
beef production was 20% over that expected had a considerable impact on this result. The share of 
livestock production in the total agricultural product thus amounted to 40% in 1983, compared with a 
traditional coefficient of 34% or 35%. Altogether, total production of the agricultural sector was 
equivalent to only 87% of that originally scheduled. 
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The goals assumed an expansion of 3.5% in the agricultural gross domestic product, but this 
estimate had to be reviewed throughout the year, as the real extent of the damage caused by the 
climatic disorders became increasingly evident. Thus, in the second quarter it was already expected 
that the agricultural product would decline by 3.2% in the year. In the third quarter that figure was 
revised assuming a decline of 4.5%, and this forecast also became more pessimistic at the end of the 
year (-7.5%), but even this fell short of the effective decline (-8.5%). 
At the national level, the area harvested dropped 9% during 1983. Striking drops took place in 
the departments of Piura and Tumbes on the northern coast (with contractions, of 78% and 51%, 
respectively), and in Huancavelica, Puno and Apurimac in the southern highlands (-61 %, -59% and -
53%, respectively). In Piura no cotton was harvested, in contrast with 30 000 hectares in 1982, while 
in Tumbes the soya harvest disappeared; in both cases, there was also a considerable reduction in the 
area of rice harvested. In Puno, for its part, the main problem was with potato cultivation, as well as in 
Apurimac and Huancavelica, where serious problems with maize and wheat also developed. 
The setbacks faced by agriculture were reflected in decreases in both fertilizer sales and in the 
area cultivated with the support of the Agrarian Bank.6 The huge reduction (-35 %) in the volume of 
fertilizer sales during 1983 was added to another substantial drop that occurred in 1982, so that sales 
were less than half those of 1981.7 
The area cultivated with the support of the Agrarian Bank showed a steep increase (29%) in 
1983. However, all the growth was concentrated in the second half of the year (55% with respect to 
the same period of 1982), since it shrank by one-fifth in the first half. As for the amount of credit 
granted by the Agrarian Bank in real terms, it declined by 23% in the 1982/1983 season8 with respect 
to the preceding one, which itself registered a drop of 12%. The reduction in credit was especially 
striking in the cases of wheat (-63%) , sugar cane (-53%) and beans (-45%). Three products (rice, 
potatoes and cotton) absorbed 74% of total credit, thereby slightly increasing its concentration. 
In the evolution by crops there were significant declines in the production of cotton (-59%), 
potatoes (-36%), wheat (-26%) and maize (-23%). Sorghum and soya exhibited the most dramatic 
drops (-70% and -74%, respectively), but these crops are of secondary importance (see table 4). 
In 1983 cotton production barely exceeded one-third that of two years before. In this case, in 
addition to problems derived from floods and from increases in temperature, serious financial 
problems arose owing to a deterioration in the international price of this commodity, and the pests 
which affected the Tangüis variety. In these circumstances, cotton exports —traditionally 
important— had to be prohibited. 
Table 5 
PERU: MONTHLY PRECIPITATION AT SELECTED LOCATIONS, 
































































Source: "Programa integral de rehabilitación y reconstrucción de las zonas afectadas por los desastres de la naturaleza" (vol. I), National 
Planning Institute, Lima, July 1983. 
"Located on the Northern coast. Located in the Southern Sierra. c Average monthly precipitation for the last 30 years. 
6Land cultivated with credit support of the Agrarian Bank. 
fertilizer sales have gone down steadily since 1978, except in 1981. 




PERU: INDICATORS OF FISHERY PRODUCTION 
Indexes of fishery 
production* (1977 = 100) 
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Source: Ministry of Fisheries. 
"Preliminary figures. 'Calculated on the basis of values at 1973 prices. "Thousands of tons. Includes river shrimps. 
As regards potato and wheat production, the declines in them caused very substantial 
reductions in their per capita availability. In the case of potatoes, the per capita output dropped from 
99 to 62 kilogrammes between 1982 and 1983, and in the case of wheat, from 5.5 to 4.0 kilogrammes, 
representing a significant intensification of the marked and persistent decrease in recent years. Per 
capita potato production in 1970 was 146 kilogrammes and 108 in 1975; that of wheat was 9.5 and 8.3 
kilogrammes, respectively, in those years. 
In contrast, rice production grew marginally (2%), although there was a major decline in 
productivity in the coastal region. In spite of an increase of 8% in the area harvested in this region, 
production contracted 6%. 
Livestock production expanded at a rate of nearly 3% (see table 4). Paradoxically, this small 
growth stemmed from the same disasters which caused a huge decline in crop-farming production. 
The drought led to substantial forced slaughtering of beef cattle, for when feed was exhausted the 
peasants were forced to sell their animals lest they perish from starvation. In September, for instance, 
50 000 head of cattle, sold at an average price of 80 000 soles, against a normal one of 200 000 soles, 
left weekly from Puno for Arequipa and Moquegua, where they were slaughtered for sale as soon as 
they gained weight (slaughtering in the slaughterhouses of Moquegua doubled in 1983, while in 
Arequipa it grew 69%). Thus, in 1983 the drought was the direct cause of the slaughtering of 640 000 
head of cattle out of a national stock of 3.2 million.9 This has resulted in heavy decapitalization of the 
agricultural sector, since these were animals already adapted to the special conditions prevailing in 
the highlands (high altitude, low temperatures, special types of food). The mere recovery of the cattle 
stock will take four or five years. 
Poultry meat production for its part, which had grown at an annual rate of 20% in the 1980-
1982 triennium, increased by less than 1% in 1983- This was largely due to a reduction in demand 
owing to a rise in its relative price. Whereas the consumer price for poultry increased by 94% in 1983, 
that for pork rose by 87%, that of beef by 77% and that of mutton by 62%. 
ii) The fisheries sector. The climatic disorders affected very strongly fishery production, whose 
value declined by one-third in 1983. This was the fourth consecutive reduction, so that its real value 
was equivalent to only a little over half that recorded in 1979 (see table 6). For its part, the sector's 
gross domestic product contracted by the astonishing figure of 40%. 
' In addition, it was estimated that around 10% of the total number of animals perished from starvation. 
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The climatic changes were reflected in increased temperature and lower salinity of sea water, as 
well as in heavy seas. The former caused a substantial decrease in the catch, as the marine species 
migrated to or took refuge in deeper waters. The heavy seas, for their part, caused substantial damage 
to fishery infrastructure, such as the sinking and damaging of vessels, destruction or deterioration of 
piers, handling modules, etc. In addition, the interruptions in the road system already mentioned 
impaired supplies to urban centres. 
In mid-year the climatic disorders disappeared, allowing a certain recovery in production; 
however, this was weakened by the serious financial problems faced by the fishery enterprises. Given 
the excessive indebtedness of the private enterprises in the sector, the financial community has been 
severely limiting credit to them, and this has resulted in an acute lack of working capital. For its part, 
the public enterprise operating in the sector (Pescaperu) also went through a critical situation. 
During 1983, the total catch for the preparation of fish meal and oil declined by 62%, after 
having expanded 55% in the preceding year. This is just an extreme case of the great variability 
traditionally observed in this field. The anchoveta catch contracted by 93%, and its share in the total 
value of the deep-sea fishing catch dropped from 25% to only 3%. The decline in the catch of other 
species (especially sardines) was 14%, and would have been larger if much of the sardine catch of the 
canning enterprises (87%) had not been sent for fish meal production. 
Fishing for direct human consumption dropped in 1983 (-40%) for the third consecutive year, 
resulting in a catch equivalent to only one-third of that obtained in 1980. The fact that the decline was 
not greater was due to a partial recovery of 61% in the catch for frozen fish, after drops of over 50% 
in 1981 and 1982. This recovery stemmed largely from the signing of contracts between Peruvian 
firms and Bulgarian and Soviet State enterprises for the operation of fleets from those countries in 
exchange for the delivery of a certain share of the catch (20% to 30%). 
The catch intended for the canning industry, for its part, after having dropped 38% in 1982, 
contracted 67% in 1983. The climatic disorders produced not only the migration of sardines toother 
areas and greater depths, but also physical deficiencies in the species, so that most of the catch had to 
be allocated to the preparation of fish meal. Sardines reappeared in the third quarter, however, and 
the catch considerably recovered in the last quarter. Given the poor situation of the canning 
enterprises, also affected by low international prices and protectionist measures, in November the 
Central Reserve Bank established a special credit line for 10 billion soles to support them, as well as 
enterprises engaged in the processing of frozen fish. 
Finally, inland fishing more than doubled (see table 6). The basic reason was the indirect 
influence of the climatic disorders. In the case of jungle rivers, the catch improved thanks to the 
favourable environment they created in that region, while due to the great food shortage in the 
highlands, fishing in Lake Titicaca grew considerably (in spite of the drought which caused a fall of 3 
metres in its level). The above factors raised the share of inland fishing in the total from a traditional 
7% to 21%. 
As already noted, Pescaperu suffered numerous problems throughout the year. This enterprise 
—which arose from the nationalization of the fish meal processing industries in 1973— has actually 
been suffering a serious crisis for some time and has been intervened by the Controller General of the 
Republic. The enterprise experienced considerable financial problems as soon as it was established, 
since many of the private enterprises from which it was formed had huge debts which were assumed 
by it. This problem has been aggravated by its high level of dollar indebtedness. As an indicator of its 
position, in September its working capital was negative, equivalent to US$ -54 million. 
The financial problems of Pescaperu were compounded by serious problems in other fields, 
especially a drop in the catch in recent years which has resulted in a high degree of over-
dimensioning. Thus, the enterprise's processing capacity is 6 million tons per year, but the average 
annual catch intended for fish meal and oil in the past five years has been somewhat under 2.1 million 
tons. This figure, moreover, includes the volume processed by private factories which have resumed 
operations since 1981, when the State monopoly in the manfuacture of fish meal was ended.10These 
factors, plus a high degree of labour instability, have given rise in turn to severe labour conflicts. In the 
first months of the year, for instance, most of the fishermen were on strike for 70 days. 
10 It should also be noted that in May, for example, only seven of the 36 factories of the enterprise were operat ing normally : twelve of t he 
factories could not operate because their electric power had been cut off for non-payment of bills. 
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Table 7 
PERU: INDICATORS OF MINING PRODUCTION 
PERU 
Indexes of mining 
production* (1977 = 
Total 
Mining of metals 
Hydrocarbons 
100) 














































































































































Source: Ministry of Energy and Mines and Central Reserve Bank of Peru. 
"Preliminary figures. Calculated on the basis of values at 1970 prices. 
Tons. 'Millions of barrels. /, 
'Thousands of tons, unless otherwise indicated 
GWH. 
Discussions in relation to the future of Pescaperú continued throughout the year. The main 
points in the discussions refer to the necessary degree of redimensioning and how to carry it out, to a 
change in emphasis in the enterprise's output (from fish meal and oil to products for direct human 
consumption), and to the permanent limitation of its area of operations to the southern zone 
(between Pisco and the border with Chile). 
iii) The mining sector. During 1983 mining production contracted by nearly 7%, dropping back 
to exactly the value obtained in 1981. Both metal mining and hydrocarbon production contracted, 
although the decline in the latter was far more intense (see table 7). 
Mining activity was severely affected in 1983 by two kinds of factors. In the first place, there was 
a sharp increase in the number of man-hours lost due to strikes. For example, in the first quarter 
15 000 workers from Centromin —the main public mining enterprise— quit their jobs for 18 days 
owing to wage issues. At the same time, the workers from the Southern Peru Copper Corporation 
went on strike, so that copper production dropped by 17 000 tons. Likewise, and also in the first 
quarter, the workers from Hierroperú —the public iron-ore enterprise— stopped work for 40 days. 
In September, the workers from the Toquepala mine of the Southern Peru Copper Corporation 
walked out for 10 days. 
Secondly, the natural disasters caused serious problems in this sector too. Floods, overflowing 
rivers and landslides blocked the Central Highway and the Central Railway which connect the 
important mining zone in the centre of the country with Lima and the port of Callao. Likewise, in the 
hydrocarbons sector these disasters caused serious damages to the Talara refinery, in Piura, and to the 
north Peruvian pipeline, which carries petroleum from the producing zones in the east to the coast. 
The reduction in the production of metallic ores was due to decreases in the extraction of copper 
(-9%) and of iron ore (-24%). In the case of copper, this decline meant a return to the 1977 
production level, and it occurred in spite of the expansion of the Cobriza concentrating plant in the 
third quarter, which allowed Centromin to increase its production by one-fourth. Furthermore, there 
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was a drop of 22% in the output of medium-scale mining. In the case of iron ore, when the sharp 
contraction of 1983 is added to that of the preceding year, this brought production to a level only half 
that achieved ten years before. This was largely due to the ending of sales contracts to Japan and 
European steelworks, as well as to the serious problems of Siderperú, the State steel manufacturing 
public enterprise. Subsequently, however, new sales contracts with Japan were signed. 
The increases in production of lead, zinc and silver partly offset the drops in copper and iron 
ore. Silver production grew (by 5 %) for the eighth consecutive year and was the most dynamic item of 
the year, as in 1982. Thereby, Peru became in 1983 the leading world exporter of silver, displacing 
Mexico. The evolution of silver prices was an important incentive in this. Thus, the average price in 
1983 was nearly 50% higher than that of the preceding year, although it declined sharply in the last 
quarter, even closing the year at a lower value than that of the end of 1982. 
Petroleum production, for its part, dropped 12%, after having grown by only 2% in the 1980-
1982 period. Most of this decline was due to lower production in the coastal oil fields, which had been 
the only fields to increase systematically in that triennium. Production on the continental shelf and in 
the east also declined, resulting in total average production of only 171 600 barrels per day. This drop 
was largely a direct consequence of the climatic disorders: transport through the pipeline was blocked 
twice in the year, while important oil zones on the coast (especially those engaged in secondary 
recovery operations) and in the east suffered serious floods and destruction of infrastructure. The 
drop in production due to natural disasters was estimated at 9.5 million barrels, or a little less than 
US$ 250 million. Furthermore, problems in the Talara refinery reduced the demand for crude. 
As for the proven petroleum reserves, at 775 million barrels these were 7% lower than in the 
preceding year, even though the legislation was attracted for foreign investors. 
Investment in the mining sector as a whole was very slight during the year. Even work on the 
Cerro Verde II copper mine could not be initiated, as the Japanese investors demanded a State 
guarantee for the loan they were to grant, and this could not be provided given the strict limits set on 
external public indebtedness under the agreements with the International Monetary Fund. 
Among the support measures taken by the Government mention may be made of the extension 
for six months, decided in the first half of the year, of the exemption from sales tax for all except silver 
producers, and the authority given to the Banco Minero to grant exceptional loans, with or without 
specific guarantees, to enterprises declared to be in a serious emergency. 
iv) Manufacturing. During 1983, manufacturing production suffered a substantial contraction 
(-17%). This, added to the declines in the two preceding years, brought down that production to a 
level equivalent to that obtained ten years before, or, in per capita terms, to that obtained 20 years 
before. Of the 22 industrial branches covered by statistics, in nine production contracted 10% or 
more, and none of them showed any increase. The production of six branches suffered a decline for 
the third year in a row, while that of textiles dropped for the fourth time. Total electric power 
consumption by the sector dropped by 18% and industrial employment in Lima fell for the second 
consecutive year (see table 8). 
The manufacturing sector reflected with particular intensity the problems affecting the 
economy during 1983. On the one hand, the natural disasters affected it in terms both of damage to 
infrastructure (especially, petroleum refineries, sugar mills and plants processing fishery resources), 
and of problems with the supply of inputs, owing to their lower quantity and quality in the cases of 
sugar and fishery products and to the interruption of communications as regards petroleum and 
minerals. 
However, the manufacturing sector was more harmed by the effects of economic policy than by 
natural disasters; in fact, together with construction, it was the sector which felt most sharply the 
effects of the crisis and of the economic measures adopted with the aim of adjusting the economy. 
Thus, the severe domestic recession and high inflation resulted in a sharp fall in private domestic 
demand, due to a reduction in the real income of the population and to a lower demand for inputs by 
certain economic sectors (such as construction). The cutback in government expenditure because of 
the need to reduce its deficit also played a role. The strict monetary programme —designed to contain 
demand pressures—, brought about, for its part, a critical shortage of liquidity and a high cost of 
banking resources. The Central Bank provided for the establishment of certain promotional credit 
lines, but these were insufficient and were immediately used up, given the great demand for available 
funds. Finally, the problems derived from the exterior persisted: low international demand for non-
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traditional export products and strong competition in the dome'stic market from legally and illegally 
imported products. 
The total production of the sectors processing primary resources contracted 21%, compared 
with a slightly lower decline (-16%) in the production of the rest of the industry. The seriousness of 
the manufacturing crisis has thus been further magnified, for over the past ten years the sectors 
processing primary resources had been the most dynamic: between 1973 and 1982 these sectors grew 
at an annual rate of 4.7%, whereas the rest of industry expanded at the rate of only 1.5%." 
The primary resource processing sector whose production dropped the most was the fish meal 
industry, whose output fell by 66% to a level equivalent to only one-third of that recorded in 1979 (see 
table 8). Besides the general factors outlined above, in this case the semiparalysation of Pescaperú due 
to the serious crisis affecting it12 played a substantial role (this enterprise manufactures 60% of total 
fish meal). 
The most severely affected industrial group, besides that manufacturing fish meal, was the 
metal products and machinery sector, whose production contracted by 35% (see table 8). Within it, 
one of the most serious falls was that suffered by the production of transport equipment (especially 
commercial vehicles), whose level fell by 59% to only two-fifths of that recorded in 1977. Sales of 
motor-vehicles declined to only 22 000 units, i.e., half the figure for the preceding year. 
The textile industry registered the second largest decline (-16%) among the different industrial 
groups. This drop constituted one of the most serious cases in the whole industrial sector, in view of 
this activity's importance in manufacturing and in the economy as a whole, for its production 
represents 15% of that of national industry as a whole, it employs 18% of the industrial manpower,13 
and normally exports between US$ 200 and 300 million per year, that is, between a quarter and a fifth 
of its total production and one-third of all non-traditional exports. This industry has suffered in an 
especially severe way from the problems derived from the situation in the external sector. On the one 
hand, it has had to face strong competition from imported products in the domestic market arising 
from the policy of trade openness. Due to the speed with which this opening-up was carried out, the 
industry had no time to adapt to the new circumstances. Smuggling, and the dumping practices of 
certain Asian countries aggravated the situation. Furthermore, several enterprises of the sector 
borrowed heavily in order to purchase the necessary equipment for producing suitable export items: 
the textile industry was one of the few branches which modernized its production equipment in 
recent years. However, the steep rise in financial costs due to the greater importance of domestic 
credit in dollars, the high devaluation rate and the need to resort to external financing brought serious 
problems. Problems were also caused by the international recession with its aftermath of low demand 
and the emergence of protectionist practices, which included the application of countervailing duties 
in the United States and problems in the Andean market. Finally, the reform of incentives to non-
traditional exports has also contributed to the serious financial crisis of the textile exterprises. 
The sugar mills also suffered serious problems due, in part, to a major technological lag: 14% of 
their machinery and equipment is over 40 years old and another 27% dates back to the 1950s. 
Moreover, the industry has experienced acute financial problems which, in the case of some sugar co-
operatives, may end in insolvency. In fact, as a result of inefficient production processes and several 
years of sugar price controls, in 1983 the co-operatives which produce 95% of Peru's sugar had an 
overall debt of US$ 130 million and suffered from an acute shortage of working capital. In 1983 
production of sugar —once an important export item— was the lowest in the past 45 years, 
equivalent to only half of that of 1973 and making imports necessary in order to adequately supply the 
domestic market. In this case, it was the natural disasters which had the greatest impact through the 
so-called "tropicalization" of sugar cane: due to the high prevailing temperatures its saccharose 
content dropped by 28%. 
v) Construction. After fisheries, it was the construction sector which recorded the greatest 
contraction (-21%) during 1983. In 1980 and 1981, in contrast, construction had been the most 
dynamic activity, with growth rates of 19% and 11%, respectively, and in 1982, although its growth 
slackened sharply, it still ranked second in the economy (see table 9). 
"i t should be noted that in 1983 the production of the sectors processing primary resources exceeded by one-fifh that of 1973; the 
production of the rest of industry, in contrast, dropped 4% in the same period. 
l2See the notes on the fisheries sector, in this section. 
13 in addition, it is the second most labour-intensive industrial sector, although employment in the sector has been declining at an annual 
rate of 5% or 6% since 1980. 
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Table 8 
PERU: INDICATORS OF MANUFACTURING PRODUCTION" 
(¿977 = 100) 
, Growth rates 
1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 ¡ 
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of electric power' 960.0 1087.6 1097.1 1100.6 902.4 13.3 0.9 0.3 -18.0 
Index of industrial 
employment (1977 = 100)'' 99.4 101.4 102.5 101.1 95.7 2.0 1.1 -1.3 -5.4 
Source: Ministry of Industry, Tourism and Integration and National Institute of Statistics (INE). 




PERU: INDICATORS OF CONSTRUCTION ACTIVITY 
Gross domestic product 
of construction 
(index 1977 = 100) 
Sales of construction 
materials 
Index of volume (first 
quarter 1977 = 100) 
Sales of some construction 
materials* 
Cement 
To the public sector 
To the private sector 
Iron bars for building 
Index of construction 
material prices 






































































































Source: National Institute of Statistics and Peruvian Chamber of the Construction Industry. 
"Preliminary figures. 'Calculated on the basis of 1973 prices. "Thousands of tons. Thousands of units, 
The most important cause of the 1983 situation was the contraction in public construction, 
owing to the imperative need to reduce the size of the public deficit. In fact, gross capital formation of 
the central government —which mainly consists of building activities— shrank in real terms by one-
third in 1983. An indicator of the low level of public activity was the fact that at the end of the third 
quarter the real amount of resources allocated to pay for accepted building tenders had fallen by two-
thirds compared with the end of 1982. Likewise, dwelling construction by the public sector 
diminished 57%, after having grown at an average rate of 50% during the three preceding years (see 
table 9). There was a large drop in private construction too: at the end of the year the number of 
dwellings built had declined by one-fifth, that is, to a level equivalent to that of 1980. 
The natural disasters of 1983 caused serious damage to dwellings and communication routes. 
The floods and landslides in the northern and central coastal areas totally destroyed 10 800 dwellings 
and caused considerable damage to 2 100 more. In rural areas, for their part, some 20 000 dwellings 
were affected. The cost of rebuilding destroyed dwellings —including essential services— and 
repairing those damaged was estimated at some US$ 70 million. As for highways, it is estimated that 
the cost of rehabilitating and reconstructing those destroyed or damaged —among them the Pan-
American Highway and the Central Highway— amounts to US$ 145 million. 
c) Employment, underemployment and unemployment 
During 1983 the employment situation experienced a marked deterioration, which was added 
to that already noted in 1982 (see table 10). Thus, the proportion of the labour force adequately 
employed in non-agricultural activities declined sharply from 49% to 40% between 1981 and 1983.u 
Over this same two-year period, the unemployment rate in such activities increased from 10% to 
13% and underemployment rose from 40% to 46%. The rural occupational situation, for its part, 
HThis proportion had attained a level of 59% in 1976. 
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Table 10 
PERU: EVOLUTION OF NON-AGRICULTURAL EMPLOYMENT 






































Source: Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare. 
'Preliminary figures. 'includes mining. 
Table 11 
PERU: EVOLUTION OF LABOUR DISPUTES" 
1980 1981 1982 1983" 
Work- Work- Work- Work-
ers Man- ers Man- ers Man- ers Man-
af- hours af- hours af- hours af- hours 
feet- lost feet- lost feet- lost feet- lost 
ed ed ed ed 
Growth rates' 
1982 1983* 
Total 481 17 919 857 19 974 572 22 751 785 19 916 13.9 -12.5 
By economic activity: 
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Source: National Insrirure of Staristics (INE). 





























































































































PERU: MAIN FOREIGN TRADE INDICATORS 
1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983" 








Terms of trade, goods (FOB/CIF) 
Terms of trade, goods (FOB/CIF) 
Purchasing power of exports of goods 




































































93.1 93.3 143.7 145.3 117.2 114.2 101.5 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
'Preliminary figures. 
also appears to have worsened considerably.15 This evolution was due to the serious economic 
problems affecting all productive sectors. 
The natural disasters of 1983 also had a considerable influence on employment. According to 
estimates on manpower utilization coefficients in productive activities affected by such disasters, it is 
estimated that employment losses amounted to a total of 37 million working days. Of this total, 32 
million corresponded to agriculture (46% in the growing of potatoes, 16% in that of maize and 13 % 
in that of cotton), and 5 million corresponded to fishing activities. In contrast, employment losses in 
manufacturing directly due to those disasters were minimal. 
The incidence of labour disputes was less in 1983 than the year before, as the number of man-
hours lost dropped by 13% (see table 11). However, the number of workers affected increased to 
approximately 13% of the economically active population. The sectors most influenced by strikes 
were transport —owing to steep rises in fuel prices and a lag in the adjustment of public transit 
tariffs—, mining, agriculture (due to the problems of the sugar co-operatives), and fisheries, because 
of difficulties in Pescaperú. Noteworthy among the causes of labour conflicts was the growth in 
strikes stemming from the non-fulfilment of collective contracts, which reflected the poor situation 
experienced by enterprises in 1983. 
3. The external sector 
a) Main trends and exchange policy 
The evolution of the external accounts during 1983 was marked by the economic crisis 
experienced during the year, the climatic disorders and the debt renegotiation process. Mainly 
because of the domestic economic depression, the high trade deficit recorded in 1981 and 1982 turned 
into a small surplus, as the value of exports of goods dropped by 8% and that of imports by 30%. 
These changes in values of exports and imports of goods were mainly due to drops in the traded 
volumes, since unit values varied very little; in fact, there was a break in the sharp downward trend 
shown in the last two years by the terms of trade (see table 12). 
"The relevant figures are not too reliable, but in any event, they indicate that adequately employed persons decreased from 39% to 32% 
of the agricultural labour force between 1982 and 1983. 
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The effects of the turnabout in the trade in goods were, however, partly offset by an increment 
in the deficit on services and in the net accountable-payments for factor services to the exterior. Thus, 
in the end the current account deficit was still quite high, although considerably lower than in the two 
preceding years. The positive balance on the capital account, for its part, decreased by approximately 
the same proportion as that deficit, so that the drop in net international reserves, just as in 1982, was 
very slight. This was made possible thanks to the rescheduling of service payments on the external 
debt achieved during the year. 
During the first months of 1983 the exchange policy remained along the lines followed in the 
preceding year: a progressive increase in the real exchange rate with the aim of preserving the 
equilibrium of the balance of payments. To this end, devaluation proceeded at a higher rate than the 
rise in domestic prices, and consequently the effective real exchange rate with respect to exports, 
which had already risen by 9% in 1982, increased another 4% up to the end of June (see table 13 and 
figure 2). However, three phenomena became increasingly patent: firstly, the devaluation process 
itself had become one of the main causes of the rise in domestic prices, thus strongly increasing the 
vicious circle devaluation-inflation-devaluation; secondly, exports (especially non-traditional ones), 
instead of increasing, were diminishing, since, among other factors, most of the positive price effect 
of devaluation was offset by its negative effect on the costs of imported and financial inputs (a 
situation which had been aggravated by the restrictive monetary policy); and, lastly, although imports 
were indeed going down, this was a perverse adjustment, as it was due rather to the process of 
domestic economic crisis and the decrease in investment than to the direct effect of the devaluation of 
the sol. 
Table 13 
PERU: EVOLUTION OF NOMINAL AND EFFECTIVE REAL EXCHANGE RATES 
(Averages per period) 
























































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of information from the International Monetary Fund and the National Institute of Statistics (INE). 
"Corresponds to the average real exchange rate indexes for the sol vis-a-vis the currencies of Peru's main trading partners, weighted according to 
the relative size of exports or imports, as the case may be, to or from those countries. For the methodology and sources used see the Statistical 
Appendix of the Economic Survey of Latin America, 1981. 
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Figure 2 
PERU: SHORT-TERM EVOLUTION OF THE EFFECTIVE 
REAL EXCHANGE RATE INDEX8 
(1980 --100) 
1981 1982 1983 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of information from the International Monetary Fund. 
aFor exports. 
Such conflicts substantially increased the uncertainty among private agents, and this fact was 
reflected, in turn, in differences between the free and the official exchange rates which had not been 
observed in the past four years. The monetary authorities, for their part, attempted to maintain the 
original programme and intensified the devaluation process. In August (when devaluation amounted 
to 14%), however, it was concluded that such a situation —along with other aspects of economic 
policy— was leading to a dead-end, and the authorities then decided to change the orientation of the 
exchange and monetary policies. 
One of the fundamental elements of the new programme was the reduction of the rate of 
devaluation and its announcement in advance: thus, it was set for the period from September up to 
November (later extended to December) at an average level of 3.7% per month (compared with the 
rate of 9% recorded in the first eight months). This was made possible due to the strengthening of 
the balance of payments as a result of the refinancing of the external debt and the (perverse) 
improvement in the current account. Two objectives were thus pursued: to reduce inflationary 
pressures, both directly and through expectations, and to reactivate the economy. As a result of this 
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situation, together with changes in monetary and pricing policies, the difference between the free and 
the official exchange rates disappeared and the rate of inflation dropped substantially, although there 
was nevertheless a deterioration in the effective real exchange rate in the second half of the year. 
b) Merchandise trade 
i) Exports. Although at the beginning of the year the value of exports was expected to grow by 
nearly one-fifth to some US$ 3.9 billion, in practice its amount contracted by nearly 10% to less than 
US$ 3 billion (see table 14). 
At the global level, two-thirds of this contraction was due to a drop of 28% in non-traditional 
exports, in contrast with their anticipated growth: in fact, they showed a year-end value 43% lower 
than that envisaged early in the year. In spite of the credit support received and the vigorous 
devaluation process followed until August, these exports suffered the effects of the protectionist 
measures taken by member countries of the Andean Group (which, besides being a market which is 
difficult to replace, represents one-third of the total markets for non-traditional exports) and by the 
United States —the main market for Peruvian textile products— in the form of counter-vailing 
import duties. To some extent, non-traditional exports also experienced the effects of the natural 
disasters, as the supply of inputs diminished. 
Table 14 
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Source: Central Reserve Bank of Peru. 
"Preliminary figures. Includes silver content. 'Includes mainly gold and minor metals. 
jewellery, wood and paper, hides and skins, and handicraft items. 
Includes mainly gold and silver 
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However, the biggest negative effect of those disasters occurred at the level of traditional 
exports, causing a reduction of US$ 105 million in external sales of fish meal, of US$ 60 million in 
sales of crude petroleum and derivatives, of US$ 55 million in the case of cotton and sugar and of 
US$ 40 million in the case of mining products.1<s With respect to the latter, in spite of labour disputes 
in the first quarter, there was a substantial recovery in the volumes of silver and lead exported, 
coinciding with a steep increase in their prices (see table 15). Thus, the volume of these two products 
exported exceeded by over 50% the figure envisaged at the beginning of the year. This offset the 
general effect of the natural disasters on mining exports, which grew by 18% as a whole and came to 
represent half of total exports. In addition, due precisely to the behaviour of silver and lead, external 
sales of traditional products as a whole only dropped 4%, and their share in the total increased to 
82%. 
ii) Imports. As in the case of exports, purchases from the exterior contracted during 1983 (to 
US$ 2.67 billion) instead of expanding, as envisaged, to nearly US$ 4 billion (see table 16). 
There were a number of causes for this lower level of imports. On the one hand, the strong 
reduction in domestic economic activity diminished the demand for imported products. This was 
reflected, for example, in a drop of 51% in imports of capital goods by the private sector and in a fall 
of 34% in its purchases of raw material and inputs. Secondly, the programme of fiscal austerity was 
reflected in the 19% decrease in purchases of investment goods in the exterior by the public sector 
and in a slump of 84% in its imports of non-food consumer goods. Thirdly, the big increase in the real 
exchange rate up to August also had an influence in the same direction. Lastly, the average tariff rate 
rose from 36% in 1982 to 41% in 1983, after the tariff surcharge equivalent to 15% of the customs 
tariff in force in 1982 had been replaced by another equivalent to 10% of the OF value. Nevertheless, 
just as in the three preceding years, about 98% of all tariff entries continued to be completely free 
from import restrictions, while only eight entries were subject to import prohibitions. 
Climatic disorders, for their part, had an opposite effect, as they led to additional spending in 
the exterior totalling around US$ 210 million: two-thirds of this amount was accounted for by 
extraordinary food imports such as rice, sugar, soya oil, dairy products and even potatoes —thereby 
increasing the value of imports of consumer and intermediate goods by the public sector—, and the 
remainder represented purchases of capital goods for reconstruction. 
c) Services trade and factor payments 
The deficit on the trade in real services increased by 17% in 1983.17 This was the result of a 
simultaneous drop in the value of sales of services to the exterior (-13%) and in that of services 
imports (-7%). 
This increased deficit was exclusively concentrated in the travel category, whose positive 
balance sank from US$ 169 million in 1982 to only US$ 15 million in 1983, since together with an 
increase of 14% in the expenditure of Peruvian citizens abroad, there was a striking contraction of 
41% in that of foreigners in,the country. The latter was basically the result of an increase in terrorist 
activities and, to a lesser extent, of climatic disorders. Net payments to the exterior for transport 
services and insurance dropped for their part by one-fourth, and there was also a general decrease in 
their volume, due to a fall in total foreign trade. 
The accounting balance of net payments for factor services expanded 9% and was greater than 
the total current account deficit. Accounting interest payments18 increased 15% to over US$ 1.15 
billion; however, this total also includes that share of interest on the external public debt covered by 
its rescheduling in negotiations with foreign governments, the socialist countries, and members of 
the Paris Club, totalling US$ 173 million. Excluding the latter figure, effective interest payments fell 
7%, to US$ 983 million. This total included US$ 95 million in interest corresponding to the 
renegotiation processes with governments and the international banks.19 For its part, owing to a drop 
l6The total effect of the disasters on exports was approximately US$ 280 million, the slight difference being accounted for by non-
traditional products. 
17 It should be noted that the average deficit was US$ 233 million in the period 1981-1983, against only US$ 41 million in the period 
1977-1980. 
18 Here, accounting payments mean total payments actually made plus those payments which, although not effected, have been recorded 
as such, together with a compensatory entry for capital inflow. 
"See table 20. 
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Table 15 
PERU: VALUE, VOLUME AND PRICES OF 

































































































































































































































































































Source: Central Reserve Bank of Peru. 
"Values in millions of dollars and volumes in thousands of tons, unless otherwise indicated; prices as indicated. 
Preliminary figures. 'Dollars per ton. Thousands of quintals. 'Dollars per quintal. 'U.S. cents per pound. 
'Millions of net legal tons. Dollars per net legal ton. 'Millions of troy ounces. 'Dollars per troy ounce. 












































































































































































































































Source: Central Reserve Bank of Peru. 
"Preliminary figures. ''Defence equipment, non-monetary gold and other public sector imports. 
in international interest rates, the amount of interest received went down, as did payments of profits. 
Indeed, the latter dropped for the fourth time, thus attaining a level equivalent to only 24% of that 
recorded in 1979. 
d) The current account position and its financing 
After two years of heavy deficits, the trade in goods and services showed a small positive 
balance, as imports contracted considerably faster than exports. Thus, in spite of an increase of 9% in 
net payments for factor services, the current account deficit shrank from a figure of nearly US$ 1.8 
billion in 1981 and in 1982, to US$ 1.1 billion. This latter amount includes an entry for refinanced 
interest on the external public debt.20 Had this been excluded, the current account deficit would have 
gone down by 49%, that is, to somewhat over US$ 900 million. 
As in 1982, the positive balance on the capital account financed more than 95% of the current 
account deficit (see table 17). This positive balance stemmed exclusively from long-term capital 
movements, and in these a decisive influence was exerted by funds received by the public sector. There 
was not only a reduction in the long-term indebtedness of the private sector, but also —in what was 
20See the preceding section. 
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one of the most striking differences in the country's economic evolution with respect to the preceding 
year— the short-term capital movements went from a positive value of over US$ 450 million to a 
negative one of over US$ 200 million. 
The net international reserves, for their part, only dropped by US$ 50 million (see table 18). 
However, their evolution exhibited noteworthy ups and downs throughout the year. At the end of the 
first quarter, when renegotiation operations on the external debt were just starting, the net 
international reserves had declined by US$ 260 million, but by the end of the second quarter, as a 
result of the first effects of the renegotiation, they had risen considerably. In the third quarter they 
Table 17 
PERU: BALANCE OF PAYMENTS 
(Millions of dollars) 
Balance on current account 
Trade balance 
Exports of goods and services 
Goods FOB 
Real services 
Transport and insurance 
Travel 
Imports of goods and services 
Goods FOB 
Real services 






Unrequited private transfer payments 
Balance on capital account 
Unrequited official transfer payments 
Long-term capital 
Direct investment (net) 











Errors and omissions (net) 
Global balance 
Total variation in reserves 
(- sign indicates an increase) 
Monetary gold 
Special Drawing' Rights 
IMF reserve position 
Foreign exchange assets 
Other assets 































































































































































































































































































Source: 1977-1982: International Monetary Fund, Balance of Payments Yearbook, March 1984; 1983: ECLAC, on the basis of official data. 
"Preliminary figures. Real services also include other official and private transactions, but not factor services cInaddition to loans 
received and amortization payments made, this entry includes net loans granted and other assets and liabilities. The global balance is 
the sum of the current account balance plus the balance on capital account. The difference between total variation in reserves of oppositesign 





PERU: EVOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL RESERVES 











































































































































Source: Central Reserve Bank of Peru. 
"Gold held by banks, either in vault or in custody abroad, and the country's gold contribution to the International Monetary Fund. Special 
Drawing Rights. 'Demand and time deposits in foreign currency, in banks and with agents abroad, and other international assets, such 
as bonds in the World Bank, contribution to the Andean Reserve Fund and deposits in local banks. The latter represented an average of 5 % of 
the amounts recorded in this column during 1982 and 1983- ''Mainly liabilities with the International Monetary Fund, short-term 
libilities with foreign banks, and balances with ALADI. 'Preliminary figures. 
contracted once more (-10%), largely due to delays in concluding the formal aspects of debt 
renegotiation with international banks which caused the latter to delay their disbursements of new 
contracted loans, and finally, in the last quarter, the international reserves remained practically 
unchanged. 
e) External indebtedness 
The total external debt expanded 12% in 1983, that is to say, at a faster rate than the Latin 
American debt as a whole (7 %). This broke a four-year cycle during which Peruvian indebtedness had 
behaved in a completely opposite way to that of the region as a whole. In 1983, the growth of the 
external debt was concentrated entirely in long-term funds and, among these, in those received by the 
public sector (which increased by 19%) and by the Central Reserve Bank (which rose 57%). Short-
term external funds, for their part, after their rapid growth in 1982, experienced a sharp reduction in 
1983 (see table 19). 
The original time schedule of the external debt service for 1983 anticipated that its level would 
be equivalent to 95 % of total exports.21 However, given the widespread contraction in international 
capital markets and the insufficient reduaion in the current account deficit of the balance of 
payments, the situation became untenable. Thus, on 7 March a forced rescheduling of the heavy short-
'The external public debt service, for its part, should have represented 57% of total exports in 1983. 
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Table 19 
PERU: EVOLUTION OF EXTERNAL INDEBTEDNESS" 
Total external debt 
Long-term external debt 
Public sectorc 
Centra] Reserve Bank 
Private sector 
Short-term external debt 
Public and private 
enterprises 
Banking system 
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Source: Central Reserve Bank of Peru. 
"Preliminary figures. Up to 1982, includes adjustment due to variation in the exchange rate of foreign currencies. ^Comprises 
central government and public enterprises. With or without the guarantee of the banking system. f The totals for each entry 
include until 1982 the adjustment mentioned in footnote , but not loans disbursed or amortization payments made. Excludes 
renegotiated debt service: USJ 173 million on account of interest and US$ 837 million for principal. *GDP = gross domestic product; 
ED = total external debt; EPD = long-term external public debt, excluding that of the Central Reserve Bank; X = exports of goods, 




PERU: NET RELIEF DUE TO THE RENEGOTIATION OF 
THE EXTERNAL PUBLIC DEBT IN 1983 


















































































































Source: Central Reserve Bank of Peru. 
"Includes Latin American countries for US$ 43 million in 1983 and for US$ 52 million in 1984. 
term external debt was unilaterally declared, under the pressure from the country's main creditors, 
who sought to avert a massive withdrawal of funds from dozens of small banks, which would have had 
catastrophic consequences. Commercial loans falling due in the period between 7 March and 31 May 
(approximately US$ 500 million, mostly owed by public enterprises) were deferred for 90 days as 
from their original maturity date.22 At the same time, there was a 360-day postponement both of 
loans for working capital of public enterprises (US$ 1.2 billion), and of those contracted by private 
banks (US$ 300 million), between 7 March 1983 and 6 March 1984. The terms of this operation were 
LIBOR plus 2%, and a commission of 0.375%. The agreements were signed in June, and until then 
Peru systematically renewed its suspension of payments. 
At the same time, an agreement was reached with commercial banks for refinancing the 
medium and long-term debt. The sum involved amounted to US$ 401 million in amortization 
payments falling due in the same one-year period mentioned above; the conditions were an eight-year 
repayment term (including three years of grace), a spread of 2.25% over LIBOR and a commission of 
1.25%. Simultaneously, and on the same terms (except for an additional annual commission of 
0.5 %) , new loans for US$ 450 million were obtained. This latter operation, besides being conditional, 
like the previous ones, on observance of the agreement with the International Monetary Fund, and 
therefore, the goals set by it, depended on the international banking system fulfilling its commitment 
to maintain at least 95% of its short-term «edit lines. That was only achieved at the end of 
September, causing a delay in scheduled disbursements, as well as extension of deferral of payment of 
the short-term debt until October. 
12 The procedure consisted in that local banks and public enterprises paid their debts to the Central Bank, which, in turn, openeda dollar 
account in favour of the creditor and deferred the payment. 
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The debt with governments was renegotiated by signing an agreement with the members of the 
Paris Club for the refinancing of loans granted by them and by official export credit agencies and State 
guaranteed supplier credits. The Peruvian authorities requested the refinancing of all loans falling 
due in the period from 1 May 1983 to 28 February 1985 (the date on which the agreement with the 
International Monetary Fund expired), amounting to approximately US$ 1.2 billion. Peru had not 
served this debt (capital or interest) since the end of April. After intensive negotiations, refinancing 
of 90% of all payments corresponding to the period 1 May 1983 to 30 April 1984 was obtained, 
subject to the continued observance of the agreement with the International Monetary Fund. 
Likewise, half of the remaining 10% to be paid during 1983 was deferred until 1984. An "automatic 
clause" included in the agreement pledged to refinance the amounts falling due within 10 months 
following its entry into force. The repayment period granted was 8 years (including three years of 
grace), and it was agreed that interest rates would be determined in bilateral negotiations, which 
began once the Paris meeting was closed. 
Finally, debt refinancing operations were completed by the signature of an agreement with the 
Soviet Union, under which maturities corresponding to 1983 would be paid over a six-year term, at an 
increasing rate. Those corresponding to 1984 and 1985 were refinanced for an eight-year term 
(including three years of grace). The amounts still due after the two refinancing operations will be 
paid in kind, according to a list of non-traditional exports which Peru undertook to submit to the 
consideration of the Soviet authorities. This part of the operation was for an amount close to US$ 200 
million, with a duration of two years, as from November 1983. 
The global results of this complex renegotiation process are shown in table 20. The total of 
US$ 1015 million refinanced during 1983 corresponded to two-fifths of the total long-term resources 
received by the public sector.23 Thanks to this refinancing, the effective debt service coefficient (that 
is, excluding refinanced principal and interest payments), as a proportion of total exports went down 
from the extremely high levels of 1981 and 1982 (73% and 70%, respectively) to 50% (see table 19). 
4. Prices and wages 
a) Prices 
During 1983, the rate of inflation grew markedly, reaching for the first time a three-digit figure, 
both in terms of its annual accumulated variation ( 125 %, as against 73% in 1982), and in its variation 
between annual averages (111%, as against 65% the year before) (see table 21.) 
However, the evolution of the consumer price index was uneven over the year, with two clearly 
differentiated periods: January to September, when inflation was running at an annual level of 145 %, 
and the last quarter of the year, when the rate of price increases in annual terms dropped by half to 
74%; i.e., a similar rate to that of 1981 and 1982. 
The rapid inflation of the first three quarters of the year was due to the combination of various 
factors: the impact of the climatic disorders, the very fast devaluation process, the policy of 
readjusting controlled prices and public service tariffs, and inflationary expectations. 
The inflationary pressures caused by the natural disasters were due both to acute supply 
shortages in markets arising from losses in production and destruction of communication routes, and 
to intense speculative activity brought about by the emergency. In the areas directly affected by rains 
and floods, the problem was particularly serious; thus, for example, in the city of Piura the increase in 
prices, which averaged 5.2 % per month during 1982, attained in the first four months of the year the 
level of 12.4% per month, and in the city of Chiclayo, it soared from a rate of 5.1% per month in 1982 
to 14.1% in the January-April period. 
In the drought zone, for its part, the average monthly inflation was also accelerated, although to 
a lesser extent: in Puno it rose from 4.3% in 1982 to 6.3% in the first four months of 1983, and in 
Arequipa from 5.2% in 1982 to 8.2% in January-April 1983. There were two reasons for the lower 
rise in this zone than in the northern zone of the country: on the one hand, there was a high degree of 
self-supply, so that part of the loss in production was not reflected in an increase in prices, and, on the 
other, there was a drop in the price of meat, because the peasants were forced to dispose of their cattle, 
"Of the remaining resources received by the public sector, two-thirds were allocated to investment projects, one-tenth to food imports 
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Source: National Institute of Statistics (INE). 
"Preliminary figures. Includes food, beverages and tobacco. 
which were being sold in September at the equivalent of only 40 dollars per head. All these factors 
also had strong repercussions on the metropolitan area of Lima, to which the official consumer price 
index refers. Thus, whereas the monthly increase in the prices of food, beverages and tobacco in 1982 
was 4.6%, in the first quarter of 1983 it was 10.4%: in that period, vegetables and pulses rose 29% 
per month, bread and grains 13%, tubers 11%, etc. 
The factors linked to the economic policy (devaluation and rises in controlled prices) were also a 
major driving force in price increases. As regards devaluation, a policy designed to protect the balance 
of payments through a real improvement in the exchange rate set off a race between that factor and 
inflation, considerably increasing financial and input costs (see figure 3). As regards controlled prices, 
their monthly rate of increase went up from 4.9% in 1982 to 9.8% in the first nine months of 1983. 
The maintenance of gasoline prices at the equivalent of US$ 1.10 per gallon had considerable weight 
in that evolution. 
The situation became highly untenable, and the series of rises in prices and in the exchange rate 
came to be futile. Along with a restrictive monetary policy which attempted to sterilize the 
inflationary effects of devaluation, these rises had given rise to very serious strangulation of the 
productive sector. Consequently, in August the authorities announced a change in the objectives of 
the short-term economic policy, and the control of inflation (with its consequences on the exchange 
rate) became an essential part of this policy. 
This new approach produced a marked decline in inflationary pressures, due basically to three 
factors. Firstly, the monthly devaluation rate of 9% recorded between January and August was 
reduced to 3.7% in the last four months of the year. Secondly, a ceiling of 3 % was set on the monthly 
increment in the price of gasoline (which thereby dropped to the equivalent of US$ 1.02 per gallon by 
the end of the year), and another of 4% for monthly adjustments in the prices of rice, bread, milk 
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distributed by the National Input Marketing Enterprise (ENCI)24 and medicines, as well as water, 
electricity and telephone tariffs; at the same time, as from the end of August the prices of kerosene, 
diesel oil and gas were frozen. In these circumstances, the high average monthly increase in the prices 
of controlled products recorded for the three first quarters of the year dropped to 4% in the last 
quarter. Thirdly, the shortages arising from natural disasters gradually disappeared in the course of 
Figure 3 
PERU: MONTHLY VARIATIONS IN THE CONSUMER 
PRICE INDEX AND EXCHANGE RATE 
1981 1982 1983 
4The public enterprise responsible for importing dairy products. 
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Table 22 
PERU: EVOLUTION OF AVERAGE REMUNERATIONS 
PERU 
Average remunerations in 
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Source: Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare; National Institute of Statistics (1NE); Central Reserve Bank of Peru. 
"Preliminary figures. ''Data for Metropolitan Lima; coverage: establishments with ten or more workers. Salaries correspond to non-
manual workers and wages to manual workers. 'Soles per month. Soles per day. 'Dollars at end of year, referred to 
Metroplitan Lima. Minimum salaries are obtained by multiplying minimum wages by 30 . 
the year; thus, for example, the prices of the products most affected in the first half of the year went 
down in nominal terms in the last quarter (the prices of vegetables and pulses in Lima fell at a rate of -
9% per month, those of tubers and roots at a rate of -7% per month, etc.). 
b) Wages 
After having grown for three years, average remunerations in the private sector in 
metropolitan Lima diminished substantially in 1983; salaries contracted 15%, against an accrued 
growth of 17% in the period 1980-1982, while wages declined 16%, after having grown 11% during 
the three preceding years (see table 22). This situation was worse than that registered in the previous 
economic crisis (1977 and 1978).25 
However, the behaviour of remunerations was uneven over the year. Although between 
November 1982 and August 1983 real wages contracted by 21%, between August and November 
1983 they grew 3 %. This was due to the reduction in the rate of inflation in the last months of the year 
and to the granting, in November, of,a general wage increase of 15% which had not originally been 
scheduled. 
Between November 1982 and November 1983, when the last survey of the year was 
undertaken, wages dropped 19% in real terms. The most seriously affected sector was 
construction (-29%), followed by wholesale trade (-28%); these drops reflected the critical situation 
of these activities during the year. In contrast, the activities in which real wages were affected the least 
were non-governmental services (-8%), transport, storage and communications (-10%) and the 
banking system (-13%). Wages paid in manufacturing held an intermediate position, declining by a 
somewhat larger percentage (-21%) than wages as a whole. 
"It should be noted that at the end of 1983 the real value of salaries only slightly exceeded half the value reached 10 years before. 
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With respect to minimum remunerations (that is, the reference unit, or minimum wage, plus 
compulsory cost-of-living allowances), their real value at the end of 1983 was exactly the same as at 
the end of 1982. This does not reflect the strong real increase of 26% in the first quarter and the 
successive declines recorded in the three following quarters. 
5. Monetary and fiscal policy 
a) Monetary policy 
During 1983, the contractive orientation of the monetary policy put into effect the year before 
was intensified. Whereas until the end of 1981 the objective of the monetary policy had been to 
increase, albeit moderately, the levels of real liquidity in national currency in the economy, with the 
purpose of providing adequate financing for productive activities, in 1982 the objective was focused 
on diminishing real liquidity and maintaining the global level of credit. This change in policy had the 
purpose of neutralizing the inflationary pressures resulting from the accelerated devaluation process 
due, in turn, to a change in the approach followed by global economic policy. Hence, the monetary 
programme for 1983 envisaged the maintenance of the emphasis laid on the contraction of real 
liquidity (which would only grow 30% in nominal terms, against anticipated inflation of 55%), as a 
means of continuing to tackle the internal and external imbalances of the economy. This time, 
however, a reduction was envisaged in the real level of domestic credit, which would expand in 
nomimal terms by 41%. This fall would be partly offset by the launching of a vigorous process of 
selectivity in the granting of credit, which would be mainly destined for agricultural and non-
traditional export activities. 
Halfway through the year, however, it was realized that such a monetary programme, rather 
than solving the problems of inflation —which kept on growing rapidly— and of the external 
accounts —whose total breakdown had been avoided only through temporary suspension of debt 
servicing— was leading, in combination with the rest of the economic programme, to an acute 
process of economic recession. 
Thus, early in August, and as part of a change in approach which affected economic policy in 
general, a new monetary programme with quite different characteristics was designed. A growth in 
nominal liquidity of 4% per month was scheduled for the second half of the year, which would result 
at least in the maintenance of the real level of liquidity, since the rate of inflation should drop, owing 
to the other measures of the new economic programme (lower devaluation rate, lower increases in 
controlled prices, etc.). On the other hand, domestic credit would be selectively raised by a total of 300 
billion soles with resources from the Central Reserve Bank, through various special lines of credit, 
and with resources from the commercial banks. To this end, the zero marginal cash reserve was 
maintained and a minimum base was established (equal to 10% of the increase in loans) for 
determining the coefficients of the credit portfolio of banks for agriculture, which was one of the 
priority sectors. 
Finally, the monetary programme included an increase in nominal annual interest rates on 
loans and deposits from 55% to 60%, with the determination of the capitalization periods being left 
open. As a result of this, along with the decrease in the devaluation rate, it was expected that saving 
deposits in soles would again become attractive. However, in spite of all those measures the nominal 
rate of return on dollar savings, calculated as the return on the Foreign Currency Bank Certificates, 
was still much greater than that of deposits in soles. Thus, the former amounted to 153% in nominal 
terms —as a.result of the devaluation of 130%, plus an interest rate generally equivalent to LIBOR 
minus one point—, whereas the latter was, on average, barely equal to 70%, which meant that after 
discounting inflation, the return deposits in soles was highly negative (-25%). This was a 
considerably lower level than that of the preceding year (-3%), and was only exceeded in recent years 
by that attained in 1978 (see table 23). This had important effects on the composition of liquidity in 
Peru. 
The change in policy halfway through the year was accurately reflected in the evolution of the 
monetary aggregates. The monetary base, after having contracted 23% in real terms during the first 
half of the year, expanded by 14% in the second. Nevertheless, this latter expansion failed to avoid a 



































































































































Source: Central Reserve Bank of Peru. 
"For operations in national currency. "Corresponds to the weighted average for the discount period, of a 90-day promissory note. 
'Weighted tax for the period. Corresponds to the weighted average, for the period, of the maximum deposit rate. 
' Loan rate plus commission. •'Loan .rate plus commission and taxes. ^Corresponds to quarterly capitalization of the nominal rate. 
only half its 1980 level (see table 24). Simultaneously, although it declined slightly in 1983 the 
monetary multiplier, referred to total money plus quasi-money, was 80% bigger than in 1980. 
The decline in the monetary base in 1983 was due to the fact that the negative balance on the 
"other items" entry (mainly foreign currency operations) doubled in real terms, thus offsetting the 
great increase in credit from the Central Bank to the public sector and to development banks. The 
former was due to the increased public financial needs owing to a big reduction in tax revenue and 
difficulties in obtaining external loans, while furthermore in the third quarter the Public Treasury 
withdrew from the Central Bank most of a US$ 200 million bridging loan received from the 
international.banks in June. In real terms, credit granted to the government by the issuing institute 
shrank by 41 % in the first half of the year but more than trebled in the second. For its part, all growth 
in credit granted by that institution to development banks was concentrated in the last quarter of the 
year. Of this credit, three-fifths went to the Agrarian Bank, after real growth of 41%, and nearly all 
the rest to the Industrial Bank. 
Despite the change in the second half of the year, a contraction in the total real monetary supply 
could not be averted. This phenomenon had not occurred since 1978, when it was smaller in 
magnitude (see table 25). In 1981 and 1982 the drop in the monetary base was offset by a large 
increase in the monetary multiplier, but this did not happen in 1983, when it dropped from 4.58 to 
4.45 (see table 24). 
The amounts of money and quasi-money suffered similar reductions over the whole of the year, 
the fall being, in the latter case, the first since 1978. It should be noted, however, that quasi-money in 
foreign currency remained stable and it was only quasi-money in national currency which contracted 
(-29%). The degree of dollarization of the economy (measured in terms of deposits in foreign 
currency as a proportion of the total money supply) attained the extremely high figure of 42%, after 
an uninterrupted series of rises (with the sole exception of 1981) since 1978, when it stood at 14%. 
This result was a direct consequence of the structure of interest rates mentioned above. 
The monetary aggregates also clearly reflected the change in policy introduced halfway through 
the year; the total real money supply contracted by 21% in the first semester and grew 8% in the 
second. As regards the money supply in national currency, the change was even more striking: after a 
fall of 28% it registered an expansion of 10%. 
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Bank credit managed to expand 9% in 1983 due to the rapid increase in credit granted to the 
public sector not only by the Central Bank but also by the Banco de la Nación and by the commercial 
banks (see table 26). Real credit to this sector expanded 186% during the second half of the year, 
compared with a contraction of 39% in the first half. 
Real credit to the private sector, for its part, recorded decreases in each of the first three 
quarters and grew less than 1 % in the last quarter, with a total reduction of 11 % during the year. This 
drop resulted from the interaction of two opposing factors. On the one hand, the Central Bank 
established a series of promotional credit lines designed to permit the reactivation of key sectors of 
the economy (agriculture, manufacturing exports, etc.). On the other, the depressed situation of 
private sector enterprises paradoxically brought about a huge surplus of loanable funds held by 
commercial banks, in conjunction with a great need for such funds by these enterprises and a 
restrictive monetary programme. 
Thus, the excess cash reserve maintained by commercial banks in the Central Bank —reflecting 
how risky it was for them to lend to private enterprises, given the prevailing economic situation— 
amounted, in the case of bank deposits in national currency, to 95 % of the demandable cash reserves 
(at the end of 1982, this latter indicator was equal to 5 %). In the case of deposits in foreign currency 
there was a movement in the same direction, although much less marked, with the excess cash reserve 
increasing from 3% to 8% of the demandable cash reserve between the end of 1982 and the end of 
1983. This reflects, in turn, the increasing importance of loans in foreign currency among the total 
loans by the commercial and savings banks: from 31% in 1981 to 38% in 1982 and 46% in 1983. 
Finally, three banks ran into serious problems during 1983, due to excessive concentration of 
credit in enterprises associated with the banking institutions in question. Thus, after the liquidation 
in 1982, of the Banco de la Industria y la Construcción, in 1983 the Banco Comercial del Perú had to be 
Table 24 
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Source: Central Reserve Bank of Peru (CRB). 
"Preliminary figures. 'Or primary issue, depending on how shown in the accounts of the Central Reserve Bank. 
'Central Reserve Bank of Peru. Includes Fondo Nacional de Propiedad Social (FONAPS) and Corporación Financiera de Desarrollo 
(COFIDE). ' Mostly operations in foreign currency. ^M, corresponds to money held by the financial system and M, corresponds to 




PERU: EVOLUTION OF THE MONEY SUPPLY" 
Total 
1. Money 
a) Bills and coins 
in circulation 
b) Demand deposits in 
national currency 
2. Quasi-money 
a) In national currency 
b) In foreign currency 
Sources 




2. Net long-term external 
indebtedness 
3. Net domestic credit 
a) To the public sector 
b) To the private sector 
c) Other accounts 
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150 284 492 751 
150 284 492 751 
144 275 462 662 

































































































































































































Source: Central Reserve Bank of Peru. 
"Exchange rates used (soles per dollar): 196 for 1978; 250 for 1979, 342 for 1980; 507 for 1981; 990 for 1982; 2 271 for 1983. 'Preliminary 
figures. 'Includes the banking and non-banking systems. ''includes the Central Reserve Bank of Peru, commercial banks and 
development banks. 'Comprises insurance and finance companies, mutual benefit societies, co-operatives and the Corporación 
Financiera de Desarrollo (COFIDE). Data referred to the financial system. 
593 
Table 26 
PERU: EVOLUTION OF NET DOMESTIC CREDIT" 
Credit from the banking 
sector''' 
By currency: 
In national currency 
In foreign currency 
By sectors: 
1. To the public sector' 
By currency: 
In national currency 
In foreign currency 
By bank: 
From the CRB' 
From the Banco de 
la Nación 
From development banks 
From commercial banks 
a) To the Central government 
From the CRB' 
From the Banco de 
la Nación 
From development banks 
From commercial banks 
b) To the rest of the 
public sector 
From the CRB' 
From the Banco de 
la Nación 
From development banks 
From commercial banks 
2. To the private setor 
By currency: 
In national currency 
In foreign currency 
By bank: 
From the CRB / 
From the Banco de 
la Nación 
From development banks 
From commercial banks 
Credit from the non-banking 
sector* 
To the public sector' 
To the private sector 
Total credit to the public and 
private sectors 
By currency: 
In national currency 
In foreign currency 
By sector: 
To the public sector' 
To the private sector 
Other accounts'1 
Total net credit from 
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Source: Central Reserve Bank of Peru (CRB). 
"Exchange rates used (soles per dollar): 196 for 1978; 250 for 1979; 542 for 1980; 507 for 1981; 990 for 1982; 2 271 for 198}. 
'Preliminary figures. 'Includes the Central Reserve Bank, the Banco de la Nación commercial banks and development banks. 
^Excluding the "other accounts" entry. 'Includes credit to the public sector minus deposits made by this sector. 
'CRB: Central Reserve Bank of Peru. 'Comprises insurance and finance companies, mutual benefit societies, co-operatives and the 
Corporación Financiera de Desarrollo (COFIDE). * Mainly capital and reserves. Includes the banking and non-bankingsystems. 
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PERU 
liquidated (the third out of four totally private banks in Lima); the Banco Internacional had to acquire 
the Banco Regional del Sur Medio y Callao (of lea), and a special operation had to be performed in 
order to avoid the bankruptcy of the Banco Amazónico of Iquitos. For all these operations, the Central 
Reserve Bank granted financial support totalling 155 billion soles during the first quarter. 
b) Fiscal policy 
As in the preceding year, in 1983 the reduction in size of the public deficit, as a share of the gross 
domestic product, was one of the main objectives of the economic programme, but it was also the one 
which fared the worst. Although the goal, jointly designed with the International Monetary Fund, 
was to attain a deficit equivalent to 3.8% of the gross domestic product, the result achieved at the end 
of the year was 12%: the highest proportion recorded in Peruvian fiscal history. Four years earlier, 
the deficit had been equivalent to only 1.5% of the gross domestic product. 
Three-fifths of the non-financial public sector deficit was financed with resources from the 
exterior (see table 27). However, although that proportion was less than that of the preceding year, 
when those resources financed three-fourths of the public deficit, it conceals a great increase in 
importance of long-term external financing, which came to be equivalent to 72 % of the total deficit in 
1983, after having amounted to 52% in 1982 and 37% in 1981; in contrast, the flow of short-term 
external resources became negative in net terms. 
The contrast between 1983 and the preceding year was especially marked as regards the deficit 
financing of public enterprises. Whereas in 1982 they financed 46% of that deficit with short-term 
external funds, in 1983 there was a negative flow of these funds equivalent to 57% of the deficit (see 
table 27). Thus, the significance of domestic resources in the financing of the latter soared from 11 % 
in 1982 to 72% in 1983. 
In the case of the central government, financing from the banking system and from the issue of 
bonds gained considerable importance. The former trebled in real terms and consisted predominantly 
of credit from the Banco de la Nación with resources from the Central Reserve Bank. Financing 
through bonds, for its part, after being negative during the three preceding years, accounted for nearly 
one-fourth of domestic financing of the central government deficit in 1983. This was mainly due to 
the issue of Civil Reconstruction Bonds. These certificates in national currency for a fixed two-year 
term were established with the purpose of collecting funds for the reconstruction of areas affected by 
the climatic disasters,26 and their purchase was mandatory, as from May, by all natural persons whose 
income exceeded a certain minimum amount,27 in the equivalent of 10% of that income. 
There are three main reasons why the public deficit was so much greater than expected. In the 
first place, the natural disasters caused a sharp fall in income, due both to the tax exemptions and 
facilities granted to the affected areas, and to a drop in revenue on account of the problems faced in 
those areas by the various economic activities. Likewise, those disasters brought about a great increase 
in expenditure (in order to meet the emergency and to cope with reconstruction), and caused losses in 
several public enterprises, especially Petroperú and Electroperu. The total cost of all these factors was 
estimated at 1 000 billion soles, that/is to say, 32% of the public sector deficit and 3.9% of the gross 
domestic product. 
Secondly, the various economic hypotheses on the basis of which the national budget had been 
prepared were far removed from the actual results: thus, economic growth of nearly 3% was assumed, 
yet there was a fall amounting to -12%; inflation of 45 % was envisaged but in practice it was 125%; it 
was estimated that the average exchange rate would reach 965 soles per dollar whereas actually it was 
1 629 soles; and it was calculated that the growth in export income would be 20%, whereas there was 
a drop of -8%. Thus, as regards the central government, income was 12% less than budgeted and 
expenditure was 30% bigger (see table 28). 
Finally, as from September the rate of increase in the prices of goods and services marketed by 
public enterprises diminished sharply and, in some cases, fell to zero, while central government 
expenditure expanded faster than before. 
26Of the total funds collected, 45% will be allocated to Piura and Tumbes, 30% to Puno and other drought areas, and the remainder to 
other disaster areas. 
"600 000 soles, in May. 
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Table 27 
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Source: Central Reserve Bank of Peru (CRB). 
"Includes social security, decentralized agencies, public welfare and municipalities. CRB = Central Reserve Bank of Peru. 
cOther than those of the banking system and the Corporación Financiera de Desarrollo (COFIDE). Preliminary figures. 
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Unlike 1982, when the deficit of public enterprises surpassed that of the central government, in 
1983 the latter grew rapidly (doubling in real terms and rising from 4% to 9% of the gross domestic 
product) to represent three-fourths of the total public deficit. 
As regards fiscal income, it was estimated that in 1983 the tax burden would be reduced from 
18% (obtained in 1981, 1982) to 16.8%. In fact, however, it only amounted to 14.3%. Among the 
major causes for this drop were the lower economic activity and its depressive effect on the levels of 
production, sales and income and, therefore, on tax revenue; the serious liquidity problems 
confronted by enterprises throughout the year, which resulted in unusually high levels of evasion; the 
effects of the natural disasters; and the erosion of the tax base stemming from a significant transfer of 
legally constituted economic activities to the so-called informal sector of the economy. 
Among the various taxes, the only one whose yield did not decline in real terms was that on 
fuels (although even so the envisaged collection level was not attained). This was due to the fact that 
between February and September the price of 84-octane gasoline was maintained at the equivalent of 
US$ 1.10 per gallon. The great speed with which revenue from this tax has grown in recent years has 
caused it to increase from 11% of the government's tax revenue in 1981 to 20% in 1983. This 
dynamism was in contrast with the behaviour of real receipts on account of income tax,28 for these 
dropped by one-third and were one-fourth less than the budgeted amount. Thus, in 1983 they were 
equivalent to only 30% of those obtained three years earlier. 
In the field of foreign trade, there were also big reductions in receipts. Taxes on imports 
contracted 29% in real terms, mainly due to a drop in the level of purchases from the exterior, even 
though the surcharge of 15% on customs tariffs in effect in 1982 was replaced by a surcharge 
equivalent to 10% of the CIF value (with the result that the effective coefficient of customs receipts 
remained in 1983 at the same 20% level of the preceding year). Likewise, export taxes contracted in 
real terms for the third consecutive year, this time by 61%, so that they were equal to only one-
seventh of those collected in 1980. This resulted from both a reduction in sales to the exterior and the 
elimination in July —when the process of their gradual quarterly reductions was concluded— of taxes 
on exports of minerals and petroleum. 
The public austerity programme caused a real contraction in government expenditure for the 
third time in a row, so that it stood at a level 14% below that attained in 1980. It was capital 
expenditure, however, which suffered the sharpest reductions, just as in 1982; in fact, it contracted 
20%, compared with a reduction of 2% in current expenditure. As a result, capital expenditure in 
1983 amounted to only 16% of total government expenditure, as against a budgeted 20%. The 
coefficient thus obtained was not only lower than its typical value in previous years (22 or 23%), but 
also stood even below the figure of 17% attained during the 1977-1978 economic crisis. 
There were various major reasons for this sudden fall in investment expenditure. Firstly, cuts in 
capital expenditure offered a much more rapid and expedite way of bringing the level of fiscal 
expenditure in line with the amount of resources available. Secondly, there was a delay in external 
credit disbursements, resulting from a delay in payment of the required national counterparts. 
Finally, the natural disasters caused considerable delays in the fulfilment of the time schedules for 
investment projects in the affected areas. Thus, investment expenditure of the central government 
dropped from 3.9% to 3% of the gross domestic product; for the public sector as a whole, the 
corresponding decline with respect to the gross domestic product was from 10.3 % to 7.9%. The areas 
most affected by restrictions were irrigation, highways and rural development, in contrast with an 
increase in the share of resources intended for the energy and mining sector and, especially, for 
housing. In the first case, the main projects were those involving hydroelectric power stations 
(Restitución, Carhuaquero), the regional electric system of Cuzco, the Mantaro-Pachachaca-
Callahuanca transmission line, and the Tintaya mine and concentrating plant. As regards investment 
in housing, during 1983 more than 30 building programmes were implemented at the national level 
as part of the National Housing Plan, 1981-1985. 
In contrast with the evolution of the central government accounts, the deficit of public 
enterprises declined from 4.5 % to 3 % of the gross domestic product between 1982 and 1983, due to 
the improved situation in some of them. In the cases of Petroperu and Mineroperu, the high 
28 The change in the legislation regarding income tax and wage tax was the most important event in the field of taxation during the year. 
It consisted of entirely separating the two taxes —instead of considering the latter as a partial payment on account of the former— and increasing 
the tax scale. The system in force in 1982, in turn, had been the result of a change introduced at the end of 1981. 
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Table 28 
PERU: CENTRAL GOVERNMENT OPERATION 
A. Total income 
1. Current income 
a) Tax revenue 
Income tax 














Other tax revenue 
Less: credit documents 
b) Non-tax revenue0 
c) Own resources 
and transfers 
2. Capital income 
B. Total expenditure 
1. Current expenditure 
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2. Capital expenditure 
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Source: Central Reserve Bank of Peru. 
"Preliminary figures. Mainly tax reimbursements for non-traditional exports, 
notes. cMainly property income, fines and deductions from pensions. 
tax capitalization and tax payment promissory 
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devaluation rate considerably increased their export earnings, while at the same time their capital 
expenditure decreased. In addition, Petroperus earnings from domestic sales also increased, in spite 
of a lower turnover, due to the dynamic price policy.29 On the other hand, the situation of the ENCI and 
ECASA enterprises30 did not show significant variations, in spite of the price increases decreed: at the 
end of 1983 the sales prices for ENCI covered 87% of its costs (against 72% in 1982) and those for 
ECASA covered 78% of costs (against 59% the year before). 
During the year, debates continued on the draft law regarding the role of the State as 
entrepreneur and its scope. These discussions have now been going on for five ordinary legislative 
sessions. The lack of a decision on this matter has been due, on the one hand, to the difficulty of 
arriving at a diagnosis of the real situation in the sector, and on the other, to the serious 
disagreements between the different political parties over its future reorganization, although there is 
consensus in relation to the origins of the problem (excessive initial indedtedness, price controls 
applied without concurrent measures, poor administrative and financial management, high financial 
costs, low international prices, etc.). At all events, the great importance of this discussion may be 
appreciated from the weight that public enterprises have in the national economy: three public 
enterprises (Petroperú, Centromín and Electroperú) account for 9% of the gross domestic product; 
three-fourths of total placements in the financial system are in State banks; the 50 main non-financial 
public enterprises employ 100 000 persons; public enterprises control two-thirds of exports and one-
third of imports; and the 15 main public enterprises invoice 15% of total sales in the country. 
29 As mentioned above, between February and September the gasoline price remained at the equivalent of US$ 1.10 per gallon, and 
although in the last quarter its rate of increase dropped by half, this price showed a total growth of 150% during the year. The price of domestic 
kerosene increased 246% between the end of 1982 and the end of 1983, even though it was frozen in the last four months of the year. 




1. Recent economic trends: Introduction and summary 
During 1983, the gross domestic product grew by approximately 4%, which was one of the 
highest rates in the region. This increase was primarily due to the expansion in mining and 
construction —particularly residential construction— and, to a lesser degree, to the growth in crop-
farming output for domestic consumption. Nevertheless, the economy continued to come under 
strong pressure, which was intensified by the effects of the adjustment programme instituted by the 
authorities in an attempt to lessen the fiscal and external imbalances. During the final quarter, these 
pressures culminated in a great deal of instability on the exchange market, which had an adverse 
effect on economic activity (see table 1 and figure 1). 
The country's current difficulties are partly the result of the historical behaviour patterns of the 
Dominican economy and of the nature of its insertion in the international market. Between 1970 and 
1977 the national economy showed great dynamism (the average annual rate of growth of the product 
reached 8%), helped along by the high level of both public and private investment and by favourable 
conditions on the external market. From 1978 onwards, however, external sales turned in a mixed 
performance, while imports rose sharply until 1980, at which point the trade deficit was nearly four 
times higher than in 1977. Moreover, unlike previous periods, production activity responded less 
strongly to the increase in exports which occurred during 1979-1981. 
The worsening external imbalance made it necessary to resort to increased borrowing. This, in 
turn, exacerbated the current account deficit as a result of the larger interest payments it involved, 
particularly in the last few years with the rise in interest rates. In addition, delays began to occur in the 
reimbursement of foreign banks for drafts and letters of credit; besides increasing the cost of making 
purchases abroad, because of the interest charged to importers, this limited and ultimately prevented 
the opening of new lines of credit. 
In response to this situation, the Central Bank placed increasing restrictions on the sale of 
foreign exchange and reduced the types of imports and payments that could be made at the official 
exchange rate. This pushed up the demand for foreign exchange on the parallel market and raised its 
price, although the rate of increase was moderate until 1981. 
Meanwhile, the growth of private investment, which had been rapid until 1977 (13% 
annually), slowed to 2% in 1978 and 1980, and decreased in 1981 and 1982. In 1979, however, a 
significant upturn had been brought about by the reconstruction work undertaken to repair the 
damage caused by hurricane David and tropical storm Frederick. 
This downward trend in private-sector capital formation was not offset by public investment 
because the administration which took office in mid-1978 found it necessary to opt for expanding 
current expenditure instead. Wages were raised after a long period of stagnation, and the number of 
workers on State payrolls was increased in order to ease unemployment. The rise in public spending 
resulted in growing fiscal deficits, which were at first financed with external credit and later, when the 
inflow of such loans slowed, through domestic borrowing. 
The State's lowered financial ability to intervene in the economy has had significant 
repercussions, in view of the important role it has played in the performance of the economy by 
creating physical infrastructure, offsetting the lack of private investment in some basic sectors, 
mitigating the effects of changes in external demand or prices, encouraging domestic activities, etc. 
The current government took office in mid-1982. Its immediate short-term policy was aimed at 
overcoming the critical situation which had arisen as a result of the growth in the external and fiscal 
deficits. Notwithstanding the austerity measures, which included the reduction of nominal wages in 
the public sector and a decrease in public investment, however, the current account deficit rose 10% 
that year and the budgetary deficit climbed 63% due to the sharpdrop in income, particularly export 
earnings. 
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In the first nine months of 1983, economic performance was quite good despite the external 
sector restrictions, as evidenced by the trends in some variables compared with the same period of 
1982. The gross domestic product grew 4% ' as a result of the development of construction, mining 
and agriculture; prices increased 5.5%, compared to 7.4% in 1982; the fiscal deficit was reduced by 
18%; and the deficit on the foreign trade in goods was slightly lower than during the same period of 
the preceding year. 
In addition, the due dates of the external debt owed in respect of delays in the payment of drafts 
and letters of credit which had mounted up over the two preceding years were renegotiated and, in 
January, an agreement was signed with the International Monetary Fund under the extended facility 
which included a credit of US$ 419 million, as well as US$ 48 million in compensatory financing. The 
conditions of that agreement were satisfactorily met on the whole, despite the high political and 
social costs of the adjustment policy that had to be undertaken, which affected the levels of real 
income and demand in broad sectors of the population. 
Table 1 
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS 
A. Basic economic indicators 
Gross domestic product at market 
prices (millions of 1970 dollars) 
Population (millions of inhabitants) 
Per capita gross domestic product 
(1970 dollars) 
B. Short-term economic indicators 
Gross domestic product 
Per capita gross domestic product 
Gross income 
Terms of trade (goods and services) 
Current value of exports of goods 
and services 




Variation between annual averages 
Money 
Current income of government 
Total expenditure of government 
Fiscal deficit/total expenditure of 
government17 
C. External sector 
Trade balance (goods and services) 
Balance on current account 
Balance on capital account 
Variation in net international reserves 

































































































































Source: ECLAC, on de basis of official data. 
"Preliminary figures. Gross domestic product plus terms-of-trade effect. "Percentages. 
'See Central Bank of the Dominican Republic, Informe de la economía dominicana, enero-septiembre de 1983y perspectivas. 
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The relatively favourable situation during the first nine months of the year both in terms of 
economic activity and the smaller deficits underwent a change in the final quarter as a result of the 
mounting pressure on the exchange rate. Until September, the price of the dollar on the parallel 
market had increased slowly up to a level of 1.60 pesos by the end of that month, which was only 7% 
higher than its price in December 1982. Despite the increasing volume of imports paid for with 
foreign exchange bought on the parallel market, the agreements concluded between the monetary 
authorities and representatives of exchange houses and commercial banks were successful in 
obviating a rapid rise of the dollar. 
By early October, however, the growing demand pressure on the price of foreign exchange 
could no longer be resisted. Therefore, as competition among the economic agents acting in the free 
exchange market escalated —primarily as a result of the reorganization of this market which was 
begun in 19822 the agreements which had maintained the exchange rate below its real value were 
broken, and the price jumped to 1.80 pesos and continued climbing until it reached nearly two 
Dominican pesos per dollar. 
In response to these circumstances, in mid-October the Central Bank suspended all transactions 
on the parallel market, prompting a flight of capital and great speculative activity, whose effects were 
compounded by the fact that finance capital had ceased to be placed in productive investments and 
was thus further pushing up the exchange rate. 
The monetary authorities attempted to ease the situation by intervening in the exchange 
market through the Reserve Bank and regulating the supply of foreign exchange in order to prevent 
sharp fluctuations in the exchange rate. In addition, business credit was restricted in order to decrease 
the amount of resources that were feeding speculation. 
These measures were not successful in moderating the rise in the dollar's value, however. The 
monetary authorities suspended transactions on the exchange market once again in November for a 
week and prohibited the exchange houses from operating. They later ordered that foreign exchange 
could only be purchased from the commercial banks to pay for imports and established a US$ 5 000 
limit per person per year for travel or remittances abroad. Moreover, a portion of the foreign 
exchange obtained from traditional exports which was handed over to the producers for imports of 
capital goods and inputs was provided in national currency. When the exchange market was re-
opened, the exchange rate declined, but only to a level which was still nearly 50% higher than the 
price at the end of September. 
The events of the final quarter slowed the pace of economic growth, for the increase in the 
exchange rate helped to make imported goods more expensive, thereby affecting manufacturing and 
business activity and raising domestic prices. The latter, which had increased by only 1% between 
December 1982 and September 1983, rose 7% during the last three months of the year. 
With respect to the balance of payments, even though the current account deficit was similar to 
that of the preceding year, the amortization of the debt, especially of short-term liabilities, caused the 
flow of net external financing to decrease by 11%. The net capital inflow was therefore insufficient to 
cover the deficit on the current account, forcing the authorities, as in 1982, to draw down 
international reserves, which were reduced by US$ 146 million. Finally, the fiscal deficit —which had 
been lower than during the preceding fiscal year until September— increased slightly and domestic 
credit had to be used to finance more than 60% of it. 
During 1983 the unemployment and underemployment situation continued to be serious, 
despite the fact that employment in absolute terms appears to have improved somewhat during the 
year thanks to the expansion of labour-intensive activities such as construction and agriculture. 
Nonetheless, the decline of nearly 5% in real wages, although at first it did no more than cause the 
virtual stagnation of per capita consumption, did more harm in the last quarter, when prices rose 
more rapidly. 
Although economic policy in 1983 was largely aimed at stabilizing and reorganizing the 
exchange market, measures designed to put the public finances on a sounder footing were also 
adopted. The most notable steps taken in this area were the establishment of a 6% levy on transfers 
2 In late 1982 the monetary authorities began to allow commercial banks tooperate on the open foreign exchange market. In May 1983, 
their role in the market increased as a result of the decision that only foreign currency acquired by companies from commercial banks could be 
taken into account for the purpose of income tax deductions. In addition, in August the Monetary Board ruled that exchange houses having a 
minimum of 300 000 Dominican pesos in subscribed and oaid-up capital were <o become exchange banks. 
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Figure 1 
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS 
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and imports of industrial goods and changes in income tax provisions. In order to strengthen and 
diversify external sales, exchange and fiscal incentives for non-traditional exports were increased, 
and credit concessions were used to spur the expansion of in-bond assembly industry in duty-free 
zones as a way of increasing employment and generating foreign exchange. Lastly, foreign 
investment was encouraged by raising the percentage of profits which could be repatriated from 10% 
to 25% and expanding the opportunities for the reinvestment of profits. 
2. Trends in economic activity 
a) Total supply and demand 
Total supply increased 3.8% in response to a very similar rise in the gross domestic product and 
a somewhat smaller increase in the volume of imports of goods and services. This trend was a 
departure from the preceding year, when total supply had declined slightly due to a sharp drop in the 
volume of imports of goods and services (18%), which the small increase in the product (2%) was 
not able to offset (see table 2). 
On the demand side, all the indicators showed an improvement. The volume of exports of 
goods and services climbed 4%, after having fallen 6% in 1982. Domestic gross investment and fixed 
gross investment also grew by approximately 4%, only partially making up for the decreases 
registered in 1981 and 1982. 
The upturn in investment was associated with the expansion of construction activity. The 
greater production activity was a factor in the moderate increase in private consumption as well. On 
the other hand, general government consumption expenditure showed a much smaller rise, in real 
terms, than in 1981 and 1982. 
b) Evolution of the main sectors 
The gross domestic product, by kind of economic activity, showed a significant upturn in the 
goods-producing sectors, which increased 6.6% as a group, after having stagnated in 1982. While all 
goods-producing activities expanded, the greatest growth was in mining and construction (30% and 
15%, respectively), whereas agriculture increased 4% and manufacturing grew less than 2% (see 
table 3). 
Basic services expanded 1.5%, despite the recovery in the supply of electricity, which had 
declined during the preceding year because a number of plants were under repair. The increase in 
transport, storage and communications was also only slight. 
Commerce likewise displayed little momentum during the year, and the same was true of other 
services with the exception of real estate, which increased 5%, and the financial, insurance and 
business services sector, which maintained the dynamism it had shown over the past three years 
(4%). 
/') The agricultural sector. The agricultural product rose 4% in 1983 as a result of the 8% 
increase in crop-farming production for domestic consumption and the 5% expansion in livestock 
production, which more than made up for the 1% drop in export crops (see table 4). 
The Government continued to give its main support to agricultural production destined for 
domestic consumption. The support prices for maize and sorghum were raised midway through the 
year, credit was allocated through the Banco Agrícola, and special support programmes were 
instituted for the production of certain crops, primarily maize, sorghum and rice. These measures 
fostered increases of 19% and 12% in the maize and rice crops, which made it possible to reduce 
imports of the former and to eliminate those of the latter. 
The rest of the products for domestic consumption turned in a mixed performance. Bean 
production rose 4%, as compared to 12% during the preceding year, and the output of taro and 
plantains —staple foods— decreased 13% and 9%, respectively. 
Production for export, which had already begun to decline in 1982, decreased further. Of the 
four main products of this type, three showed decreases and the only increase was in coffee production 
(7%), which had already grown considerably in 1982. These increases brought production to slightly 
higher levels than those attained prior to the 1979 hurricane. 
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Table 2 
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: TOTAL SUPPLY AND DEMAND 
Total supply 
Gross domestic product at 
market prices 




Gross domestic investment 









Exports of goods and 
services 
Millions of dollars 























































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of data supplied by the Central Bank or the Dominican Republic. 
"Preliminary figures., '"The figures for exports and imports of goods and services correspond to the balance-of-payments figures, which 
were converted to constant 1970 values using price indexes calculated by ECLAC. 
Table 3 
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT, 
BY KIND OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITY 







Electricity, gas and water 




Ownership of dwellings 
Community, social and 
personal services 
Government services 
Millions of dollars 



























































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of data supplied by the Central Bank of the Dominican Republic. 
"Preliminary figures. At factor cost. As the individual activities and the totals were calculated independently, the sum of the former 




DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: INDICATORS OF 
AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION 
Index of agricultural 
production (1970 = 100) 
Crop farming 
For export 
For domestic consumption 
Stock-raising 























































































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of data supplied by the Central Bank of the Dominican Republic. 
"Preliminary figures. fcThe growth rates correspond to the totals, and not to the rounded figures. 
'Thousands of tons. ''Thousands of bunches. 'Thousands of litres. 
Sugar cane production dropped 2%. A reduction of 9% had been programmed due to the 
increase in stocks resulting from the excellent harvests of 1981 and 1982 and from external market 
conditions. However, the quota for sugar exports to the United States was raised. ' 
The tobacco yield was hurt by the reappearance of blue mould, and production dropped once 
again, but this time only by 2%, which was much less than in 1982 (39%). 
The decline in international cocoa prices which had begun in 1980 was a contributory factor in 
the producers' neglect of the plantations and the damage done to output as a result. Despite the fact 
that prices began to recover, production fell 6%. 
As regards livestock production, pork output jumped 47%, though it still did not exceed the 
mark of 2 000 tons slaughtered annually. The restocking programme was continued, thanks to which 
pig stocks are being brought back to the level they had before they were hit by fever outbreaks in 1978 
and 1979. Nevertheless, it was not until 1983 that a greater domestic supply of maize and sorghum, 
which must be supplemented by imports, was made available for this programme. 
The 6% growth in cattle slaughtering was less than in previous years and reflected the 26% 
drop in beef exports to the United States. Milk production maintained the slow rate of growth seen in 
recent years —around 2%— which has made it necessary to import powdered milk. In order to deal 
'Due to some countries non-fulfilment of their quotas, 50 000 tons of sugar were reassigned, 18 000 of which were allocated to the 
Dominican Republic. 
607 
with this situation, programmes were implemented to provide support for milk producers and to 
encourage forage production and storage. 
Agricultural policy continued to assign priority to production for domestic consumption, 
although because of the public sector's limited resources, credits from the Banco Agrícola were kept to 
the same level as the preceding year. As part of the support policy for non-traditional exports (which 
include a large number of agricultural products), exporters were authorized to receive the total 
amount of foreign exchange earned from their sales abroad: quite different treatment from that 
applied to traditional exporters, who receive only a part of the value of their exports in foreign 
currency. 
ii) Mining. In keeping with the uneven performance of mining during recent years, in 1983 the 
gross domestic product generated by this activity climbed 30%, after having dropped by a similar 
amount in 1982 (see table 5). 
One factor in this recovery was ferronickel production, which rose from 14 000 tons to 54 000 
tons after production returned to normal levels in October 1982 thanks to the reopening of a 
ferronickel plant which had been closed for nine months. It should be noted that the recovery in the 
international price for this mineral is still not sufficient to cover this plant's operating costs. The 
industry has not been working at full capacity in recent years. 
Bauxite production has been stopped until 1986 because it has been rendered unprofitable by 
the sharp drop in international prices. For their part, gold and silver mining fell 8% and 40%, 
respectively, despite the fact that international prices improved in 1983. 
In 1983 the measure taken in 1971 declaring mineral reserves to be State property and 
prohibiting the private sector from undertaking exploration was revoked. 
iii) Manufacturing. The growth rate of manufacturing fell from 5% to less than 2% between 
1982 and 1983- The output of the large food processing industry went down slightly, as sugar mill 
production dropped off by 6% and the growth of the grain milling industry slowed. In contrast, rice-
milling output rose 12% and coffee processing increased 7% (see table 6). 
Beverage production climbed 7%, primarily due to the higher beer output (16%), since rum 
production showed no major change. The output of the tobacco manufacturing industry, for its part, 
fell by 5%; this was apparently caused by a drop in domestic demand brought on by the increase in 
prices, which was in turn due to the higher taxes imposed on these products. 
Construction-related industries showed substantial dynamisn during the year. The production 
of reinforcing rods jumped 42%, cement output climbed 16% and that of paint rose 8%. Production 
dropped in the consumer durables manufacturing and assembly industries, however, which had 
difficulty in importing parts and raw materials. 
A variety of economic policy measures taken during the year had implications for 
manufacturing. Thus, while the ban on imports of a number of goods helped domestic production, 
Table 5 
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: INDICATORS OF MINING PRODUCTION 
Index of mining 
production' (1975 = 





























































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of data supplied by che Central Bank of the Dominican Republic. 
"Preliminary figures. The growth rates correspond to unrounded figures. ' Based on the product ion of bauxite, ferronickel, gold 




DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: INDICATORS OF MANUFACTURING PRODUCTION 
Index of manufacturing 
production (1970 = 100) 




Other manufacturing industries 





















































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of data supplied by the Central Bank of the Dominican Republic. 
"Preliminary figures. 'Thousands of tons. 'Millions of litres. Millions of packets. 
'Millions of 42.5 kg sacks. -'Thousands of quintals. "Millions of kWh. 
other measures such as the one laying down that many goods can only be imported by using dollars 
obtained on the parallel market made the inputs and intermediate goods for industry more expensive. 
The industrial development policy applied by the Government during 1983 tended to 
encourage the growth of the in-bond assembly industry in the duty-free zones. These enterprises 
were provided with financing through the established banks in the country; the Investment Fund for 
Economic Development (FIDE) approved credits for constructing industrial parks and for the 
industries set up in them; and, lastly, the creation of two new duty-free zones was authorized in the 
provinces of Azúa and Barahona. By 1983 there were 88 companies in the duty-free zones of Santiago, 
San Pedro de Macon's and La Romana, providing around 19 000 jobs. These plants grew rapidly 
during the 1975-1979 period, but lagged somewhat as from 1980 and virtually stagnated in 1982. 
iv) Construction. The value added by construction was 15% higher in 1983, thus representing 
an excellent recovery from the drop of the year before. The increases in public investment in housing 
construction contributed to that upturn. The National Housing Institute (INVI) put into operation a 
plan for the construction of about 17 000 dwellings, of which 1 911 were completed in 1983, the great 
majority of them in the city of Santo Domingo. The private sector, through mortgage associations, 
also participated actively in housing construction, mainly to satisfy the demand of middle- and high-
income sectors (see table 7). 
In addition, the public sector continued to urge forward the construction of infrastructure 
works. The major agricultural works were irrigation and drainage projects in the area served by the 
Valdesia Dam, and one of the canals was virtually completed. A total of 300 kilometres of highways 
were also constructed, including one joining Azúa and Barahona, as were approximately 1 000 
kilometres of secondary roads. As part of the project to expand and improve the port of Haina, the 
docks on the east bank were completed. 
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3. The external sector 
The balance-of-payments current account deficit remained as high in 1983 as it had been in the 
preceding year, i.e., approximately US$ 450 million, which was equivalent to 37% of the exports of 
goods and services. It should be noted, however, that in 1980 this deficit had reached US$ 670 million, 
which was equivalent to 53% of total exports. 
The persistence of this negative balance was due to the fact that interest payments on the 
external debt, which account for a quarter of export earnings, rose 18% during the year; in contrast, 
the trade deficit was reduced by 11%. 
The net capital inflow has diminished by 60% over the last three years; in 1983 it dropped 11%, 
and US$ 146 million of the international reserves therefore had to be used to cover the imbalance on 
the current account. The reserves had already been drawn down by US$ 160 million in 1982. 
The drop in the prices of most agricultural exports and ferronickel was only just offset by the 
higher prices for cocoa, gold and silver, with the result that the unit value of exports rose less than 1 % 
in 1983; even so, this was a considerable achievement after the sharp decline of the preceding year. 
Moreover, since the prices of imports decreased nearly 2%, the terms of trade improved by slightly 
over 2% and this helped to bring about the 3.7% growth in the purchasing power of exports which 
was registered in 1983 (see table 8). 
The high and persistent external deficit shook the stability of the exchange market, especially 
towards the end of the year. It should be remembered that the official exchange rate was set at one 
peso to the dollar in 1962 and that subsequently, in response to the placing of limitations on the sale 
of foreign exchange for travel abroad, a parallel market emerged on which the exchange rate was very 
close to the official level. In 1964, in an attempt to regulate the inflow of foreign exchange from 
exports, a law was passed making it mandatory to hand over to the Central Bank all foreign currency 
earned by any means. The outflow of foreign currency for imports, service payments, dividends, the 
amortization of loans, etc., also had to have the approval of the Central Bank. In 1967, restrictions 
were placed on imports, the bringing in of some luxury goods was prohibited and quotas were 
established for others. Later on, imports of the merchandise which had been banned were authorized, 
provided that foreign currency obtained outside the official market was used for this purpose: thus, 
the parallel market was not only acknowledged and tolerated, but its scope was also expanded. The 
free exchange rate in that year was 1.10 pesos to the dollar. 
Since that time, the exchange rate on the parallel market has risen to 1.60 pesos to the dollar 
(1983), which is very close to its real parity (adjusted for the variation in domestic prices, less 
imported inflation). Betwen 1972 and 1977, however, the two rates began to diverge, and in 1977 the 
free exchange rate reached the point where it was 18% below the real rate. This widening gap 
between the two exchange rates was possible so long as the Central Bank supplied foreign exchange 
Table 7 
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: CONSTRUCTION INDICATORS 
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Source: ECLAC, on the basis of data supplied by the Central Bank of the Dominican Republic. 
"Preliminary figures. Building permits granted. ^Thousands of tons. Millions of 42.5 kg sacks. 
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Source: ECLAC, on the basis of data supplied by the Central Bank of the Dominican Republic. 
"Preliminary figures. 
to pay for most transactions. In 1975, however, the supply of foreign exchange at the official price 
began to be restricted, and the volume of imports paid for with dollars from the parallel market 
increased. In 1978 the restrictions were tightened as the current account deficit grew, and the price of 
the dollar on the free market neared the real rate (see table 9). 
During 1983 the amount of imports paid for with foreign currency from the parallel market 
grew. Nevertheless, the price of the dollar rose scarcely 1% between December 1982 and September 
1983, due to the agreements in effect between the Central Bank and those offering foreign exchange 
on the free market. It seemed clear that the exchange rate could not be maintained at the agreed-upon 
level, however, and in October and November alone it climbed from 1.60 to 1.87 pesos per dollar 
(17%). 
a) Merchandise trade 
i) Exports. In 1983, exports of goods recovered slightly from the steep drop (35 %) of the year 
before. The small upturn (2 % ) resulted from minimal improvements in both sales volume and prices 
(see table 10). 
Ferronickel exports grew by a factor of 3.4 in 1983, but even so they did not make a complete 
recovery from the heavy fall suffered the preceding year. Sugar exports, which account for one-third 
of total export income, were largely unchanged during the year, as was also true of gold and silver 
exports (21% of the total), whereas coffee exports declined 16%. Of the remaining exports, cocoa 
rose 5% and tobacco increased only 2%, while molasses diminished 41% and no bauxite was 
exported. The noteworthy recovery of ferronickel exports was due to the fact that production 
conditions were brought back to normal with the resumption of operations in the plant which had 
been closed. In contrast, gold and silver exports showed no major variation during 1983, even though 
their average sale prices rose 11 % and 46% respectively. Moreover, the mining of bauxite ceased and 
exports of this mineral were suspended as a result of the drop in its price on external markets.. 
Due to the reassignment of part of the United States import quota for sugar, the volume of 
Dominican sugar exports grew 10%; nonetheless, since the average sale price decreased by a similar 
amount, the value of exports declined slightly. The reduction in coffee exports, for its part, resulted 
from a 4% drop in prices and a 12% decrease in the volume exported, the latter being due to a 
reduction of 146 000 60 -kilogramme bags in the quota assigned to the country by the International 
Coffee Organization. Furthermore, exports of roasted coffee, which had already dropped by one-third 
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Table 9 
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: EVOLUTION OF THE EXCHANGE RATE 





































Source: Central Bank of the Dominican Republic; International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics. 
"1970 exchange rate on the parallel market, extrapolated on the basis of the index of the ratio of domestic prices in the Dominican Republic and 
the United States. 
Table 10 
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: EXPORTS OF GOODS, FOB 




1981 1982 1983" 1975 1980 1983° 1980 1981 1982 1983° 
Total 1 188 768 783 100.0 100.0 100.0 10.7 23.5 -35.4 2.0 








747 477 451 78.7 50.1 57.6 -8.0 54.9 -36.1 -5. 







































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of data supplied by the Central Bank of the Dominican Republic. 




DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: IMPORTS OF GOODS, FOB 
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Source: ECLAC, on the basis of data supplied by the Central Bank of the Dominican Republic. 
"Preliminary figures. The percentage breakdown and growth rates correspond to the actual rather than the rounded-off 
figures. cNot including adjustments of coverage. 
in 1982, ceased almost entirely in 1983, mainly as a result of its loss of competitiveness against other 
suppliers of semi-roasted coffee to the Puerto Rican market. 
The rise in cocoa exports was linked to the higher price of this product (18%), while the 
increase in tobacco sales stemmed from the larger amount exported (12%). 
In 1983 an effort was made to further the policy of providing incentives for non-traditional 
exports, especially agro-industrial products, which had been in effect since late 1979.4 A total of 86 
crop-farming products were made entirely exempt from the requirement of surrendering foreign-
currency export revenue to the Central Bank; until that time, approximately half of such earnings had 
to be handed over. Producers of containers for non-traditional exports were allowed to operate under 
the temporary importation system, and procedures were simplified so that exporters of non-
traditional products could obtain the foreign exchange corresponding to them for the granting of Tax 
Allowance Certificates with a view to allowing them to benefit from other export incentives. 
With respect to traditional exports, in October gold, silver and doré were added to the list of 
products eligible for Exchange Allowance Certificates (CAC).5 These certificates were eliminated in 
November when the Export Clearing Fund entered into operation. Through this Fund, exporters of 
raw sugar, molasses, green and semi-toasted coffee beans, cocoa beans, oil cake, cocoa butter and 
liquor, raw tobacco, gold and silver receive a sum in national currency equivalent to a percentage of 
the value of their exports FOB; that percentage is 20% for raw sugar and tobacco and 10% for the 
other products. The amount in national currency is calculated on the basis of the average exchange 
rate on the parallel market during the six-month period preceding the surrender date of the foreign 
exchange, taking total exports into account. 
ii) Imports. After having decreased approximately 17% in value and 22% in volume during 
the two-year period 1981-1982, there were small increases of slightly over 3% in the value and nearly 
5% in the volume of imports of goods in 1983 (see table 11). 
In contrast with the significant increase in imports of consumer goods (25%), imports of raw 
material and intermediate goods decreased and those of capital goods rose only 5%. The rapid growth 
in imports of consumer goods was essentially due to the purchase of foodstuffs, and especially grain 
imports, which increased by nearly 70% and came to US$ 54 million. Milk and oilseed imports also 
rose substantially (50% and 25%. respectively). 
4This policy includes the exemption of temporary imports from duties and taxes, the granting ofTax Allowance Certificates (CAT), and 
total or partial exemption from the requirement of surrendering foreign exchange export earnings to the Central Bank. 
'The Exchange Allowance Certificates were created in November 1982 with the object of supplying the exporters of major traditional 
export products with the foreign exchange they needed to acquire capital goods and imported inputs. These certificates could be exchanged for 
foreign currency, and were issued for the equivalent of 10% to 20% of the FOB export value, depending on the product. 
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The decrease in imports of intermediate goods and raw materials is attributable to products ' 
other than oil and fuels, since purchases of the latter rose slightly in 1983. Under the heading of oil 
and fuels, which accounts for over one-third of total imports, the volume of purchases of crude and 
reconstituted petroleum (which make up three-fourths of this category) climbed 20%. That growth is 
explained by the reopening of the ferronickel plant, whose oil purchases trebled; in contrast, the 
volume imported by the Dominican Oil Refinery, which accounts for 84% of external crude oil 
purchases, only increased 4%. 
Growth in capital goods imports reflected the slight upturn in investment. Imports of 
machinery and electrical materials and equipment were 3% higher whereas those of transport 
equipment, including private automobiles, fell almost 25%; this coincided with the rise in the 
exchange rate on the open foreign exchange market, which made such imports more expensive. 
With the exception of petroleum and petroleum products, imports of intermediate goods went 
down for the third year running. A large part of these goods, which had previously been imported 
using foreign exchange at the official rate, were transferred to the free market category and, with that 
change, their prices rose. This fact, in combination with the slow growth of economic activity, partly 
accounts for the steep decline of these imports. 
The policy of containing imports initiated several years before continued to be applied strictly 
during 1983. The ban on imports of a long list of articles was maintained, and in September other 
goods were added to that list. Nevertheless, in November the ban on automobile imports was 
temporarily lifted, subject to the following conditions: purchases had to be paid for with the 
importers' foreign-currency holdings in foreign banks, import duties had to be paid before 
31 December, and total imports were not to exceed US$ 25 million. 
In addition, the list of goods for which the Central Bank would not supply foreign exchange 
continued to be expanded. Pursuant to the agreement with the International Monetary Fund, US$ 40 
million corresponding to payment for imports was transferred to the parallel market, and a further 
US$ 15 million was transferred in each of the three remaining quarters. 
Lastly, the 10% value added tax on imports which had been established late in the preceding 
year was replaced by a 6% tax on imports of manufactures. Furthermore, it was stipulated that in the 
case of merchandise paid for with foreign exchange from the parallel market, tax would be calculated 
on the basis of th exchange rate at which the foreign exchange had been bought rather than the 
official rate, as had traditionally been done. 
b) Real services and factor payments 
The tourism surplus climbed from US$ 180 million in 1982 to US$ 250 million in 1983, since 
the outflow in respect of travel abroad fell 12 %. The higher price of the dollar on the parallel market 
and the deterioration of income as a result of the recession have caused the number of trips abroad and 
the amount spent on such travel to decrease gradually since 1981 (see table 12). 
Furthermore, there was an increase of approximately 10% in the number of travellers arriving 
by air from the United States, which is the country of origin of roughly 75 % of foreign visitors; these 
travellers also spend more than the other tourists. Visits by Dominicans residing abroad also rose 
(6%), although the rate of increase was slightly less than in the preceding year and substantially 
lower than in 1981 (35%). On the other hand, the number of tourists arriving by cruise ship 
continued to decline (33%); however, the amount spent by these travellers while in the country is 
estimated at under US$ 20 per day, and the drop in the number of such visitors therefore only 
represented a decrease of slightly less than US$ 1 million in income from tourism. 
The construction of six hotels was completed and another was expanded during the year, thus 
raising hotel capacity by 716 rooms. Of this, 72% is located in Puerto Plata, 24% in San Pedro de 
Macorís and only 4% in the capital city. 
Net factor payments climbed 18% as a result of an increase of similar proportions in interest 
payments on the external debt, which amounted to US$ 304 million, or a quarter of total exports of 
goods and services. 
Finally, private transfer payments, which are mainly made up of remittances sent by 





DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: BALANCE OF PAYMENTS 
(Millions of dollars) 
Balance on current account 
Trade balance 
Exports of goods and services 
Goods FOB 
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Total variation in reserves 
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Source: 1977-1982; International Monetary Fund, Balance ojPayments Yearbook (March 1984, magnetic tape); 1983: ECLAC, on the basis of 
official data. 
"Preliminary figures. ''Real services also include other official and private transactions, but not factor services. cIn addition to 
loans received and amortization payments made, this entry includes net loans granted and other assets and liabilities. The global 
balance is the sum of the current account balance plus the balance on capital account. The difference between total variation in reserves (of 
opposite sign) and the global balance represents counterpart items; monetizationofgold, allocation of Special Drawing Rights and variations 
due to revaluation. 
615 
c) The current account position and its financing 
The 1983 current account deficit was US$ 454 million, an amount similar to that of the 
preceding year. It was equivalent to 37% of exports of goods and services and 5% of the gross 
domestic product (in 1982, these figures were 40% and 6%, respectively). 
Net capital inflow has dwindled rapidly since 1980. In 1983, this revenue totalled only US$ 276 
million, which was 11 % less than the year before. The net inflow of long-term capital nearly doubled, 
reaching its highest level in the last five years, but in contrast, there was a net outflow of short-term 
capital of US$ 255 million, mainly attributable to commercial banks (US$ 271 million) and, to a 
lesser extent, to the public sector (US$ 97 million) (see table 12). 
The flow of external credit to the public sector rose substantially during the year (84%), 
increasing much more than amortization payments, so that the net flow was nearly double the 1982 
level. 
The smaller net inflow of capital in 1983 was once again not enough to cover the current 
account deficit, thus forcing the authorities to draw down international reserves for the second year in 
a row —this time, by US$ 146 million. This involved a US$ 12 million reduction in the gold reserves 
and the use of an International Monetary Fund loan for US$ 176 million. However, foreign exchange 
holdings climbed US$ 34 million and reserves in the International Monetary Fund grew by US$ 8 
million. 
d) External indebtedness 
During 1983 the total external debt increased by 32 % to a year-end figure of US$ 2 570 million, 
which was two-thirds more than it had been at the end of the preceding decade. The expansion of the 
debt was due largely to the substantial disbursement of long-term external credit to the public sector, 
which was 90% greater than in 1982. This brought the external public debt to US$ 2 230 million in 
December, or 87% of the total debt. In contrast, the private debt was reduced during the year. The 
total debt with a term of over one year rose by 40%, while short-term credit decreased by 16% (see 
table 13). 
Table 13 
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: EXTERNAL INDEBTEDNESS 
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983° 
Millions of dollars 
Total external debt 
Balance 
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Source: ECLAC, on the basis of data supplied by the Central Bank of the Dominican Republic. 




DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: EVOLUTION OF DOMESTIC PRICES 
Consumer price index 
Food 
Consumer price index 
Food 
1978 1979 1980 
Variation December to December 
8.8 25.6 4.6 
11.2 32.6 -4.3 
Variation between annual averages 
7.1 9.2 16.8 
















Source: ECLAC, on the basis of data supplied by the Central Bank of the Dominican Republic. 
°November-to-November variation. 'Variation January-November with respect to the same period of the preceding year. 
The considerable inflow of long-term external capital was linked to the partial renegotiation of 
the debt. The 11 % decrease in the amount of debt service and the sharp rise in disbursements (75 %) 
meant that there was a surplus of over US$ 300 million, and this eased the pressure on the balance of 
payments. In 1981 and 1982, amortization and interest payments had exceeded loan disbursements. 
Although the ratio between the external debt and the gross domestic product rose from 25% in 
1982 to nearly 30% in 1983, the extension of its due dates brought down the ratio between the debt 
service and total exports from approximately 60% to 50%. 
As regards medium- and long-term external financing for the public sector, 53% was obtained 
through debt renegotiation, 23% came from the International Monetary Fund and about 13% was 
supplied by credits from the Agency for International Development (US$ 22 million), the Inter-
American Development Bank (US$ 44 million), the Banco Exterior de España (US$ 27 million) and 
the Commodity Credit Corporation (US$ 18 million). 
Early in the year, an Extended Facility agreement was signed with the International Monetary 
Fund for US$ 419 million over a three-year term, as well as another agreement for US$ 48 million in 
compensatory financing. These credits, plus the liabilities already pending, brought total 
conmmitments to the Fund to nearly US$ 250 million. 
In September 1983, renegotiations were completed with the private banking system in respect 
of US$ 565 million of the external debt which was to fall due in 1983. Short-term liabilities accounted 
for 82% of the rescheduled debt and nearly two-thirds of the renegotiated amount was to be used to 
make good the Central Bank's delays in reimbursing foreign banks for letters of credit and drafts 
issued to pay for imports. The debt renegotiation was for a six-year term, with a two-year grace 
period, at an interest rate of 2 1/4 points over LIBOR or 2 1/8 points over the prime rate, plus a once-
only commission of 1 1/4%. 
4. Prices, wages and employment 
In 1983 the variation in the nation's consumer price index on the basis of annual averages was 5%, 
which was less than the year before (8%). When figured on a December-to-December basis, the 
variation rose to 7.6% due to the steeper increases occurring in the fourth quarter (see table 14). 
In the period up to the end of September, prices rose at a rate of 0.1% per month, and they 
actually declined during four of those nine months; during the last three months of 1983, however, 
they rose at a pace of 2.2% per month. This acceleration stemmed from the higher exchange rate on 
the free foreign exchange market, which had a decisive effect on the costs and prices of manufactured 
goods. 
As a result of the good supply of the main agricultural products which was available for 
domestic consumption, food prices rose less than did those of other products. The price index for 
clothing increased more rapidly, especially towards the end of the year. Housing rents, however, rose 
less than 2% in 1983 whereas they had increased 5% in 1982. The price of a gallon of gasoline 
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dropped 27 centavos in April (11%) and urban transport fares decreased 5 centavos (33%), thus 
helping to slow the increase in prices. 
Minimum wages have remained unchanged since mid-1974. In real terms, they slipped 5 % in 
1983, and real wages have declined 22% since 1973 (see table 15). 
The public sector's employment and wage policy was made more flexible in 1983. The staff was 
expanded slightly, and wage increases were granted to civil servants working in the judiciary branch 
and in the departments of income tax, internal revenue and the Customs. 
Additionally, in order to promote greater use of manpower in private companies, a law was 
passed authorizing a deduction of 100 pesos per month from companies' taxable income for each new 
job created. 
The problems of unemployment and underemployment continued to be serious. According to a 
survey taken in February 1983, the unemployment rate in the city of Santo Domingo was 21.4% of 
the economically active population, which was a slight increase over the 20.7% level recorded in June 
1980. In absolute terms, the number of unemployed in the capital city amounted to 107 200 workers in 
1983, or 21 000 people more than in 1980. 
5. Monetary and fiscal policy 
a) Monetary policy 
In 1983, as in the previous year, monetary and financial policies were primarily directed 
towards halting the drop in international reserves and reducing the fiscal deficit. During the final 
months of the year, however, attention shifted to the adoption of measures for lessening the 
pronounced imbalances in the exchange market. 
Thus, the list of prohibited imports continued to be expanded, stiff restrictions were placed on 
the kinds of products that could be imported using dollars bought at the official exchange rate, and a 
limit of US$ 5 000 per person per year was set for the sale of foreign exchange for travel or 
remittances abroad. As a result of the transfer of imported goods to the parallel foreign exchange 
market which has been carried out in recent years, in 1983 nearly 6 0 % of imports were paid for with 
foreign exchange bought at the free rate. In order to increase supply, the authorities gave more and 
more exporters of non-traditional goods the chance to receive the value of their sales abroad, either 
totally or partially, in foreign currency. 
The basic objectives of the exchange measures were to reorganize the market, to stop the rise of 
the dollar, and to prevent speculation and the flight of capital. Some of the most important measures 
were the conversion of the exchange houses into exchange banks; the role assumed by the Reserve 
Bank in the parallel market in order to regulate the supply and demand of foreign exchange; and the 
extension of exchange concessions to commercial banks, which began to operate in the open foreign 
exchange market as from 1982. 
Table 15 
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: EVOLUTION OF WAGES 
1980 1981 1982 1983 
Indexes (1978 = 100) 
125.0 125.0 125.0 125.0 
98.1 91.2 84.7 80.6 
Growth rates 
11.1 
-4.8 -7_0 -7_1 -48 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official data. 
aAverage minimum wages. 
Wages and salaries" 
Nominal 
Real 
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Source: ECLAC, on the basis of data supplied by the Central Bank of the Dominican Republic. 
aPreliminary figures. 
The persistence of the balance-of-payments current account deficit and the diminishing flow of 
capital were once again the main limitations on the money supply. Net international reserves 
declined steadily until November, and by the end of that month they registered a negative balance of 
over US$ 570 million. When the year had almost come to an end the deficit was reduced to US$ 308 
million, however, thanks to the renegotiation of the external debt. 
In view of the lack of external resources to finance public-sector activity, the authorities 
resorted, as in previous years, to borrowing from the banks, and this form of indebtedness climbed 
22%. Domestic credit expanded 17%, and about 80% of this increase in credit went to the public 
sector. It is noteworthy that, during the period 1977-1983, the average annual increase in credit to the 
Government (26%) exceeded that received by the private sector (8%). As a result, the latter sector's 
share of total credit fell from 65% in 1977 to 42% in 1983 (see table 16). 
The money supply grew only 7% during the year; this was 4% less than in 1982 (11%), and 
also four points less than the increase in the gross domestic product at current values. The amount of 
currency outside banks climbed 16% whereas demand deposits dwindled by 2%, the drop being 
particularly noticeable in December. 
Savings and time deposits grew by 11%, which was less than in 1981 and 1982 (19% and 14%, 
respectively). In contrast, long-term foreign borrowing —which had increased scarcely 3% up to 
November— nearly doubled as a result of the renegotiation of the debt. 
b) Fiscal policy 
In observance of the agreement signed with the International Monetary Fund, a strict policy 
restraining government spending was followed during the year. Together with the expansion of tax 
revenue, this was aimed at reducing the fiscal deficit, and this purpose was achieved. Even though the 
1983 deficit was slightly higher than that of the preceding year, in relation to the gross domestic 
product it fell to 3.4% compared with the 1982 figure of 3.7%. 
The situation worsened in the final quarter of 1983 because the growth rate of income slowed. 
The rate of current saving became slightly negative, and the fiscal deficit jumped from 144 million 
pesos in September to 293 million pesos in December (see table 17). 
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Despite the events of the fourth quarter, however, budgetary operations showed certain 
favourable changes during the year; the decrease in the tax burden that had been occurring for several 
years was halted and it even grew slightly, from 8.6% in 1982 to 9.1% in 1983.6 Thanks to this, the 
fiscal deficit stayed at a level similar to that of the preceding year even though total expenditures rose 
16%. 
Tax revenue climbed 18% after having fallen 10% during the previous fiscal year. Tax receipts 
from foreign trade were up 31%, in contrast to the 32% decrease seen the year before. The main 
factor in that increase was the creation in late 1982 of a 10% tax on the value of imports, which caused 
the ratio between import duties and the value of imported goods —excluding petroleum and 
petroleum products— to move up from 22% in 1982 to 28% in 1983. It should also be noted that in 
November changes were made in the way of calculating ad valorem taxes on merchandise paid for 
with dollars acquired on the parallel market. From that date onward, these taxes were levied on the 
Table 17 
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INCOME AND 
EXPENDITURE 




On foreign trade 
Other 
Non-tax revenue 
2. Current expenditure 
Wages and salaries 
Other expenditures 
3. Current saving (1 - 2) 
4. Capital expenditure 
Real investment 
Debt amortization payments 
Capital transfers 
Other capital expenditure 
5. Total expenditure (2 + 4) 
6. Fiscal deficit ( 1 - 5 ) 
7. Financing of deficit 
Domestic financing 
External financing 
Current saving/capital expenditure 


































































































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of data supplied by the Ministry of Finance and the Central Bank of the Dominican Republic, Department of 
Economic Studies. 
a Preliminary figures. 
6The ratio between tax revenue and the gross domestic product had dropped from 15.3% in 1971 to 10.8%  in 1980. 
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DOMINICAN REPUBLIC 
value as calculated in terms of the parallel exchange rate rather than the official rate, as they had been 
before. This expanded the tax base considerably, since the price of foreign exchange on the open 
market was more than double the official exchange rate. 
The collection of indirect taxes rose 17%. The differentials between the import and domestic 
prices for imported crude oil, gasoline and fuel oil grew by 27% despite the fact that the price of 
gasoline was reduced by 17 centavos per gallon. The prices of crude oil and fuel oil, for their part, held 
steady, and the volume of sales rose. This fiscal revenue, which represents 16% of tax receipts, would 
be eliminated if crude oil imports were paid for with dollars from the parallel market rather than 
dollars granted at the official exchange rate, as is currently the practice. 
Taxes on the production of cigarettes and alcoholic beverages, which account for 44% of 
indirect taxes, increased 12 % in total. The mid-year increase in the tax on cigarettes raised the income 
from that source 23%, whereas revenue from alcoholic beverages increased only 8%. 
In addition, direct taxes expanded 9% due to the increased income tax receipts which resulted 
from the rise in the rates applied to dividends and income from professional activities. 
Finally, non-tax revenue made a comeback from the sharp drop suffered the preceding year, 
thanks to the increased revenue produced by the State mining company Rosario Dominicana which 
extracts gold and silver, whose prices rose on the international market. 
Central government spending, which had shrunk in 1982, picked up again in 1983. The 15% 
rise in current expenditure was due to the increase in interest payments on the debt (from 62 million 
pesos to 99 million pesos) and to the 21% increase in current transfers. Wages, however, rose only 
5%. For its part, capital expenditure was up 20%, thus breaking with the negative trend which had 
prevailed since 1979. Of the 50 million peso increase, 51% corresponded to capital trasnfers to 
independent agencies, 22% to real government investment and 8% to the amortization of the debt. 
A number of changes were made in income tax regulations during the year, and in order to 
encourage companies to recruit more employees, they were allowed to deduct 100 pesos per month 
from their taxable income for each new job they created. Moreover, attempts were made to give the 
municipalities greater economic autonomy by providing them with 20% of the fiscal income from 
income taxes. The most outstanding and controversial step, however, was the establishment of a tax 
on transfers and imports of manufactured goods. This is a value added tax with a limited scope, 
inasmuch as it is not levied on either the production and importation of basic consumer goods, 
including medicines and agricultural inputs, or on imports made by companies in the duty-free zones 
or by public bodies. Cigarettes, alcoholic beverages, soft drinks and matches are also exempt from it. 
The 6% level of the new tax is quite low, and though it is not designed to replace the general sales tax, 




1. Recent economic trends: Introduction and summary 
The evolution of the economy of Uruguay in 1983 was characterized by an accentuation of the 
economic crisis, accompanied however by a relatively successful process of external and fiscal 
adjustment (see table 1 and figure 1). 
Thus, the gross domestic product contracted for the second year running in what has been the 
worst recession in recent decades. Because of its contraction by almost 5 %, global production in 1983 
fell to a level 14% below that of two years earlier. In so far as gross domestic income was concerned, 
its decline (-8%) was even sharper, as the country's terms of trade suffered a considerable setback in 
1983, aggravating the decline which had already taken place in this respect in the three preceding 
years. The drop in the product was less severe, however, than in 1982 because agriculture achieved a 
fairly marked expansion, and both manufacturing and the services sector experienced considerably 
lower contractions than in that year. The results in the spheres of agriculture and industry reflected to 
a considerable degree the effects of the higher real exchange rate prevailing in 1983 compared with 
the year before, since this had the effect of stimulating exports. 
This increase in the real exchange rate (deriving from the drastic devaluation of the peso at the 
end of 1982) was also, however, a direct cause of the worsening of inflation. Thus, in 1983 prices rose 
by 52% after an uninterrupted decline in the rate of increase from 83% to 21% between 1979 and 
1982. This resurgence of inflation was clearly related to the fact that until November 1982 exchange-
rate policy had consisted of restraining the process of devaluation of the peso precisely in order to 
reduce inflationary pressures. When it was no longer possible to continue applying this policy due to 
problems in the inflow of external capital —which was needed to balance the acute current account 
deficit that had been generated— the Central Bank decreed the floating of the peso and withdrew 
from intervening in the exchange market. Thus, from a value of 14 pesos to the dollar at the end of 
November 1982, the exchange rate rose to more than 33 pesos per dollar by the end of the same year. 
This brought about an increase in prices of 9% in December after accumulated inflation of only 11% 
in the first eleven months of the year, and although it subsequently moderated to a certain extent, this 
situation of high inflation persisted throughout 1983-
The lack of dynamism in economic activity, the rapid rise in prices, and modification of the 
official wage policy brought about an appreciable contraction of wages in real terms. After having 
risen by more than 7% in 1981 and contracted only marginally in 1982, the real value of urban wages 
declined by over one-fifth in 1983. Added to this situation was a marked deterioration in the sphere of 
employment, since the unemployment rate climbed over a period of only two years from less than 7 % 
to close on 16%. In addition to representing a grave threat to the living standards of the population, 
the decline in real wages and the growth of unemployment helped to depress domestic demand, and 
this in turn had a negative effect on the evolution of global production. 
On the other hand, the authorities managed in 1983 to re-establish a state of equilibrium in the 
country's external accounts. The balance of trade in goods and services was positive for the first time 
in several years, with the result that the current account deficit, although not disappearing entirely 
(owing to higher net interest payments), contracted appreciably to a level of only US$ 55 million after 
having averaged US$ 450 million in the four preceding years. At the same time, the negative balance 
on the capital account in 1982 —after the considerable surpluses of previous years— disappeared in 
1983 when a positive result was again obtained. The sharp drop of US$ 500 million recorded in the 
level of international reserves in 1982 was thus checked, and reserves rose by US$ 56 million in the 
year under review. 
These positive results in the external field were the consequence of two factors: the 
continuation of the severe crisis in economic activity on the one hand, and the exchange-rate and 
monetary policy measures and those applied in the sphere of external indebtedness on the other. 
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The influence of the economic recession manifested itself primarily through the lower level of 
imports to which it gave rise. The value of imports fell by 29% and, although unit prices declined 
appreciably, the volume of imports also contracted to a marked extent (by 26% in the case of goods). 
This was due both to the smaller purchasing power of the population and to the drop in demand for 
inputs and capital goods by enterprises. On the other hand, the depressed situation of domestic 
markets and the critical financial situation of business concerns compelled them to develop a dynamic 
export marketing policy. 
Implementation of this policy by enterprises was made possible by the economic policy changes 
already mentioned, for the considerable devaluation of the currency at the end of 1982 and the 
abandonment of the policy of deterioration in the effective real exchange rate led to an improvement 
in the profitability of external sales. The rapid decline in real urban and rural wages, too, was not 
unconnected with this greater profitability of exports. 
The foreign exchange policy also helped to heighten the effect of the economic depression on 
imports, by raising their cost. To this, moreover, were added the consequences of a contractive 
monetary policy. 
Table 1 
URUGUAY: MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS 
A. Basic economic indicators 
Gross domestic product at market 
prices (millions of dollars at 1970 prices) 
Population (millions of inhabitants) 
Per capita gross domestic product 






B. Short-run economic indicators 
Gross domestic product 
Per capita gross domestic product 
Gross national income 
Terms of trade (goods and services) 
Current value of exports of goods 
and services 




Variation between annual averages 
Money 
Wages and salaries' 
Unemployment rate 
Current government income 
Total government expenditure 
Fiscal deficit/total government expenditure' 
Millions 
C. External sector 
Trade balance (goods and services) 
Balance on current account 
Balance on capital account 
Variation in international reserves 








































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official data. 
"Preliminary figures. ^Gross domestic product plus terms-of-trade effect (goods and services). 
nominal wage averages. Annual average rate for Montevideo. 'Percentages. Surplus. 
Variation between annual 
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In addition to the foregoing, there was the refinancing of the external debt, after signature of an 
agreement with the International Monetary Fund. 
Finally, mention should be made of the improvement recorded in the country's fiscal accounts. 
After the sharp decline of public sector income in real terms in 1982, it rose slightly in 1983. At the 
same time (and for the first time in recent years) the real value of fiscal outlays —for both current and 
capital expenditure— contracted. This favourable development did not however lead to the 
disappearance of the considerable imbalance recorded since 1982, since the fiscal deficit, measured as 
a proportion of total government expenditure, only declined from one-third in 1982 to 20% in 1983-
In the period 1979-1981, in contrast, a small fiscal surplus had been obtained on average. 
2. Trends in economic activity 
a) Total supply and demand 
Total supply and demand slackened considerably (by -7%) for the second year running. In the 
case of total supply, its two basic components —the gross domestic product and imports— were both 
lower than in the preceding year. Imports contracted due to the higher cost of foreign currency, the 
lower purchasing capacity of economic agents in general, and the depressed situation of the 
productive sectors. The proportion of imports in total supply thus fell from 17% in 1980 to 10% in 
1983- The gross domestic product, for its part, contracted by nearly 5% on top of its 10% decline in 
1982. This deterioration contrasted noticeably with the average 5% rate of growth recorded in the 
period 1978-1981. However, this trend in the gross domestic product was reversed, albeit only 
slightly, as from the third quarter of 1983. Disregarding seasonal effects, it expanded in that quarter 
by 0.6% and by 0.2% in the last quarter of the year. Among other reasons, this improvement was 
attributable to the greater competitiveness of Uruguayan products in external markets as a result of 
the considerable currency devaluation and the contraction in real wages. 
Thus, an analysis of total demand shows that exports of goods and services increased in the year 
by more than 4%, this being the only demand component to exhibit this trend. Domestic demand 
contracted by 9%, reaching a level 25% below that of 1980. As in the two preceding years, the 
reduction of gross domestic investment was particularly acute, since it fell by 27%. The lower 
investment in machinery and equipment was attributable to high prevailing interest rates and heavy 
corporate indebtedness. Building investment, for its part, also declined owing to the high rates of 
interest and the policy of austerity in public expenditure. A further effect of this austerity was a 
decline in the level of public consumption, which compounded the simultaneous contraction of 
private consumption (see table 2). 
The part played by gross domestic saving in the financing of gross domestic investment 
increased appreciably. Thus, it financed four-fifths of investment costs, exceeding its share in 
previous years. The favourable evolution of gross domestic savings was particularly noteworthy in 
that it helped to offset the considerable deterioration in net external factor payments and the terms-
of-trade effect (see table 3)-
b) Evolution of the main sectors 
The sharp contraction of production observed in 1982 continued in 1983. Activity declined in 
most of the sectors producing goods and services, with the notable exception of agriculture, whose 
product rose by almost 3% after a contraction of 11% the year before. This was due mainly to the 
growth of agricultural exports owing to their improved competitive position. The level of activity in 
manufacturing continued to recede, although much more slowly, but the product of the construction 
sector fell twice as fast as the year before. In the sphere of services, the declines observed since 1982 in 
commerce and in transport, storage and communications continued (see table 4). 
i) Agriculture. The physical volume of agricultural output in 1983 declined slightly, since 
improved results in the livestock-raising and fishing sectors failed to offset completely the sharp drop 
in crop-farming output. This contraction occurred for the third successive year and was influenced to 
an important degree by the critical financial situation of the sector, deriving mainly from its heavy 
indebtedness and the high cost of credit (see table 5). 
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Figure 1 
URUGUAY: MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS 
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Gross national income3 ^ 
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Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official data. 
aAnnual growth rate. *>Average annual rate in Montevideo. cFirst half of year. 
¿August 1974 - February 1975. Percentage variation from December to December. 









Gross domestic product 
at market prices 
Imports of goods 
and services 
Millions of dollars 
at 1970 prices 
1981 1982 1983° 1970 1980 1983° 1980 1981 1982 1983° 
4 845 4 314 4 007 110.4 116.6 110.1 7.3 0.1 -11.0 -7.1 
4 227 3 816 3 638 100.0 100.0 100.0 6.0 1.9 -9.7 -4.7 
618 498 369 10.4 16.6 10.1 16.1 -10.6 -19.4 -25.8 
Total demand 
Domestic demand 
Gross domestic investment 
Gross fixed investment 
Construction 
Machinery and equipment 
















































































































Source: ECLAC, on rhe basis of data from the Central Bank of Uruguay. 
"Preliminary figures. The figures for exports and imports of g(x>ds and services were taken from balance-of-payments data expressed 
in dollars at current prices, which were converted to constant 1970 values using price indexes calculated for the purpose by ÜCLAC. 
Table 3 
URUGUAY: FINANCING OF GROSS DOMESTIC INVESTMENT 
1. Gross domestic investment 
2. Gross national savings (a + b + c) 
a) Gross domestic savings 
b) Net factor payments abroad 
c) Terms-of-trade effect 
































28.3 40.1 34.0 46.9 20.8 
Percentages of gross domestic product 
1. Gross domestic investment 
2. Gross national savings (a + b + c) 
a) Gross domestic savings 
b) Net factor payments abroad 
c) Terms-of-trade effect 


























4.2 7.4 5.6 6.6 2.2 
Source: Central Bank of Uruguay. 
"Preliminary figures. The original information is expressed in constant values, as in table 2. 
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Of the main crops, only maize and sugar beet showed increases (7% in both instances), while 
contractions were recorded in the rest of this product group. The output of wheat declined by 6% 
owing to the smaller area sown, despite an appreciable improvement in yields. Rice production, for 
its part, contracted by 23% in 1983 after rising by a total of 70% in the preceding three years. This 
negative result was due to a considerable decrease in yields, since adverse climatic conditions at the 
time of sowing delayed the whole production cycle. Finally, the output of oilseeds as a whole fell by 
more than 50% to only a fifth of the amount harvested in 1980. Various factors influenced this fall: 
the drop of 64% in the production of linseed was due to a reduction of 60% in area sown, which sank 
to only 7 400 hectares (after having amounted to 100 000 hectares in 1980), while the 61% lower 
production of sunflower seed was caused by a contraction of 57 % in yield after a drop of 16% in 1982. 
Livestock production expanded in 1983 by nearly 6% after declining by 8% in the previous 
year. It was thus the only important agricultural sub-sector whose level of activity did not decline. 
Wool production recorded the greatest increase (10%), making it the only livestock product to show 
constant expansion in the last four years. Wool exports in 1983 were 5% greater than in 1982 (when 
they contracted by 14%) and some new markets were gained, as in the case of exports of blankets to 
Taiwan. Meat production expanded at a rate only slightly below that of wool and represented —both 
in the case of beef and other meats— a significant turnaround from the declines recorded in 1981 and 
in particular in 1982. This result was strongly influenced by a considerable expansion of beef exports 
(which rose by 37% after contracting in 1982 by 4%) due to a combination of factors, including the 
depression of domestic prices —partly caused by illegal meat imports— and the need to cover rising 
local credit costs, both of which induced producers to increase their sales volume. Secondly, the 
considerable currency devaluation which came into force at the end of 1982 greatly improved the 
profitability of exports, which were also favoured by the penetration of new markets, particularly in 
the Middle East. Devaluation also stimulated the production of milk, since the milk industry normally 
sells more than a third of its output abroad. 
Table 4 
URUGUAY: GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT, BY KIND OF ECONOMIC 
ACTIVITY, AT FACTOR COST 







Electricity, gas and water 




Ownership of dwellings 
Community, social and 
personal services 
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Source: ECLAC, un the basis of official data. 
"Preliminary figures. ''As the individual activities and totals were calculated independently, the sum of the former does not correspond 
with the latter. 'Including financial establishments, insurance and real estate, except ownership of dwellings. Including 




URUGUAY: INDICATORS OF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION 
Indexes of agricultu 




Marine fishing and 











Indexes of volume of 
agricultural and livestock 













































































































































































Source: Central Bank of Uruguay. 
"Preliminary figures. Crop years. 1 Thousands of tons. 
Finally, the fishing industry recorded a production increase of 16%, thereby resuming its 
dynamic evolution of previous years (temporarily interrupted in 1982). Exports of fish, however, 
contracted slightly from 58% of total fishery production in 1982 to 50% in 1983. This proportion had 
risen steadily every year since 1973, when it amounted to only 9%. As regards individual products, 
exports of frozen fish declined by 12% while those of fish méal rose b^87%. 
ii) Manufacturing. Manufacturing output fell for the third year running, making a total decline 
of 26% over this period. In the period 1975-1979, in contrast, its annual growth rate was consistently 
high (7% on average). 
Three types of factors were mainly responsible for the negative evolution of this sector in the 
year under review, namely: problems of demand in domestic and foreign markets; the financial 
difficulties faced by producers; and finally, the lower availability of local raw materials. 
Two-thirds of the enterprises covered by the industrial survey carried out by the Central Bank in 
the last quarter of 1983 referred to insufficient demand as a primary limiting factor in industrial 
activity throughout the year. In the sphere of domestic demand, the considerable decline in real wages 
—due to renewed rising prices— and the negative trend in general economic activity led to a 
contraction of 5% in global domestic private consumption, which came on top of the 12% decline 
experienced in 1982. This was, however, compensated to some extent by less competition from 
foreign suppliers (only 5% of the enterprises surveyed at the end of 1983 pointed to this as an 
important limiting factor compared with 13% of those consulted at the end of 1982 and 24% a year 
earlier). On the external front, for its part, difficulties were experienced due to the poor economic 
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situation in neighbouring countries, a revival of protectionism in foreign markets, and lower 
international prices. These features were blamed by a third of the exporting firms surveyed in the 
exercise already mentioned. However, many industrial concerns assigned much greater significance 
to the improved competitiveness of their products abroad as a result of the considerable devaluation 
effected at the end of 1982. In this respect, 23 of the 35 branches of industry exporting part of their 
output reported an increase in the proportion of their foreign sales. Viewed from another angle, the 
physical volume of production of firms exporting more than 25 % of their output increased by 14% in 
1983, whereas the rest of industry registered a 14% contraction in output; in 1982 both categories of 
enterprises had registered equal declines. 
Financial difficulties deriving from the high cost and scarcity of credit and, in many instances, 
insufficient increases in domestic selling prices were referred to as important causes of problems in 
the sector by 20% of the firms responding to the above-mentioned survey. Partly for these reasons, 
the manufacturing firms affected found it necessary to resort to a reduction of stocks owing to their 
high maintenance cost, with the result that the level of production was cut back still further. More 
than half of the industrial firms surveyed reported lower stock levels in the last quarter of 1983 than 
in the same period of 1982. 
Finally, problems connected with the supply of domestic raw materials were mentioned as a 
limiting factor by 8% of the firms surveyed, although in some sectors (producers of foodstuffs, 
beverages, textiles, footwear and clothing) this proportion rose to between 15% and 18%. 
For the above reasons, a very high average level of idle production capacity (64 % ) was observed 
at the end of the year. In three sectors (metal products, electrical machinery, and transport 
equipment) this proportion exceeded 80%, and in six others (beverages, paper, printing, rubber 
products, chemical products and non-metallic minerals) it exceeded 70%. Even the most dynamic 
industrial sectors reported high levels of idle capacity in 1983:44% in the foodstuffs industry, 48% in 
the leather industry and 53% in the textile, footwear and clothing manufacturing sectors. 
The number of hours worked in manufacturing decreased by slightly more than 2% in the year. 
This meant a loss of labour productivity, since the level of production dropped by a proportion three 
times greater. The sector showing the greatest decline in productivity was the tobacco industry; in 
contrast, appreciable gains in productivity were recorded in the leather and rubber-products 
industries. 
The sectoral evolution of industrial production reveals that output levels contracted in 11 of the 
16 branches considered in the Uruguayan statistics. The greatest reduction (-48%) was recorded in 
the manufacture of electrical machinery, due partly to market saturation. Following this were 
contractions of between 21 % and 25 % in the industries manufacturing transport equipment, tobacco 
products, non-metallic minerals and metal products. In the case of transport equipment, the greatest 
decline in output occurred in the motor-vehicle sector (-64%). This drop affected all its products 
—automobiles, light commercial vehicles and trucks— and was due to lower demand and inventory 
adjustments. In the non-metallic minerals sub-sector, the drop in output was strongly influenced by 
lower building activity. In the important food-products industry, for its part, a reduction of only 2% 
was recorded (the same result as in 1982). Declines reported by the rice-processing and edible oil 
producers were due to shortages of domestic raw materials, while larger supplies of cattle, milk and 
fish influenced the output increases reported by the corresponding processors. Despite the small 
decrease in output in the year, the foodstuffs industry has not only been the most dynamic industrial 
branch in the past five years, but also the only one to report higher output levels in 1983 than in 1978, 
since its production in the period expanded by 13% while that of manufacturing as a whole was 19% 
less in 1983 than in that year (see table 6). 
Other industrial branches recording increases in production in the year were textiles (35%), 
rubber products (22%), footwear and clothing (21%) and leather goods (15%). In the case of the 
first-named, there was a notable increase (of more than 50%) in the output of yarns and woollen 
fabrics —mainly due to higher demand from traditional producers of clothing for export— and in 
that of cotton and synthetic yarns and fabrics, for the same reason, also assisted by a general increase 
in exports of cotton products. 
iii) Construction. The gross domestic product of this sector contracted for the second year 
running and this time the drop (-27%) was double the severe decline recorded in 1982. In the period 




URUGUAY: INDICATORS OF MANUFACTURING PRODUCTION 
Index of manufacturing 
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Paper and paper products 




























































































































































Source: Central Bank of Uruguay. 
"Preliminary figures. 
Unlike the preceding year, when there was a considerable recovery in the construction of public 
works which compensated to a large extent the decline in private building activity, both subdivisions 
recorded declines in 1983, the drop being greater in the case of the public sector. The consumption of 
cement in this latter sector decreased by 36% after rising by 44% in 1982, successive contractions 
being recorded in the first three quarters of the year. Events influencing this negative evolution were 
a severe contraction (of 52%) in the building of dwellings by the Uruguayan Mortgage Bank (Banco 
Hipotecario del Uruguay) and a reduction of 20% in works controlled by the Ministry of Transport 
and Public Works, owing to the policy of economies in public expenditure. 
Private construction activity contracted for the second year running after having stagnated in 
1981. The level of consumption of cement by the private sector in 1983 was the same as in 1977. 
There was a severe drop in construction financed by resources from the Mortgage Bank, which closed 
its lines of credit to all applicants except those holding savings accounts in this bank. There was also a 
drop in the rest of private building activity owing to the general shortage of credit. Saturation of the 
housing market in Montevideo and the absence of major new credits from Argentina for projects in 
Punta del Este complicated the situation still further (see table 7). 
The increase in the index of construction costs (46%) was lower than that of inflation as 
measured by the variation in the consumer price index (52%). This situation contrasted with the 
preceding year, when the index of construction costs rose more than twice as fast as the consumer 
price index. 
c) Employment 
The trend towards rapid growth of unemployment observed throughout 1982 was accentuated 
in 1983 (see table 8). In the first quarter of the latter year the unemployment rate in the active 
population of Montevideo was 15.9% compared with 11.7% and 13.8% in the third and fourth 
quarters of 1982. In the period April-June 1983 this rate again rose, reaching the highest quarterly 
level (16.1%) recorded since statistics have been kept (the lowest quarterly rate on record (5.7%) had 
been registered only two years earlier). This was clear evidence not only of the severity of the 
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recession in Uruguay, but also of the rapidity with which it had developed. The unemployment 
situation began gradually to improve, however, in the third and fourth quarters of 1983 (15.2% and 
14.6% respectively). The sectors most affected in the year were manufacturing and construction 
(17% unemployment at the year's end in each instance) and commerce (14%). Underemployment, 
for its part, affected almost 11 % of the total work force in Montevideo at the end of the first half of 
1983. 
3. The external sector 
a) Merchandise trade 
The volume of external trade in goods decreased in 1983- That of imports showed a marked 
contraction (-26% ) for the third consecutive year, so that it sank to a level only 45 % of that recorded 
in 1980. Moreover, the volume of exports declined for the first time since 1979, although only to a 
comparatively small extent. As for unit values, both export and import prices fell sharply, in similar 
proportions. The terms of trade thus showed only a small variation of - 1 % (see table 9). 
i) Exports. The sharp drop in the value of exports in 1983 (-10%) represented a serious 
reversal in this respect (see table 10). The last time that export earnings had shown a negative result 
was in 1971, after which they rose at an average annual rate of 18% until 1982. 
The drop in the value of exports in 1983 was caused to an important extent by the difficulties 
facing domestic economic activity in general, and occurred despite the considerable incentive 
provided by the end-1982 devaluation. In the case of non-traditional exports, contractions were 
observed in almost all major products. Of particular significance was the decline of more than 50% in 
Table 7 











































































































































































Source: Central Bank of Uruguay. 
"In the case of the quarterly figures the growth rate has been calculated with respect to the preceding quarter. 
corresponding period. ' Preliminary figures. 
At the end of the 
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Table 8 






Unemployment rate (Montevideo) 
Employment rate (Montevideo/ 
1980 1981 1982 1983 
1977 1978 1979 Half year Half year Half year Half year 
I II I II I II I 
11.8 10.1 8.4 7.7 6.8 
7.9 6.7 5.8 5.1 4.9 3.9 4.9 7.2 8.1 11.1 


















Source: Department of Statistics and Censuses. 
"Percentage of unemployed persons in the total economically active population. 
time. 'Percentage of employed persons in the total population aged 14 or more-
Excludes those seeking work for first 
Table 9 
URUGUAY: MAIN FOREIGN TRADE INDICATORS 








Terms of trade (goods) 
Terms of trade (goods) 
Purchasing power of exports of goods 
Purchasing power of exports of goods 
and services 
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Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official data. 
"Preliminary figures. *Volume of exports of goods or of goods and services (as appropriate), adjusted in accordance with the 
corresponding terms-of-trade index. 
exports of non-monetary gold. This product had not been exported before 1982 (with the exception 
of a very small amount in 1981), but its share in total exports rose from 1% in 1981 to 19% in 1982 
and, despite a decline in 1983, still remained high (9%). Other important non-traditional products 
showing a drop in export sales included rice (mainly owing to marketing problems in Brazil) and 
fishery and leather products. The volume exported, however, increased in the last-mentioned 
instance. 
Exports of textile manufactures, on the other hand, increased by 13%. Particular dynamism was 
shown in this context by sales of carded wool, the volume of which increased fourfold. Export sales of 
cotton products also rose appreciably, but those of synthetic products declined. Finally, exports of 
foodstuffs, beverages and tobacco increased considerably (by 67%) although their share in total non-
traditional exports still came to less than 5%. 
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Traditional exports, for their part, rose by 20%, although sales of wool declined, in addition to 
the contraction experienced by this product in the non-traditional category. On the other hand, meat 
exports rose by 39%, partly offsetting the lower sales of wool. Foreign sales of meat became 
considerably more profitable for a number of reasons (especially the effects of the devaluation), and 
moreover they were very necessary in order to cover higher domestic production costs. The main 
overseas markets in this case were Brazil, the United Kingdom and Middle Eastern countries (Egypt, 
Iran, Iraq, and Israel). 
As regards the destinations of exports as a whole, an abrupt decline was recorded in the 
proportion of shipments to Europe (from 38% in 1982 to only 32% in 1983) and in that of sales to 
the countries of the Latin American Integration Association (ALADI), which fell from 31 % to 24%. In 
the latter group, the relative importance of the Argentine and Brazilian markets decreased by 17% 
and 18% respectively, while there was an even greater decline in that of the rest of the ALADI member 
countries (-41%), owing to generalized recessions in their economies and resurgence of 
protectionism. On the other hand, the Middle Eastern area became as important in this context as 
Europe, owing to growth of almost 140% in sales to Iran, which reached a value of more than 
US$ 116 million in 1983 (by comparison, sales to Brazil —Uruguay's main trading partner— 
amounted to US$ 121 million). 
ii) Imports. In 1983, as in the preceding year, the value of total purchases abroad dropped 
sharply (by 36%). Declines were recorded in each of the three main groups of imports (see table 11). 
Table 10 









Foodstuffs, beverages and 
tobacco 
Minerals, ceramics and glass 
Products of the chemical and 
allied industries 
Plastic materials and rubber 
products 




Paper, paper-board and related 
manufactures 
































































































































































































URUGUAY: IMPORTS OF GOODS, CIF 
Total 
Consumer goods 







Parts and accessories of 
machinery and equipment 
Basic foodstuffs and 
beverages 
Parts and accessories for 
transport equipment 




Machinery and equipment 
Transport equipment 












































































































































































Source: Central Bank of Uruguay. 
"Preliminary figures. 
The value of external purchases of consumer goods contracted for the second year running. This 
time, the decline was approximately 60%, bringing it to a level similar to that recorded in 1978. As a 
result, the share of these goods in total Uruguayan imports dropped in 1983 from 16% to 6%. As in 
1982, the drop in imports of durable consumer goods was particularly severe, after having been the 
most dynamic group in total imports in the period 1979-1981. From a value of less than US$ 10 
million in 1978 (1 % of the total) they rose to US$ 166 million in 1981 (10%) but contracted to only 
US$ 11 million in 1983 (2% of total imports in the year). Imports of intermediate and capital goods 
also decreased considerably (by 31% and 51% respectively). In both instances this was the third 
consecutive annual contraction (in contrast, the high rate of increase in imports of consumer goods 
had continued in 1981), and it closely reflected the decline in global economic activity in 1982 and 
1983. Between 1980 and 1983 imports of industrial inputs decreased by 58% while those of 
machinery and equipment fell by two-thirds in the same period. On the other hand, capital imports 
for the manufacturing sector declined by only 4% and accounted for 60% of the total in this import 
group. Significant increases were recorded in these imports in four industrial sectors: basic metal 
products (a fivefold increase), the paper and paperboard industry (threefold), bakeries (3.6 times) 
and sugar mills (2.4 times). 
The composition of imports by areas of origin showed no appreciable change in the year as 
compared with 1982. The ALADI countries continued to be Uruguay's main supplying area (42%), 
although the shares of Argentina and Brazil within this group rose considerably to the detriment of 
the rest of the member countries. In this connection, a sharp drop was recorded in Uruguayan 
purchases of petroleum from Ecuador, Mexico and Venezuela. 
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b) The balance-of-payments position and its financing 
Trade in goods and services showed a positive balance in 1983 for the first time in ten years. The 
surplus on merchandise trade increased significantly (by 93%) in comparison with 1982, while the 
services trade deficit contracted in real terms by 25% after increasing sevenfold in the previous year. 
The larger positive trade balance in goods was attributable to an abrupt drop in imports as a result of 
the severe process of economic contraction and the end-1982 devaluation. The contraction of imports 
was partly offset by a reduction in the value of exports. In the case of real services, the large deficit 
under the heading of travel continued and, although it went down by 30%, it again contrasted with 
the surplus traditionally obtained. On the other hand, trade in transport and insurance services 
showed only a very small negative balance (see table 12). 
Two-fifths of the improvement in the trade balance was wiped out by higher net factor service 
payments. Net interest payments on the external debt, in particular, rose by 11 % in 1983 after having 
expanded by 56% in 1982. The drop in interest received in 1983 on deposits of reserves abroad 
however, was greater than the increase in interest payments on the debt, whereas only the latter had 
represented a problem in 1982. Net interest payments, which in 1981 had been equivalent to 4% of 
the value of exports of goods and services, rose to 11% in 1982 and 23% in 1983. The negative 
current account balance thus diminished for the third consecutive year and stood at only US$ 55 
million (after having exceeded US$ 700 million in 1980). 
In so far as the capital account is concerned, there was a sharp increase in loans contracted 
abroad by the public sector (i.e., by the Central Bank —in order to alleviate the situation in the private 
banking system—, the Mortgage Bank, and the central government). This increase came about as a 
result of the foreign debt refinancing negotiations. New private sector external indebtedness, on the 
other hand, decreased considerably, although the drop was insufficient to offset the larger external 
commitments of the public sector and, a positive balance was therefore recorded on the capital 
account. Nevertheless, this balance was equivalent to less than a quarter of the net average annual 
flow recorded in the 1977-1981 period. 
c) Evolution of the real exchange rate 
After the abandonment at the end of November 1982 of a stable exchange system —which had 
consisted of daily adjustments in the rate of exchange in accordance with a pre-established 
programme— official exchange policy underwent numerous changes. In the month referred to, and 
in accordance with a change in the global approach of economic policy, the Central Bank withdrew 
completely from the exchange market. This caused an immediate severe drop in the nominal parity of 
the peso (which, from a value of 14 to the dollar, rose to 33 by the year's end). Subsequently, in the 
first months of 1983, the Central Bank again intervened in the market by means of open market 
operations. Later —as from April— these operations were discontinued by the Central Bank, while 
the Banco de la República stepped up its participation in the exchange market. Finally, in November, 
the Central Bank adopted a number of measures designed to revive the "clean float" system, as a result 
of which the rate of devaluation in December reached 11.2 % compared with an average monthly rate 
of 2.8% in the first eleven months of the year. 
The devaluation process was nonetheless insufficient to prevent a decline in the effective real 
exchange rate throughout 1983. In terms of annual averages, however, that rate was appreciably 
higher (by 24%) than in the previous year,1 since the big rise took place in December 1982 and thus 
had little effect on the average for the year. The index measuring the value of this variable recorded 
increases up to March, after which it contracted steadily (except injuly) until November (see figure 2 
and table 13). 
d) External indebtedness 
After rising at an average annual rate of 36% in the four preceding years, the country's external 
indebtedness increased by only 6% in 1983 (see table 14). As in 1982, this growth was due to a 
considerable increase in the public sector's external commitments, partly offset, as already 
mentioned, by a contraction in those of the private sector. As in previous years, the evolution of the 
1 In terms of the effective rea] exchange rate for exports. 
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Table 12 
URUGUAY: BALANCE OF PAYMENTS 
URUGUAY 
(Millions of dollars) 
Balance on current account 
Trade balance 
Exports of goods and services 
Goods FOB 
Real services 
Transport and insurance 
Travel 
Imports of goods and services 
Goods FOB 
Real services 







Unrequited private transfer payments 
Balance on capital account 
Unrequited official transfer payments 
Long-term capital 
Direct investment (net) 
Portfolio investment (net) 














Errors and omissions, net 
Global balance 
Total variation in reserves 
(minus sign indicates an increase) 
Monetary gold 
Special Drawing Rights 
IMF reserve position 
Foreign exchange assets 
Other assets 





















































































































































































































































































































Source: 1977-1982: International Monetary Fund, Balance of Payments Yearbook (magnetic tape), March 1984; 1983: ECLAC, on the basis of 
official data. 
"Preliminary figures. Real services also include other official and private transactions, but exclude factor services. 'In addition 
to loans received and amortization payments made, this entry includes net loans granted and other assets and liabilities. The global 
balance is the sum of the current account balance plus the balance on capital account. The difference between total variation in reserves of 
opposite sign and the global balance represents counterpart items: monetization of gold, allocation of Special Drawing Rights, and variations 
due to revaluation. 
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country's foreign indebtedness reflected the domestic situation and the turn of events in economic 
policy. In a first stage (1974-1976), the annual growth rate of the foreign debt had amounted to 16%, 
after a contraction of 7% in 1973. In that period, the external debt of the public sector, reflecting the 
preponderant role of the latter in the country's modest economic recovery, rose at an annual average 
rate of 21 %. At the same time, the external debt of the private sector was going down by almost 2% 
per year, so that this sector's indebtedness dropped in that period from 25% of the national total in 
1973 to only 15% in 1976. In 1977, however, this proportion began to rise rapidly, and continued to 
do so up to 1981. This second stage was marked by a more thorough-going liberalization of the 
economy, and in particular of the financial system. Big capital inflows were thus attracted, consisting 
mostly of deposits made in Uruguayan banks by Argentine nationals. Thus, deposits in private 
Figure 2 
URUGUAY: EVOLUTION OF EFFECTIVE REAL EXCHANGE RATE 
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URUGUAY: EVOLUTION OF NOMINAL AND EFFECTIVE REAL 
EXCHANGE RATE 
(Averages per period) 
„,,. . , , Indexes of effective real exchance rate" Official exchange _ 
rate (pesos _ Imports j r „ . Exports r per dollar) r 
(1) (2) b 
1975 2.30 130.2 108.4 121.0 
1976 3.40 136.5 117.6 132.4 
1977 4.68 136.2 115.9 129.4 
1978 6.06 133.8 112.0 127.5 
1979 7.86 109-9 97.9 106.6 
1980 9.10 100.0 100.0 100.0 
1981 10.82 94.0 98.1 95.2 
1982 13.91 110.1 111.5 110.0 
1983 34.54 136.6 137.0 139.8 
1981 
I 10.25 101.1 107.0 104.7 
II 10.63 97.1 102.5 99.4 
III 11.00 90.0 94.2 90.8 
IV 11.40 92.0 94.0 92.1 
1982 
I 11.80 95.9 98.1 97.1 
II 12.25 97.8 99.1 98.5 
III 12.87 94.1 95.0 93.4 
IV 18.71 147.8 149.9 148.4 
1983 
I 30.79 140.9 141.3 141.3 
II 32.99 139.5 138.7 141.4 
III 34.99 134.7 135.4 139.3 
IV 39̂ 40 1320 1326 136.7 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of information from the International Monetary Fund. 
"Represents the average of the real exchange rate indexes of the peso with respect to the currencies of Uruguay's main trading partness, 
weighted according to the relative importance of the exports to or imports from those countries. For further details of the met hod and sources 
employed, see the Statistical Appendix (Methodological Note) in the Economic Survey of Latin America, 1981. Excluding the three 
main petroleum-exporting countries. 
commercial banks, which accounted in 1976 for less than 7% of the country's external liabilities, rose 
by 1981 to the equivalent of 40%. Moreover, with the inclusion of supplier credits, private sector 
indebtedness grew almost tenfold in that period, while that of the public sector rose by only 50%. At 
the end of 1981, however, economic activity began to encounter severe difficulties closely related to 
the deterioration of the external indicators and unfavourable developments in neighbouring 
countries. Another factor was the greater difficulty of gaining access to international capital markets, 
which were indispensable for financing the heavy and growing current account deficit. Private sector 
indebtedness immediately began to contract in net terms (by 7% in 1982 and 15 % in 1983), while the 
public sector made great efforts to take its place. These efforts were initially successful (the public 
debt rose by 85% in 1982 alone), but became increasingly difficult thereafter (public indebtedness 
expanded by only 18% in 1983, including the result of refinancing operations). The private sector 
debt, which had reached a level of 53% of total foreign indebtedness in 1981, thus fell to only 29% in 
1983. 
Debt-servicing costs rose at a very high rate, for the second successive year, reaching a value in 
excess of US$ 570 million. This figure was equivalent to 42% of the 1983 exports of goods and 
services, after having amounted to 28% in 1982 and 16% in 1981. 
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The refinancing of the public sector external debt was completed in 1983. Earlier —in April— 
the International Monetary Fund had approved a two-year stand-by credit for 378 million Special 
Drawing Rights.2 This agreement, concluded after 11 months of delays and amendments, was 
conditional on the undertaking in principle, on the part of the international private banks, to 
refinance the country's external public debt and provide new funds. The official agreement in this 
respect was signed at the end of July, when 90% of the country's short-term indebtedness was 
refinanced, together with the payments on the long-term debt falling due between March 1983 and 
December 1984. The total amount of this operation came to US$ 693 million, of which four-fifths 
corresponded to the short-term debt. The terms of this transaction, also applicable to a new loan of 
US$ 240 million, were for repayment over a period of 7 years with 2 years' grace, and interest at the 
rate of LIBOR plus 2.25%. 
4. Prices and wages 
a) Prices 
The rise of 52% in the consumer price index in 1983 marked the end of the downward trend in 
inflation registered in preceding years (see figure 3 and table 14). In a first phase the high rate of 
inflation of the period 1972-1975 (an average annual rate of 86%) was reduced to 56% in the 
following four years. In a second phase, in which the policy of delayed exchange-rate adjustments 
practiced since 1979 played an unquestionably significant part, the growth rate of consumer prices 
eased appreciably to an average annual rate of less than 31%, dropping from 83% in 1979 to 21% in 
1982. Furthermore, the accumulated rate of inflation in the first 11 months of the latter year was only 
11%. However, the inflow of foreign capital needed to compensate the current-account deterioration 
arising from that policy was less than expected, despite the policy of full openness of external 
financial operations, and the situation thus became extremely difficult at the end of 1982, when the 
Central Bank had to abandon the system of pre-established exchange rates and withdrew from the 
intervention in the exchange market. This brought about a rise of 100% in the rate of exchange in 
December and a 9% increase in prices in the same month (equivalent to five-sixths of that recorded 
throughout the rest of the year). In January 1983, the effect of the abrupt November devaluation was 
felt even more severely, with consumer prices rising in that month by more than 15%. Subsequent 
fluctuations of inflation were decidedly irregular, a rate of 4 % or 5 % being recorded in some months 
(February, April, September and October), in contrast with rates of almost zero in others (March and 
November). All components of the consumer price index evolved in a fairly similar way, with the 
exception of housing which rose at a much lower rate because rents were officially linked with past 
wage movements. 
In contrast with the two preceding years, public service tariffs in 1983 were in most instances 
adjusted by considerably higher percentages than the rate of inflation, thus becoming yet another 
contributory cause of the latter. Tariff increases took place in particular in April (when inflation for 
the month reached 3.9%, after having amounted to 0.3% in March) and in September (when prices 
rose by 4.9% compared with 32% the month before). The reason for these increases was the need to 
reduce the growing public deficit by a direct attack on one of its fundamental causes (see table 16). 
Wholesale prices in 1983 showed even higher increases than those of the consumer index. The 
causes were in general the same in both cases: as a result of the November 1982 devaluation, the 
wholesale price index for domestic products rose by 22% in December of that year and by 18% in 
January 1983, after having risen by only 9% in the first eleven months of 1982. In terms of the 
variation between annual averages, the rates of increase rose from 13% in 1982 to 74% in 1983 (see 
table 15). The biggest increase occurred in agricultural products, and in particular in the livestock-
product group, owing to the considerable proportion of exportable products in these subdivisions and 
the logical consequences of devaluation. The latter also brought about a spectacular increase in the 
variation between annual averages of the wholesale price index for imported products, which rose 
eightfold between 1982 and 1983. 
2Of this total, 94 million were supplied from the regular resources of the IMF and were loaned at an annual interest rate of 6.6%, with a 
repayment period of 7 years with 3 years of grace. The rest was obtained on loan from the IMF, repayable over 7 years with three years'grace and 
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There was a sharp deterioration in real wages in 1983 (see table 17). Contributory factors were 
the resurgence of inflation and a significant change in wage policy. After a general increase of 15 % in 
public and private-sector wages in January —in accordance with the policy followd up to that time— 
the authorities announced that wages in the private sector would be established by free negotiation 
between employers and employees. The Government henceforth fixed only the minimum legal wage 
and public-sector remunerations. Comparing annual averages, nominal wages in the private sector 
rose in 1983 by less than one-fifth. This was the result of increases of 15% in January (already 
mentioned) and in September, with relative stagnation in the rest of the year. The real value of wages 
thus decreased by 20%, falling to only 57% of the level recorded in 1975. The situation in the 
Department of Montevideo was slightly worse than in the rest of the country. In the case of the public 
sector, the changes observed followed a similar trend; but the accumulated deterioration of wages 
over the last eight years (31 %) was less than that of the private sector. Finally, rural wages evolved in 
a manner similar to those in urban areas, although their deterioration was less severe. 
Table 14 
URUGUAY: INDICATORS OF EXTERNAL INDEBTEDNESS 
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983" 
Total external debt 
Of the public sector 
Central Bank 
Banco de la República 
Mortgage Bank (Banco Hipotecario) 
Non-financial public sector 
Of the private sector 
Suppliers 
Commercial banks 




Of the public sector 
Of the private sector 
Total service cost 
Principal 
Interest 
Millions of dollars 
1 031 1 135 1 320 1 240 1 679 2 156 3 129 4 255 4 509 

















































































































82.4 -34.2 -38.0 166.7 -76.6 81.0 -43.8 42.4 128.6 
76.3 17.9 -2.5 23.4 13.7 53.7 32.5 56.4 11.0 
Public debt/total debt 
Private debt/total debt 



















14.7 32.9 21.1 37.6 13.9 17.8 16.4 27.8 41.5 
Source: Central Bank of Uruguay. 
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Source: Central Bank of Uruguay and Department of Statistics and Censuses. 
5. Monetary and fiscal policy 
a) Monetary policy 
Until November 1982, the policy applied by the monetary authorities had, as its primary aim, 
the struggle against the severe inflationary process. An essential instrument in this direction was the 
progressive deterioration of the real exchange rate. It was hoped that the moderation of prices of 
internationally-tradeable goods, combined with their greater availability resulting from the 
liberalization of external trade, would succeed in checking the upward trend of domestic prices. For 
this policy to succeed, it was esseential that the country's financial openness should attract 
considerable autonomous capital flows capable of compensating the balance-of-payments current 
account deficit. During 1979 and 1980 this scheme appeared to be working well, but in 1981 (and 
especially in 1982) the situation suffered a reversal: the inflow of foreign capital contracted in 1981 by 
40% after having trebled in the preceding two years, and it actually became negative in 1982. Despite 
the reduction of the current account deficit in both years, it was not possible to prevent difficulties 
from arising in the sphere of international reserves. Thus, these reserves rose by only US$ 26 million 
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in 1981 (only one-fifth of the average nominal increase recorded in the four preceding years), while 
they decreased by more than US$ 400 million in 1982. Since the reserves form part of the monetary 
base, their evolution was a determining factor in the contraction of the latter in real terms: -19% in 
1981 and -18% between January and November 1982. This became a factor of importance in the long 
term through its restrictive effects on liquidity after the severe recession of 1982. At the same time, 
conditions of access to international financial markets began to harden. The authorities therefore 
decided to abandon the anti-inflationary objective and concentrate their efforts on exercising direct 
control over the evolution of the money supply. It was hoped in this manner to secure an instrument 
serving both to direct the country's economic recovery and to restore equilibrium in its external 
accounts (by doing away with the unlimited availability of foreign exchange). However, after 
expanding by 8% in 1982 as a result of the end-year devaluation, the monetary base again contracted 
in 1983 (by 3%). Its evolution over the course of the year was extremely variable, since it recorded an 
annual growth rate of between 130% and 160% in January, March and July; a negative rate in 
February, April and August-November, and a growth rate of 270% in December. 
Total liquidity and its components, after their high artificial rate of expansion in 1982 owing to 
the end-year devaluation, deteriorated considerably in real terms in 1983. Total real liquidity 
contracted by 25%, while the quantity of money and of quasi-money decreased by 29% and 25% 
respectively. Within the latter, the reduction of deposits held in foreign currency was relatively 
greater (see table 18). 
As regards sources of liquidity, the real level of domestic credit fell, and the negative balance on 
the "other accounts" item increased sharply. This situation was partly mitigated by the increase in 
international reserves which came about as a result of the refinancing of the external debt, and by the 
sale of gold abroad. 
Total net domestic credit (excluding the Mortgage Bank) diminished by almost a third in real 
terms in 1983. Credit received by the private sector contracted severely, aggravating the financial 
difficulties affecting enterprises and accentuating the recessive process. The effects of this 
contraction came on top of the negative evolution recorded in 1982. The real growth of 74% shown in 
table 19 is wholly artificial, and was due to the sharp end-1982 devaluation: up to October 1982 real 
credit to the private sector had contracted by 2%. The devaluation, on the other hand, brought about a 
sharp increase in the weight of foreign-currency indebtedness within the total corresponding to each 
Table 16 






























































































































































































Source: Central Bank of Uruguay. 




URUGUAY: EVOLUTION OF WAGES 























































































































Source: Central Bank of Uruguay and Department of Statistics and Censuses. 
"Preliminary figures. Calculated on the basis of the minimum increases decreed by the Government up to October 1980, and of wages 
effectively paid thereafter. c Deflated by the consumer price index. 
Table 18 
URUGUAY: EVOLUTION OF MONETARY AGGREGATES 
Total liquidity 
Sources: 








Currency outside banks 
Current account deposits 
Quasi-money 
Time deposits in 
national currency 

















































































































































M,/Monetary base* 1.06 1.11 1.19 1.10 0.81 
M;/Monetary base' 3.64 4.34 6.35 8.56 6.62 
Source: Central Bank of Uruguay. 
"Preliminary figures. M, corresponds to money only. l M : corresponds to money plus quasi-money, or total liquidity. 
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productive sector. For the private sector as a whole, this proportion rose from 48% in 1981 to 73% in 
1982, declining marginally to 72% in 1983- The sectors with the highest foreign-currency 
indebtedness —representing four-fifths of their total debt— were manufacturing and construction, 
while in the case of livestock activity the proportion amounted to 55% (see table 20). 
During 1983 the monetary authority found it necessary to refinance part of the above debts. 
Thus, by June, commitments amounting to US$ 750 million had been rephased with resources 
provided by the Central Bank (US$ 200 million), the Banco de la República (US$ 150 million) and the 
private banking system. This operation covered 40% of the debt contracted in foreign currency by the 
productive sectors, and 23% of that incurred in national currency. 
Credit to the public sector continued to expand rapidly, since the Government, in progressively 
assuming a more direct role in the operation of the economy in response to the various difficulties 
affecting it in recent years, needed a greater supply of resources. Thus, from representing only 1 % of 
net domestic credit to the private and public sectors, credit to the public sector rose to 26% in 1983 
(see table 19). Strongly influencing this development was the fact that the monetary authority 
undertook the role of principal lender of the refinanced external debt, as a result of which its assets 
against the public sector expanded considerably. 
The delicate position of the private productive sector gave rise to a comparable situation in the 
case of the banking system. A number of measures were consequently instituted to relieve the 
situation. Firstly, the date on which the banks must reduce their capital by the amount of their 
uncollectable debts was postponed from 1 June 1983 to 1 January 1984. This gave them more time to 
reinstate their capital, in the event that it had fallen below established limits. Secondly, in view of the 
lack of bank liquidity, the Central Bank decreed that the basis for calculation of legal bank reserves 
would be the value of deposits held at the end of 1982, and granted five-day periods of grace to enable 
the banks to reconstitute their legal reserve levels and thereby avoid incurring penalties. At the same 
time, the Central Bank lifted the legal reserve requirement on inter-bank deposits of a duration of 
more than ten days. The Central Bank also offered funds directly to the banks at a rate of interest of 
110% in order to reduce inter-bank interest rates, which had reached levels of 130%. Finally, in 
August, two banks were officially intervened (Pemar Sudamérica and, under less strict conditions, 
Investbanca). 
Table 19 
URUGUAY: EVOLUTION OF NET DOMESTIC CREDIT 
Central Bank, Banco de la 
República and private banks 
Net credit to public and 
private sectors 
To public sector 
Central government 
Rest of public sector 
To private sector 
In national currency 
In foreign currency 
Other accounts' 
Total net credit 
Mortage Bank 
Net credit to public and 
private sectors 
To public sector 
To private sector 
Other accounts' 




































































































































Source: Central Bank of Uruguay. 








In national currency 
In foreign currency 
Livestock-raising 
Total 
In national currency 
In foreign currency 
Manufacturing 
Total 
In national currency 
In foreign currency 
Construction 
Total 
In national currency 
In foreign currency 
Commerce 
Total 
In national currency 
In foreign currency 
Services 
Total 
In national currency 
In foreign currency 
Consumption 
Total 
In national currency 
In foreign currency 
Total private bank credit 
to the private sector 
Total 
In national currency 
In foreign currency 


























































































































































































































































Source: Central Bank of Uruguay. 
a Preliminary figures. These columns show for each productive sector, the percentage of total private bank credit to the private sector 
received by it and, in figures between brackets, its composition as between national and foreign currency. 
Bank interest rates for operations in national currency continued at high positive values in real 
terms, although at the end of the year these rates were equivalent to only half those ruling in the 
second half of 1982 (see table 21). The effects of this high cost of credit were thus added to the scarcity 
of lendable funds already referred to. Furthermore, the real interest rates on national currency 
deposits continued to be higher than the interest paid on foreign-currency deposits (this having been 
the case since the last quarter of 1980). Combined with uncertainty throughout 1983 concerning the 
exchange rate policy, and in the light of the low monthly rates of devaluation, the above circumstances 
brought about a considerable increase in peso deposits. Although these contracted in real terms, they 
did so at a lower rate than deposits in foreign currency (see table 18). 
b) Fiscal policy 
After the marked deterioration of the fiscal accounts in 1982 —when an unprecedented deficit 
equivalent to 8.6% of the gross domestic product was recorded— the situation improved in 1983. The 
fiscal deficit dropped to less than half in real terms and was equivalent to 4% of the gross domestic 
product (see table 22). 
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This result was mainly due to the programme of austerity in public expenditure. A sharp 
contraction (-23%) was thus recorded in investment expenditure, in contrast with the expansion of 
20% in the preceding years, while current expenses shrank by 19% after the rapid growth of 45% 
registered in the same three-year period. The reduction in current expenses would have been greater 
had it not been for the rapid growth of public debt interest payments, which rose by 85 % in real terms 
after having increased by 67 % in the previous year. Thus, over a period of two years, the payments in 
question rose from 2% to 7% of total current expenditure. This increment was due to servicing costs 
on Treasury bills issued in foreign currency, which were used as a source of finance for the fiscal 
deficit. Expenditure on wages and social security contributions (which accounts for three-quarters of 
current fiscal outlays) fell sharply, as did that incurred in the purchase of goods and services. 
The Government managed to avoid a severe contraction of income in the year under review. 
After a reduction of 23% in real terms in 1982, revenues rose marginally in 1983, by 1%. Although 
the collection of taxes of domestic origin declined by 7% (after dropping by 22% in 1982), proceeds 
from dues levied on foreign trade recovered appreciably, expanding by 15% after successive 
contractions of 13% and 30% in the two preceding years. The basic cause of growth in the latter 
instance was the reintroduction of export retentions under the terms of Law 15360 enacted at the end 
of 1982.1 ncome under this heading represented almost 7% of fiscal revenues in 1983, whereas no 
income was obtained from this source in 1982. The devaluation, moreover, avoided a greater drop 
than that recorded in revenue from import dues, owing to the higher taxable base in national currency 
terms. Prominent in the sphere of domestic taxes was an increase of 21% in real terms in revenue 
from fuel taxes, income from this source having been strongly influenced by the adjustment of selling 
prices owing to the new exchange rate conditions (see table 16). 
Table 21 
URUGUAY: BANK INTEREST RATES" 
Operations in national currency Operations in 

































































































































Source: Central Bank of Uruguay. 
"Average of the most frequeni; interest rates of the five most representative institutions in each case, for fixed-term operations up to six 
months. Normal rates at the end of the last month of the period considered. c Nominal rates deflated by the accumulated 12-





URUGUAY: CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INCOME AND EXPENDITURE 
Current income 
Internal taxes 







Net income in industry and 
commerce 
Others 
On net worth 
Other taxes 
Less: documents received 
Taxes on foreign trade 
Import surcharges 
Customs dues 




Social security contributions 
Goods and services 
Transfers 
Interest on public debt 
Allocated income 
Current saving (1-2) 
Investments 
Total expenditure (2 + 4) 
Fiscal deficit or surplus (1-5) 
Financing 
Domestic 
Central Bank credit 
Banco de la República credit 
Exchange differences 
Bond sales 
Net sales of bills 























































































































































































































































































Source: Up to 1981: Office of the Accountant-General. As from 1982: combined figures prepared by the National Treasury and the Officeof the 
Accountant-General. The breakdown of internal taxes has been provided by the General Tax Department. 
"Preliminary figures. 'Corresponds to tax collection: the difference with respect to information on total cash is shown under other 
income. 'Including consular fees, other National Treasury receipts, allocated income, National Investment Fund, National Energy 
Fund, and difference between cash balances and tax collection information. Includes subsidies, advances and National Housing 
Fund. ' Real growth rate of the deficit. •'For 1980, excludes financing for payment of the 200 million pesos wheat debt, assigned 
to the 1979 financial year. 
The financing structure of the deficit was similar to that of the preceding year: three-quarters 
came from Central Bank funds and 30% from the net proceeds of the sale of Treasury bills, the latter 
mechanism being employed for the first time on this occasion. Credit received from the Banco de la 
República, on the other hand, decreased from the equivalent of 8% of the deficit in 1982 to only 1 % in 
1983. The other main difference was the evolution of net proceeds from the sale of bonds. Foreign 




1. Recent economic trends: Introduction and summary 
For the economy of Venezuela the year 1983 represented both a culmination of trends observed in the 
preceding year and a radical change in some basic features. Thus, for example, the aggravation of 
pressures that had been building up since the end of 1981 on the external front made it necessary to 
modify the foreign-exchange system. The abandonment after almost 20 years of a fixed single 
exchange parity and of an exchange system totally devoid of quantitative restrictions and their 
replacement by a multiple exchange-rate system and a controlled foreign-currency market 
represented the initiation of a first phase in an abrupt and difficult adjustment process. 
This measure contributed to the correction of the main external imbalances, since both the 
trade and the current accounts again showed positive results after the large deficits recorded in 1982 
(see table 1 and figure 1). These results, however, were primarily due to a drastic drop of 52% in 
imports and the postponement of service payments on the external debt. Exports, for their part, 
continued to face unfavourable conditions and contracted by 15%. At the same time, the capital 
account again closed with a considerable deficit (US$ 2 900 million), so that the slight increase of 
close on US$ 470 million in the country's international reserves at the end of the period fell 
substantially short of compensating their contraction in the preceding year by more than US$ 7 600 
million. 
In contrast with previous years, domestic economic activity failed to make up for the negative 
results in the external sector, and the gross domestic product therefore declined by 3% —its largest 
contraction in the entire period since the war. The per capita product, for its part, fell for the sixth 
consecutive year, so that it stood at a level 20% below that of 1977. At the same time, largely owing to 
the unusually high open unemployment rate (10%), average family income dropped to an even 
greater extent (see table 1). 
This reduction in income levels helped to some extent to offset the effects of a 30% expansion 
in the money supply, with the result that the rate of inflation continued to decline for the fourth 
successive year. Similarly, the reduction of 9% in government expenditure contributed to a slight 
alleviation of the fiscal deficit, which thus sank to a level equivalent to less than 1% of the gross 
domestic product. 
2. Trends in economic activity 
a) Total supply and demand 
The total supply of goods and services decreased by nearly 17% in 1983 as a consequence of 
unusually large contractions in both domestic activity and imports. As already noted, the gross 
domestic product registered the largest contraction since the war, decreasing by 3 % in real terms to a 
level below that recorded in 1978. At the same time, external purchases decreased by more than 52%, 
so that the import coefficient —which during almost the whole of the preceding decade had shown a 
vigorous upward trend— fell from 35% in 1982 to less than 19% in 1983—a level equivalent to that 
of 1970 (see table 2). 
Among the components of demand, investment was the most adversely affected. While gross 
fixed investment dropped by nearly 32 %, stock levels declined by an amount equivalent to nearly 3 % 
of total demand. Gross domestic investment consequently decreased by 49% to a level equivalent to 
only 17% of the gross domestic product —the lowest such proportion in the past 13 years (see 
table 3). 
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At the same time, substantial changes took place in the sources of investment. In the first place, 
the inflow of external resources showed a substantially negative balance, equivalent to more than 7% 
of the gross domestic product and to almost half the level of gross domestic investment. Domestic 
savings, on the other hand, whose participation in investment financing had shown a marked decline 
in 1981 and 1982, again contributed to an extent closer to that recorded in the second half of the 1970s 
(36%), but they were equivalent to only 6% of the gross domestic product —a level only slightly 
above that of net external factor payments. Domestic investment financing in 1983 consequently 
relied primarily on the terms-of-trade effect, although this was lower in relation to the gross domestic 
product (see table 3). 
Table 1 
VENEZUELA: MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS 
A. Basic economic indicators 
Gross domestic product at market prices 
(millions of 1970 dollars) 
Population (millions of inhabitants) 
Per capita gross domestic product 
(in 1970 dollars) 
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983" 
19 817 20 081 19 682 19 623 19 757 19 164 
14.1 14.6 15.0 15.5 15.9 16.4 
1 408 1 380 1 310 1 267 1 239 1 169 
B. Short-run economic indicators 
Gross domestic product 
Per capita gross domestic product 
Gross income 
Terms of trade (goods and services) 
Current value of exports of goods 
and services 




Variation between annual averages 
Money 
Wages and salaries 
Unemployment rate 
Current government income 
Total government expenditure 
Fiscal deficit/total government expenditure 




























































































Millions of dollars 
C External sector 
Trade balance (goods and services) 
Balance on current account 
Balance on capital account 
































Source: EC LAC, on the basis of official data. 
"Preliminary figures. ''Gross domestic product plus terms-of-trade effect. c Cost-of-living index for the Caracas metropolitan 
area. ** Average family income» deflated by the cost-of-living index for the Caracas Metropolitan area. 'First half of 
'Percentage. year. 
reporting to the Bank for International Settlements. 




VENEZUELA: TOTAL SUPPLY AND DEMAND 
Total supply 
Gross domestic product 
at market prices 




Gross domestic investment 




Machinery and equipment 




Exports of goods and 
services 
Millions of dollars 





























































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official data from the Central Bank of Venezuela. 
"Preliminary figures. 'The figures for imports and exports of goods and services were taken from balance-of-payments data expressed 
in dollars at current values, which were converted to constant 1970 values using price indexes calculated by ECLAC for the purpose. 
Table 3 




1. Gross domestic investment 
Percentage of gross domestic investment 
100.0 100.0 
2. Gross national savings (a + b + c) 
a) Gross domestic saving 
b) Net external factor payments'7 
c) Terms-of-trade effect 
3. External savings 
1. Gross domestic investment 
6.2 -26.4 
As percentages of gross domestic product 
38.6 29.2 
2. Gross national savings (a + b + c) 
a) Gross domestic savings 
b) Net external factor payments' 
c) Terms-of-trade effect 











































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official statistics. 





VENEZUELA: MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS 
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Source: ECLAC, on the basis of offícial data. 
aAnnual growth rate. t>Average annual rate for whole country. cPercentage 
variation, December - December, in the Caracas metropolitan area. ¿Millions °f dollars. 




VENEZUELA: GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT, BY KIND OF 
ECONOMIC ACTIVITY, AT FACTOR COST 










Electricity, gas and water 




Financial institutions, insurance, 
real estate, and business services 
Ownership of dwellings 
Community, social and 
personal services 
Government services 
Less: imputed commission 
for bank services 
Millions of dollars 

















































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures supplied by the Central Bank of Venezuela. 
"Preliminary figures. * As the individual activities and the totals were calculated independently, the sum of the former does not 
correspond exactly with the latter. 'Excludes petroleum refining. 'Refers to real estate and business sévices. 
The other two components of final demand —exports and consumption— showed less 
pronounced declines (-7%). While the contraction of consumption was the first recorded in the past 
25 years, that of exports marked the continuation of the declines of the three preceding years. The 
volume of external sales of goods and services was thus 20% lower in 1983 than in 1979 (see table 2). 
b) Evolution of the main sectors 
Although exact details are not available, it seems reasonable to assume that the contraction of 
economic activity in 1983 affected the production of goods more than that of services. The 
construction sector was especially hard hit, since its product fell by almost 11 % and thus stood, after 
five consecutive years of contraction, at a level barely 60% of that recorded in 1979. The increase of 
7% in petroleum refining activity, for its part, failed to make up for the decline of 5 % in oil extraction 
(see table 4). 
i) Agriculture. Agricultural output virtually stagnated in 1983, since it increased by only 0.7%. 
This small increment was due to the increase of almost 3% in the livestock sector, which more than 
offset the drop of 3.6% in crop-farming production. Fishing and forestry also showed declines in 
their levels of activity, though without appreciably affecting global results in the sector owing to their 
modest relative weight (see table 5). 
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The production of most crops diminished in 1983, but the most marked declines occurred in the 
harvests of cereals. The output of maize fell by 14%, and that of rice and sorghum went down by about 
a quarter (-24% and -26% respectively). Credit restrictions were a decisive factor in this decline, since 
producers of cereals —who customarily absorb approximately half of the credit allocated to 
agriculture— received loans that were 20% lower than in 1982.' 
The volume of the sugar cane harvest also declined (by nearly 5%). This sector continued to be 
in a precarious financial situation due to the failure of the public sugar-refining enterprise 
(CERAZUCA) to pay its extremely high debts to producers. 
On the other hand, the production of some other crops rose, representing in most instances a 
recovery from declines caused in the preceding year by adverse weather conditions. This was 
particularly so in the case of tropical export crops (coffee and cocoa), where the volumes harvested 
increased by 4% and 8% respectively (see table 5). Although the production of both these crops 
continued to be lower than in 1975, the financial results of these activities improved in 1983 because 
they received the benefit of the new higher exchange rate applicable to exports. 
Table 5 
VENEZUELA: INDICATORS OF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION 

























Eggs, for consumption 










































































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of statistics sumplied by the Central Bank of Venezuela. 
'Preliminary figures. 'Calculated on the basis of the gross value of production at 1968 prices. 
Thousands of head. 'Thousands of litres. Thousands of units. 
'Thousands of tons. 
1 The loans granted by the sectoral bodies as a whole (the Agricultural Credit Institute, the Agricultural Development Bank and the 




VENEZUELA: MAIN INDICATORS OF PETROLEUM PRODUCTION 
Crude oil 

























































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of information contained in the address by the President of Venezuela to the Congress of the Republic, January 
1984. 
"Preliminary figures. ^Includes industrial consumption, including that of the petroleum industry, and domestic uses. c Billions of 
barrels. ''in years. Calculated by dividing total reserves by the production of crude oil in the corresponding year. 'Percentage. 
The new foreign exchange system also favoured the development of activities in the livestock-
raising sector, which benefited from imports of inputs at subsidized prices and the establishment of 
strict quotas for external purchases of meat. All component activities in this sector expanded 
vigorously, prominent among them being the slaughtering of cattle (27%) and of sheep (16%). With 
regard to the latter, however, the effects of the sharp drop of 29% experienced in the preceding year 
were only partially compensated, and the number of animals slaughtered was less than that recorded 
in 1980 (see table 5). 
Milk production, for its part, rose by 3%, continuing its moderate upward trend, while that of 
eggs dropped by 1 %. Finally, fishery output contracted in volume by almost 2 % and was barely equal 
to that of three years earlier. 
ii) The petroleum sector. The petroleum sector product declined in 1983 by nearly 3 %, basically 
as a result of the persistence of a decidedly unfavourable international situation. Some degree of 
stabilization of world markets due to factors influencing both supply and demand was nevertheless 
noted in the course of the year. 
The significant recovery in the leading industrialized economies —especially in the United 
States— failed to bring about sufficient additional demand for petroleum to compensate for the 
contraction attributable to the energy-saving programmes instituted in those countries since 1973.2 
Nevertheless, there was an appreciable deceleration during the year in the rate of contraction of 
world oil consumption observed since 1978. Consumption in the member countries of the 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) fell by only 2.7% in 1983 after 
declines of more than 5% in each of the three preceding years. 
On the other hand, world petroleum production —which had fallen steadily in the three 
previous years— showed almost no variation in 1983. The rate of contraction in the production of the 
2Energy-saving programmes and technological changes have considerably lowered the ratio of energy input per unit of production. 
Thus, fuel consumption in the OECD countries has fallen by half in the past ten years, while gasoline consumption has increased only marginally. 
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OPEC countries also declined considerably, since, after a drop of 18% in 1982, it went down by only 
6% in 1983- The proportion of world production supplied by the OPEC countries, however, fell to 
30%: well below the figure of 50% recorded ten years earlier. 
The lower volume of OPEC production was the result of decisions adopted by the organization 
itself at an extraordinary meeting held in March 1983. On that occasion, in the light of an 
unprecedented tense situation on the international oil scene, the OPEC member countries managed to 
restore a consensus and agreed to reduce not only their volume of production, but also their reference 
Figure 2 
VENEZUELA: INDICATORS OF THE PETROLEUM INDUSTRY 
(Millions of barrels) 
1 500 
Production of crude oil 
Production of refined 
products 
Exports of refined 
products 
J L _L 
Domestic consumption of refined products 









VENEZUELA: MAIN FINANCIAL INDICATORS RELATING 
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Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures published by Petróleos de Venezuela. 
prices.3 Consequently, in order to comply with the quota of 1 675 000 barrels per day which had been 
assigned to it by OPEC, Venezuela had to cut back its oil production by 13 % as from the second quarter 
of 1983. The volume of crude oil exports, however, only decreased by 7%, partly owing to sales of 
stocks accumulated by the petroleum industry in the preceding year. Even so, the volume exported 
failed to reach half of that recorded in 1970 (see table 6 and figure 2). 
A further effect of drawing on oil stocks accumulated in previous years was that both production 
and exports of refined products rose in 1983 by nearly 5%. At the same time, domestic consumption 
of these products dropped for the first time in recent decades as a result of economic sluggishness and 
repeated increases in domestic fuel prices (see table 6). 
For this last reason the value of sales in the domestic market rose by 16% and accounted for 6% 
of the total earnings of Petróleos de Venezuela: the highest such proportion ever recorded (see 
table 7). In contrast, the average price of external sales fell by almost 8%. 
The realization prices of exports of light and medium crudes, which are directly dependent on 
the OPEC crude oil reference price, dropped in 1983 by an even greater extent (-12%). The prices of 
heavy crude oils and residual fuels, which are not subject to administrative controls, were less affected 
and fell by only 3 %. This was due, on the one hand, to their greater deterioration in the preceding year 
and, on the other, to the policy of more active co-operation applied by Mexico and Venezuela in the 
sale of residual fuels in the North American market. The joint fixing of prices and of corresponding 
export levels in this case led to certain improvement in market conditions, as a result of which it even 
became possible to institute small price rises in August and November 1983. 
Due to the lower external prices, the operating surplus of the petroleum industry contracted 
substantially (-30%). Owing to this contraction and to those suffered in the two preceding years, the 
profits of the petroleum industry were barely half those obtained in 1980. A consequence of this 
decline was a reduction of almost 25% in the oil companies' gross fixed investment. As well as being 
of considerable magnitude, this reduction was the first registered in this form of investment in the 
past ten years (see table 7). 
'The official price of light Arabian crude was reduced from 34 to 29 dollars per barrel, and a decline of approximately the same 
proportion (159?) affected other crudes included in the OPEC reference group. These reductions were the first to be established by OPEC since 
its formation. 
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iii) Mining. The non-petroleum mining product decreased by 10% in 1983 as a result of 
contractions in the levels of activity of almost all its component sections (see table 8). Particularly 
noteworthy was the drop of 8.5 % in iron ore output which, after three consecutive years of decline, 
sank to a level equivalent to only two-thirds of the volume produced in 1980. Export sale's of iron ore, 
on the other hand, rose by almost 5%, but nevertheless failed to make up for their drastic decline 
(-47%) in the preceding year. 
Coal production, for its part, contracted by 13% as a result of a simultaneous drop in domestic 
demand and in prices. In contrast, although the volume of diamond production fell for the fourth 
successive year, its value rose by 32% due to a substantial price increase on the domestic market. Still 
more favourable were the results in the production of gold, which rose by 1 % in volume and by 64% 
in value. 
iv) Manufacturing. Manufacturing output fell by more than 2% in 1983. Particularly affected 
were the branches producing capital goods and, especially, motor vehicles. In spite of several 
measures introduced in its favour (such as a ban on the importation of buses and an authorization to 
raise prices by 14% to cover the effects of devaluation on costs), the production of commercial 
vehicles fell by almost two-thirds in 1983, while that of automobiles showed a more moderate decline 
of 4%. The output of other classes of machinery decreased by between 9% and 12% (see table 9). 
The depressed level of domestic activity also had a negative effect on the production of inputs 
and intermediate goods. Reflecting the spectacular fall in activity in the building sector, output of 
basic iron and steel products declined by approximately 20%, while that of cement dropped by 24%. 
Likewise, the stagnation of agricultural activity and the consequent lower demand for fertilizers 
contributed to a decrease of 11% in the production of industrial chemicals and of 6% in that of 
petroleum products (see table 9). 
Some sub-sectors, on the other hand, recorded rises in their levels of activity. This was 
especially the case in the group of public manufacturing enterprises. Steel production rose by almost 
8%, since the considerable drop (-33%) in domestic demand was more than offset by an increase of 
228% in external sales. To this greater sales volume were added the positive effects of the new 
exchange system,4 so that the public steel corporation SIDOR was able to reduce its operating loss by 
39%. This loss nevertheless still amounted in the year to 486 million bolívares, mainly due to the 
heavy financial commitments undertaken by this enterprise. 
The expansion of exports, and the benefits deriving from the modification of the exchange 
system, proved still more favourable in the case of aluminium production, which rose by 22% to its 
highest level of the past four years. Another favourable factor was the bringing into operation of the 
Table 8 







































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of statistics prepared by the Ministry of Energy and Mines. 
"Preliminary figures. Millions of tons. 'Kilogrammes. Thousands of carats. 'Thousands of tons. 
4 Under the new exchange system, the steel and aluminium industries were authorized to sell their foreign-currency export proceeds at 





VENEZUELA: INDICATORS OF MANUFACTURING PRODUCTION 
























































































































































































































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of statistics supplied by the Central Bank of Venezuela. 
"Preliminary figures. ''Base: 1975 = 100. ' Thousands of tons. ^Thousands of units. 
Thousands of persons. 
'Bi l l ions of kWh. 
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INTERALUMINA corporation, which turned out 500 000 tons of alumina (the main input employed in 
the manufacture of aluminium). The consequent reduction of costs, together with the exchange-rate 
advantage already referred to, enabled the two public aluminium-producing companies, ALCASA and 
VENELUM, to end the year with the highest operating profits recorded since their establishment. 
Finally, the manufacture of consumer goods showed variable results, since the incentives 
deriving from import restrictions and higher Customs tariffs did not in all cases make up for the 
unfavourable effects of the contraction of family income. The latter deterioration affected in 
particular the manufacturers of footwear and tobacco products, whose output dropped by 9 % and 5 % 
respectively (see table 9)- In contrast, clothing production increased by approximately 8% —more 
than three times the previous year's growth rate, The foodstuffs and beverage industries, for their 
part, recorded positive growth rates of 7% and 4%, although these increases were much lower than 
those attained in the preceding year. 
v) Construction. The building industry was undoubtedly that most affected by the recession in 
1983- Its level of activity, which had already decreased in the four preceding years, fell by a further 
11% in the year under review, so that its gross product was 40% lower in 1983 than it had been in 
1979 (see table 10). 
This negative result was basically due to the financial restrictions which severely limited 
activity in both the private and public sectors in 1983. In the case of the public sector, the drop in fiscal 
revenue and the tense financial situation of the quasi-autonomous institutions5 led to a considerable 
contraction in infrastructural works, which mostly affected the building sanitary and transportation 
facilities. Thus, the value of the latter was 70% less than in the preceding year. 
Likewise, the number of new dwellings started by the public sector decreased by 40%, while 
private sector activity in this sphere also contracted severely (-36%) as a result of the decline in real 
incomes and the drop of nearly 50% in the financial resources granted to building companies (see 
table 10). 
Table 10 
VENEZUELA: INDICATORS OF CONSTRUCTION ACTIVITY 
Index of sectoral GDP 
Activity indicators 
Domestic sales of steel 
for building^ 
Domestic sales of cement^ 
Employment 
Loans received' 
Construction of dwellings 






















































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of information from the Centra] Bank of Venezuela and the Central Planning and Co-ordination Office 
(CORDIPLAN). 
"Preliminary figures. Base: 1975— 100. cThousandsof tons. ''Thousands of persons. eMillionsof bolívares.Loans 
to private-dwelling building concerns. Including —in addition to dwellings— plots of land and loans for low-cost construction. 
^Up to 1982 these institutions had financed their projects by resorting to excessive increases in short-term indebtedness. However, since 
there were simultaneous reductions in 1983 in public revenue receipts, fiscal contributions, and access to external financing, they had to face 
enormous repayment commitments. The case of the National Institute for Sanitary Works (INOS) was particularly acute since, because of its 
inability to pay the interest commitments on its high external debt, it had to resort to emergency assistance from the central government to 




VENEZUELA: EVOLUTION OF EMPLOYMENT AND UNEMPLOYMENT 
Total work force 











Electricity, gas, water 
and sanitary services 
Tertiary sector 
Commerce and financial 
institutions 

















































































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of data compiled by the Central Statistics and Information Office (OCEI), reproduced in the publication entitled 
lincuesta de Hogares (Household surveys). 
"Preliminary figures. Percentage of total population in the work force. 
c) Employment and unemployment 
The level of 9.8% reached by the unemployment rate in the first half of 1983 marked the 
greatest point of deterioration in recent years, directly reflecting the decline in national economic 
activity (see table 11). 
Although the work force expanded slightly less than in previous years, so that the participation 
rate declined by one percentage point, the level of employment showed a slight decrease (-0.3%) for 
the first time in five years. This contraction mainly affected the secondary employment sector, where 
an increase of 17% in the number of persons employed in public utility services failed to compensate 
for the contractions of 6% and 17% respectively in the number engaged in manufacturing and 
construction. The secondary sector thus accounted in 1983 for less than a quarter of total employment 
in the country. 
Service activities consequently represented almost 60% of the employed population. In 
particular, employment under the sub-heading 'other services' rose by 4%, thereby reflecting the 
displacement of manual labour within the total number employed towards domestic service and 
informal activities in this recessionary period. 
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As was to be expected, the manufacturing and construction sectors recorded the highest 
unemployment rates (12% and 21% respectively). Labourers and artisans thus accounted for more 
than one-third of the unemployed. The unemployment rate in the commercial sector, for its part, 
although much less severe than in other activities, was more than double the level recorded in the 
same sector in 1979 (see table 11). 
3. The external sector 
a) Exchange policy 
The radical modification of the foreign-exchange system considerably influenced external 
sector results in 1983. The replacement of a fixed single parity, which had been in force in Venezuela 
for 18 years, by a system of different exchange rates became necessary because of the persistence 
throughout the first two months of the year of the massive outflows of private capital which had been 
occurring since the beginning of the previous year. These outflows, together with the simultaneous 
contraction of normal foreign-currency earnings (especially those of the petroleum industry), 
provoked an initial decision to revalue and centralize the country's foreign currency reserves. This 
decision, adopted in September 1982, caused the country's international reserves to rise to more than 
US$ 10 billion6 (see table 12 and 13). 
Table 12 
VENEZUELA: INTERNATIONAL RESERVES 
(Millions of dollars) 












































































































































Source: Central Bank of Venezuela. 
6The revaluation of the price of the gold held by the Central Bank enabled the value of the reserves to rise from USS 484 million to 
USS 5 459 million, while the centralization in the same bank of the foreign-currency assets of Petróleos de Venezuela almost doubled the 




VENEZUELA: CENTRAL BANK FOREIGN EXCHANGE 
RECEIPTS AND OUTGOINGS 









































































































































































































Source: Central Bank of Venezuela. 
"Position at end of period, including adjustments. 
petroleum industry. 
Including the effect of centralization of the foreign-exchange assets of the 
This measure failed to re-establish confidence, however, and private capital outflows rose still 
further, exceeding US$ 60 million daily during February 1983. The Central Bank international 
reserves consequently fell by 14% in the first six weeks of the year to a level of US$ 8 630 million on 
18 February 1983. Within this total, only US$ 3 500 million consisted of foreign-currency holdings: a 
quantity equivalent to the value of three months' imports, or no more than the level recorded before 
the reserves were centralized in September 1982. 
In order to put an end to this situation and restore a more adequate level of international 
reserves, a multiple exchange system consisting of three basic rates was established on 28 February 
1983- The previous exchange rate of 4.30 bolívares per dollar was maintained for imports regarded as 
essential. Venezuelan students' expenses abroad, and foreign-debt servicing payments. A second 
preferential rate, at 6 bolívares per dollar, was established for less essential imports; and, finally, 
other transactions (travel expenses, capital transfers) became subject to the rate deriving from the 
exchange operations on the Caracas Stock Exchange. 
At the same time, a commission known as the Differential Exchange System (Régimen de 
Cambio Diferencial —RECADI) was set up and made responsible for issuing licences authorizing 
economic agents to obtain foreign currency from the Central Bank at the preferential rates. In 
practice, however, this process became characterized by vagueness and operational delays which 
severely limited the release of foreign currency by the authorities. This relative domestic shortage of 
foreign currency, combined with the depressed external conditions in both the petroleum and 
financial fields, brought about a rapid rise in the free exchange rate, which reached 7.50 bolívares per 
dollar in the first week of March, and continued to rise exceeding 14 bolívares by August. A small 
reduction in the latter rate took place in the last quarter of the year, and the level was 12.75 bolívares 
per dollar at the end of December. Owing to the large difference in value compared with the fixed 
preferential exchange rates, the previous over-valuation of the bolivar was appreciably reduced in the 
case of some transactions due to the increase of 180% in the effective real exchange rate (see 
table 14). 
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Sales of foreign currency at the old rate nevertheless continued to account for a significant 
proportion (81%) of the foreign currency outgoings of the Central Bank, with sales at the rate of 6 
bolívares per dollar and at the free rate representing much lower proportions (6% and 12% 
respectively). The average exchange rate for the whole economy was thus 5 bolívares per dollar, 
which only exceeded the former ruling rate by 16%. 
b) Merchandise trade 
The modification of the foreign-exchange system naturally affected the trade in goods, causing 
the merchandise trade surplus to rise to nearly US$ 7 200 million: more than double the level of the 
preceding year. Nevertheless, this positive balance was still lower than that obtained in 1980 and 
1981, and was in practice the consequence of a drastic contraction (-48%) in the volume of external 
purchases, since the volume and value of exports were the lowest in the last five years. The terms of 
trade, for their part, deteriorated by 7% after two years of virtual stagnation (see table 15 and 
figure 3). 
i) Exports. Although in 1983 there was a moderate drop in the volume of exports (-4%), the 
decline of 12% in their average unit value was the largest in the past ten years and was more than 
Table 14 
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Source: ECLAC, on the basis of information from the International Monetary Fund. 
''Corresponds to the average of the indexes of the real exchange rate of the bolivar in relation ro the currencies of Venezuela's main trading 
partners, weighred according to the relative importance of exports to and imports from those countries. For further information concerning 
the methods and sources used, see the Statistical Appendix (methodological note) to the llconomic Survey of Lutin A tuertea, 
19HI. Preferential exchange rate ruling as from 28 February 1983 exclusively for imports regarded as essential, expenses of students 
abroad, and external debt commitments. ' Freely floating exchange rate determined by transactions on the Caracas Stock Exchange; 
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double the drop of 5% recorded the year before (see table 15). Because of these developments, the 
purchasing power of exports of goods diminished for the fifth consecutive year —on this occasion by 
11%— so that it was only 20% above the level recorded in 1978 (i.e., before the second series of rises 
in international oil prices). 
As was to be expected, this evolution was mainly attributable to the performance of external 
sales of hydrocarbon products, which, in spite of the unfavourable international situation, continued 
to represent more than 90% of the country's total exports of goods (see table 16). In this respect, the 
decisions adopted by OPEC in March 1983 brought about a drop of 7% in the volume of Venezuelan oil 
sales and of 9% in their average price. Their value thus contracted by nearly 13 % to a total of less than 
US$ 13 700 million —a figure barely higher than that recorded in 1978. 
The external prices of other traditional export products also contracted considerably and 
consequently reduced earnings from external sales. Thus, for example, the increase of 5% in the 
volume of iron ore exports failed to compensate for the drop of more than 30% in their average 
external price. Foreign sales of coffee and cocoa also fell significantly (-33% and -20% respectively). 
On the other hand, the new foreign-exchange system had a very favourable effect on non-
traditional exports, and external sales by private sector enterprises rose by 43%. Agro-industrial 
exports —especially of rum, essential oils and poultry products— were prominent in this group, 
which benefited from the considerable difference between the preferential exchange rate affecting 
imports of inputs and the free rate applicable to the proceeds of external sales. 
The public industrial enterprises also found favourable conditions for their non-traditional 
exports. External sales of aluminium rose by more than 50% as a consequence of the combined effects 
of the new exchange rate and higher international prices. Still more impressive was the growth of 
exports of iron and steel products, which increased almost fivefold from US$ 53 million in 1982 to 
US$ 253 million in 1983 (see table 16). 
Finally, the expansion of non-traditional exports was reflected in the higher share (65 %) of the 
OECD countries in total Venezuelan sales, since they were the largest purchasers of these products (see 
table 17). 
ii) Imports. Exchange control had both a more direct and a quantitatively larger effect on the 
evolution of imports, which contracted by more than 50% to a level barely above that of 1977 (see 
table 15). 
Table 15 
VENEZUELA: MAIN FOREIGN TRADE INDICATORS 
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Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 







































































































































Source: Central Bank of Venezuela; for 1983, Fifth Report to the National Congress ( "V Mensaje al Congreso de la República"). 
In accordance with the foreign-exchange measures which came into force in February 1983, the 
rate of 4.30 bolívares per dollar remained valid for imports of goods classified as essential, namely 
food and basic pharmaceutical products, raw material inputs for the agricultural and manufacturing 
sectors, and capital goods. As already mentioned, other imports became subject to a second 
preferential exchange rate of 6 bolívares per dollar. 
At the same time, direct restrictive measures were extended7 by the inclusion in the list of 
prohibited imports of most jewellery, watches and clocks, and electrical and other household 
appliances, and by the generalued use of prior licenses for external purchases. 
Finally, the operational slowness of the new administrative process and shortages of foreign 
currency at the Central Bank, also contributed to the unusually large reduction of imports in 1983. 
Although the restrictions affected a wide range of products, consumer goods were —as might be 
expected— those that declined to the greatest extent (-58%), since purchases of goods classified as 
luxury items which came within this group fell by more than two-thirds (see table 18). The 
restrictions on imports of textiles and agro-industrial products had a particularly adverse effect on 
purchases from Colombia, which fell by 72% in the first ten months of the year, while the ban on 
imports of vehicles and domestic appliances had a similar negative effect on purchases from Japan 
(see table 17). 
Purchases of raw materials, on the other hand, showed the smallest relative contraction 
(-43%), although special mention should be made, in this context, of the severe drop (-75%) in 
imports of inputs for the construction industry, which had the dual effect of raising the cost of 
imported building components and further restraining domestic activity in this sector. 
c) Services trade and factor payments 
The exchange-control measures provoked an even greater contraction (-68%) in foreign-
currency outgoings for travel expenses. These amounted to only US$ 940 million in the year and were 
consequently the lowest under this heading in the past seven years. The sharp upward trend of the 
deficit on the services account observed since 1974 was thus reversed, as it fell from US$ 4 825 
million in 1982 to US$ 1 345 million in 1983 (see table 19). 
'The importation of 146 items rated as luxury products (alcoholic beverages and some articles of clothing and electrical domestic 
appliances) had been prohibited at the end of 1982, whilequantitative limits were imposed on other foreign purchases (fertilizers, motor vehicles 
and agro-industrial products). 
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Unrequited private transfer payments also decreased (by 57%), due to the lower dollar value of 
remittances abroad made by foreigners working in Venezuela. 
Interest payments, for their part, decreased by 18% as a result of substantial delays in payment 
by both the public and private sectors. The repatriation of considerable public funds invested abroad 
in order to alleviate the heavy domestic demand for foreign currency provoked a simultaneous, but 
much greater, reduction (-49%) in income from external assets. The negative balance of interest-
payment operations thus increased by 53%, leading to a net outflow of slightly more than US$ 1 700 
million. 
d) Current account and capital account balances 
As a result of the above developments, the current account showed a striking turnaround from a 
deficit of US$ 4 200 million in 1982 to a surplus of US$ 3 500 million in 1983 (see table 19). This 
amount, however, only exceeded by US$ 670 million the negative capital account balance of nearly 
US$ 2 900 million. The latter deficit —though 20% less than in 1982— was the result of an abrupt 
reversal of the external capital flow trends observed up to 1980. Thus, for the first time since 1974, 
there was a net outflow of long-term capital, and moreover this reached the unusually high level of 
US$ 1 930 million, owing mainly to the drastic contraction in the external financing received. On the 
other hand, short-term capital movements showed a small positive balance (US$ 630 million) which 
brought to an end a period of three successive annual deficits. This change was possibly due largely to 
delays in the disbursement of interest payments. 
Table 17 
VENEZUELA: ORIGIN OF IMPORTS, AND DESTINATION 











































































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures published by the IMF in Direction of Trade Statistics. 
"Preliminary figures. ''January-May. 'Growth rate in relation to the same period of the preceding year. 
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Source: ECLAC, on the basis of statistics of the Central Bank of Venezuela and —for 1983— "V Mensaje al Congreso de la República". 
"Refers to the period January-July. ''January-July, compared with the same period in 1982. 
At the end of the year, therefore, the Central Bank was able to report an increase of US$ 960 
million in its foreign-exchange holdings. Its total international reserves also rose (by 11%), reaching 
the level of US$ 11 150 million. The other components of the country's international reserves, 
however, showed a declining trend. In this respect, the net external assets of the Fondo de Inversión 
de Venezuela - FIV (Venezuela Investment Fund) recorded the largest decrease, contracting by 65%, 
while the foreign-currency holdings of the commercial banks decreased by 23% despite their already 
depressed level since the preceding year. Total international reserves, therefore, only expanded by 
9%, reaching a level of US$ 11 700 million at the year's end (see table 12). 
e) External indebtedness 
The country's external indebtedness showed a fairly ambiguous evolution in quantitative terms 
in 1983- Both the balance of the public debt and that of the total national debt showed relatively 
modest growth rates (12% and 10% respectively), while interest payments declined substantially 
(-18%) for the first time, after seven years of vigorous expansion (see table 20). This apparently 
favourable situation was largely due, however, to a moratorium agreed with the country's foreign 
creditors as from February 1983, and to delays in interest payments by public and private debtors. 
Despite these circumstances, the latter payments continued to represent more than 20% of the value: 
of exports of goods and services, while the total foreign debt reached an unprecedented level 
equivalent to twice the value of external sales, or almost three-quarters of the gross domestic product. 
Several factors combined to bring about this situation. On the one hand, the contraction of the 
oil market considerably reduced foreign-currency earnings (by 35%), while the international banks 
simultaneously cut back their net financing to the country. On the other, these same conjunctural 
difficulties revealed a number of shortcomings in the structure of the external debt, which had been 
characterized by its disorderly and sustained expansion (at an annual average rate of 35% in the 1975-
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Table 19 
VENEZUELA: BALANCE OF PAYMENTS 
(Millions of dollars) 
Balance on current account 
Trade balance 
Exports of goods and services 
Goods, FOB 
Real services 
Transport and insurance 
Travel 
Imports of goods and services 
Goods, FOB 
Real services 






Labour and ownership 
Unrequited private transfers 
Balance on capital account 
Unrequited official transfers 
Long-term capital 
Direct investment (net) 
Portfolio investment (net) 














Errors and omissions 
Global balance 
Total variation in reserves 
(- sign indicates an increase) 
Monetary gold 
Special Drawing Rights 
IMF reserve position 
Foreign exchange assets 
Other assets 




























































































































































































































































































































Source: 1977-1982: International Monetary Fund, Balance of Payments Yearbook, March 1984 (magnetic tape); 1983: ECLAC, on the basis of 
officiai data. 
"Preliminary figures. Real services also include other off icial and private transactions, but exclude factor services. c In addition to 
loans received and amortization payments made, this item includes net loans granted and other assets and liabilities. The global balance 
is the sum of the current account balance plus the balance on capital account. The difference between the total variation in reserves (of opposite 
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Source: ECLAC, on rhe basis of statistics compiled by the Cenrral Bank of Venezuela and by international financial agencies. 
"Preliminary figures. According to the Law governing Public Credit, direct debt is that deriving from loan contracts entered into by the 
State and from bonds sold on behalf of the State. Indirect debt comprises commitments deriving from loans contracted (wit h of without State 
guarantee) by autonomous public institutions and public enterprises, and those deriving from sales of securities issued by these 
bodies. 'ECLAC estimates, including the public debt and the non-guaranteed long- and short-term debt owed to financial institutions 
reporting to the Bank for International Settlements. Public debt only. 'ECLAC estimates, based on the movement in the 
relevant balance-of-payment items. The debt-servicing costs referred to in the calculation of this coefficient include public-debt 
amortization payments (as prescribed in the Law on Public Credit) and interest payments on the global debt. 
1980 period). More specifically, the actual manner of contracting public credit8 encouraged the 
dispersal of the contracting organisms, incompatibilities between the repayment periods and 
destinations of loans and an excessive concentration of short-term maturities. 
In the light of these circumstances, the Government attempted at the end of 1981 to draw up a 
general rephasing programme rather than deal with the various cases individually as hitherto. In a 
first stage it was sought to renegotiate an amount of US$ 7 to 8 billion corresponding to the short-
term debt of the central government and of some government agencies, with a view to converting 
these debts into longer-term commitments guaranteed by the State. 
The growing international financial tensions, however, hampered the relevant negotiations, 
and it only proved possible to refinance part of these debts in 1982. In the meantime it became 
necessary to increase the total amount of loans for which refinancing was sought. Moreover, it 
"Although precise information in this connection is not available, it may reasonably be estimated that the public debt has come to 
represent between 80Ç? and 90'^ of the total external debt, reflecting the considerable incidence of the Government in the Venezuelan economy 
in both real and financial terms. The country's legislative framework, however, is extremely strict in so far as long-term credits are concerned, 
since borrower enterprises and bodies are required to comply with a lengthy and fairly rigid administrative process including official approval by 
the Controller of the Republic. In the case of short-term loans, on the other hand, the law is far more flexible, as a result of which the contracting 
of loans of one years duration, refinanced as they reach maturity, has been the form of indebtedness most resorted to by the decentralized public-
agencies. 
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became necessary at the outset to include in the public debt proper US$ 7 billion of external 
indebtedness contracted by public financial institutions (government banks and credit funds) which 
had been severely affected by the exodus of private capital and the domestic monetary and exchange 
crisis. In addition, the central government was compelled to assume responsibility for the debts of 
various enterprises owing overdue commitments, since they were State-owned or mixed enterprises 
or private firms backed by guarantees issued by public institutions9 (see table 21). 
The debt-maturity profile thus faced by the Government proved to be unmanageable, especially 
as almost three-quarters of the indebtedness contracted by public financial institutions was due for 
repayment in less than one year (see table 22). Had it not been possible to find an alternative solution, 
4 8 % of the total external public debt would have fallen due in 1983, involving amortization payments 
of US$ 13 500 million, or almost 90% of the value of total exports. 
Table 21 
VENEZUELA: STRUCTURE OF THE EXTERNAL PUBLIC DEBT, 
BY TYPE OF DEBTOR, 1983 
End-year balances in 
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Source: ECLAC, on the basis of statistics compiled by the Finance Ministry. 
"Owing to the different sources of information used, the totals do not tally exactly with those shown in table 20. 
Table 22 
VENEZUELA: PROFILE OF EXTERNAL PUBLIC DEBT MATURITIES 
Accumulated percentage at the end of each year 
1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 
Total external public debt 
Central government 
Public enterprises 






















Source: ECLAC, on the basis of statistics compiled by the Finance Ministry. 
''In its capacity as second guarantor, the Government had to assume responsibility in 1983 for commitments amounting toUSS 1 350 
million guaranteed by public bodies. Of this total, 44 % had been backed by guarantees issued by the Corporación Venezolana de Fomento -CVF 
(Venezuelan Development Corporation), and another 30% by the Banco Industrial de Venezuela-BIV (Industrial Bank of Venezuela), both of 
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Source: ECLAC, on the basis of statistics compiled by the Finance Ministry. 
"Owing to the different sources of information used, the totals do not tally exactly with those shown in table 20. 
The magnitude of this amount, together with the decreasing foreign currency availability, 
compelled the Venezuelan authorities in February 1983 to ask their creditors for a partial 
moratorium. By this means, the amortization payments corresponding to direct and indirect public 
external indebtedness contracted with commercial creditors were deferred. Payments corresponding 
to commitments with multilateral and bilateral financial bodies were not included in the moratorium, 
nor were the amortization payments on government bonds.10 However, due to the considerable 
concentration (90%) of the total debt in the commercial banks, the moratorium covered almost all 
the year's maturities (see table 23). 
The moratorium was periodically extended in the following months, pending the initiation of 
negotiations with a commercial bank advisory committee in order to rephase the debt in a manner 
more consistent with the country's payment capacity. At the close of the year, however, no agreement 
had yet been reached and the negotiations continued to come up against two main obstacles. Firstly, 
uncertainty continued throughout the period with regard to the future official economic-adjustment 
policy and, more specifically, concerning the foreign-exchange system that would be applied to 
payments relating to the servicing of the private external debt.11 
Secondly, the international banks repeatedly stipulated that all outstanding interest payments 
must be settled as a preliminary condition for any renegotiation arrangement. Although, in so far as 
the public debt was concerned, these overdue payments were reduced by half between May and 
December 1983, they still amounted at the end of the year to US$ 150 million, while overdue interest 
payments on the private debt rose in the meantime to US$ 400 million. 
4. Prices and wages 
a) Prices 
Prices rose moderately in 1983 despite the inflationary pressures that could reasonably be 
expected to derive from the devaluation, especially considering the high incidence of imports and 
exports in the Venezuelan economy. In fact, the consumer price index even showed some 
'"Neither was it necessary to resort to the Paris Club, since Venezuela has no direct debts with the governments of other countries. 
Finally, it is worth mentioning in this connection that the Government did not undertake to renegotiate the private external debt. 
11 As already mentioned, the Government did not include the private external debt in its refinancing programme. However, the 
exchange regulations introduced in February 1983 envisaged the possibility that commitments arising from that debt might benefit from the 
preferential exchange rate of 4.30 bolívares per dollar, provided that the corresponding repayment schedule were renegotiated for a minimum 
period of three years. The international banking system, for its part, insisted that in order to carry out these refinancing operations, the debt must 
be backed by a government guarantee. 
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deceleration, both in the Caracas metropolitan area and in most of the country's main cities.u The 7 % 
increment in that index in the capital city between December 1982 and December 1983 was the 
lowest in the past five years (see table 24 and figure 4). For the first time since 1979, however, it 
exceeded the variation between annual averages (6.3%), thereby reflecting a reversal of the 
slackening trend of retail prices prevailing since that year. The rate of growth of wholesale prices on a 
December-December basis, for its part, showed a marked acceleration, rising from 6% in 1982 to 
almost 11% in 1983 (see figure 5 and table 24). 
Among the factors responsible for the moderate expansion of domestic prices, one of the most 
decisive was the sluggishness of domestic economic activity, both in terms of production and credit. 
Due to their unusual size, the contractions of domestic demand and of private consumption (-17% 
and -7% respectively) had a considerable restraining effect on domestic prices. 
The consequences of this contraction of demand were compounded by the effects of the 
application of a price-control policy closely linked with the new foreign-exchange system. Thus, after 
freezing the prices of goods and services in the two months following the devaluation, the authorities 
established a more complex mechanism called the Sistema Administrado de Precios - SAP (Supervised 
Price System). This system, which covered the entire range of marketable products, operated in 
parallel with the differential exchange-rate system, and this also helped to limit domestic price 
increases. In particular, the maintenance throughout the year, for products classified as essential, of a 
preferential exchange rate at a level only half that prevailing in the free exchange market represented 
an indirect subsidy whose effect more than made up for the elimination of the direct subsidies 
formerly granted by the Government. 
These factors helped to limit increases in the prices of certain products. Thus, prices of services 
rose by only 4.5%, as did those of semi-durable goods,13 while those of clothing and footwear 
increased even less (35%). In the latter two cases the use of the large stocks of imported products 
accumulated in 1982 influenced these results. 
Table 24 
VENEZUELA: EVOLUTION OF DOMESTIC PRICES 
Consumer price index'' 
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Clothing 
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Source: Central Bank of Venezuela. 
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"With the exception of Valencia and Puerto La Cruz, where preliminary information revealed an acceleration of inflation in 1983. 
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Source: ECLAC, on the basis of information provided by the Central Bank of Venezuela. 
The prices of some other goods, however, rose more appreciably. In the first place, devaluation 
brought to bear relatively greater inflationary pressures on internationally tradeable goods than on 
non-tradeables, and because of the greater incidence of the former in the wholesale price index, this 
indicator (in contrast with previous years) showed significantly larger variations than those in the 
consumer-price index (see table 24). 
A further factor in this connection, and an additional consequence of the contraction of real 
incomes, was the greater concentration of family expenditure on consumer goods —a characteristic of 
which is their low income elasticity. Growing pressure was thus noted in the demand for agricultural 
products, the wholesale and retail prices of which rose considerably more than the average variation, 
i.e., by 21% and 11% respectively. 
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In the case of wholesale products, the higher prices of foodstuffs were the result of the 
suppression of some direct subsidies and of price increases authorized by the Government with a view 
to stimulating domestic production and avoiding supply shortages. The prices of locally-produced 
agricultural products consequently rose by more than 19% and were largely responsible for the 11 % 
increase recorded in the prices of national products 
The agricultural component in the prices of imported goods also rose substantially (by 16%), 
and its impact was compounded by that deriving from increments in the prices of tobacco and 
beverages (86%) and of chemical and pharmaceutical products (14%). These inflationary pressures 
were offset, however, by very moderate variations (5 % on average) in the other components, because 
of the already-mentioned use of accumulated inventories and the prevalence of severely depressed 
demand. The prices of imported goods consequently did not reflect the full effects of the devaluation 
and tended to rise in a manner very similar to those of national products (see table 24 and figure 5). 
Figure 5 
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Source: ECLAC, on the basis of house huid surveys carried out by the Central Statistics and Information Off ice (OCEI) and statistics compiled by 
the Central Planning and Co-ordination Office (CORDIPLAN). 
"First half year. In activities other than agriculture (except exports). As from 1982 the figures refer to the Federal District only. 
b) Wages and incomes 
In spite of the deceleration of inflation, real incomes contracted significantly in the year under 
review. As a result of the lower levels of economic activity and employment, average family incomes 
even diminished in nominal terms, while their real value was 17% lower than that recorded four 
years earlier (see table 25). 
Although exact information in this connection is not available, the drop in the participation 
rate would seem to justify the assumption that average per capita income contracted to an even 
greater extent, due to the lower average number of persons employed in each family group. 
Real wages in the modern sector of the economy showed less severe contractions, due basically 
to the greater degree of organization of the work force in these activities, where collective bargaining 
procedures are prevalent. Public employees, in particular, succeeded in obtaining wage adjustments 
higher than the rate of inflation during the year, which helped to limit to only 0.3 % the contraction of 
real wages in the non-manual class as a whole. Manual workers' wages, on the other hand, fell by 3 % 
in real terms (see table 25). 
5. Monetary and fiscal policy 
a) Monetary policy 
As was to be expected, the modification of the foreign-exchange system had a significant effect 
on the country's domestic monetary aggregates, two clearly different periods being discernible in the 
evolution of these variables. 
In the first period (from the beginning of the year to 18 February 1983), the contractive trends 
already noted in the preceding year became more marked. The monetary base contracted by 2%, so 
that it barely exceeded its 1980 level, while the exodus of private capital continued with exceptional 
vigour (see table 26). 
This contraction of the means of payment was attributable primarily to the persistent 
stagnation of foreign-currency inflows, which, until 1981, had supported the expansion of both fiscal 
expenditure and the money supply. In order to counteract this negative factor, other forms of 
injection of money through fiscal channels were resorted to at the beginning of 1983- Thus, Treasury 
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bills amounting to 3 500 million bolívares were placed with the Central Bank in January and were 
followed by the use of more than 100 million bolívares deposited by the Treasury in the same Bank 
(see table 26). 
This increase of fiscal expenditure failed, however, to have an expansive effect on the domestic 
monetary variables, since monetary liquidity (M2) showed a decline of 2% in the first two months of 
the year, while money in circulation (M,) contracted by 6% (see table 27). Although part of this 
contraction may be attributed to seasonal factors, the main determinant in this direction was the 
growth of demand for foreign exchange on the part of the public, either for speculative purposes or 
due merely to lack of confidence in national economic prospects. Current account deposits proved in 
practice to be an important source of financing for these foreign exchange operations, as a result of 
which these deposits contracted by 4% during the period. 
In order to limit this channelling of the money supply towards the exterior, the Central Bank 
decided to abandon its expansive domestic credit policy applied since September 1982. It 
consequently reduced by more than 30% the balance of rediscounts and advances granted to the 
financial system, thereby provoking a contraction of almost 1 % in the volume of credit transactions 
carried out by the commercial banks (see table 28). 
Although this measure became an additional factor of contraction of the money supply, it failed 
to reduce significantly the exodus of private capital. Thus, by the end of the seventh week of the year, 
foreign exchange movements between the financial system and the Central Bank showed a negative 
balance of more than US$ 2 800 million, which went a long way towards explaining the fall of more 
than US$ 1 400 million in the net international reserves of the Central Bank in the same period (see 
table 26). The establishment at the end of February of a multiple foreign-exchange system 
—bringing to an end 18 years of unrestricted exchange freedom combined with a single fixed 
exchange parity— naturally had a marked influence on the evolution of the monetary variables. It also 
Table 26 
VENEZUELA: COMPOSITION OF THE MONETARY BASE 









of other assets 








3. Monetary base ( 1 - 2 ) 
Source: Cenrral Bank of Venezuela. 
"Preliminary figures. Including the accounts of Petróleos de Venezuela, the Venezuelan Investment Fund and other special deposits. 
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Balances at end of period „ , 
(billions of bolívares) 
1983" 
1983° Feb. Dec. Dec. 
1979 1980 1981 1982 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983/ 1983/ 1983/ 
Feb Dec Dec Feb Dec 
1982 1983 1982 
40.6 38.4 47.8 48.5 46.0 64.0 21.5 -5.3 24.4 1.3 -5.2 39.1 32.1 
32.9 30.0 37.0 43.2 38.1 48.4 20.6 -9.0 23.5 16.9 -11.9 27.2 12.1 
0.9 0.3 0.3 3.2 3.4 2.1 76.6 -62.7 9.9 778.4 6.7 -37.4 -33.2 
2.9 2.9 1.5 5.4 3.8 1.9 11.5 -1.5 -47.5 256.4 -30.5 -50.2 -71.0 
3.9 5.2 9.0 -3.3 0.7 11.6 29.0 36.7 70.5 
15.3 11.2 16.2 20.1 17.7 24.4 38.7 -26.7 44.4 23.9 -11.7 37.9 21.6 
6.0 2.1 4.3 3.2 2.2 1.0 128.0 -64.3 102.0 -25.7 -33.2 -50.7 -67.1 
3.4 3.1 4.2 3.8 4.3 5.5 32.8 -8.6 35.6 -8.1 11.4 28.3 43.0 
1.5 0.4 0.3 8.5 6.8 7.3 -34.1 -75.5 -2.8 1 833.3 -20.3 8.0 -13.9 
4.4 5.6 7.4 4.5 4.5 10.6 22.9 27.0 30.3 -24.6 - 32.8 32.8 
25.3 27.2 31.6 28.4 27.6 39.6 13.0 7.6 16.2 -10.3 -2.0 43.3 39.5 
VENEZUELA 
Table 27 
VENEZUELA: EVOLUTION OF THE MEANS OF PAYMENT 
Total means of payments (M,) 
Current account deposits 




Monetary liquidity (M2) 
Mortgage bonds 




Public preference for 
money in circulation' 
Multipliers: 
Money in circulation 
Liquidity* 
Balances of end of period 





























































































































Source: Central Bank of Venezuela. 
"Preliminary figures. Monetary liquidity (M2) comprises money in circulation (M() plus quasi-money. 'Expanded Liquidity 
(M,) comprises monetary liquidity (M¿) plus mortgage bonds. Relation between currency outside banks (including private-sector 
sight deposits in the Central Bank) and monetary liquidity. 'Relation between money in circulation and monetary 
Liquidity. Relation between money in circulation and the monetaty base. * Relation between monetary liquidity and the 
monetary base. 
induced a radical change in Central Bank policy which, from May onwards, placed less emphasis on 
the maintenance of external equilibrium and more on the revival of domestic credit. With the aim of 
expanding the money supply and at the same time favouring a decline in interest rates, the Central 
Bank reduced its rediscount rate from 13% to 11% and liberalized to a certain extent the procedures 
relating to these operations. 
The effects of all these changes on the monetary variables were, however, contradictory. On the 
one hand, the foreign exchange restrictions completely halted the outflow of monetary resources, 
provoking a marked increase in deposits by the public in the banking system and a sharp recovery in 
monetary liquidity (see tables 26,27 and 28). This reversal of the trend, however, failed to bring about 
either a reduction in the cost of money or a revival of activity in the credit market. 
Between March and December 1983, monetary liquidity (M2) expanded by approximately 30%, 
reaching a level of 163 800 million bolívares at the year's end (27% more than in December 1982). 
Within its components, both money in circulation (M[) quasi-money increased appreciably, by 39% 
and 24% respectively. A more significant development, however, was the increase of money in 
circulation, since it contrasted with the drop of 8% recorded in 1982 and the further 6% decline in the 
period January-February 1983 (see table 27). This reversal of the trend was mainly the result of a 
considerable expansion of demand deposits, which rose by 43% in this second period, and by 38% in 
the whole year —the highest such rate registered in the last five years. 
The 24% increase of quasi-money in comparison with December 1982, for its part, was due to 
increases both in time and savings deposits (26% and 22% respectively). Of particular significance 
was the growth of savings deposits, in view of the declining trend they had shown prior to February 
1983. 
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This evolution in the structure of deposits reflected a certain preference on the part of the 
public to maintain assets capable of rapid conversion into liquid resources. The coefficient of public 
preference for ready money thus increased by 7%, thereby reversing the declining trend observed in 
this respect in recent years. The monetary multipliers contracted, however, on account of a certain 
stagnation in the capacity of the financial system to increase liquidity through the medium of the 
monetary base (see table 27). 
The growth of the monetary aggregates between March and December 1983 was consequently 
mainly due to the expansion of primary money issues, which increased by more than 43 % in relation 
to their February level and almost 40% compared with December 1982 (see table 26). 
One factor that influenced this evolution was the establishment of the differential foreign-
exchange system and the suspension of foreign-debt service payments. As a result of these measures, 
the international reserves became a source of monetary expansion, since they increased by 27% 
between March and December and ended the year at a level 12% higher than in December 1982. 
However, a factor that influenced the expansion of money even more was the maintenance of a 
high level of fiscal expenditure, as reflected in the contraction of 51% between March and December 
in the deposits held in the account of the Treasury. The decline in these deposits for the whole year 
came to 67%. The monetary effects of this contraction were compounded by those generated by a new 
issue of Treasury securities amounting to 3 500 million bolívares, which were acquired by the Central 
Bank in April and paid for through the monetization of the accounting proceeds deriving from the 
revaluation of monetary gold in 1982.M 
However, despite the above-mentioned measures of relaxation in monetary policy, the 
evolution of the domestic credit granted by the Central Bank continued to contribute to the 
contraction of the monetary base, since it decreased by 50% in this second period, thereby completing 
a contraction of 71% in the whole year. 
As far as the commercial banking system was concerned, this lower demand for Central Bank 
credit was partly attributable to the considerable growth (27%) of deposits received between March 
and December, while the level of loans granted remained almost static, rising by only 3% (see 
table 28). The consequent accumulation of bank reserves caused an unprecedented expansion in 
surplus reserve funds, which increased by a factor of 13 during this period and to a large extent 
neutralized the expansive incidence of monetary policy. 
The high level of bank reserves also prevented the Central Bank rediscount rate from acting as 
the governing variable in market rates. The latter showed little downward flexibility and, although 
rates on deposits fell slightly at the end of the year, rates on loans continued at high levels throughout 
the period, thereby restricting the effective demand for credit. 
Several factors contributed to the maintenance of high interest rates. To begin with, there were 
the growing financial difficulties experienced by some enterprises as a consequence of the depressed 
level of real economic activity." These difficulties, in their turn, induced a more cautious attitude on 
the part of the banks and a consequent increase in the risk component of the interest rate. Uncertainty 
as to future developments in the foreign-exchange market was a further contributory factor in this 
connection. For the latter reason, and also because of the slowness of operation of the new differential 
foreign-exchange system, a considerable proportion of the banks' resources was held in reserve for 
the possible purchase of the foreign currency needed to meet external commitments, and 
consequently it could not be used to increase the supply of domestic credit. Finally, the high 
profitability of foreign-exchange transactions, which was well above the interest rate obtainable on 
local loans, encouraged the maintenance of a greater proportion of idle liquid resources and their 
diversion to the exchange market. 
The preference of the public for highly liquid resources had an unfavourable effect on activity in 
the rest of the financial system. Although the total resources attracted by the institutions specializing 
in mortgage financing grew by 15%, there was simultaneously a substantial increase in the 
dependence of these financial intermediaries on short-term resources. Savings certificates thus came 
to account for more than 40% of deposit receipts in the mortgage-financing system by the end of 
1983 after having amounted to only 33% one year before and to 12% at the end of 1980. Meanwhile, 
HThe first issue had been acquired in January by the commercial banking system, in partial substitution of the required legal reserves. 
"This situation was reflected in a significant increase in overdue commitments and those subject to legal collection proceedings, the 
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Source: Central Bank of Venezuela. 
"Preliminary figures. Includes mortgage banks and savings and loan associations. 
and in spite of the assistance made available in this respect by the Central Bank,16 the participation of 
longer-term instruments —particularly of mortgage bonds— continued to contract (see table 28). 
The total value of loans granted for the building or purchase of dwellings consequently rose by only 
10%, while their relative dependence on official financial assistance increased (60% of these loans 
were issued under the State subsidy system). 
The situation of the finance companies in 1983 was even more unfavourable. On the one hand, 
the increase of 76% in their short-term receipts barely compensated for the contraction of 20% in 
"In the first nine months of 1983 the Central Bank acquired mortgage bunds to the extent of 750 million bolívares. 
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their time-deposit holdings, as a result of which the total volume of resources attracted by this system 
rose by only 3%. The decline of 4% in the amount of credit granted by them, for its part, was due to 
their being affected to a greater extent than the rest of the financial system by the lower demand for 
credit, since these companies were traditionally more closely linked with transactions involving 
external payments (foreign tourism, motor-vehicle purchases, etc.). Finally, the high level of overdue 
commitments in the overall credit portfolio of some finance companies caused acute cash squeezes 
and in some instances made necessary the intervention of the Superintendency of Banks. 
b) Fiscal policy 
Fiscal management continued to face severely restrictive conditions in 1983 owing to the 
continuing decline of revenues from the main tax categories since the previous year. 
Table 29 
VENEZUELA: CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INCOME AND EXPENDITURE 
1. Current income 
Petroleum revenue 
Income tax 
Indirect domestic tax on 
petroleum products 
Royalties 




Other non-tax income 




On external indebtedness 
On domestic indebtedness 
Other current expenditure 
3. Current savings (1-2) 
4. Capital expenditure 
Real investment 
Other capital expenses 
5. Total expenditure (2 + 4) 
6. Surplus or deficit (1-5) 
7. Financing of deficit 
Domestic financing 
Central Bank 
Sale of securities 
Amortization 























































































































































































































































































VENEZUELA: SOME INDICATORS RELATING TO FISCAL ADMINISTRATION 
1970 1975 1980 1981 1982 1983° 
Income from the petroleum industry/ 
current income 60.8 78.1 73-1 65.1 60.0 56.2 
Indirect income from the petroleum industry/ 
total indirect income 
Customs revenue/ indirect tax income 
Interest payments/current expenditure 
Current savings/capital expenditure 
Fiscal deficit/total expenditure 
Income from the petroleum industry/GDP 
Non-petroleum tax revenues/GDP 
Total expenditure/GDP 
Fiscal deficit/GDP 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of information from the Central Bank of Venezuela. 
"Preliminary figures. 
Income from the petroleum industry —by far the largest source of fiscal revenues— continued 
to be restrained by the depressed international energy scene, while additional contractive factors were 
the decisions adopted by OPEC at its extraordinary meeting in March 1983. The resulting lower 
volumes of production and exports and lower average selling prices caused a drop of 17% in official 
revenues from oil-industry income, thereby aggravating the already substantial contraction of 25% 
that had taken place in 1982 (see table 29). 
This contraction was only compensated toa very slight extent by an increase of 50% in revenue 
from the domestic tax on petroleum-product consumption. Total oil-industry revenues consequently 
dropped by 14% and, even in nominal terms, failed to reach the level recorded in 1980, while their 
participation in the gross domestic product fell to 14%: a figure only slightly higher than that 
recorded in 1970 (see table 30). 
At the same time, the contraction of other fiscal revenue sources was made more acute by the 
stagnating domestic economic situation and, to a certain extent, by the foreign-exchange measures 
instituted in February 1983. The latter particularly affected Customs receipts, which fell by 42% to 
their lowest level of the last four years. Other tax revenues also declined appreciably (by 37% and 
20% in the case of indirect and direct taxes, respectively). 
The fiscal effects of the foreign-exchange measures nevertheless had a positive aspect in view 
of the substantial profits accumulated by the Central Bank in its foreign-currency transactions. As a 
result of a foreign-exchange agreement signed in June 1983, the Central Bank delivered to the 
Government 10 500 million bolívares on this account. This amount was greater than that deriving 
from direct tax revenues other than from the petroleum sector, and enabled a considerable 
proportion of the drop in tax revenues to be offset, so that current central government income only 
decreased by 8% in 1983-
In these circumstances, an attempt was made to restrict fiscal expenses. This policy mainly 
affected capital expenditure, which fell by approximately 25% in the year, mostly as the result of a 
severe reduction (-45%) in government transfers to decentralized public agencies. 
Current expenses, for their part, dropped by only a little over 1 %. The effect of the contractive 
measures was concentrated on financial subsidies, the amount of which decreased by 46%. The 
impact of this considerable saving was however completely offset by a large increase in interest 
payments, which represented almost a quarter of current government expenditure (see table 30). 
The total amount of this expenditure was, moreover, much greater than that originally budgeted, 
since the Government had to assume the debt service commitments of some decentralized public 
agencies which had fallen into arrears. Interest payments on the domestic debt therefore increased 
more than threefold in this period. 
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As a consequence of the foregoing, current savings fell by a quarter in 1983 after a 40% decline^ 
in the preceding year. They were only sufficient to cover 88% of capital expenditure, with the result 
that the fiscal financial year closed with a deficit of 25 billion bolívares. This amount was nevertheless 
30% less than in 1982, so that the incidence of the fiscal deficit as a proportion of the gross domestic 
product decreased slightly (see tables 29 and 30). 
Despite this decrease in its financing needs, the fiscal authorities had to face a decidedly 
unfavourable financial market in 1983. On the one hand, external loans —which in previous years 
had usually covered all, or almost all, of the deficit— fell by 90% compared with the preceding year 
and only covered 16% of the 1983 fiscal financial deficit. At the same time, although the moratorium 
declared in Februaray 1983 made it possible to reduce the amortization payments on the external debt 
by 25 %, these outgoings were still nearly ten times as much as the loan disbursements received from 
abroad, with the result that a negative flow of 3 600 million bolívares was recorded in the year's 
operations (see table 29). 
Amortization payments on the domestic debt, for their part, almost doubled owing largely to 
the inclusion in the central government budget of some payments normally corresponding to 
decentralized agencies. In order to cover these outgoings, the issue of public bonds to the value of 
1 600 million bolívares and of Treasury bills for 7 billion bolívares was resorted to. The difficulties of 
placing these issues in the domestic financial market, however, meant that it was only possible to 
obtain 1 300 million bolívares from this source. The central government budget therefore continued 
to show a large financial deficit, which had to be covered by the Central Bank through the 
monetization of the revaluation of its gold reserves. 
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